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I rely on data from 31,754 electoral districts in the United States from 1834 until 2016 to explore how the nationalization of politics occurs within districts. I argue that in the early stages of the American democracy local concerns were more prominent in the distant districts from the capital city than in the nearby districts, and therefore the number of parties was greater in the former than in the latter. However, these differences vanished after the New Deal, when authority was centralized. Nationalization reduced the number of parties everywhere, but above all in the most distant district from Washington, D.C.

Data de publicació electrònica: 28 de març de 2023 Objective: Although there is a huge literature examining how diversity affects group performance, an important limitation is the lack of evidence at the employee level. This article tries to fill this gap. We focus on professional football given the high ethnic diversity of football squads, the nonexistence of language barriers to hire players, and the granularity of data. Methods: Relying on data from 1528 professional footballers joining a new club in the 2021–2022 season in five European countries, we run ordinary least squares cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by club. Results: We find that ethnic backgrounds do not make a difference in the performance of professional football players in their new clubs. However, newcomer players with a different ethnic background than natives in their new clubs do better the younger they are and when subgroup imbalance in the squad is high. Conclusion: Our results support the approach integrating the social categorization and the information/decision-making perspectives. From the players’ recruitment or renovation perspective, our results can help managers and coaches to make correct recruitment decisions.

The conditions under which women's national football teams do better or worse in international tournaments remains an open question. Using data from 116 countries worldwide, we have examined three arguments accounting for the gender gap in international football success, focusing on positive externalities from economic development and women's empowerment, and the active policies promoting women's football. Our findings show that the international performance of women's national football teams compared to men's national football teams increases with women's empowerment and in countries committed to the promotion of women's football, while economic development is not relevant. The general question we address is whether gender gaps disappear because of economic and social development, or if active policies promoting women are required to achieve gender equality.

With the recent rise of populism in the developed world, the division between large cities and rural areas is in the spotlight as never before. This article explores the effect of the urban–rural divide on satisfaction with democracy in 27 European countries. I argue that individuals living in rural areas are less satisfied with the way democracy works, in particular, in those countries more affected by rural depopulation. Using data from approximately 35,000 respondents to the European Social Survey, I demonstrate that there is a “geography of discontent” when accounting for citizen satisfaction with democracy. Specifically, I find that individuals living in rural areas show lower levels of satisfaction than do those in urban areas. Moreover, there is an interaction between the geographical distribution of population and the area where a person lives. Individuals in rural areas tend to be less satisfied with democracy when the country exhibits a higher degree of urbanization. The hypotheses are examined through single-country linear regressions and multilevel models.

This chapter examines the factors that shape voting behaviour in Portugal. It is structured in three stages. The first stage provides an overview of the determinants of voting behaviour, in particular the impact of voters’ long- and short-term predispositions when it comes to elections. The second stage explores the correlates of voting behaviour in the 2019 Portuguese election using data from the corresponding National Election Study. Findings illustrate the relevance of variables that increase the homogeneity of voting behaviour across districts, namely the role of the economy and party leader ratings. Finally, the chapter examines the degree of nationalization of electoral politics in Portugal in comparative perspective. It aims to clarify the question of why Portugal is the country in the European Union with the most homogenous party system across districts, when the electoral system offers very strong incentives for heterogeneous electoral results.

This article examines whether household size affects economic voting. We argue when individuals are asked about national economic conditions and their personal financial situation that moderate or mid-range responses are more likely in multi-person households than in one-person households. The aggregation of personal economic evaluations within households reduces the variation in economic opinions across household members. As a result, it is harder for an individual to say that the national economic conditions and her personal financial situation are good or bad as the number of household members increases. Using individual-level data from the American National Election Studies from 1966 to 2016, the authors find that both evaluations of the national economy and personal economic conditions are endogenous to household size. The aggregate, state-level evidence from five presidential elections in the U.S. shows that the impact of the economy on the incumbent support increases the larger the number of one-person households. Ignacio Lago acknowledges support from the Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant number AEI/FEDER CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P) and ICREA under the ICREA Academia program.

