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Shield-nose and Coral snakes (Aspidelaps spp.) are medium sized venomous snakes found throughout southern Africa. Little is known about the venom of these snakes and its clinical relevance, as human bites are uncommon. Neurological signs and symptoms usually develop following bites by this genus but evaluations of the severity are inconclusive. We report on the first confirmed human fatality by the Kunene Shield-nose Snake (Aspidelaps lubricus cowlesi) in a child. Envenomation by Aspidelaps and other snakes considered lesser-venomous - especially those possessing neurotoxic venom - should be treated with caution as they may result in life-threatening envenomation without established clinical management protocols., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

How states and great powers rise and fall is an intriguing enigma of human history. Are there any patterns? Do polities become more vulnerable over time as they age? We analyze longevity in hundreds of premodern states using survival analysis to help provide initial insights into these questions. This approach is commonly used to study the risk of death in biological organisms or failure in mechanical systems. The results reveal that the risk of state termination increased steeply over approximately the first two centuries after formation and stabilized thereafter. This provides the first quantitative support for the hypothesis that the resilience of political states decreases over time. Potential mechanisms that could drive such declining resilience include environmental degradation, increasing complexity, growing inequality, and extractive institutions. While the cases are from premodern times, such dynamics and drivers of vulnerability may remain relevant today., Competing Interests: Competing interests statement:The authors declare no competing interest.

Prudent risk management requires consideration of bad-to-worst-case scenarios. Yet, for climate change, such potential futures are poorly understood. Could anthropogenic climate change result in worldwide societal collapse or even eventual human extinction? At present, this is a dangerously underexplored topic. Yet there are ample reasons to suspect that climate change could result in a global catastrophe. Analyzing the mechanisms for these extreme consequences could help galvanize action, improve resilience, and inform policy, including emergency responses. We outline current knowledge about the likelihood of extreme climate change, discuss why understanding bad-to-worst cases is vital, articulate reasons for concern about catastrophic outcomes, define key terms, and put forward a research agenda. The proposed agenda covers four main questions: 1) What is the potential for climate change to drive mass extinction events? 2) What are the mechanisms that could result in human mass mortality and morbidity? 3) What are human societies' vulnerabilities to climate-triggered risk cascades, such as from conflict, political instability, and systemic financial risk? 4) How can these multiple strands of evidence-together with other global dangers-be usefully synthesized into an "integrated catastrophe assessment"? It is time for the scientific community to grapple with the challenge of better understanding catastrophic climate change.

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues., Competing Interests: Authors TM and HS are affiliated with Opencell. KM is affiliated with Biosecure Ltd. Arcadia provided support in the form of salaries for authors WS and CR. There are no patents, products in development or marketed products to declare. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.

Horizon scanning is intended to identify the opportunities and threats associated with technological, regulatory and social change. In 2017 some of the present authors conducted a horizon scan for bioengineering (Wintle et al., 2017). Here we report the results of a new horizon scan that is based on inputs from a larger and more international group of 38 participants. The final list of 20 issues includes topics spanning from the political (the regulation of genomic data, increased philanthropic funding and malicious uses of neurochemicals) to the environmental (crops for changing climates and agricultural gene drives). The early identification of such issues is relevant to researchers, policy-makers and the wider public., Competing Interests: LK, LA, CB, RB, RC, MD, AD, RH, LH, AM, CN, SÓ, NP, WP, VR, CR, CR, AR, PS, CS, LS, ET, GU, BW, NZ, WS No competing interests declared, NE Has received funding in the past five years from the following organizations to conduct research and speak on issues related to this article: Greenwall Foundation; Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology; Davis Foundation; National Science Foundation. Has participated in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGem) competition as a judge and a member of the Safety Committee several times over the past five years. KH Has participated in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGem) competition as a judge and a member of the Safety Committee several times over the past five years; has accepted travel funding from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology. TK Holds a grant from the Open Philanthropy Foundation to study DIYbio, including gene drives; member of the IUCN task force on synthetic biology and gene drives; co-chair of the human practices committee of iGEM; member of the biosafety/security advisory board for MIT Broad Foundry; has been affiliated with the Genetic Biocontrol of Invasive Rodents consortium at NC State but has never received any salary or other compensation. PM Co-founder of Biosecure Ltd. JN Listed as an inventor on multiple patents; most relevant patent is US 2019/0323022 A1 and family. Acted as a consultant to BASF (2014-2019). AO Director of the Industrial Biotechnology Alliance, Norwich Research Park; trustee with the New Phytologist Trust. MP Recipient of a grant and a gift from the Open Philanthropy Foundation to study biosecurity at Stanford university; volunteer director of the human practices committee of the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) Foundation; member of the board of directors of Revive & Restore. EP Holds shares in Celixir Ltd and Arkurity Ltd; has received payment from Deep Science Ventures Ltd, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Revive & Restore, Celixir Ltd, Arkurity Ltd, CSIRO, International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Biosecure. DS, RS Involved in a consultancy for the ERA-CoBioTech programme (an ERA-Net network funded by Horizon 2020)., (© 2020, Kemp et al.)