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The Iran-Iraq war may be the bloodiest international conflict since World War II, Resistant to all negotiating efforts since its start in September-October 1980, the conflict has posed unique challenges to would-be mediators and tremendous threats to regional stability. Underlying the war are long-standing enmities and disputes: friction between Arabs and Persians and between Sunni and Shia Moslems, disagreements over the boundary line in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and conflicting political systems and different international orientations during the era of the Shah of Iran. This chapter discusses the motives of the war, the four distinct phases through which the war passed by, the effect of the war on neighboring countries and on the Soviet Union and the United States, and the potential for further escalation of the war. It also discusses the role of the United Nations as a potential mediator and the various possibilities for managing the conflict.

During the 1980s and through the 1990s, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seemed to be approaching peace, instead, went into sharp reverse. Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and January 2006 Palestinian elections brought victory for the Islamist Palestinian group Hamas. A wave of Palestinian terrorist attacks profoundly shook Israeli trust in Yasser Arafat’s intentions and abilities. The Israeli and United States governments hailed this action as an important step toward peace. The Israelis approved the plan despite reservations, which Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben Ami called “minor and dealing mainly with security arrangements." On Jerusalem, Israel proposed a special regime for the whole city, but the Palestinians again demanded control over all East Jerusalem. The most detailed evidence of Arafat’s direct involvement in terrorist attacks came from documents taken by Israel during its March 2002 siege of his Ramallah office compound. Palestinian Authority leaders, including Arafat, claimed that Israel had massacred many Palestinians.

Summary Conventionally, methods of coupling reservoirs and surface networks are categorized into implicit and explicit approaches. The term "implicit coupling" indicates that the two simulators solve unknowns together, simultaneously, or iteratively, whereas "explicit coupling" indicates that the two simulators solve unknowns sequentially and exchange their boundary conditions at the last coupled time tn. The explicit approach is straightforward to implement in existing reservoir and surface-network models and is widely used. Explicit coupling does have drawbacks, however, because well rate and pressure oscillations are often observed. In this paper, a new semi-implicit method for coupled simulation is presented. This technique stabilizes and improves the accuracy of the coupled model. The "semi-implicit coupling" overcomes the problems found in explicit-coupling methods without requiring the complexity of a fully implicit coupled model. The new approach predicts inflow-performance-relationship (IPR) curves at the next coupled time tn+1 by simultaneously conducting well tests for all wells in the reservoir before actually taking the required timestep. All wells first flow simultaneously to the next coupled time tn+1 with the well rates unchanged from the last coupled timestep. The timestep is rewound, and all well rates are reduced by a uniform fraction and then simultaneously flow again to tn+1. By extrapolating the resulting well pressures, the well's shut-in pressures at time tn+1 are determined, and thus, straight-line IPRs are produced. The new IPR curves approximate better each well's drainage region at tn+1 and each well's shut-in pressure at tn+1 which helps to stabilize the explicitly coupled model. The new coupling technique normally does not require iteration between the reservoir and surface network and normally has the stability and accuracy characteristics of an implicitly coupled approach. Because the well tests already account for individual well-drainage regions, an explicit knowledge of the well-drainage region is not required. Because of the stabilized IPR, the approach also was found to reduce the overall computational time compared with explicit coupling. Applications of the new approach are presented that show significant improvements surpassing explicit coupling in both stability and accuracy.