Data de publicació electrónica: 17-03-2021 This paper explores an alternative mechanism for understanding the drivers of the nomination of women for elective office in single-member electoral systems. Previous research has generally examined two sources of gender-based politics: party ideology, with leftist parties being more female-friendly than rightist parties, and the strategic nomination of candidates depending on whether the party is expected to win or lose in the district, with women more likely to be used as ‘sacrificial lambs’ in hopeless contests. We argue that the nomination of male and female candidates across districts reflects an interdependence of party strategies – in particular, the actions of the main opposition party. We hypothesise that when the trailing party is not committed to gender equality, its equilibrium strategy in a given district is the nomination of a candidate of the same gender as that of the front-running party. Secondary data from 1,017 single-member Australian districts and more than 2,000 candidates from 2001–2019 confirm our hypothesis. We acknowledge support from the Australian Research Council Discovery Project [Grant Number: DP190101978], the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [Grant number: CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P (AEI/FEDER)], and ICREA, under the ICREA Academia programme.

Objectives The current study offers the first systematic analysis of the impact of citizens’ interest in and perceptions of specific elections on gender differences in turnout. Methods Using an Internet panel survey conducted by the Making Electoral Democracy Work project covering the 2013 state, 2013 federal, and 2014 European elections in Bavaria (Germany), our probit models examine mediation and moderation effects of three election-related characteristics: the issues that citizens consider most central in the elections, citizens’ interest in the elections, and the perceived influence among citizens of the policies of the different levels of policy making on their well-being. Results The results indicate an overall gender difference in turnout in Bavaria with women being less likely to vote compared with men. Yet, this gender effect ceases to be significant once citizens’ attitudes toward and perceptions of specific elections are controlled for. Interest in the election at hand has a particularly strong and positive effect on the likelihood of voting. We find no significant gender interactions. Conclusion Citizens' interest in and perceptions of specific elections have a strong impact on turnout and gender differences therein. Ignacio Lago acknowledges support from the Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant number AEI/FEDER CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P) and ICREA under the ICREA Academia program.

This article revisits the foundations of prior research on the effects of plebiscitarian selection mechanisms on candidates' electoral strength. While previous studies do not nest political parties' decision making, the authors argue that party primary effects entail the interdependence of party procedures for candidate selection. The article assesses the validity of the two approaches. Using original data from seven parties and 296 regional elections in Canada, Germany and Spain, and from sixty-two pre-election polls in Germany and Spain, it shows that, other things equal, primary-selected candidates are not stronger than those selected by other procedures. However, there is evidence of a penalty for parties that do not select candidates by primary when their main rival does, in particular when the primary election is not divisive and is held closer to the general election. We acknowledge support from the Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant number AEI/FEDER CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P), the Catalan Institut for Self-government Studies (IEA), and the ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.

The general question addressed in this special issue of Regional Studies is whether the Great Recession of 2008 affected the political consensus about decentralization and the conventional wisdom a...

Data de publicació electrònica: 20 de juny de 2022 While electoral reforms clearly affect how seats are (re)distributed among parties immediately after their adoption, they do not significantly change the (re)distribution of votes among parties. As political knowledge is positively related to turnout, we argue that the effect of majoritarian electoral reforms on the number of parties is contingent upon the turnout in the last election prior to the reform. Specifically, the lower the turnout level in the previous election, the more effective the majoritarian reform will be. However, the psychological effect of proportional reforms relies on the interplay between elites and voters and is highly uncertain. The argument is tested using aggregated data from 43 major electoral reforms worldwide from 1945 to 2020 and individual data from the first election held in New Zealand after the 1993 electoral reform.

En este artículo se examina el sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas en España desde la economía y la ciencia política. Tras definir los principios básicos del federalismo fiscal y su relación con las preferencias políticas de los ciudadanos, discutimos los problemas del modelo vigente y sus posibles reformas en tres escenarios de federalismo débil, moderado y potente. El sistema de financiación autonómico en España se compara con el de cuatro países federales: Alemania, Canadá, EE. UU. y Suiza. Se adopta una perspectiva propositiva dirigida a la formulación de recomendaciones políticas.

