Search

We provide evidence on the extent to which survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences - trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity - predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original participant sample of Falk et al. (2022). Our results, which are based on a replication study with university students in Tehran, Iran, are mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.

The study aims to explore the effect of behavioral biases on financial decision making in the real estate sector of Pakistan. The data of a sample of 244 real estate investors are collected through a survey carried out using different sources. The findings of the study show the relationship of different biases, including overconfidence, herding effect, gambler’s fallacy, and regret aversion on prices of real estate. Real estate prices are more affected by overconfidence and gambler’s fallacy than herding effect and regrets aversion bias in Pakistan. The findings furthermore reveal that these biases do not depend on gender, education, and demographics. It is recommended to carefully consider the market factors while making decisions in real estate, as the prices do not always show the real value of the property.

Many healthcare report cards provide information to consumers but do not represent a constraint on the behavior of healthcare providers. This is not the case with the report cards utilized in kidney transplantation. These report cards became more salient and binding, with additional oversight, in 2007 under the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Conditions of Participation. This research investigates whether the additional oversight based on report card outcomes influences patient selection via waiting-list registrations at transplant centers that meet regulatory standards. Using data from a national registry of kidney transplant candidates from 2003 through 2010, we apply a before-and-after estimation strategy that isolates the impact of a binding report card. A sorting equilibrium model is employed to account for center-level heterogeneity and the presence of congestion/agglomeration effects and the results are compared to a conditional logit specification. Our results indicate that patient waiting-list registrations change in response to the quality information similarly on average if there is additional regulation or not. We also find evidence of congestion effects when spatial choice sets are smaller: new patient registrations are less likely to occur at a center with a long waiting list when fewer options are available.

This paper investigates whether aspirations matter for education, which offers a common route out of poverty. We find that mother aspirations are strongly related to the child’s grade achieved at age 18. The relation is nonlinear, suggesting there is a threshold, and depends on caste, household income and the village setting. The coefficients remain large and significant when applying control function estimation, using firstborn son as instrument. A similar strong relation is observed with learning outcomes, including local language, English and maths test results, and with attending school, but not with attending private education. These results are confirmed for outcomes at age 15. The findings provide direct evidence on the contribution of mother aspirations to children’s education outcomes and point to aspirations as a channel of intergenerational mobility. They suggest that education outcomes can be improved more rapidly by taking aspirations into account when targeting education programmes, and through interventions that shape aspirations.

Decisions are often postponed even when future profits are not expected to compensate for the losses. This is especially relevant for financial and entrepreneurial disinvestment choices, as investors often have a disposition to hold on to losing assets for too long. We use an experiment with real real-options to study one possible behavioral motivation. Studies in psychology suggest that individuals have different styles of handling the stress involved in making decisions. We find that participants' styles of decision-making and risk aversion as well as the interaction of those can assist in predicting the likelihood that the participants will make investments and the timing of their disinvestment decisions. We also find the overall structure of the findings to be in line with a planner–doer model.

Expert advice is often biased in ways that benefit the advisor. We demonstrate how self-deception helps advisors be biased while preserving their self-image as ethical and identify limits to advisors' ability to self-deceive. In experiments where advisors recommend one of two investments to a client and receive a commission that depends on their recommendation, we vary the timing at which advisors learn about their own incentives. When advisors learn about their incentives before evaluating the available investments, they are more likely to be biased than when they learn about their incentives only after privately evaluating the investments. Consistent with self-deception, learning about the incentive before evaluating the options affects advisors' beliefs and preferences over the investments. Biased advice persists with minimal justifications but is eliminated when all justifications are removed. These findings show how self-deception can be constrained to improve advice provision.

