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In recent years, the European labour market has undergone a radical change. In addition to part-time, fixed-term and agency work (the original ‘atypical’ contracts), new casual forms of employment have become more prevalent such as zero-hours contracts, employee sharing, ICT-based mobile work, interim management, portfolio, crowd, and platform work. These new forms of employment have blurred the lines between dependent and independent work, leaving many individuals standing uncomfortably in the grey area between ‘employment’ and ‘self-employment’. On the one hand, these new working professionals (i.e., Uber drivers) do not satisfy the archetypical paradigm of subordinate employees working under open-ended contracts of employment for one principal throughout their lives. On the other, they are not entrepreneurs free to provide their services in the market in whatever way they please. Since they exhibit characteristics of both categories, their classification has become increasingly troublesome. Are all these quasi-subordinate individuals ‘self-employed persons-undertakings’ or are they ‘workers’? In other words, should they be captured by, or considered irrelevant to, EU labour and competition law provisions and how do we decide? This thesis responds to these challenges by coming up with a refined and detailed framework that would help judges and legislators classify working individuals. The originality of the thesis lies in its unique methodological approach of using tools and indicia that have been provided within the sphere of EU competition law to elucidate our understanding of who constitutes a modern-day ‘worker’. More particularly, instead of focusing on the notion of ‘subordination’ and the well-rehearsed debate on ‘worker vs self-employed status’, the thesis ventures into competition law to identify the instances when working persons can be said to be ‘integrated’ into their employers’ undertaking. In the competition law field, the ECJ has drawn an explicit jurisprudential parallel between the categories of ‘agents’ and ‘workers’, specifying the criteria that need to be present for an ‘agent’ to be integrated into his/her principal’s undertaking in the same way that a ‘worker’ is integrated into his/her employer’s business unit. The thesis draws on the voluminous guidance and case law that has been provided in the EU competition law ‘agency’ field on the instances when an ‘agent’ is in a comparable position to a ‘worker’ (from an integration point of view) and uses it as a starting point for the development of a refined and detailed framework for distinguishing between integrated ‘workers’ and unintegrated ‘self-employed persons-undertakings’ in the EU competition law field. It then brings the proposed framework into other areas of EU law that rely on the same concept of ‘worker’. Overall, this doctoral thesis adds to the existing literature by providing an up-to-date, refined account of the basic characteristics of integrated working activity that would support a broader and more holistic conception of ‘worker’. If adopted, the proposed framework can act as a blueprint in the hands of EU judges and legislators in their attempts to classify working individuals who are engaged in complex, casual forms of work. On a domestic level, national legislators would have to provide explicit reasons for depriving certain categories of the working population of labour and social protections when the latter have been proven to share the same characteristics of integration as archetypical workers. This would allow for a larger number of people to be able to take advantage of favourable EU and national labour and social protection legislation and to engage in collective bargaining. Finally, even though definitions may differ for the purposes of tax law, undoubtedly, a robust labour and competition law ‘worker’ conceptualisation can have cross-field implications for both individuals and the State itself., Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC DTP studentship); Cambridge Trust (Cambridge European Scholarship); Onassis Foundation (Onassis Scholarship)

European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(3), 1325-1337, European Forum Insight of 11 February 2022, I. Introduction. - II. The economic entity's liability for damages under EU competition law. - II.1 The very existence of the economic unit as a basis for (civil) liability. - II.2. Conditions for determining the responsible economic unit. - II.3. Extension of liability to further companies of the same economic unit. - III. The subsidiary as defendant in damage claims for EU competition law infringements. - III.1. Framework for the exercise of the subsidiary's rights of defence. - III.2. Civil procedural implications of the EC's findings in administrative proceedings. - IV. Joint and several liability of the legal entities of the economic unit. - IV.1. Financial risks of the joint and several liability for shareholders. - IV.2. The internal allocation of the debt for the payment of damages. - V. Conclusion., The judgment of the Court of Justice in the Sumal ECLI:EU:C:2021:800 case charts new territory in the application of the concept of the "economic unit" in EU competition law. In addition to the established principles regarding the liability of the economic unit for fines imposed by the European Commission, the Court has found that the concept may also serve as a basis for damage claims against a subsidiary of a parent company that has been found to infringe EU competition law. The application of these principles regarding the liability of a subsidiary for its parent's conduct warrants an adjustment of the criteria that determine the existence of the single economic unit. In the case of downward liability, the exercise of decisive influence of the parent company over the subsidiary is not enough. Additionally, to establish a uniform market conduct the subsidiary needs to be involved in the specific economic activity of the economic unit. Based on this new judgment, victims of infringements of EU competition law will no longer be limited to bringing actions for damages against those companies punished by the Commission. They may also hold liable any subsidiary of the parent company belonging to same economic unit - even though it is not named in the Commission's decision - and may benefit from the binding effect of this decision, joint and several liability, and additional fora.

Gun-jumping and EU merger control Abstract This thesis deals with the issue of gun-jumping under the EU Merger Regulation. On the EU level of competition law, gun-jumping is an infringement of the obligation to notify a concentration and the obligation not to implement such concentration before receiving Commission's clearance. Gun-jumping was, for a long time, a marginal and undeveloped topic within the context of EU competition law. However, over the years, the Commission has significantly tightened its grip over the undertakings that do not respect the basic principles of EU merger control procedures and imposed heavy penalties for such infringements. Over the last few years, gun-jumping has thus become one of the leading issues within the EU competition law. This thesis sets the objective to examine the evolution of the gun-jumping enforcement on the EU level. Furthermore, it aims to identify the various types of gun-jumping conduct from the undertakings' point of view and their subsequent assessment by the Commission. Finally, the thesis also seeks to identify the problematic and unclear areas of gun-jumping and the possible clarifications to be made by the Commission. To achieve these objectives, the author researches the academic literature on gun-jumping and examines the decision-making practice of...

