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Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game

Authors :
Cochard, Francois
Cochard, François
Le Gallo, Julie
Georgantzis, Nikolaos
Tisserand, Jean-Christian
Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) (CRESE)
Université de Franche-Comté (UFC)
Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)
Centre d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales Appliquées à l'Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux (CESAER)
AgroSup Dijon - Institut National Supérieur des Sciences Agronomiques, de l'Alimentation et de l'Environnement-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)
Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN)
Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB)
Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (EA 3190) (CRESE)
Source :
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Elsevier Inc., 2021, 90 (en ligne), pp.101613. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2020.101613⟩
Publication Year :
2021
Publisher :
HAL CCSD, 2021.

Abstract

International audience; We perform meta-regressions on a single database containing 96 observations of simple ultimatum games and 144 observations of simple dictator games to disentangle the fairness hypothesis based on the degree of economic development of a country. According to the fairness hypothesis, o ers in the two games should not di er if they were motivated by a subject's fairness concerns. Using the di erence across countries between o ers in ultimatum and dictator games, we address the e ect of being exposed to the market mechanism on pure fairness concerns and other-regarding, expectations-driven fairness. Our results show in particular that the lower the level of economic development in a country, the less likely the rejection of the fairness hypothesis.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
22148043 and 22148051
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Elsevier Inc., 2021, 90 (en ligne), pp.101613. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2020.101613⟩
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....9f00bf43ebab5267656d4801a2a3c979
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101613⟩