Combining weekly productivity data with weekly productivity beliefs for a large sample of truckers over 2 years, we show that workers tend to systematically and persistently overpredict their productivity. If workers are overconfident about their own productivity at the current firm relative to their outside option, they should be less likely to quit. Empirically, all else equal, having higher productivity beliefs is associated with an employee being less likely to quit. To study the implications of overconfidence for worker welfare and firm profits, we estimate a structural learning model with biased beliefs that accounts for many key features of the data. While worker overconfidence moderately decreases worker welfare, it also substantially increases firm profits. Overconfidence biased learning turnover D03 J24 J41 M53

This paper explores the possibility that demand for costly commitment may prove unnecessary and thus excessive. In an online experiment, subjects face a tedious productivity task where tempting YouTube videos invite procrastination. Subjects can pay for a commitment device that removes the videos with some probability less than one, allowing us to compare their willingness to pay with realized material and psychological costs of temptation. A significant share of subjects overestimate their commitment demand, being overly pessimistic about their performance when tempted. However, the total realized ex-post disutility from undercommitment is greater than that from overcommitment. Torsten Söderberg Foundation Formas

In an experiment that elicits subjects' willingness to pay (WTP) for the outcome of a lottery, we confirm the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes described by Kahneman and Tversky. In addition, we document a systematic effect of stake sizes on the magnitude and sign of the relative risk premium, holding fixed both the probability that a lottery pays off and the sign of its payoff (gain vs. loss). We further show that in our data, there is a log-linear relationship between the monetary payoff of the lottery and WTP, conditional on the probability of the payoff and its sign. We account quantitatively for this relationship, and the way in which it varies with both the probability and sign of the lottery payoff, in a model in which all departures from risk-neutral bidding are attributed to an optimal adaptation of bidding behaviour to the presence of cognitive noise. Moreover, the cognitive noise required by our hypothesis is consistent with patterns of bias and variability in judgments about numerical magnitudes and probabilities that have been observed in other contexts.

This paper shows that agent inattention to taxes generates a time-inconsistency problem in the choice of tax policy. In equilibrium, inattention leads to inefficiently high tax rates and a taxation bias emerges. Combining structural and sufficient statistics approaches, we quantify the magnitude and the welfare effects of this policy distortion for US income tax rates, and find that the taxation bias is large, alters the progressivity of income taxes, and significantly reduces social welfare. Overall, our findings shed new light on the policy and welfare implications of inattention and misperceptions.

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be an excuse, a refusal reveals that the person in need, or the relationship, is not valued very much. We show that a failure to ask can occur even when most helpers would help if told about the need, and that even though a greater need makes help both more valuable and more likely to be granted, it can reduce the propensity to ask. When potential helpers concerned about the recipient's ask-shyness can make spontaneous offers, this can be a double-edged sword: offering reveals a more caring type and helps solve the failure-to-ask problem, but not offering reveals a not-socaring one, and this itself deters asking. This discouragement effect can also generate a trap where those in need hope for an offer while willing helpers hope for an ask, resulting in significant inefficiencies.

We measure individual-level loss aversion using three incentivized, representative surveys of the U.S. population (combined N = 3,000). We find that around 50% of the U.S. population is loss tolerant, with many participants accepting negative-expected-value gambles. This is counter to earlier findings−which mostly come from lab/student samples−and expert predictions that 70-90% of participants are loss averse. Consistent with the difference between our study and the prior literature, loss aversion is more prevalent in people with high cognitive ability. Loss-tolerant individuals are more likely to report recent gambling and to have experienced financial shocks. These results support the general hypothesis that individuals value gains and losses differently, although the tendency in a large proportion of the population to emphasize gains over losses is an overlooked behavioral phenomenon.

We provide new evidence on the extent that survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences − trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity − predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original student sample from Bonn, Germany. Our results, which are based on a replication study in Tehran, Iran, are somewhat mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.