The purpose of this paper is to research how effectively EU competition law and the Digital Markets Act address abuse of dominance by Big Tech within digital markets. The possibility that existing competition rules are underenforced or enforced ineffectively in digital markets creates an environment that favours the increase of market power of a few market players and the foreclosure of digital markets to new entrants, thus reducing competition to the detriment of consumers. In the absence of effective regulation in digital markets, it is crucial that new solutions are found to promote competition in these markets.

European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(2), 627-639, European Forum Insight of 17 October 2022, I. Introduction. - II. Background. - II.1. The European Commission Decision. - II.2. The 2014 General Court judgment in Intel. - II.3. The Intel judgment of the Court of Justice. - III. The 2022 General Court decision in Intel. - IV. Critical analysis and further discussion. - V. Conclusion., The latest judgment of the General Court in the Intel case annulled the EU Commission's decision from 2009 imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel for abusing its dominant position by offering fidelity rebate schemes (case T‑286/09 Intel v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2022:19). The judgment reaffirms the application of an "effects-based" approach which requires careful economic analysis in order to establish the abusive nature of fidelity rebates. The judgment demonstrates that the presumption that fidelity rebates are restrictions of competition by object can be rebutted by the dominant company. It also clarifies that the as efficient competitor (AEC) test is not an indispensable part of the assessment in examining the foreclosure capability of all rebate systems but can be a relevant factor where the Commission has carried it out as part of its assessment of the anticompetitive effects of the rebate schemes. This Insight seeks to examine how this clarification can be translated into concrete lessons not only for future cases but also for other cases dealing with similar issues (i.e. the Qualcomm and Google Shopping cases) and, in particular, the significance of the AEC test as a specific tool to evaluate the anticompetitive effects of fidelity rebates. The Insight concludes that the recent judgment leaves more questions than answers regarding the application of the AEC test, and that it can be seen as signalling the demise of the application of this test for future cases.

Sellers in oligopolistic markets can cooperate in ways that diverge from the orthodox vision of competition. It is a bigger issue, however, that there are also deviations in vision between competition law and economics on some basic categories. Foremost among these is the grey zone between two of the practices this thesis studies: tacit collusion and concerted practices. The two disciplines’ divergent interpretations of the interaction between sellers permeate the canon of enforcement practice, case law, and academic thinking. In more clear-cut instances, like cartels, this underlying divergence is inconsequential. However, the more ambivalent the practice, the more glaring the divergence becomes. Blind spots ensue because the two disciplines look at the problem from different angles. Using the prism of natural and artifical transparency, this thesis explores these blind spots, which feature throughout the history of competition law but appear to be expanding as technology and the means of interaction evolve from human intution to artificial intelligence (“AI”). Novel forms of coordination may expand the scope of tacit collusion. Here, the competition toolkit will likely prove adaptable. Yet, as long as human actors remain involved in the process, certain social codes and mutual perceptions of the market and will continue to enhance transparency in ways that competition law struggles to categorise. These social and economic vagaries of human interaction necessarily elude clean binary categorisations between the permissible and the impermissible.

In February 2019, the Executive Committee of the Czech Ice Hockey Association (CIHA) decided to create a new junior hockey competition, the Junior League of Academies, beginning in September 2019. As a result, a few clubs were administratively excluded from the highest junior competition. Three of the five excluded clubs decided to initiate arbitration proceedings. After the failure of arbitration, the clubs filed a lawsuit in the Czech civil court seeking the annulment of the decision of the CIHA to expel them from the competition. This article analyses the actions of CIHA from the perspective of EU competition law. It assesses whether the CIHA’s exclusion of clubs from the new league may violate Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. For this purpose, the article uses the methodological approach adopted by the Court in Meca-Medina. Although in general, in accordance with EU law and EU law policy, the organization of competitions and the setting of sporting rules fall within the competence of sports associations, these competences are not unlimited. Sports rules have to be set up in advance based on the transparent process of sports governing body in accordance with good governance principles. If the procedure of adopting sporting rules is not in accordance with the principles of good governance, it cannot be considered inherent and proportionate and as such it may be found contrary to the Article 101 or 102 TFEU.

application/pdf, On 18 July 2018, European Commission issued a violation decision in respect of Google’s Android based on abuses of market dominant position as provided by Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. European Commission has accordingly imposed fines amounting to €4,34 billion. In this article, based on the full text of the decision in this case, I would like to focus on the following three points and summarize the arguments. First, what is the Google’s Android business model? Second, what are the contents of the three Agreements that Google required device manufacturers, etc. to sign the Anti-Fragmentation Agreements, the Mobile Application Distribution Agreements and Portfolio-based revenue share agreements? Third, why did European Commission distinguish between the market for licensable operating systems（mainly Google’s Android OS）and the market for vertically integrated operating systems（mainly Apple’s iOS）as two separate markets in finding market definition or market dominance? And what impact did the indirect network effects as recognized in the Microsoft cases have in the deliberation of this decision?