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more /Or close the wall up with our English dead!-William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act III,Scene IWe demand of everyone to push ahead with reconciliation [between Fatah and Hamas] and to end the state of division, so that we will be able to stand against the occupation, to halt its activities against our prisoners, and to turn to the struggle for the liberation of Palestine-all of Palestine. - PA Minister of Social Affairs Majida al-Masri (a moderate in PA terms), al-Hayat al-Jadida, March 9, 2012Mr. Praline: That parrot is definitely deceased, and when I purchased it not half an hour ago, you assured me that its total lack of movement was due to it being tired and shagged out following a prolonged squawk.Owner: Well, he's...ah...probably pining for the fjords.Mr. Praline: Pining for the fjords?... Why did he fall flat on his back the moment I got him home?Owner: The Norwegian Blue prefers keeping on its back!...Mr. Praline: ....I discovered the only reason that it had been sitting on its perch in the first place was that it had been nailed there!-Monty Python's Flying Circus, Dead Parrot SketchThe key to understanding the Middle East is to recognize when things change. Alongside the "Arab Spring," the Turkish campaign to be a regional power, and Iran's drive to get nuclear weapons is another important development that is, internationally at least, the least recognized of all: Any hope for Israel-Palestinian or Arab- Israeli peace agreements ending the conflict is dead. There is no more "peace process;" or if you prefer, the possibility of a formal Israel- Palestinian peace that ends the conflict is dormant for a long historical era.Western, especially European, political leaders, intellectuals, and journalists simply do not in most cases grasp this reality. A fantasy continues to direct their policies, writings, and much of the debate. Yet it is vital to understand that this is a fantasy, why that is so, and how policies should be adjusted in the face of these circumstances.This article will examine the psychological and structural factors that, on one hand, make the "peace process" deceased and, on the other hand, inhibit recognition of that reality.THE MODEL THAT DOES NOT WORKEven if it is not fully articulated, the narrative of the Israel-Palestinian conflict widely accepted in the West is prevalent largely because it is taken as corresponding with the historical experiences of Western states on other issues. A nationalist movement develops among a people ruled by others; they engage in political activity and violence, but the situation is eventually settled by giving them the state they crave.Precisely, it is because they so passionately want a state of their own they are willing to make compromises to get it. A comprehensive treaty is signed and implemented, peace prevails, Nobel prizes are handed around to the architects of the agreement, and everyone lives happily ever after. This description is not meant to be sarcastic. This formula has indeed worked on many occasions and resolved many disputes. The problem is that it does not match the Israel- Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflict cases. To pretend otherwise requires statesmen, experts, and journalists to ignore huge swathes of facts and factors, thus ensuring both failure and an inability to understand the events actually taking place in the region.In this model, the existing problem is due to a dispute over territory in which one side, Israel, has won, and the other side has lost. Yet both sides thus have a strong incentive to resolve the problem. Israel wants peace and an end to the conflict and terrorism, to secure its existence, and enjoy the benefits that would accrue as a result of having normal relations with its neighbors.In parallel, the Palestinians are suffering from Israeli occupation, lower living standards, and violence. …

Remaining in Iraq will bring the U.S. into confrontation with a new government and the Shi'a majority. Washington should withdraw its forces during the next 12–18 months, after a new Iraqi constitu...

What does the U.S. experience in Iran in 1953 teach us about the policy to change Iraq's regime today? Among other lessons, the real danger may not lie in the U.S. role in initially changing the old regime, but rather in a longstanding U.S. presence.

From an Israeli perspective, the United States should properly pursue its own interests. The basic problem is not some U.S. mistaken policy; it has done quite well. Regional extremism and ambitions mean no perfect options or easy solutions exist.

Israel’s 1999 elections drew considerable international interest, but claims of foreign interference are exaggerated. The statements and preferences of Arab leaders reveal much about their understanding and views of Israel, while American officials were careful not to directly enter the fray, despite perceptions to the contrary. Russia’s introduction into Israel’s domestic elections is an intriguing result of Israel’s demographic changes over the past decade.

this is the best introductory source on Turkeys political parties in English. Recommended for all major university, college, and urban libraries" - Choice