Does being lucky (or unlucky) affect honest decision-making? We examine (1) whether luck-based income strengthens or erodes the moral value of honesty; (2) whether the perceived level of agency over an uncertain event affects the relationship between luck and honesty; and (3) whether accumulated luck affects honesty. To this end, we conducted a lab experiment where participants self-report a dice roll outcome, which is associated with effort-based income, after having received luck-based income. We manipulated the participants' perceptions regarding their influence on luck-based income. In the exogenous luck treatment, computerized coin tosses determines the luck-based income, whereas in the endogenous luck treatment, the participants choose the coin's winning side before the computerized coin toss. Our results are as follows: (1) lying behaviour increases when contemporaneous luck-based income is high, (2) lying is not affected by the perceived level of agency, and (3) lying is not affected by the previous outcomes of the luck-based income. Our observations challenge the relative importance of context that may render moral justification. Therefore, our findings indicate that differences in dishonest behavior may be largely due to individual-specific heterogeneity.

Emerging and developing states are home to powerful corporations capable of deploying economic activities on a global scale. But such corporations have to date been largely overlooked in the field of business and human rights. Treatment of such corporations has typically been in the context of supply chain studies, as subsidiaries of corporations from economically developed Western states. This book takes a radically different approach. It aims to investigate the conditions under which the European Union and its Member States regulate and remedy human rights violations by corporations from emerging and developing states. Stemming from the hypothesis that the EU intends to play a central role, Aleydis Nissen explores how the EU and its Member States attempt to ensure that EU-based businesses are not undercut by emerging competition, drawing on global examples to illustrate this developing phenomenon.

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a ���trap,��� where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer���s valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein���s example of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally removes the trap.

Psychologists claim that being treated kindly puts individuals in a positive emotional state: they then treat an unrelated third party more kindly. Numerous experiments document that subjects indeed ‘pay forward’ specific behavior. For example, they are less generous after having experienced stinginess. This, however, is not necessarily driven by emotions. Subjects may also imitate what they regard as socially adequate behavior. Here, I present an experiment in which imitation is not possible at the next opportunity to act with a stranger: after being given either a fun or an annoying job, subjects have to decide whether to be generous or not. I find that although subjects who are given the annoying job report more negative emotions than those with the fun job, they do not treat an unrelated third person more unkindly in terms of passing on less money.

We consider infinite-horizon bargaining in which an uninformed seller sequentially makes a price offer to a privately informed buyer who decides whether to accept or reject it in every bargaining round. Existing theories suggest that the presence (absence) of an arbitrarily small outside option available to the buyer in this dynamic screening problem leads the seller (buyer) to enjoy a substantial surplus, and we examine the validity of the differences in the share of the surplus theoretically and experimentally. We first show that the theoretical differences collapse if an arbitrarily small fraction of optimistic buyers would believe that the sellers sometimes ask for a lower price in the subsequent rounds. We then present experimental evidence that the earnings of both the buyers and the sellers when the buyer has an outside option are not significantly different from those without the outside option. We find supporting evidence that some buyers reject the current-round offers, optimistically believing that the next offer would be more favorable to them.

Why do people give when asked, but prefer not to be asked, and even take when possible? We introduce a novel analytical framework that allows us to express context dependence and narrow bracketing axiomatically. We then derive the utility representation of distributive preferences additionally obeying standard axioms such as separability and scaling invariance. Such pref- erences admit a generalized prospect-theoretical utility representation reminiscent of fairness- based altruism. As in prospect theory, the underlying preferences are reference dependent and non-convex, which directly predicts the previously irreconcilable empirical evidence on giving, sorting, and taking. We test the model quantitatively on data from seminal experiments and observe significantly improved fit in relation to existing models, both in-sample and out-of- sample.

We find a strong relationship between risk-loving preferences and cognitive ability which becomes stronger as adherence to the generalized axiom of revealed preference (a proxy for rationality) increases. Our results are taken from a field study of individuals at the very bottom of the income distribution in a developing nation. Our results for some of the poorest in the world support recent findings drawn from subjects in wealthy Western nations, suggesting there may be a stable relationship between risk preferences and cognitive ability for the human population as a whole irrespective of socio-economic status.