There is perennial debate in comparative politics about electoral institutions, but what characterizes this debate is the lack of consideration for citizens’ perspective. In this paper, we report the results of an original survey conducted on representative samples in 15 West European countries ( N = 15,414). We implemented an original instrument to elicit respondents’ views by asking them to rate “real but blind” electoral outcomes. With this survey instrument, we aimed to elicit principled rather than partisan preferences regarding the kind of electoral outcomes that citizens think is good for democracy. We find that West Europeans do not clearly endorse a majoritarian or proportional vision of democracy. They tend to focus on aspects of the government rather than parliament when they pass a judgment. They want a majority government that has few parties and enjoys wide popular support. Finally, we find only small differences between citizens of different countries., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Voting early allows people to vote at the time that is most convenient to them. In this study, we examine whether early voting reduces satisfaction with vote choice. Using unique individual-level data from 16 surveys in national and regional elections in 4 countries and more than 15,000 voters, we show that early voters, particularly those who are less informed, are slightly less satisfied with their vote choice than those who vote on Election Day. Ignacio Lago acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [grant number CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P (AEI/FEDER, UE)] and ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.

A new theoretical development for examining the institutionalization of party systems is proposed in this article. We build on electoral coordination theories to disaggregate volatility into the vote transfers that occur between or towards parties that are in equilibrium (which we call endogenous volatility) and those that are not (exogenous volatility). The former captures accountability, and the latter reflects the number of voters who are not acting in accordance with the existing equilibrium in the party system. Exogenous volatility measures the institutionalization of party systems. We also show that endogenous volatility depends on government performance, while exogenous volatility is a function of institutional openness. The empirical evidence comes from an original data set that includes 448 electoral cycles in lower-house elections in 66 countries between 1977 and 2011. This work was supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad of Spain under the research project CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P and ICREA.

Electoral rules are a crucial institutional factor shaping the entry and success of new parties. However, testing how they affect voting behavior is problematic when using observational data in cross-national studies. As district magnitude is usually correlated with politically salient features affecting the likelihood of voting for new (and small) parties, the latent support of small parties differs across electoral systems. Using a quasi-experimental design in Spain focused on the district viability of a new party, Vox, in two elections held within 196 days, I provide a more robust estimate of the impact of electoral systems on the success of new parties. Strong evidence that the electoral system makes a difference for new parties has been identified: strategic considerations found in the districts where Vox was not successful prevented a significant number of voters from supporting the party. I acknowledge support from the Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant number AEI/FEDER CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P), and the ICREA under the ICREA Academia program.

While there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence on the impact of soccer wins on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, there is relatively little hard empirical evidence. It is expected that soccer stimulates more positive attitudes towards immigrants when it highlights immigration benefits rather than costs and increases exposure to famous members of an out-group. Individual-level data from the eight rounds of the European Social Survey (2002–16) in Spain and aggregate data from the Spanish professional soccer league, La Liga, were used to test the hypothesis that the more foreign players in the team of the club winning the corresponding season of Spain’s La Liga, the more favourable the views of immigrants in the club’s region in that year. The empirical evidence from linear and ordinal regression using different measures of opinions on immigration shows that soccer can affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The authors acknowledge support from the Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant numbers AEI/FEDER CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P and DEP2016- 75785-R) and the Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA).

This article examines the forces shaping changes in the number of parties between consecutive elections. We argue that the transaction costs in electoral coordination depend on the turnout level in the previous election. The greater the number of peripheral voters entering the electorate, the less likely a substantial change in the distribution of partisan support in the subsequent election. The argument is tested using data for 313 parliamentary elections in 63 countries from 1990 to 2011, and two cases studies of countries using compulsory voting (the Netherlands and Australia). We acknowledge support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [Grant number CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P (AEI/FEDER], ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme, and the Australian Research Council Discovery Project [Grant number DP190101978].

This handbook examines Spanish politics and government since the transition to democracy. The volume studies the political history, institutional changes, bureaucratic decision-making, political behaviour, and foreign affairs of Spain. The introductory chapter provides an overview of the main themes of democratic Spain and discusses the end of Spanish exceptionalism. It also introduces Spanish politics to an international audience of scholars and practitioners to be considered either in its own right or as a case among others in a comparative perspective. The driving force of the handbook is to move away from complacent analysis of Spanish democracy and provide a nuanced view of some of its strengths and challenges. The introduction also explains the rationale for the volume and outlines its organization and themes.

Objectives. This article relies on data from 20,730 matches in 30 national soccer leagues in Europeto explore the determinants of penalties taken in elite soccer. Methods. We run OLS cross-sectionalregressions using aggregated data. Results. We find that the variation in the number of penaltiesgiven across European soccer leagues is largely explained by the individualism versus collectivismdimension. Conclusions. The more (less) collectivistic (individualistic) the culture of the country,the more likely soccer players are to fall intentionally in the penalty area to increase the chances ofa foul being called. The authors acknowl-edge support from the Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities (grant number AEI/FEDERCSO2017-85024-C2-1-P) and ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.