espanolEste estudio investiga la modalidad deontica, la categoria gramatical a traves de la cual los textos legales expresan principalmente obligacion y permiso, en un corpus bilingue ingles-griego compuesto por textos legislativos relacionados con el Derecho de la Competencia de la Union Europea (UE). Mas concretamente, el estudio parte del debate de Biel sobre la modalidad deontica, es decir, la obligacion deontica y el permiso deontico (Biel 2014: 158). El analisis de los datos es principalmente cuantitativo, si bien se ha recurrido a un analisis cualitativo a pequena escala cuando ha sido necesario. Los resultados del estudio se comparan con las directrices especificas propuestas por las instituciones de la UE para ingles y griego, es decir, la Guia practica comun del Parlamento Europeo, del Consejo y de la Comision para la redaccion de textos legislativos de la Union Europea (2015), la Guia de estilo de traduccion del ingles: un manual para autores y traductores en la Comision Europea (2018) y la Guia de estilo de traduccion del griego: un manual para autores y traductores en la Comision Europea (n.d.), asi como con los de estudios anteriores sobre textos de naturaleza legislativa. EnglishThis study investigates deontic modality, the grammatical category through which legal texts express mainly obligation and permission, in an English-Greek bilingual corpus composed of legislative texts related to European Union (EU) Competition Law. More specifically, the study is based on Biel’s discussion on deontic modality, i.e. deontic obligation and deontic permission (Biel 2014: 158). The analysis of the data is mainly quantitative, while a small-scale qualitative analysis is also carried out when necessary. The results of the study are compared with the specific guidelines proposed by the EU Institutions for English and Greek, i.e. the Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of European Union legislation (2015), the English Style Guide: A handbook for authors and translators in the European Commission for English (2018) and the Greek Style Guide: A handbook for authors and translators in the European Commission for Greek (n.d.), as well as with those of earlier studies on legislative texts.

Although e-commerce is relatively new, it has been the cornerstone of international trade in the modern world. Broadly, e-commerce can be described as the process of buying, selling or exchanging any kinds of products, services and information via electronic channels. The economy is one of the areas directly affected by e-commerce, and as a result of this significant impact, the concept of the digital economy has emerged. It is complicated to define the concept of the digital economy as it continues to expand in scope day by day; however, its impact can broadly be experienced in many different fields. To set an example, the occurrence of the digital economy has already caused many significant changes in many areas, such as the examination of competition issues in the markets. It has significant effects on current EU competition law understanding, and it is evident that it will continue to form future prosperity. Therefore, this article aims to explain the general dynamics of the digital economy and digital markets as an important issue being discussed in EU competition law., E-ticaret her ne kadar görece yeni bir kavram olsa da, modern dünyada uluslararası ticaretin temel taşı olmuştur. Genel olarak e-ticaret, her türlü ürün, hizmet ve bilginin elektronik kanallar aracılığıyla satın alınması, satılması veya değiş tokuş edilmesi süreci olarak tanımlanabilir. Ekonomi, e-ticaretten doğrudan etkilenen alanlardan biridir ve bu önemli etkinin bir sonucu olarak dijital ekonomi kavramı ortaya çıkmıştır. Dijital ekonomi kavramını tanımlamak gün geçtikçe kapsamı genişlemeye devam etmesi sebebiyle oldukça güçtür; ancak etkisi birçok farklı alanda geniş ölçüde deneyimlenebilir. Örnek vermek gerekirse, dijital ekonominin ortaya çıkması, piyasalardaki rekabet konularının incelenmesi gibi birçok alanda şimdiden birçok önemli değişikliğe neden olmuştur. Mevcut Avrupa Birliği rekabet hukuku anlayışı üzerinde önemli etkileri vardır ve gelecekte de refahı oluşturmaya devam edeceği açıktır. Bu nedenle bu makale, AB rekabet hukukunda tartışılan önemli bir konu olarak dijital ekonominin ve dijital pazarların genel dinamiklerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Article 6 (2) of the Constitution of Georgia recognises free competition as the basis of the economic order in the country. Defining the content of the constitutional clauses regarding economic competition and determining positive and negative obligations of the state deriving from the constitution usually give rise to significant practical and theoretical challenges. Preceding paper aims to establish proper theoretical grounds to overcome abovementioned legal obstacles. Based on the best western experience and scientific approaches, it defines the scope of the state’s positive and negative obligations concerning free competition and competitive equality of undertakings. The paper also examines the teleological grounds of the constitutional provisions regarding free competition and its role in the process of assessment of the constitutionality of a legislative act related to economic competition. Moreover, the study discusses the functions of free competition with respect to freedom of enterprise and consumers’ rights, and it identifies the relevant legal values as well.

In recent years, the EU competition framework has been under strain because of the increasing market interconnectivity. Criticisms have raised regarding the EU competition enforcement model. In response, institutional debate and measures have focused on the enhancement of fairness in this area of EU law. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, another source of ‘fairness’ in the enforcement of EU competition law is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 47 of the EU Charter is the most invoked provision in the context of EU competition litigation. Considered to reaffirm the EU general principle of effective judicial protection, this article constitutionalises the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. Although the existing literature has highlighted the overall influence of fundamental rights in the enforcement of competition law, the contribution of Article 47 Charter, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in enhancing fairness in EU competition policies remains, so far, underexplored. The current paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by offering a threefold input. First, the paper situates the discussion on fairness in EU competition law in the broader philosophical debate regarding various conception(s) of fairness. Second, the paper analyses the case law of the EU Court of Justice on Article 47 of the EU Charter in EU competition litigation. Finally, the paper discusses what kind of ‘fairness’ Article 47 strengthens in the area of EU competition law enforcement., Market and Competition Law Review, v. 4 n. 2 (2020)

This article contributes to the debate on how collective agreements can enhance social security from the perspective of unpaid care work. It defines the risk of giving up employment in favour of unpaid care as a social security risk (the care risk). It analyses how collective agreements in the EU can address this risk without compromising gender equality. The analysis is conducted with a focus on analysing the risks emerging from European Union law on a regulatory practice yet to emerge: the inclusion of institutional (child) care provisions in collective agreements. The article concludes that it is disruptive for innovative collective bargaining strategies if interpreted from a standpoint focusing merely on economic integration. Occupational Social Security, Work-Life Balance, EU Competition Law, Collectively Agreed (Child) Care Institutions, European Union, EU Law

The present contribution addresses the excessive amount of discretion left to the EU Commission (and Courts) in defining the enforcement priorities in the field of EU State aid Law, by singling out one element of the (inherently vague) the notion of State aid, namely the effect on trade between member States. The approach taken by the Commission’s practice and the ECJ case law in this field ends up building a rather unpredictable legal framework. This risks unreasonably undermining both member States’ legislative choices in fields not necessarily falling under an EU competence, and undertakings’ legitimate expectations.