Psychologists claim that being treated kindly puts individuals in a positive emotional state: they then treat an unrelated third party more kindly. Numerous experiments document that subjects indeed 'pay forward' specific behavior. For example, they are less generous after having experienced stinginess. This, however, is not necessarily driven by emotions. Subjects may also imitate what they regard as socially adequate behavior. Here, I present an experiment in which imitation is not possible at the next opportunity to act with a stranger: after being given either a fun or an annoying job, subjects have to decide whether to be generous or not. I find that although subjects who are given the annoying job report more negative emotions than those with the fun job, they do not treat an unrelated third person more unkindly in terms of passing on less money.

Exemptions from costly policy measures are frequently applied to alleviate financial burdens to specific market participants. Using a stated-choice experiment with around 6,000 German household heads, we test how exemptions for lowincome households and energy-intensive companies influence the political acceptability of additional cost for the promotion of renewable energies. We find that the support for the policy is substantially higher when low-income households are exempt rather than the industry. Introducing exemptions for low-income households on top of existing exemptions for the industry increases the acceptability of the policy. We show that the support for exemptions as one example of distributional policy design is associated with individual behavioral measures like inequality aversion and fairness perceptions., Discussion Paper / SFB823;30/2021

People's value for their own time is a key input in evaluating public policies: evaluations should account for time taken away from work or leisure as a result of policy. Using rich choice data collected from farming households in western Kenya, we show that households exhibit non-transitive preferences consistent with behavioral features such as loss aversion and self-serving bias. As a result, neither market wages nor standard valuation techniques (such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak—BDM—mechanism of Becker et al., 1964) correctly measure participants' value of time. Using a structural model, we identify the mix of behavioral features driving our choice data. We find that these features distort choices when exchanging cash either for time or for goods. Our model estimates suggest that valuing the time of the self-employed at 60% of the market wage is a reasonable rule of thumb.

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the classical setting by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). This allows us to formally identify the endowment and attachment effect and study their impact on information rents, allowing us to show that, in contrast to other behavioral approaches to the bilateral trade problem, the impossibility of inducing materially efficient trade persists in the presence of loss aversion. We then turn to the design of optimal mechanisms and consider the problem of maximizing the designer's revenue as well as gains from trade. We find that the designer optimally provides the agents with full insurance in the money dimension and, depending on the distribution of types, optimally increases or decreases the trade frequency in the presence of loss aversion. This version: July 2022

This paper studies the relationship between patience and comparative development through a combination of reduced-form analyses and model estimations. Based on a globally representative dataset on time preference in 76 countries, we document two sets of stylized facts. First, patience is strongly correlated with both per capita income and the accumulation of physical capital, human capital and productivity. These correlations hold across countries, subnational regions, and individuals. Second, the quantitative magnitude of the patience elasticity strongly increases in the level of aggregation. To provide an interpretive lens for these patterns, we analyze an OLG model in which savings and education decisions are endogenous to patience, and aggregate production is characterized by capital-skill complementarities. This model reconciles both the correlations between patience and macroeconomic variables as well as the substantial amplification of patience elasticities at higher levels of aggregation. The results of model estimations resemble the reduced-form patterns and suggest that cross-country variation in productivity plays an important role in generating the observed comparative development patterns and aggregation effects.

People often act out of a desire to be responsible for good and not for bad events. Similarly, people frequently reward and punish other people if they perceive them to be responsible for the implementation of events that they like or dislike. When the implementation of an event depends on the interaction of multiple persons and, potentially, moves of nature, the determinants of such responsibility perceptions are not well understood. In this paper, I propose a notion of causal responsibility which attempts to objectively capture the causal importance of a person's action for the implementation of an event in such situations. A laboratory experiment shows that the notion successfully predicts people's responsibility perceptions. Furthermore, I incorporate the notion in a framework of responsibility preferences and study its implications for worker motivation and the design of voting rules. Finally, I show that the notion can explain experimentally elicited behavior and punishment and reward patterns in multi-agent situations that are not well-explained by existing social preference theories.

This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the agents to reveal their types unless the principal either (i) excludes one group from the productive relationship, or (ii) demands different efforts from different preference groups. I also characterize the contract-inducing pooling equilibria in which all agents are incentivized to exert a high level of effort.