Conventionally, methods of coupling reservoirs and surface networks are categorized into implicit and explicit approaches. The term implicit coupling indicates the two simulators solve unknowns together, simultaneously or iteratively. While explicit coupling indicates the two simulators solve unknowns sequentially and exchange their boundary conditions at the last coupled time tn. The explicit approach is straightforward to implement in existing reservoir and surface network models and is widely used. Explicit coupling does have drawbacks, however; as well rate and pressure oscillations are often observed. In this paper, a new semi-implicit method for coupled simulation is presented. This technique stabilizes and improves the accuracy of the coupled model. The semi-implicit coupling overcomes the problems found in explicit coupling methods without requiring the complexity of a fully implicit coupled model. The new approach predicts inflow performance relationship (IPR) curves at the next coupled time tn+1 by simultaneously conducting well tests for all wells in the reservoir before actually taking the required timestep. All wells first simultaneously flow to the next coupled time tn+1 with the well rates unchanged from the last coupled timestep. The timestep is rewound, and all well rates are reduced by a uniform fraction and then simultaneously flow again to tn+1. By extrapolating the resulting well pressures, the well’s shut-in pressures at time tn+1 are determined and thus straight line IPRs are produced. The new IPR curves better approximates each well’s drainage region at tn+1 and each well’s shut-in pressure at tn+1 which helps to stabilize the explicitly coupled model. The new coupling technique normally does not require iteration between the reservoir and surface network and normally has the stability and accuracy characteristics of an implicitly coupled approach. Since the well tests already account for individual well drainage regions, explicit knowledge of the well drainage region is not required. Due to the stabilized IPR, the approach has also been found to reduce the overall computational time when compared with explicit coupling. Applications of the new approach are presented which show significant improvements over explicit coupling in both stability and accuracy.

A ray trace model for predicting fiber optical properties has been previously described. This model, which treats each filament in a yarn bundle independently, has been extended to include multifilament scattering. The new model is used to predict the reflectance properties of a series of simulated yarn bundles with different numbers of filaments, providing further insight into the interaction of light with a fabric. Two effects of reducing denier per filament are predicted: decreased dye yield and increased back-scattering. The dye yield data are in agreement with the empirical relationship that the amount of dye required to achieve a given depth of shade varies as the inverse square root of the denier per filament.

An optical ray trace luster prediction computer model is used to explain the reduced dye yield of microdenier yarns. Results from the model demonstrate that the reduced dye yield is a necessary consequence of the reduced path length of light inside the filaments. Data are shown for the predicted brightness of a set of standard denier per filament and microdenier PET ( Micromattique ) yarns.

Unconventional shale gas reservoirs require stimulation via hydraulic fracturing of pre-existing fracture networks for practical exploitation, creating a stimulated reservoir volume (SRV). Within the SRV, gas flow from the nano-Darcy shale to the complex stimulated fracture network has been modeled in reservoir simulators using a variety of techniques which upscale/simplify the fracture network. The simulation techniques used in the past were normally not compared with reference solutions. This work investigates using finely-gridded single well reference solutions (approximately 6-14 million cells) for simulating Darcy and non-Darcy flow within an explicitly modeled SRV complex fracture network, in 2-D, with and without primary hydraulic fractures, as well as scenarios which model stress sensitive permeability and later re-stimulation of a horizontal well. The network fractures use cells which are only 0.001 ft. wide. The reference solutions are compared with standard dual permeability and MINC (multiple interacting continua) dual continua models as well as novel models which simulate flow inside of the SRV using coarse, logarithmically spaced, locally refined, dual permeability grids, and simulate flow outside of the SRV using unrefined dual permeability grids. These coarse models can be run in minutes on standard hardware, where as the reference models can take days to run on the same hardware. We will show that excellent matches to the reference solutions are possible using a modest number of refinements to simulate the flow within the SRV when the fracture permeability and the fracture Forchheimer number (for non-Darcy flow) are scaled as described in the paper. These techniques allow the use of 2.0 ft. wide fracture conduits to mimic non-Darcy flow in 0.001 ft. wide fractures. Good agreement between the reference and coarse models are observed even during the early flow period of the reservoir.

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This chapter examines three key Muslim Brotherhood groups—those of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt— compares their politics and methods, and looks at the relationships among them. Each of these groups, of course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.