The European Commission is looking for new ways of enforcing EU competition law faster to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust intervention. Against this context, this article explores a tool that is already at the Commission’s disposal: interim measures. These allow the Commission to intervene quickly in those markets where anticompetitive harm must be addressed as soon as possible. The antitrust community generally encourages the Commission to use this tool more frequently. However, there is room to think about how to make interim measures sharper. For this purpose, the article first studies whether there are some necessary changes to make to overcome obstacles that may be impeding the Commission from using interim measures; and, second, it explores aspects that can be reformed to enhance the effectiveness of this instrument. The article concludes that, while there is no need to make any fundamental change for the Commission to resort to interim measures, there is space to introduce some reforms in three aspects: the standard of “irreparable damage”, the notion of victims, and the procedure. For each of them, this article offers two options for reform drawing from the experience of other jurisdictions.

The paper addresses the issue of excessive price abuse under Article 102(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by drawing inspiration from a recent stream of cases (developed first at the national and then at the EU level) involving pharmaceutical companies marketing off-patent drugs. In particular, the two ‘most advanced’ cases are analysed:Aspenin Italy andPfizer/Flynnin the United Kingdom. This new-found attention towards exploitative practices in the form of excessive and unfair pricing by dominant undertakings that have traditionally been subject to a cautious antitrust scrutiny seems worth exploring for a number of reasons, as illustrated in the paper. Ultimately, it is argued that this further ‘interference’ of competition law into the realms of regulation may be actually justified, albeit subject to precise conditions for enforcement, and may pursue policy objectives in the wider context of EU health law.

This article studies the private enforcement conducted in Visita v Booking from the perspective of the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law. This case concerned the question whether the narrow MFN clauses maintained by Booking were contrary to Article 101 TFEU and could therefore be prohibited by a Swedish court. The focus of this article is placed on the assessment carried out by the Swedish courts to determine whether the MFN clauses were restrictive of competition by effect and on the standard of proof attached to the claimant in this regard. With regard to the interaction between public and private enforcement, Visita v. Booking is viewed as an illustration of the increased complexity of competition policy, in particular were novel practices are at issue.

Antitrust scholars have always wondered what makes competition law systems succeed and what makes them fail, or falter. Particularly interesting, and somewhat rare, are studies where insights are gained empirically, usually from interviews with key stakeholders. Maciej Bernatt’s book, Populism and Antitrust: The Illiberal Influence of Populist Government on the Competition Law System, is one of the most recent contributions to the field of institutional antitrust, building on such empirical insights. One of the most prominent scholars of competition law in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Bernatt is Associate Professor at the University of Warsaw, and Director of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (CARS). He is also Editor-in-Chief of the Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (YARS), the leading CEE academic journal focused on competition law issues. In the book, Bernatt uses empirical findings from Poland and Hungary to propose a new theoretical framework aimed at better measuring and understanding the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems, addressing both challenges at the competition authority level and at the level of the judiciary. The book was published in 2022 by Cambridge University Press in their series on global competition law and economics policy, edited by Ioannis Lianos (University College London), Thomas Cheng (The University of Hong Kong), Simon Roberts (University of Johannesburg), Maarten Pieter Schinkel (Universiteit van Amsterdam), and Maurice Stucke (University of Tennessee). The book, totalling some 270 pages, is structured in four parts. In the first, titled ‘Background: populism, democracy, economy’, Bernatt sets the scene by discussing the broader context and showing the implications populism has on democracy and the economy. The heart of the book is the second part, titled ‘Populist influence on competition law systems’, where he examines the influence of populism on competition law systems both by systematically discussing his empirical findings and by laying out his original theoretical framework. The third part, ‘A regional system’, is crucial for Bernatt’s analysis of the actual (and potential) EU response to populist-related challenges to competition law development in Hungary and Poland. The fourth part gives the final diagnosis and prospects.

Today many companies are collecting and extracting data from different sources to help them with their strategic decision-making. Big data is the basis of data-driven economy, bringing significant competitive advantage and market power to companies who are able to harness and exploit its potential. Digital transformation of markets and economy challenges the existing structures of consumer protection, data protection and competition law. Data is a commodity and a strategic asset. Traditionally, data issues are part of data protection law. However, given their possible effect on the competitive structure of the market, the use of big data and its underlying technology requires the involvement of competition regulators as well. A huge amount of data can reveal information about consumers’ behaviour and preferences, and companies are keen on harvesting and monetising this data. This is quite evident in the multi-sided platforms where on the one side of the platform there is monetary payment, and on the other side the users are paying with their data. The use of algorithms may lead to dominant position and possible abuses, as critical mass of data collected can lead to competitive advantage. The paper will examine the possible application of Article 102 TFEU on the disputes over access to data. It will scrutinize some examples of anticompetitive practices though accumulation of big data. The idea is to try to bridge the gap between competition and data protection law.