When complex procurement projects are conducted, it is often not possible to write complete contracts. As a consequence, the relationship between buyer and supplier is important for the success of the project. In this paper we investigate the claim that auctions in procurement can be detrimental for the buyer–supplier relationship, which is in line with the observation that reverse auctions are less frequently conducted if projects are complex. A poor relationship can result in a decrease in trust on the part of the buyer during the sourcing process and an increase in the supplier’s opportunistic behavior following sourcing. We consider a setting in which the winning supplier decides on the level of quality to provide to the buyer, and we compare a standard reverse auction and a buyer-determined reverse auction, both analytically and in the laboratory. We find that the buyer-determined reverse auction can perform better than the standard reverse auction from both the buyer’s and the suppliers’ perspective. In a buyer-determined reverse auction, it may be optimal for the buyer to select the supplier who submitted a higher bid, which may in turn induce this supplier to deliver higher quality. Standard auctions, however, yield lower prices but reduce cooperation. The degree of trust, as reflected by a larger number of transactions and a higher average efficiency of trade, is significantly higher in buyer-determined reverse auctions. Theoretical reasoning based on other-regarding preferences organizes our data well. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.

Many studies report on the association between 2D:4D, a putative marker for prenatal testosterone exposure, and economic preferences. However, most of these studies have limited sample sizes and test multiple hypotheses (without preregistration). In this study we mainly replicate the common specifications found in the literature for the association between the 2D:4D ratio and risk taking, the willingness to compete, and dictator game giving separately. In a sample of 330 women we find no robust associations between any of these economic preferences and 2D:4D. We find no evidence of a statistically significant relation for 16 of the 18 total regressions we run. The two regression specifications which are statistically significant have not previously been reported and the associations are not in the expected direction, and therefore they are unlikely to represent a real effect. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.1007/s40881-019-00076-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

There is a heated debate on whether markets erode social responsibility and moral behavior. However, it is a challenging task to identify and measure moral behavior in markets. Based on a theoretical model, we examine in an experiment the relation between trading volume, prices and moral behavior by setting up markets that either impose a negative externality on third parties or not. We find that moral behavior reveals itself in lower trading volume in markets with a negative externality, while prices mostly depend on the market structure. We further investigate individual characteristics that explain trading behavior in markets with negative externalities.

Experimental social scientists working at research-intensive institutions deal inevitably with subjects who have most likely participated in previous experiments. It is an important methodological question to know whether participants that have acquired a high level of lab-sophistication show altered pro-social behavioural patterns. In this paper, we focus both on the potential effect of the subjects’ lab-sophistication, and on the role of the knowledge about the level of lab-sophistication of the other participants. Our main findings show that while lab-sophistication per se does not significantly affect pro-social behaviour, for sophisticated subjects the knowledge about the counterpart’s level of (un)sophistication may systematically alter their choices. This result should induce caution among experimenters about whether, in their settings, information about lab-sophistication can be inferred by the participants, due to the characteristics of the recruitment mechanisms, the management of the experimental sessions or to other contextual clues. Experimental social scientists working at research-intensive institutions deal inevitably with subjects who have most likely participated in previous experiments. It is an important methodological question to know whether participants that have acquired a high level of lab-sophistication show altered pro-social behavioural patterns. In this paper, we focus both on the potential effect of the subjects’ lab-sophistication, and on the role of the knowledge about the level of lab-sophistication of the other participants. Our main findings show that while lab-sophistication per se does not significantly affect pro-social behaviour, for sophisticated subjects the knowledge about the counterpart’s level of (un)sophistication may systematically alter their choices. This result should induce caution among experimenters about whether, in their settings, information about lab-sophistication can be inferred by the participants, due to the characteristics of the recruitment mechanisms, the management of the experimental sessions or to other contextual clues.

