Book Review: Populism and Antitrust: The Illiberal Influence of Populist Government on the Competition Law System, Maciej Bernatt (Cambridge University Press 2022)

Antitrust scholars have always wondered what makes competition law systems succeed and what makes them fail, or falter. Particularly interesting, and somewhat rare, are studies where insights are gained empirically, usually from interviews with key stakeholders. Maciej Bernatt’s book, Populism and Antitrust: The Illiberal Influence of Populist Government on the Competition Law System, is one of the most recent contributions to the field of institutional antitrust, building on such empirical insights. One of the most prominent scholars of competition law in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Bernatt is Associate Professor at the University of Warsaw, and Director of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (CARS). He is also Editor-in-Chief of the Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (YARS), the leading CEE academic journal focused on competition law issues. In the book, Bernatt uses empirical findings from Poland and Hungary to propose a new theoretical framework aimed at better measuring and understanding the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems, addressing both challenges at the competition authority level and at the level of the judiciary. The book was published in 2022 by Cambridge University Press in their series on global competition law and economics policy, edited by Ioannis Lianos (University College London), Thomas Cheng (The University of Hong Kong), Simon Roberts (University of Johannesburg), Maarten Pieter Schinkel (Universiteit van Amsterdam), and Maurice Stucke (University of Tennessee). The book, totalling some 270 pages, is structured in four parts. In the first, titled ‘Background: populism, democracy, economy’, Bernatt sets the scene by discussing the broader context and showing the implications populism has on democracy and the economy. The heart of the book is the second part, titled ‘Populist influence on competition law systems’, where he examines the influence of populism on competition law systems both by systematically discussing his empirical findings and by laying out his original theoretical framework. The third part, ‘A regional system’, is crucial for Bernatt’s analysis of the actual (and potential) EU response to populist-related challenges to competition law development in Hungary and Poland. The fourth part gives the final diagnosis and prospects.