This research considers the role of EU Private International Law (EU PIL) in the development of the private enforcement mechanism for Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This mechanism refers to actions before national courts seeking, most commonly, compensation for harm caused by infringements of these Treaty provisions. The thesis starts from the assumption that the EU PIL instruments are indispensable for the enforcement of EU competition law claims. Of particular importance are the PIL rules on allocation of jurisdiction, and, identifying the applicable law. This is because EU competition law applies only to behaviour capable of affecting competition in the internal market and trade between Member States. Therefore, litigation based on EU competition law infringements typically (although not invariably) involves cross-border elements. It will be argued that the current EU competition law policy on the development of the private enforcement mechanism is too narrow, and, cannot ensure the full effectiveness of EU law. It argues that the role of the private enforcement mechanism is to complement the public mechanism towards ensuring the objective of detection and deterrence. On the basis of already published empirical evidence, this thesis will demonstrate, in order to unleash the full potential of the private mechanism to complement public enforcement, a complete private mechanism must be developed. It should address a full and varied menu of (EU) remedies alongside the remedy of damages. The thesis will focus on the role of EU PIL in supporting the development of a complete private enforcement mechanism in the shape of one that is capable of complementing public enforcement and of ensuring the full effectiveness of EU law. Given the time and word count limitations of this research, the analysis focuses primarily on the legal and jurisprudential developments in the context of actions for damages. The results of the analysis are far-reaching, and, allow this author to offer conclusions on the future role of EU PIL in the context of damages and non-damages remedies. The emerging conclusion is that the current EU PIL instruments are too rigid for the necessities of EU competition law litigation, and they apply only on account of the lack of more suitable rules. By examining the CJEU jurisprudence, the thesis will demonstrate the emergence of an EU civil law system which supersedes the scope of the substantive law identified by the PIL rules. This author proposes that all remedies which are necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law should be governed directly by EU civil law (as EU remedies). A general jurisdiction rule specific to EU competition law litigation should also be established. The role of EU PIL should be only to support transition to that ideal mechanism. If such a system cannot be achieved, or, if it is not desired upon further consideration, the current EU PIL instruments should, at least, accommodate the particular intricacies and necessities of EU competition law litigation. The thesis contributes to the literature by analysing the role of EU PIL rather than its practical application. While it clarifies the application of the current PIL rules, it aims, primarily to propose a new approach for EU PIL in competition law litigation. Under the proposed approach, EU PIL should play either not role in the long-term development of the private enforcement mechanism, or, play a much more limited role than was assumed at the outset of this research, and, in the pre-existing literature.

1 NEW APPROACHES TO ASSESSING ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION IN RELATION TO STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS IN EU COMPETITION LAW ABSTRACT The present thesis deals with the assessment of abuse of dominance in relation to a Standard- Essential Patents as a globally developing phenomenon of recent years. The assessment of abuse of dominance is examined in the context of EU competition law, in particular in the light of recent decision-making practice of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU. This thesis examines whether European competition law is close to finding a firm standard in assessing abuses of dominance by competitors who benefit from intellectual property rights from patents on standardised technology. This firm standard is specified in two ways. The first level is whether in EU competition law the unwillingness of the owner of the Standard-Essential Patent to license such a patent is considered as an abuse of a dominant position. On the second level, it analyses under which circumstances a negatory action brought by a Standard-Essential Patent owner against a licensee in bad faith can be considered as an abuse of his dominant position. In Chapter 2, the thesis introduces key concepts related to Standard-Essential Patents and standardisation. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the decision-making...

Analysis of the concrete-reinforcing cartel jugdments regarding the procedural aspects of EU competition law in readption cases : excessive duration of proceedings, non bis in idem principle and rights of the defence.

Analysis of the Qualcomm v European Commission judgment(T-235/18) regarding the application of the Intel test in exclusivity payments.

Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) test the ability of the existing EU legal framework for the protection of economic competition to regulate entities originating from the systemically different socialist market economy of today’s China. The question left unanswered so far is whether or not is the EU competition law sufficiently neutral and flexible to be universally applicable and able to encompass corporate structures guided and managed differently from its underlying assumptions. Thus, one of the main theses of the following analysis is that the key concepts of the undertaking and of the single economic unit under EU competition law do not correspond to the reality of Chinese SOEs. They cause difficulties of interpretation and, in particular, of application on Chinese SOEs and even could weaken the EU competition law ability to protect competition by standard procedures. To solve that puzzle for the EU competition law, the following text proposes that the Commission and the CJEU should opt for a different interpretation of the concept of undertaking / single economic unit for the purposes of SOEs ex-ante merger scrutiny on one hand, and their internal practices´ ex-post investigation and sanctions on the other.

European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(2), 987-1013, I. Introduction. - II. The road to the ECN+. - II.1. Regulation 1/2003. - II.2. Success and shortcomings of Regulation 1/2003. - II.3. Actions taken to address the shortcomings. - III. The ECN+ Directive. - III.1. Institutional security of NCAs. - III.2. Harmonised power to investigate and sanction. - III.3. Dissuasive fines. - III.4. Leniency pro-grams. - III.5. Mutual assistance. - IV. Decentralised cooperation as a role-model leading to an ever closer un-ion? - IV.1. Is the decentralised enforcement of competition law after the ECN+ to be considered as a well-functioning system? - IV.2. Can a decentralised enforcement system contribute to an ever closer union? - IV.3. Does the system under the ECN+ serve as a role-model for other areas, too? - V. Conclusion., Present Article deals with Directive 1/2019 which intends to harmonise public enforcement regimes of EU competition law in the Member States. The Directive does so by harmonising and complementing the existing decentralised system of competition law enforcement and empowering the competition authorities in the Member States to be more effective enforcers. In light of the overall topic "Shaping the Future of Europe", the Directive will be tested regarding its possibilities to contribute to more effectiveness, acceptance and ultimately deeper integration. It is concluded that the system complemented by Directive 1/2019 can overall be considered a success, multiplying enforcers and thus strengthening enforcement. With the preconditions of uniform - and uniformly interpreted - substantive law, well-equipped expert authorities as well as close cooperation within a network, it could, furthermore, even contribute to an ever closer union and serve as a role-model for other areas, too.