International audience; We perform meta-regressions on a single database containing 96 observations of simple ultimatum games and 144 observations of simple dictator games to disentangle the fairness hypothesis based on the degree of economic development of a country. According to the fairness hypothesis, o ers in the two games should not di er if they were motivated by a subject's fairness concerns. Using the di erence across countries between o ers in ultimatum and dictator games, we address the e ect of being exposed to the market mechanism on pure fairness concerns and other-regarding, expectations-driven fairness. Our results show in particular that the lower the level of economic development in a country, the less likely the rejection of the fairness hypothesis.

We provide the first investigation of the relationship between self-awareness and dis- honesty in a multi-wave pre-registered experiment with 1,260 subjects. In the first wave we vary the level of awareness of subjects' past dishonesty and explore the impact on behaviour in tasks that include the scope to lie. In the second wave we vary the degree of competitiveness in one of our core tasks to further explore the interactions between self-awareness, (dis)honesty and competition. We also test for the experimental demand effect in order to rule it out. Our results suggest that in non-interactive tasks, self-awareness helps to lower dishonesty in the future. However, in tasks that are competitive in nature becoming more aware of past dishonesty raises the likelihood of dishonesty in the future. In other words, we show when making people aware of their own past dishonesty can help to reduce dishonesty and when it might back-fire.

A recent literature emphasizes the importance of the gender gap in willingness to compete as a partial explanation for gender differences in labor market outcomes. However, whereas experiments investigating willingness to compete typically do so in anonymous environments, real world competitions often have a more public nature, which introduces potential social image concerns. If such image concerns are important, we should expect public observability to further exacerbate the gender gap. We test this prediction using a laboratory experiment that varies whether the decision to compete, and its outcome, is publicly observable. Across four different treatments, however, all treatment effects are close to zero. We conclude that the public observability of decisions and outcomes does not exert a significant impact on male or female willingness to compete, indicating that the role of social image concerns related to competitive decisions may be limited.

How do people assess risks associated with a hedonic but dangerous activity? I conduct a longitudinal field experiment (N=434) exploiting the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic to investigate whether monetary incentives induce people to motivate their risk assessments. Each participant receives a café voucher with a random value: treated participants receive a 10EUR voucher, and the control group a 1.50EUR voucher. The results show that subjects who receive a high incentive not only visit cafés more often but also reduce their risk assessment relative to subjects with a low incentive. Importantly, the assessment updating happens in anticipation of the visit, suggesting that it justifies a risky activity. This finding is inconsistent with the standard notion of Bayesian updating but consistent with motivated reasoning. It is robust to different risk measures (incentivized and non-incentivized) and does not lend support for alternative explanations, such as visits at less busy times or additional information acquisition. The data further suggests that the formation of motivated risk assessments is supported by selective recall of previous assessments. Treated subjects systematically underestimate former assessments relative to subjects of the control group.

Almost two in 10 adults in the U.S. and Europe are, at any moment in time, diagnosed with a mental illness. This paper asks whether mental illness is over- (or under-) diagnosed, by looking at its causal effect on individuals at the margin of diagnosis. We follow all Swedish men born between 1971 and 1983 matched to administrative panel data on health, labor market, wealth and family outcomes to estimate the impact of a mental illness diagnosis on subsequent outcomes. Exploiting the random assignment of 18-year-old men to doctors during military conscription, we find that a mental illness diagnosis for people at the margin increases the future likelihood of death, hospital admittance, being sick from work, and unemployment, while lowering the probability of being married. Using a separate identification strategy, we measure the effect of military service on the same set of outcomes to rule out that the effect of diagnosis in our setting is primarily mediated by altering the probability of serving. Our findings are consistent with the potential over-diagnosis of mental illness.

This paper focuses on determining the factors influencing investors' risk-taking through empirical evidence from Vietnam. This study investigates risk perception, expected return and herding behavior, and other determinants such as historical volatility and subjective financial risk attitude; according to previous studies, these are the main components affecting risk-taking behavior among investors. Overconfidence (better than average, miscalibration, and excessive optimism) is also taken into consideration. We employ pooled-OLS and quantile regression to overcome the shortage of research models in this field. In addition, we demonstrate how risk-taking behavior can be affected by those factors with the application of measures across four different investment channels. This study suggests implications for investors who wish to control risk.