We argue that decentralization of economic and political power makes a substantial difference in football. We demonstrate, with analyses of 35 European democratic countries over the period 1950–2010, that regional autonomy boosts the competition among clubs from different regions and results in a greater competitive balance of domestic football leagues. This first-moment effect creates an advantage for clubs from decentralized countries in international competitions. Evidence from the first 18 editions of the UEFA Champions League shows that clubs from decentralized countries have a greater chance of winning, or at least playing in the final, than those from centralized countries.

The Making Electoral Democracy Work project conducted a unique survey prior to the election held on 21 December 2017 in exceptional circumstances in Catalonia. In spite of a series of major events in fall 2017, overall election results were similar to those of the previous regional election, held in 2015. In addition to standard demographic, attitudinal, and vote choice questions, the survey included novel questions on identity, support for independence, perceptions of corruption, and acceptance of the result by losers. The data will be particularly useful to scholars seeking to assess the impact of long- and short-term factors on vote choice in such unusual circumstances, the crystallisation of public opinion, and voters’ willingness to accept that their side lost the election.

Social fractionalisation has been omitted in most influential cross-sectional studies on turnout, and when it has been included, evidence is, at best, mixed. This article addresses this gap from two perspectives. First, using aggregated data from 22 countries we show that turnout is inversely related to ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, even after controlling for institutional, political and socioeconomic determinants. Second, we rely on data from elections in two multilingual territories, Catalonia and Quebec, to examine both the direct and indirect causal mechanisms for which voting and the sense of duty of vote are affected by the individuals’ aversion to the opposite ethnicity and the relative size of ethnicities. Analyses show that those relatively more averse to mixing with others who are different to themselves have a lower propensity to vote and are less likely to construe voting as a civic duty when they belong to the minority group.

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between migrating soccer players and the annual ranking of the national teams according to the World Football Elo Rating. The sample includes annual data for 243 countries over the period 1994–2018. Migration is captured with the number of migrating players by country in the “big-five” leagues. The causal relationship between the two variables is examined by using Granger causality test. Four control variables are included: the political regime, per capita income, population, and regional soccer confederations. It was hypothesized that (i) the better the ranking of the national teams in the Elo rating, the higher the number of migrating players in the “big-five” leagues (shop-window hypotheses) and that (ii) while the shop-window effect takes place in the short-run, the annual Elo rating of a national team is positively affected by expatriate players in the medium or long-run, but not in the short-run (blending hypotheses). The results shed light on two crucial issues. First, causality mainly goes from national soccer performance to migrating soccer players rather than the other way around. Second, the timing of the two effects is quite different. While those players giving an outstanding performance when their national team is doing well are immediately bought by clubs from more highly ranked leagues (the shop-window effect), it takes at least 4 years for the additional skills acquired by migrated players to have a positive effect on the national soccer performance (the blending effect). The authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant No. DEP2016-75785-R, AEI/FEDER CSO2017-85024-C2-2-P, AEI/FEDER CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P) and ICREA under the ICREA Academia Programme.

Understanding the multi-physics phenomena associated with blade dynamics constitutes a fundamental factor for the continuous development of wind-turbine technology and the optimization of the efficiency of wind farms. Large size differences between wind-tunnel models and full scale prototypes preclude the proper extrapolation of experimental data, especially when several coupled physical phenomena are acting simultaneously; thus the need of an advanced Virtual Test Environment where innovative designs could be tested at reasonable computational cost.We present a novel approach that we call the Dynamic Rotor Deformation - Blade Element Momentum model (DRD-BEM), which effectively takes into account the effects of the complex deformation modes of the rotor structure mentioned above. It is based on a combination of two advanced numerical schemes: First, a model of the structural response of composite blades, which allows full representation of the complex modes of blade deformation at a reduced computational cost; and second, a novel aerodynamic momentum model where all the velocities, forces, and geometrical features involved are transformed by orthogonal matrices representing the instantaneous deformed configuration, which fully incorporates the effects of rotor deformation into the computation of aerodynamic loads.Results of validation cases for the NREL-5MW Wind Reference Turbine are presented and discussed. Fil: Ponta, Fernando Luis. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos Fil: Otero, Alejandro Daniel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Centro de Simulación Computacional para Aplicaciones Tecnológicas; Argentina. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ingeniería; Argentina Fil: Lago, Lucas Ignacio. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos Fil: Rajan, Anurag. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos

Objectives This article relies on data from two samples of 47 and 49 European countries from 1950 through 2011 and 1,980 and 1,960 football domestic leagues, respectively, to explore to what extent political regimes affect the competitive balance in domestic football (soccer) leagues. Methods We run OLS cross-sectional regressions comparing democracies and nondemocracies and pooled cross-sectional time-series analyses conducted on the 13 countries that have experienced a transition to democracy after 1950. Results We find that the percentage of league competitions won by the most successful club in the country is substantially lower in democracies than in nondemocracies. Democratic transitions trigger pressures to increase the competitive balance in football leagues. Conclusions The link between nondemocracies and specific teams breaks when a country experiences a transition to democracy and the economic liberalization that takes place in transitions to democracy disperses resources and generates competition among descending and ascending teams.

Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project, we measure the level of gerrymandering according to country expert surveys in Lower House elections in 54 democracies from the second half of 2012 until the first half of 2015. We show that majoritarian systems are more prone to gerrymandering than mixed-member and above all in Proportional Representation (PR) systems. When majoritarian systems are employed in large countries, gerrymandering is exacerbated. Per capita GDP and the age of electoral systems do not significantly affect gerrymandering.

The conditions under which losers are willing to challenge the results of elections remain an open question. Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project for 66 democratic and non-democratic countries in 2012 and 2013, we measure how parties or candidates react once votes have been cast and one of them is declared the winner. Do they accept or challenge the results? This measure allows us to examine the causal mechanisms that account for the self-enforcing nature of democracies. Our findings show that losers’ consent increases with free and fair elections and in more economically developed countries, while income inequality is not relevant. Additionally, the impact of free and fair elections is particularly important in more economically developed countries.

This paper explores how the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within countries is affected by the level of economic and political decentralization. It relies on aggregate data from 3796 districts in 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in two consecutive national elections before and after the Great Recession to show that the more influential regional policies are for individuals’ well-being, the more uniform are electoral swings across districts. This causal mechanism accounting for the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is examined with Internet panel surveys from national elections in Canada and Spain. Ignacio Lago acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [grant number CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P1 (AEI/FEDER, UE)] and the ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.

To get a sense of the institutional variation across the three countries and six regions, this chapter discusses the electoral rules, regime types, and party systems in the given cases. The party systems vary in the extent to which they are nationalized, with some countries having important differences at the subnational level, such as regional parties that compete in a single region, and other countries having party systems that look similar across multiple arenas. To put the elections studied in context, the chapter also discusses the political and economic situation facing citizens of the different regions during the period under analysis. The analyses cover a period of financial stress in these countries, though variation is seen in how much different countries, and regions within countries, suffered from the global financial crisis that began shortly before the study. Parties and voters are expected to vary accordingly in their reaction to the crisis.

Existing accounts of multi-level elections focus on voters rather than on political parties, but the multi-level arrangement also affects party strategies. Party elites base their voter mobilization strategies in part on the features of each electoral arena, and make decisions about how to allocate their resources across these arenas accordingly. Small parties, in particular, focus their mobilization efforts on electoral arenas in which the electoral rules are more permissive, so that the parties have a better chance of winning seats. This chapter shows that larger or more nationalized parties tend to make different choices with respect to what kind of potential voters they attempt to mobilize, and for which kind of election, compared with smaller, under-resourced, or regionally based parties.

This chapter argues that individual voting behaviour and the strategies chosen by political parties across multiple electoral arenas should be considered jointly. Existing literature points to the importance of an election as a major driving force in voting behaviour, but it is argued that voters and parties may differ in their assessments of the importance of elections at different levels. The chapter discusses how the effect of the importance of an electoral arena, for both voter and party behaviour, will be conditioned by electoral institutions and characteristics of parties and the party system, in addition to individual voter characteristics contributing to it.

The existing framework for explaining variation in voter turnout and vote choice across multiple levels of government is more useful for addressing aggregate patterns than for addressing micro-level behaviour. To better understand the aggregate outcomes of interest, this chapter proposes an examination of individual voter behaviour and strategies of party elites that take account of the incentives provided by multiple electoral arenas. In doing so, the chapter investigates the variation in both party and voter behaviour that is often overlooked in existing work. In the presence of multiple electoral arenas, the behaviour of both party elites and voters in one arena is affected by what happens in another. The decisions of party elites and voters are shaped by the incentive structure that is produced by the combination of multiple arenas with different electoral rules.

