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En 2019, le prix de la Sveriges Riksbank en sciences économiques en Mémoire d’Alfred Nobel était décerné à trois des principaux promoteurs des expérimentations aléatoires (Randomized Controlled Trials – RCT), pour leur contribution essentielle à la lutte contre la pauvreté. Utilisée de longue date en médecine, l’expérimentation devient aujourd’hui la référence dans le champ des politiques économiques et sociales. Cette suprématie est-elle scientifiquement légitime, éthiquement satisfaisante et politiquement désirable ? Les RCT ont-elles réellement « considérablement amélioré notre capacité à combattre la pauvreté », dont la pandémie de Covid-19 a encore accru l’urgence ? À quelles questions permettent-elles de répondre et quelles autres sont laissées de côté ? Cet ouvrage de référence réunit 26 spécialistes mondiaux sur ce thème (y compris deux éminents lauréats du prix Nobel d’économie), issus d’origines différentes et d’un large spectre de disciplines (économie, statistique, anthropologie, philosophie, santé publique, etc.). Il présente, dans un langage accessible à tous, les principales forces et faiblesses des RCT dans le champ du développement : comment elles fonctionnent, ce qu’on peut en attendre, pourquoi parfois elles échouent, comment elles pourraient être améliorées, et pourquoi d’autres méthodes sont à la fois utiles et nécessaires.

Ce chapitre présente les débats autour des expérimentations randomisées dans le secteur de l’eau, de l’assainissement et de l’hygiène (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene – WASH), et en tire des enseignements pour les politiques de développement en général. L’assainissement est un cas intéressant, d’une part parce que l’amélioration des systèmes sanitaires est largement reconnue comme un élément essentiel du processus de développement, d’autre part car les interventions dans le secteur WASH sont souvent moins adaptées aux expérimentations randomisées que d’autres sujets appartenant aux sciences de la santé ou à l’économie du développement. Le présent chapitre traite d’une série récente d’évaluations randomisées qui, loin de régler définitivement les questions importantes des politiques d’assainissement en milieu rural, ont ravivé la confusion et le débat dans ce domaine. En effet, même des interventions sanitaires parfaitement conçues et mises en œuvre peuvent produire des effets qui diffèrent de l’une à l’autre ou en fonction des différents contextes, et les faits et théories issus de sources autres que les RCT sont nécessaires (en complément de celles-ci) pour apporter des réponses complètes et opportunes aux problématiques des politiques d’assainissement. Enfin, nous argumentons en faveur d’un recours accru aux RCT dans le secteur WASH sur un point qu’elles pourraient permettre d’éclairer en particulier : répondre à des questions concernant les comportements, plutôt que la santé elle-même.

Table providing full details of Cochrane risk of bias assessment for the WASH-Benefits and SHINE trials (Word document). (DOCX 18 kb)

This paper studies how self-help groups—village-based organizations designed to encourage savings, household production and social cohesion among the poor—can promote economic and social capital. The paper uses survey data and a wide array of social capital measures to assess the impact of a pilot program that was randomly rolled out in rural villages in Cambodia. The study finds that the program encouraged savings and associations via self-help groups. However it did not improve social capital measured by household and network surveys and lab activities that gauge trust, trustworthiness and the willingness to contribute to public goods. The findings contradict recent work that has found significant positive impacts of such groups on social capital. This paper evaluates community-wide impacts while most previous studies focus on program participants. In addition, the empirical strategy is based on a broader array of social capital measures, including behavioral indicators, suggesting that finding impacts of such programs on social capital is sensitive to the measurement strategy.

Deliberative decision-making processes are becoming increasingly important around the world to make important decisions about public and private goods allocation, but there is very little empirical evidence about how they actually work. In this paper the authors use data from India extracted from 131 transcripts of village meetings matched with data from household surveys conducted in the same villages prior to the meetings, to study whose preferences are reflected in the meetings. The meetings are constitutionally empowered to make decisions about public and private goods. The findings show that the more land a person owns, the higher the likelihood her preference is mentioned in the meeting, the longer the amount of time spent discussing this preference, and the higher the likelihood that a decision to provide or repair this public or private good is taken. At the same time, the voices of disadvantaged castes, while not dominating the meeting, are also heard. By contrast, the preferences of Muslims are given less time. High village literacy and the presence of higher level officials during village meetings mitigate the power of the landed, but political reservations for low castes for the post of village president increase the power of the landed.