This poster is a visual summary of my PhD project "Ordoliberalism and EU Competition Law: a digital conceptual history" [Link], which I am currently completing at the Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory and Goethe University Frankfurt. The project was selected by the committee of the AG Digitale Geschichte and chosen for the poster pitch for the Peter Haber Prize at the Historikertag 2021 [Link].

La importancia del precio es indudable para los operadores del mercado. Ademas, los cambios que se llevan a cabo en un ordenamiento juridico pueden conllevar un impacto inesperado en los precios; por lo tanto, los reguladores deben ser especialmente cautelosos cuando disenan herramientas legales para evaluar la adecuacion a la legalidad de las practicas de fijacion de precios. Este estudio demuestra que de todas las ramas del ordenamiento juridico son el Derecho de la competencia y el Derecho fiscal las que tienen un mayor impacto sobre los precios que las empresas fijan en los mercados en los que operan. Por medio de un analisis comparativo de los mecanismos empleados por las autoridades administrativas de cada rama identifica las sinergias que favorecen que una aprenda de la experienciade la otra en materia de evaluacion de precios injustos

INTRODUCTION. The article examines the extent to which the Union’s internal market can be said to have been externalised, given the extraterritorial implications of the Union’s internal energy market rules and regulations. In this respect, the article investigates the exercise and control of EU regulatory power beyond EU borders by examining the crossborder reach of the Union’s regulatory power beyond its boundaries given its implications for Gazprom and Russia’s interests on the European market. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The article pursues a doctrinal approach to the research methodology which includes the internal dimension of the Union’s energy policy and the extent to which the Union’s internal market regulation has been externalised and imposed on its external energy relations with Russia – this includes a detailed analysis of: (i) the Third Energy Package (TEP)’s ownership unbundling rules; (ii) the Third Country Clause; and (iii) the Union’s Competition law (given the recent decision of the EU Competition investigation of Gazprom’s sales in Central and Eastern Europe). RESEARCH RESULTS. A fundamental aspect of the EU’s rule-based market approach, is the perception that a fully liberalised and competitive EU market can facilitate energy security by way of enhancing diversification of suppliers. As such, the TEPs’ ownership unbundling; the Third Country Clause; and the EU’s Competition law have become significant mechanisms in the Union’s toolbox of instruments to further its rule- based approach and market-based agenda for the purpose of ensuring European energy security. The article illustrates the Union’s sectoral application of the acquis beyond its borders in its efforts to export its liberalization model and Europeanise its energy corridors in pursuit of European security of energy supply. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The article reveals a fascinating dimension to the Union’s role as a global actor by analysing the Union’s normative agenda which it pursues through the export of its acquis and rule-based market approach which it imposes on third countries and its strategic energy partner, Russia. In undertaking this analysis, the article shows that the EU’s efforts to reform Russia’s energy markets through its liberalization movement and European model, suggest an external dimension to its internal market rules given the implications for Russia and Gazprom.

In this paper, the author explores the legal treatment of no challenge clauses in license agreements. In effect, these clauses prohibit a licensee to challenge the validity of intellectual property rights which are the subject matter of a license agreement for a specified period, usually within the duration of the contract. The author analyzes the legality of contracting the no challenge clause in license agreements from the aspect of European Union Competition Law, given the fact that there are still no positive legal norms governing this institute in Serbian competition law.

This article raises a number of theses in support for a more liberalised approach to EU Net Neutrality rules. It offers a graded system of levels of regulatory intervention, arguing that soft Net Neutrality rules are capable of meeting all positive objectives of regulation without causing the problems generated by hard Net Neutrality rules, such as those currently in place in the EU. Hard Net Neutrality rules prevent Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from making disruptive innovations. Meanwhile, they enable some Content and Application Providers (CAPs) to monopolise many markets via (disruptive) innovations, resulting in newly established dominant positions which have, in many instances, been abused. The hypothesis of the essay is that loosening the rules on Net Neutrality would create competition between ISPs and CAPs as well as (which is even more important) between different CAPs for limited premium speed traffic. Such newly established competition could remedy some antitrust conundrums faced by EU competition enforcers and sectorial regulators vis-à-vis disruptive innovators in the area of electronic communications. Resume Cet article soulève un certain nombre de thèses en faveur d’une approche plus libéralisée aux règles de l’UE concernant la neutralité du Net. Il offre un système progressif de niveaux d’intervention réglementaire, affirmant que des règles non contraignantes de la neutralité du Net sont en mesure de répondre à tous les objectifs positifs de la réglementation sans causer les problèmes engendrés par les règles contraignantes, telles que celles actuellement en vigueur dans l’UE. Les règles contraignantes de la neutralité du Net empêchent les fournisseurs de services Internet de développer des innovations perturbatrices. Dans le même temps, ils permettent à certains fournisseurs de contenus et d’applications de monopoliser nombreux marchés via des innovations (perturbatrices), donnant ainsi lieu à des nouvelles positions dominantes, qui ont souvent fait l’objet d’abus. L’hypothèse de l’article est que desserrant les règles sur la neutralité du Net créerait la concurrence entre les fournisseurs de services Internet et les fournisseurs des contenus et d’applications, ainsi que (ce qui est encore plus important) entre les différents fournisseurs des contenus et d’applications pour le trafic de vitesse limitée premium. Cette concurrence nouvellement établie pourrait remédier à certains problèmes de concurrence soulevés par les autorités de la concurrence de l’UE et les régulateurs sectoriels vis-à-vis des innovateurs perturbateurs dans le domaine des communications électroniques.