This chapter develops and tests hypotheses about the implications of different kinds of strategic behaviour on the part of voters at the individual, regional, and party levels. Whereas some voters try to avoid wasting their vote on unviable parties, others deviate from their preferred small party to make it more likely that the more preferred of the large parties can assume the prime ministership in a potential government. Some voters deviate from their most preferred party in order to balance the overall direction of policies by having ideologically different governments at different levels of governance. Overall, the chapter cautions against a naïve approach that assumes that voters are voting strategically if they vote for different parties in different levels of election, because the electoral context, election campaigns, the number and the type of parties that compete in each election are different.

Voters face different incentives to turn out to vote in one electoral arena versus another. Although turnout is lowest in European elections, it is found that the turnout is only slightly lower in regional than in national elections. Standard accounts suggest that the importance of an election, in terms of the policy-making power of the body to be elected, drives variation in turnout across elections at different levels. This chapter argues that this is only part of the story, and that voter attachment to a particular level also matters. Not all voters feel connected to each electoral arena in the same way. Although for some, their identity and the issues they most care about are linked to politics at the national level, for others, the regional or European level may offer the political community and political issues that most resonate with them.

The goal of this book has been to examine in detail the micro mechanisms underlying the aggregate patterns described by the second-order election model commonly used to study multi-level elections. The book builds on existing work showing that the incentives provided by multiple arenas affect political behaviour and show that these effects are heterogeneous across parties and voters and across regions and countries. Multi-level governance complicates the study of elections but it also creates greater variation, and this variation allows richer theories about party and voter behaviour to be tested. As the importance of electoral arenas beyond the national level increases across ever more countries, it is imperative that those theories help us to understand the implications not just for parties and voters but for the quality of electoral democracy.

In this research note, I revisit the conventional wisdom about when the psychological effect of electoral systems is observed. I rely on data from the first presidential and legislative elections in 45 third- and fourth-wave presidential and semi-presidential regimes to show that the psychological effect of electoral systems manifests itself in the first election. The effective number of legislative parties is significantly higher than the effective number of presidential candidates in the first election when the electoral system in legislative elections is more permissive than in presidential elections. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad of Spain under the research project CSO2013-40723-C2-1-R.

One of the technological challenges in wind power is the development of a next generation of feasible upscaled turbines of cheaper construction that may further reduce generation costs. But limitations in the current blade technology constitute a technological barrier that needs to be overcome. As the size of the typical turbine increases, savings in weight and complexity in the rotor design and its auxiliary mechanisms, like the pitch-control actuators, become more important. The notion of smart or intelligent advanced blades that can control themselves and reduce (or completely eliminate) the need of an active control system is a very attractive prospect for future developments in blade technology. The idea of wind turbine rotors which automatically adapt to the meteorological and working conditions is not entirely new. It has been around for the last two or three decades, and several control systems have been proposed to achieve this goal using either a purely-passive or a combination of active-passive means. Blade adaptiveness can be achieved by means of inducing coupling among modes of deformation of the blade which are usually only slightly coupled. For instance, coupling between bending and twisting can be used to control power production, to reduce vibration and extreme loads, and to improve fatigue performance. In this case, as aerodynamic loads begin to bend the blade, flexo-torsional modes induce a twist. This changes the angle of attack on the airfoil sections, reducing the lift force acting on the blade. In this paper, we are going to review different aspects of the adaptive-blade concept development, covering a historical overview, recent advances, and future trends. Fil: Ponta, Fernando Luis. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos Fil: Otero, Alejandro Daniel. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina Fil: Rajan, Anurag. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos Fil: Lago, Lucas Ignacio. Michigan Technological University; Estados Unidos

Objectives This article examines whether voters look to the past or the future when forming their perceptions of the parties’ chances of winning. Methods We use OLS regression models to analyze panel survey data from the districts where the incumbent was defeated in the 2011 provincial election in Ontario (Canada). Results We find that voters’ expectations in the districts are mainly affected by the results of the upcoming election and not by the outcome of the previous election. We also find that expectations are influenced by the phenomenon of wishful thinking. Conclusions This study sheds light on how voters form their perceptions of the parties’ chances of winning.