Deliberative decision-making processes are becoming increasingly important around the world to make important decisions about public and private goods allocation, but there is very little empirical evidence about how they actually work. In this paper the authors use data from India extracted from 131 transcripts of village meetings matched with data from household surveys conducted in the same villages prior to the meetings, to study whose preferences are reflected in the meetings. The meetings are constitutionally empowered to make decisions about public and private goods. The findings show that the more land a person owns, the higher the likelihood her preference is mentioned in the meeting, the longer the amount of time spent discussing this preference, and the higher the likelihood that a decision to provide or repair this public or private good is taken. At the same time, the voices of disadvantaged castes, while not dominating the meeting, are also heard. By contrast, the preferences of Muslims are given less time. High village literacy and the presence of higher level officials during village meetings mitigate the power of the landed, but political reservations for low castes for the post of village president increase the power of the landed.

The first two essays examine the functioning of two local governance institutions empowered or created by the 73rd amendment to the Indian constitution. First, I look at village meetings which were given real decision-making powers by the constitutional amendment, thus becoming real deliberative spaces. The setting of village meetings allows me to study deliberative democracy, a frequently discussed but infrequently empirically examined alternative to preference aggregation (such as through voting). In particular, by using village meetings transcripts and linking them with a household survey, I am able to investigate the relationship between group and individual characteristics, and voice. My main findings show that not all villagers are equally heard in the meetings. I find that the deliberations are not equitable, relative to norms of equal influence relative to group size, and of equal time dedicated to each participant. Second, I look at political reservations for women, mandated by the same constitutional amendment. By using a household survey that includes the household of the village leader, I am able to examine whether the leaders in reserved constituencies are token women, chosen from among the weak women of the village only to be controlled by the traditional elites. I find that the women leaders are not weak, as they are among the younger, wealthier and more knowledgeable women in the village. In addition to this finding about the selection of women, I am also comparing the policy outcomes between reserved and unreserved constituencies. I find that women perform no differently from men in terms of provision of public goods, but also that women perform worse than men in terms of meeting with upper level officials. A finding that emphasizes the antagonism between women leaders and the traditional elites, is that women leaders' performance is negatively affected by the concentration of landowner-ship in the hands of the upper castes. In the third essay I examine the role of gubernatorial political incentives in the provision of assistance to the elderly in the early years of social security in the United States. I find that assistance to the elderly is higher when the term limit is not binding. Furthermore, as predicted by my theoretic model, I find that the term limit effect is present only in the states where the fraction elderly takes on moderate values. In addition the term limit effect is smaller when political competition is less intense. These findings combined suggest that assistance to elderly is shaped by the electoral incentives of the state governor. Finally, in the fourth essay, I examine the change in the likelihood of voting due to a weather shock. In particular, I find that the decrease in the likelihood of voting due to rain during the election day is higher for less educated, relative to more educated individuals. One hypothesis that I put forward is that individuals who experience a lower drop in the likelihood of voting due to rain act strategically because they realize that their vote is likely to weigh more given that overall voting presence is reduced. An important assumption that I make is that, conditional on the comprehensive set of observable individual characteristics, the increase in the cost of voting due to rain is equal across individuals. Using measures of rain for specific time intervals during the election day I make comparisons between individuals for whom this important assumption may hold.

Despite efforts to mandate and finance local governments' provision of environmental sanitation services, outcomes remain poor in the villages surveyed in the four South Indian states. The analysis indicates some key issues that appear to hinder improvements in sanitation. Local politicians tend to capture sanitary infrastructure and cleaning services for themselves, while also keeping major village roads reasonably well-served. Their decisions suggest, however, that they neither understand the health benefits of sanitation, nor the negative externalities to their own health if surrounding areas are poorly served. Our findings suggest that improving sanitary outcomes requires disseminating information on the public goods nature of their health benefits, as well as on the local government's responsibilities. It also requires putting public health regulations in place, along with measures to enable accountability in service provision.