The paper presents four pillars of competition law that can be recognised in the European Union and Member States, namely EU competition law, national competition law sensu stricto, national competition law sensu largo and competition rules sensu largissimo. In order to demonstrate that this multi-faceted and complex system is able to work in an orderly manner, it is considered in relation to various concepts, particularly unity, uniformity and effectiveness. Nevertheless, the concept of unity serves as a focal point for the observations. The perspective of the EU single market plays a part also, enhancing the call for unity. With regard to discussed threats for unity, possible solutions are proposed in the final part of the article.

Distribution cartels in the automotive sector used to be frequently dismantled and sanctioned by the European Commission and the EU Courts still some 15 years ago. In recent years, however, only a few cases have been reported at the national level of EU Member States. Is it because the distribution of new cars really ceased to be a competition problem as the European Commission declared when it removed this part of the automotive business from the specific Block Exemption Regulation for the automotive sector in 2010? The purpose of the present analysis is first to inspect the car distribution cases that emerged in the EU after the year 2000 and, second, to speculate somewhat whether new forms of distribution, brought by the digitalization of marketing and sales, cannot bring about also new risks to cartel agreements and other types of distortions of competition in car sales.

Natural gas is one of the most frequent fuels in the European Union. Based on the specific features of the natural gas transportation (i.e. the need for pipelines), the market liberalization and subsequently the application of EU competition law in this sector have always been challenging. The purpose of this thesis is to consider the European gas supply contracts from the competition law aspects in order to find how the main anti-competitive arrangements in this sector could be addressed. In this way, the structure of the sales market is considered by the critical view to the European gas policies. The aim is to find the tools that EU policies could provide to deal with the anti-competitive concerns of the infringements and to what extent these preventive or punitive measures have been successful. Moreover, the outcomes of the research on the future gas sales agreements and the development of the European gas supply market is studied as well.

The submitted work concerns itself with the topic of protection of consumers and their welfare as an objective of the EU competition policy, as well as with the regulation of EU competition law and the way in which this objective has changed over time, both in fact and in legal perception. The first, theoretical, part of this thesis explains concepts essential for this analysis - the concept of "consumer" and its specifics in the context of the EU competition law, the definition of "consumer welfare" and the general relationship between consumer protection law and competition law. The second part deals with the historical development of consumer protection as an objective of EU competition policy. Particular attention is paid to the progress made in understanding the importance of this objective over time. An emphasis is placed on it in the political declarations of the Commission's representatives and subsequently, whether and how these political declarations and efforts were reflected in the actually adopted documents of competition law. This section therefore analyses the processes that formed the ideological basis for consumer protection under competition law and how they were reflected in formal sources of law. Although, at the doctrinal and political level, the parameter of consumer protection and...

Eiropas Komisija ir paudusi uzskatu, ka Eiropas Savienībā tiesību regulējumam ir jābūt vienādam, “likvidējot jebkādu mākslīgu nošķīrumu starp tradicionālo un digitālo tirgu”. Šis maģistra darbs pētī jautājumu, vai Eiropas konkurences tiesības paredz iespēju pierādīt aizliegtas vienošanās, karteļa esamību tad, ja tiek izmantoti viedie cenu algoritmi un nav pierādījumu par tradicionālu komunikāciju starp tirgus dalībniekiem. Analizējot judikatūru par LESD 101 (1) punktu, īpaši pievēršoties lietām, kurās pierādījumi vākti e-vidē, tiek secināts ar kādiem ierobežojumiem būtu jāsastopas izmeklējošajai iestādei, piemēram, EK, mēģinot pierādīt tāda karteļa esamību, kas darbojas uz algoritmu pamata. Secināts, ka ir atšķirība starp tradicionālo un ar algoritmu programmatūrām saistīto pierādījumu tiesiskajā nozīmībā un izmantojamībā., European Commission has expressed the goal that the EU legal regime should be the same “eliminating any artificial division between traditional and digital markets”. This Master Thesis explores the issue whether the EU competition law treats evidence of cartel agreements the same in both markets. The research question is set as follows: whether the standard of proof in the European Courts in cases where pricing algorithms are used to facilitate collusive agreements permits proving collusion without direct communication between competitors. After analysis of permissibility of evidence under Article 101 (1) TFEU and the relevant case law conclusions are drawn about limits that the EC is likely to encounter when trying to prove collusive agreements based on algorithmic evidence solely.

This paper analyses the legal and economic consequences of the change in the legal standard applied to self-preferencing under article 102 TFEU following Google Shopping.

Certain suppliers choose to distribute their products through commercial agents. Due to special features of this particular commercial relationship, for the purpose of EU competition law the agent is considered to form an integral part of supplier’s undertaking and as a consequence, the agreement between the two falls out of the scope of competition rules. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the importance of the EU competition law criteria for agency qualification and the existent ambiguities in that regard, with a view of providing a much-needed clarification in the context of online platforms. To this end, the authors first provide a brief overview of CJEU and EU Commission development related to agency agreements, followed by a comparative NCA’s analysis of the market-specific investments as the most critical agency criteria when it comes to online platforms business models. Finally, authors analyze the revisions of Vertical Guidelines proposed during the EU Commission’s evaluation of VBER. The authors argue that Vertical Guidelines should make a clear distinction between online platform’s investments that are specifically related to the relevant market and investments which could also be used in other product markets. This would improve legal certainty for undertakings by allowing them to assess what types of risks or costs would bring their agreements within the scope of competition rules.