Unethical behavior in organizations is usually associated with the risk of negative consequences for the organization and for the involved managers if being detected. The existing experimental literature in economics has so far focused mainly on the analysis of unethical behavior in environments that involve no fines or similar monetary consequences. In the current paper, we use a tax compliance framework to study (un-)ethical behavior of individuals and small groups. Our results show that groups are clearly less compliant than individuals. The risk of being detected is the most important aspect in the group communication process when deciding on compliance.

This paper analyzes empirically whether individuals' decisions to start an own business can be influenced via television (TV). To identify its effect, we utilize exogenous regional variation in the availability of TV that conveyed images conducive to entrepreneurship and the notion that self-reliance, self-determination and proactive behavior are desirable from individual and social point of view. We use both regional-level as well as geo-referenced individual level data and show that the entrepreneurship incidence is higher among the residents of regions that had TV signal than in regions without TV, indicating a first-order effect on the directly exposed individuals. We find that the effect would fade out if only directly treated individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs and the last exposed cohort becomes "too old". However, we also find that non-directly exposed successive cohorts and descendants of directly exposed individuals also wish to become entrepreneurs more often. We provide evidence that is consistent with second-order effects due to the intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurial mindset and suggests a formation of a self-sustaining entrepreneurial culture, which can cause long lasting differences between treated and non-treated population groups or regions.

This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This premium reduces the value of the employment relationship to the organization, and thus its incentive to pay subjective bonuses to the hard-working employees. To restore credibility of its incentive system, a transparent organization must therefore reduce the weight of bonuses, and increase the weight of fixed salaries, in the employees' compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional "pay secrecy" regime. Second, we show that transparency enables the employees to collectively sanction the organization for reneging on subjective incentives. Collective enforcement allows the transparent organization to use strong employment relationships to "cross-subsidize" weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay transparency laws.

Situations where independent agents need to align their activities to achieve individually and socially beneficial outcomes are abundant, reaching from everyday situations like fixing a time for a meeting to global problems like climate change agreements. Often such situations can be described as stag-hunt games, where coordinating on the socially efficient outcome is individually optimal but also entails a risk of losing out. Previous work has shown that in fixed interaction neighborhoods agents’ behavior mostly converges to collectively inefficient outcome. However, in the field, interaction neighborhoods often can be self-determined. Theoretical work investigating such circumstances is ambiguous in whether the efficient or inefficient outcome will prevail. We performed an experiment with human subjects exploring how free neighborhood choice affects coordination. In a fixed interaction treatment, a vast majority of subjects quickly coordinates on the inefficient outcome. In a treatment with neighborhood choice, the outcome is dramatically different: behavior quickly converges to the socially desirable outcome leading to welfare gains 2.5 times higher than in the environment without neighborhood choice. Participants playing efficiently exclude those playing inefficiently who in response change their behavior and are subsequently included again. Importantly, this mechanism is effective despite that only few exclusions actually occur.

We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others' behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others' dishonesty (With and Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment. Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals' beliefs is accounted for. Third, social information and payoffs do not interact with each other.

Happiness is strongly associated with goal attainment, productivity, mental health and suicidal risk. This paper examines the effect of satisfaction with areas of life on subjective well-being (SWB), the importance of relative perceptions compared to absolute measures in predicting overall life satisfaction, and differences in the domains of life which have the greatest impact on happiness of men and women. The findings suggest that relative perceptions have a large statistically significant effect on SWB. Satisfaction with family life and health have the largest while satisfaction with income has the lowest impact on overall SWB for both genders. Work satisfaction is more important for men than for women, whereas partner's happiness is more valued by female respondents. Satisfaction with household compared to personal income has a larger effect on SWB in all subsamples except employed women. Understanding the perceived and factual determinants of happiness has urgent implications in the context of the detrimental impact of the Covid-19 outbreak on SWB.

Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

Companies increasingly shift from hierarchical to team-based organizational structures. Scholars and practitioners alike have emphasized the potential of leadership to foster performance in these settings. However, the causal impact of leadership is difficult to identify, as in agile and crossfunctional teams leadership is often determined endogenously. This study exploits a unique opportunity to uncover the value of leadership in a non-routine task performed by teams with flat hierarchies. In a large-scale natural field experiment (>1200 participants in 280 teams), we randomly encourage teams to select a leader before performing a complex task. The leadership encouragement increases the fraction of teams solving the task within the given time limit by about 25% and teams' remaining times by roughly 75%. Choosing a leader not only improves performance time-wise, but also team organization, without reducing the originality of solutions. Hence, leadership encouragements can serve as a cost-effective tool to foster team performance.

The epistemic conditions of rationality and mth‐order strong belief of rationality (R mSBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward‐induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with R mSBR across all type structures. In particular, in a class of generic games, R( m − 1)SBR is characterized by a new solution concept we call an m‐best response sequence ( m‐BRS). Such sequences are an iterative version of extensive‐form best response sets (Battigalli and Friedenberg, 2012). The strategies that survive m rounds of extensive‐form rationalizability are consistent with an m‐BRS, but there are m‐BRS's that are disjoint from the former set. As such, there is behavior that is consistent with R( m − 1)SBR but inconsistent with m rounds of extensive‐form rationalizability. We use our characterization to draw implications for the interpretation of experimental data. Specifically, we show that the implications are nontrivial in the three‐repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Centipede games.

We use large-scale survey data of German speaking villages from the 1930's to investigate drivers of cooperation, gender, and religious norms. Through geographic cluster analysis, we show that inter-regional variation explains only little heterogeneity in norms. Villages in the same physical and institutional environment still maintain different norms. We argue that local differences in the structure of social relationships can explain intra-regional heterogeneity in norms. We focus on a community's ability to transmit and enforce norms to derive theoretical links between correlates of community social relationships and the number of norms it maintains (norm prevalence). Empirically we find that: (1) norm prevalence is positively related to three correlates of community social relationships: religiously homogeneous villages, villages that border on other villages with a different majority religion, and villages with more within-village social gatherings; (2) villages with stronger community-level social relationships are also less likely to segment their reference group for the cooperation norm to smaller social units; (3) cooperation norms make other norms more likely.

Perceived urgency and regret are common in many sequential search processes; for example, sellers often pressure buyers in search of the best offer, both time-wise and in terms of potential regret of forgoing unique purchasing opportunities. theoretically, these strategies result in anticipated and experienced regret, which systematically affect search behavior and thereby distort optimal search. In addition, urgency may alter decision-making processes and thereby the salience of regret. To understand the empirical relevance of these aspects, we study the causal effects of regret, urgency, and their interaction on search behavior in a pre-registered, theory-based, and well-powered experiment. Empirically, we and that anticipated regret does not affect search behavior either with or without time pressure, while experienced regret leads to systematic adjustments in search length. Urgency reduces decision times and perceived decision quality, but does not generally alter search length. Only very inexperienced decision-makers buy earlier when pressured. Thus, consumer protection measures against pressure selling tactics can help inexperienced consumers in particular.

The conventional wisdom summarized in the adage ‘misery loves company’ suggests that suffering can be made easier to bear if it is also shared by others. Given increasing interest in subjective well-being and happiness as constituents of national wealth and priorities in policy-making and organizational management, we empirically investigate the validity of this phenomenon in order to explore whether it may be possible to mitigate decreases in subjective well-being simply by leveraging social comparison. We implement an experimental survey designed to gauge the suitability of this strategy on a representative sample of approximately 2,000 US residents. Our results indicate that, while this hypothesis is indeed borne out among certain populations within the sample, we find stronger and more widespread support for the opposite phenomenon, suggesting rather that ‘happiness hates company’. These novel findings can inform policy interventions aiming to enhance well-being and point to promising avenues for further work.