In this paper, we propose a new measure of party system nationalization based on a minimalist definition of the phenomenon. A perfectly nationalized party system is a party system with only national parties or, in other words, without sub-national parties. Instead of the homogeneity of parties’ vote shares or the number of parties throughout the country, our measure captures the aspirations of parties to be national whose proxy is the proportion of districts (weighted by seats) that a party runs a candidate. The measure is compared with existing indicators through a longitudinal analysis of 256 elections in 18 Western European countries from 1945 to 1998.

Sistemas electorales y partidos políticos.Dieter Nohlen. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004.Cómo votamos. Los sistemas electorales del mundo: pasado, presentey futuro.Josep M. Colomer. Barcelona: Gedisa, 2004.

Este artículo estudia el número de partidos en las Comunidades Autónomas en Españaen el período 1980-2000 como el resultado de la combinación de la permisividad de lossistemas electorales y la heterogeneidad de las sociedades. Las diferencias en el númerode partidos entre las Comunidades no tienen tanto que ver con la permisividad de sussistemas electorales como con la presencia más o menos acentuada del cleavage nacionalo regional en cada Comunidad Autónoma. En todo caso, es la adición de estas dos variablesmás que su interacción multiplicativa el mejor predictor del número de competidoresen cada Comunidad. Es decir, una Comunidad Autónoma puede tener un número elevadode partidos si cuenta, sobre todo, con un cleavage regional activado por las elites políticaso si el sistema electoral es débil.

En este artículo se estudian los efectos de las campañas en las elecciones de 1993 y 2000en España a partir de una metodología basada en una simulación contrafáctica. Nos preguntamoscuáles hubieran sido los resultados electorales sin campañas. Nuestra evidenciaempírica sugiere que las campañas juegan un papel relevante tanto en la activación comoen la conversión de los votantes.

Objectives This article relies on data from two samples of 47 and 49 European countries from 1950 through 2011 and 1,980 and 1,960 football domestic leagues, respectively, to explore to what extent political regimes affect the competitive balance in domestic football (soccer) leagues. Methods We run OLS cross-sectional regressions comparing democracies and nondemocracies and pooled cross-sectional time-series analyses conducted on the 13 countries that have experienced a transition to democracy after 1950. Results We find that the percentage of league competitions won by the most successful club in the country is substantially lower in democracies than in nondemocracies. Democratic transitions trigger pressures to increase the competitive balance in football leagues. Conclusions The link between nondemocracies and specific teams breaks when a country experiences a transition to democracy and the economic liberalization that takes place in transitions to democracy disperses resources and generates competition among descending and ascending teams.

We examine the impact of the current economic crisis on the accuracy of responsibility attribution between levels of government within states. Using individual-level data from Spain, we show that learning about responsibility attribution depends on the saliency of the issue (in our study, unemployment) and economic self-interest. The (unintended) positive consequence of economic crisis is that citizens are now more able to accurately attribute the responsibility for political decisions than some years ago. Learning is particularly significant among those individuals more affected by the economic crisis. Nous analysons l'impact de la crise économique actuelle sur l'attribution de la responsabilité aux différents niveaux de gouvernements dans des États. Selon des données individuelles d'enquêtes espagnoles, nous démontrons que l'attribution correcte des responsabilités dépend de la prépondérance du sujet en question (dans notre étude, le chômage) et de l'intérêt économique de chacun. La conséquence (non intentionelle) de la crise économique est qu'aujourd'hui les citoyens sont capables d'attribuer de manière plus précise la responsabilité des décisions politiques qu'il y a quelques ans. L'apprentissage est encore plus grand entre les individus les plus touchés par la crise économique.

The literature on the nationalization of electoral politics focuses on the institutional characteristics of political regimes and the structure and organization of social cleavages. We argue that the nationalization of electoral politics is also driven by economic performance. Economic perturbations increase vote transfers from large (and highly nationalized) parties to small (and weakly nationalized) parties. Permissive electoral systems exacerbate the influence of economic performance on nationalization. Pooled cross-sectional time-series regression analysis is conducted on data from 43 countries and 475 elections between 1950 and 2012. The party-level mechanisms are shown through a closer look at Austria, Portugal and Ireland. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Minister of Economy and Competitiveness (CSO2013-40723-C2-1-R and CSO2013-47023-C2-2-R).