The subject matter of this paper are the short-term and long-term consequences of Brexit, a historical event and a turning point in the development of the European Union (EU), as well as for the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU competition law and policy. The article first provides a comparative analysis of the historical development of legal regulation of competition in the UK and the EU, including relevant cases from the practice of competition authorities. In particular, the authors focus on the decisions of the European Commission regarding anti-cartel policy. The article further examines to what extent Brexit will influence the mergers and acquisitions policy, antitrust policy, anti-cartel policy, and state aid policy in the UK and the EU. The central question refers to the extent of Brexit's influence on the change of the UK and the EU business environment, and the repercussions that this change will have for the competition law. In the concluding remarks, the authors discuss the direction of future development of the UK competition law, particularly in terms of whether and to what extent the UK law will be harmonized with the EU competition law and case law in this area, or whether there will be a radical turn towards adopting a completely new concept of competition law and policy.

Research question: The paper investigates the way in which the large football clubs are increasing their dominance, and whether this is compatible with EU competition law. Research methods: Various insights from the economic and legal literature have been combined to give a new interpretation of EU competition law. Results and findings: The number of clubs with a realistic chance of winning important prizes has declined in many national markets. As a result, the economic competition has diminished and prices have increased to the detriment of welfare. This development has been reinforced by the joint actions of the top European clubs, such as threatening to start a Super League. Consequently, UEFA has implemented policies that have been particularly helpful for the top clubs. But, the clubs’ actions are incompatible with EU competition law, as is the actual creation of a European Super League. Implications: If the EU were to enforce the law, the power of the big clubs would be reduced, and UEFA's policies could be based more on the old democratic principles, again. This would lead to more sporting successes for small clubs and to lower prices for the fans.

This unit was published in „International Cooperation of Competition Authorities in Europe: from Bilateral Agreements to Transgovernmental Networks” Błachucki, M., ed., (2020). The ECN+ Directive aims to create a ‘homogeneous’ plane for the operation of antitrust authorities in the EU. Therefore, it is intended above all to harmonise the functioning of the national competition authorities in all the Member States, so that they can exercise the same powers and apply identical legal instruments when enforcing EU competition law. This article describes how to implement the ECN+ Directive into Polish antitrust law. 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This paper investigates the employment status of platform workers from an EU competition law perspective with a focus upon Wolt couriers. It argues that the employment status of platform workers in general is unclear. In their current state, the EU competition rules may constitute a barrier for the collective bargaining of platform workers as they typically have the status as self-employed. As the classification of employment status affects the rights and obligations of platform workers, it is essential to be able to determine their employment status. Whether platform workers under EU competition law may be considered as self-employed (undertaking) or an employee depends on the characteristics of the relationship between the parties in question. Thus, the paper draws upon the current criteria and factors from case law by the European courts on how the relationship should be assessed in order to determine the employment status. The employment status of platform workers can vary depending on the online platform and the current business model of the online platform. As a result, it is essential to analyze the online platform in question before the employment status can be evaluated. Therefore, an analysis of the business model of Wolt will be presented, which is followed by an assessment of the employment status of Wolt couriers. The paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the challenges to the existing legislative frameworks.

This thesis was submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University London Innovation is one of the key determinants of competitive capacity, as either making or suppressing innovation can be effective tools for competing. In addition, innovations have improving characteristics for the advancement of consumer welfare and the economy. Therefore, companies want their contributions to existing technologies to be considered when they are accused of abusing their dominant positions because, in practice, competition conditions are evolving from price-centric to innovation-centric, particularly in technology markets, where almost all companies allocate considerable budgets to research and development (R&D) activities. Hence, the competition starts before the product is even released onto the market in the current economic climate, which requires these companies to innovate constantly. It is therefore likely that noninnovative companies will eventually leave the market, as the existence of companies is directly proportional related to their innovativeness. However, instead of being innovative, businesses can maintain their market share, and even increase it, by suppressing innovation. This can be done in many different ways, but this study examines specific types of innovation suppression practices, namely the non-use of patents, pay-for-delay agreements, standard-setting, spare parts design protection, evergreening patents and exclusionary product design (planned obsolescence), as these issues have not received adequate attention in terms of EU competition law despite their particular importance to the functioning of competitive markets. This thesis, accordingly, debates whether the suppression of innovation is anti-competitive as a form of abusing the dominant position and therefore contrary to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), since it leads to less choice for consumers and more market barriers for rivals. In particular, the thesis examines the grey area of the relationship between law and innovation over selected issues by testing Article 102 TFEU, the scope of application of which has been broadened by the AstraZeneca case, which tilted practice towards an entirely fresh approach. Pursuant to this case, whenever a practice causes anti-competitive effects on the market, Article 102 TFEU would be applicable, which provides an open interpretation. This study consequently demonstrates the negative impacts of innovation suppression practices on the market, as well as their anti-competitive features, in order to show the applicability of this specific rule. Republic of Turkey‘s Ministry of National Education

International audience; This contribution will focus on the implementation of the Single Market programme between its definition in the Single Act in 1986, and its "opening" in 1993. I will argue that the Single Market was a compromise between different visions of Europe, and not solely a neoliberal project. In doing so, I will use a typology that differentiates between three types of economic policies: socially-oriented, neomercantilist, and market-oriented, with neoliberal policies being a subgroup of the final category. A few examples, including legislation on mergers and car pollution, will be explored in-depth by way of illustration.