Summary The exploitation of unconventional gas reservoirs has become an ever increasing component of the North American gas supply. The economic viability of many unconventional gas developments hinges on effective stimulation of extremely low-permeability rock by creating very complex fracture networks that connect huge reservoir surface area to the wellbore. In addition, gas desorption may be a significant component of overall gas recovery in many shale-gas reservoirs. The widespread application of microseismic (MS) mapping has significantly improved our understanding of hydraulic fracture growth in unconventional gas reservoirs (primarily shale) and has led to better stimulation designs. However, the overall effectiveness of stimulation treatments is difficult to determine from MS mapping because the location of proppant and the distribution of conductivity in the fracture network cannot be measured (and are critical parameters that control well performance). Therefore, it is important to develop reservoir-modeling approaches that properly characterize fluid flow in and the properties of a complex fracture network, tight matrix, and primary hydraulic fracture (if present) to evaluate well performance and understand critical parameters that affect gas recovery. This paper illustrates the impact of gas desorption on production profile and ultimate gas recovery in shale reservoirs, showing that in some shale-gas reservoirs desorption may be a minor component of gas recovery. In addition, the paper details the impact of changing closure stress distribution in the fracture network on well productivity and gas recovery. In shale-gas reservoirs with lower Young's modulus rock, stress-dependent network-fracture conductivity may reduce ultimate gas recovery significantly. The paper includes an example that contrasts the application of numerical reservoir simulation and advanced decline-curve analyses to illustrate issues associated with conventional production-data-analysis techniques when applied to unconventional reservoirs. Selected examples from the Barnett shale are included that incorporate MS fracture mapping and production data to illustrate the application of production modeling to evaluate well performance in unconventional gas reservoirs. This paper highlights production modeling and analysis techniques that aid in evaluating stimulation and completion strategies in unconventional gas reservoirs.

Chapter 1: What Do Middle Eastern Armies Do? - Barry Rubin. Chapter 2: Why Arab Armies Lose Wars but Defeat Insurgencies - Norvell B. DeAtkine. Chapter 3: The Iran-Iraq War: Will Without Means - Joana Dodds and Benjamin Wilson. Chapter 4: The Lessons of the Jihadist Insurgency in Saudi Arabia - Hassan Mneimneh. Chapter 5: Egypt's Civil War - Barry Rubin. Chapter 6: Terrorism as a Military Factor: the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Era, 1993-2000 - Boaz Ganor. Chapter 7: Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War - Jonathan Spyer. Chapter 8: Lebanon's Militia Wars - Antoine Badran. Chapter 9: The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains - Lester Grau. Chapter 10: The Morocco-Polisario War for Western Sahara, 1975-1991 - Jacob Mundy. Chapter 11: Islamism and Insurgency in Post-Independence Algeria - Yahia Zoubir. Chapter 12: Iraq and U.S. Military Doctrine - William McCallister. Chapter 13: Innovation and War: The U.S. Military and the Iraq Insurgency - James Russell.

The dream of pan-Arab nationalism - the idea that all Arabs could and must be united in a single state - has had an effect on Middle East history as compelling as that of Marxism on modern Europe. While both ideologies had lost appeal by the 1990s, that of pan-Arab nationalism continued to exercise an intellectual hegemony far in excess of that parallel utopian philosophy in Europe. Whereas in Europe, nationalism focused predominantly on the individual nation-state, the nation in the Middle East was supposed to incorporate all Arabs; existing states were merely shards of the whole. Inasmuch as the Arabs chose a European model, it was the unifications of Italy and Germany. Identity was believed destined to create a state rather than the state consolidating a new identity. This gap between reality and ideology was a major factor shaping the turmoil and seeming political perversity of the modern Middle East. Arab politicians and states engaged in constant battle; relations with the West were largely conditioned on the regional competition. Some leaders were reluctant participants in this game, pressured by foreign Arab rivals, domestic enemies, or fear of their own people's passions; others chased Arab leadership out of conviction or ambition. The root motive of this restlessness was the perception that something was unacceptably wrong with the world. Arab and Islamic societies were weaker and poorer than those in the West, though they considered themselves superior. Their centuries-long decline left them asking, as in the title of a 1930s article by Shakib Arslan, 'Why are Moslems Lagging Behind the Christians?' Arslan believed in panIslam, seeing Moslem unity as the answer to Western predominance. His brother, Adil, became a pan-Arab activist, believing that all Arabs must unite under a single government. Both men were struggling with the same paradox.