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Objectives:In 1950, Kurt Schneider proposed that a considerable number of schizophrenia patients develop first-rank symptoms (FRS). In such cases, patients report made experiences, replaced control of will, thought insertion, broadcast or withdrawal and delusional perception, respectively. Although a number of recent studies tend to explain FRS in terms of neurobiological and neuropsychological processes, the origin of these symptoms still remains unknown. In this paper, we explore the subjective experience of patients with the following two FRS: (1) "made" impulses and (2) “made" volitional acts. Method:The method applied for the study of two FRS consists first in the overview of psychiatric and philosophical literature and second in the further investigation of subjective experience in patients with FRS. Psychopathological and phenomenological aspects of FRS are discussed by means of patient cases. Results:We discovered a profound transformation of intentionality and agency in schizophrenia patients with body-affecting FRS. This concept offers an insight into the interrelatedness between particular FRS. Conclusion:We propose that the subjective experience of schizophrenia patients with body-affecting FRS is rooted in the disturbance of intentionality and diminished sense of agency. This theoretical account of body-affecting FRS will open up new directions in both phenomenological and neurobiological psychiatric research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Depth electrode recordings in the human mesial frontal cortex have revealed individual neurons with mirror properties. A third of these cells have excitatory properties during action execution and inhibitory properties during action observation. These cells - which we call super mirror neurons - provide the neural mechanism that implements the functions of layers 3+4 of the shared circuits model (SCM). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the second year, children's copying behaviour shifts from a focus on emulating to a focus on imitating. This shift can be explained by a change in focus from copying others to satisfy cognitive motivations to copying in order to satisfy social motivations. As elegant and detailed as the shared circuits model (SCM) is, it misses this crucial, motivation-based feature of imitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The empirical support for the shared circuits model (SCM) is mixed. We review recent results from our own lab and others supporting a central claim of SCM that mirroring occurs at multiple levels of representation. By contrast, the model is silent as to why human infants are capable of showing imitative behaviours mediated by a mirror system. This limitation is a problem with formal models that address neither the neural correlates nor the behavioural evidence directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]