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Bringing the literature on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state capitalism in conversation with studies on offshore financial centers (OFCs), this paper dissects the post-2000 internationalization of Russian SOE Gazprom via the OFC of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Not adhering to the conventional financial logics of private firms, nor exclusively following political orders of the Kremlin, Gazprom is one of the exemplary state-capital hybrids of the new state capitalism. Where Gazprom steadily increased Russia's geopolitical leverage over Europe's energy needs prior to the 2022 military invasion of Ukraine, we stress that "it takes two to tango", as the internationalization of Gazprom could not have occurred without active and passive help of capitalist states elsewhere. We argue that the Netherlands functions as a transnational capitalist state in the service of foreign capital, including state capital, with Amsterdam's corporate services providers having long provided the legal stepping stones and corporate respectability enabling Gazprom to expand internationally. In this sense, the prevalent "othering" of SOEs and state capital neglects how the global ascent of state capitalism could not have happened without dedicated assistance orchestrated in leading Western OFCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore a major European competition decision, the 2012-18 Gazprom case, using a global gas market simulation model. We find that access to LNG markets alone is insufficient to counterbalance Gazprom's strategic behaviour; central and eastern Europe (CEE) needs to be well interconnected with bidirectional flow capability. 'Swap deals' created by the decision facilitate CEE market integration, while limiting Gazprom's potential market power. Such deals may increase the diversity of contracted gas and number of market players, but do not improve physical supply diversity. In the next five years, swap deals could marginally impact negatively the utilization of strategic assets in CEE, but since Gazprom's commitments expire by mid-2026, utilization of these strategic assets may fall considerably, especially if Gazprom withholds supplies. As an unintended consequence, CEE markets may disintegrate from the rest of Europe. Avoiding such outcomes will require further gas market reforms, particularly, market design for gas transportation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis in this paper was performed before the disastrous and unsolicited invasion of Russia to Ukraine. The paper aims to identify if the biggest Russian gas exporter Gazprom used market power to decouple its gas prices from European gas hub benchmarks. The empirical analysis is based on pairwise price convergence between the Russian pipeline and European gas hubs. The main finding shows that Gazprom takes advantage of its market position. The proposed model does not support the company's claims of pipeline price tightness to liquid European gas hubs, and rather proves fluctuating and unstable price convergence between pipelines and hubs from 2016 to March 2020, right before the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, a robust and trendy-stable price convergence is observed between the Russian pipeline gas and Brent benchmark. Methodologically, the paper contributes with a modified convergence model compliant with gas market fundamentals and suggests a time-expanding concept missed in previous studies. Ongoing political and European gas market developments of 2022 (during the paper review) support the conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last period, the energy issue and the concept of “energy security” has been firmly consolidated in the political and public discussions in Chisinau and Tiraspol, however, often used against economic opportunities. The geo-energy significance of the Republic of Moldova is determined by its position. However, since the independence of the Republic of Moldova, the energy security of the republic continues to be threatened by the Transnistrian conflict. For the Republic of Moldova, which does not have primary energy resources and depends on their import, the issue of energy supply remains critical for the functioning and development of the state. In the context of the political negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, the energy problem remains difficult to solve. At the same time, the energy infrastructure of the Republic of Moldova is characterized by the high dependence of the right bank of the Dniester on the electricity production on the left bank of the Dniester and on the transit gas pipelines that cross the Transnistrian region. In this sense, energy, which is “essential for economic and social development and improving the quality of people's lives”, as stated by the UN in Agenda 21 from 1992, becomes an additional problem of the Transnistrian case. Taking into account the connection between human security and its energy component, the article proposes a research into the origin and evolution of the energy issue of the Transnistrian case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sustainable development of the large-scale oil and gas industry is necessary to preserve the environment in Russia. Today, when growing volumes of the global production increase the demand for raw materials, rapid expanding production rates often can be achieved through outdated technological processes which negatively affects the ecosystem and society. Oil and gas corporations take responsibility for implementing sustainable development strategies. The implementation of key performance indicators (KPIs) is one of the management tools to monitor socially responsible activities. The authors studied Gazprom and Zarubezhneft's environmental trends from the perspective of these indicators based on innovation development programs (IDPs), publications and corporate annual reports. Major challenges were related to changing corporate methods of metrics calculation, the lack of generally accepted methodology of environmental KPIs implementation, which complicated the study. Based on the previous research, this study enhances the current view on the role of IDPs in shaping Russian oil and gas corporations' environmental performance. Comparative analysis of environmental performance of global oil and gas corporations was conducted in order to assess the functioning of the selected Russian corporations according to the general practice. The study has shown that Gazprom might fail to achieve its current environmental benchmarks which corresponds the overall global trends as energy companies have lately been facing challenges in improving their sustainability performance. The important aspect of Gazprom innovation strategy has been identified: while most major greenhouse gas emitters are also the key investors in research and development (R&D), the leading Russian company has fixed one of the lowest R&D expenditures/ revenues ratios in the industry. This practice is not considered to be typical for other Russian oil and gas companies with IDPs. Since innovations are the key drivers of sustainable development, it is suggested that a legally fixed R&D budget in state-owned companies might be introduced in order to stimulate environmental performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Russian gas export scenarios to Europe, considering infrastructure, long-term contracts (LTC), and the new geopolitical landscape in Europe. Short-term expectations preclude export growth, while Ukraine transit risks stem from military actions, sanctions, or termination of the transit contract. Export volume may recover in a benign post-conflict resolution, though not to pre-war levels. Available export infrastructure options include the Ukraine transit and the TurkStream pipeline, with a combined capacity of 75 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma), about 50% of Russia's exports in 2021. Gazprom's LTC position will also dictate possible export volume to Europe. Pre-Ukraine war, Gazprom held 135bcma of LTCs with EU buyers. Currently, only 25bcma is active, with the rest terminated or under legal review. Of the remaining LTC, 12bcma faces risk if the Ukraine transit ends in 2025. Considering these issues, we model baseline and counterfactual scenarios with flows from Russia from 0 to 75bcma. Results suggest gas price differences are prominent until 2026 due to a tight global gas market. Beyond 2026, LNG expansion and Europe's decarbonisation commitments lessen the price impact, making Russian gas economically irrelevant. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the divisive issue of Russian gas becomes economically insignificant by mid-decade. • Russian gas supply scenarios to Europe considering geopolitics, contracts, economics, and infrastructure. • Short-term expectations suggest no supply growth, while disruption of flows through Ukraine remains high. • Until 2026, European buyers would benefit from any increased availability of Russian gas. • Buying more Russian gas before 2026 is politically infeasible or morally unacceptable. • The potential economic impact of Russian pipeline gas is set to decline sharply from the mid-decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses a neglected question about the effects of dispersed authority in the European Union (EU) on the EU's ability to manage external contestations. It investigates authority challenges from two major external actors in the energy, and specifically the gas sector, and scrutinizes the management of authority conflicts at local sites in different EU states in the Baltic Sea region. The second Russian transboundary submarine gas infrastructure project Nord Stream 2 (NS2), owned and managed by a whole-owned subsidiary of the Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom, serves as an illustrative case study. It reveals how multiple authority conflicts at different sites and levels, and the challenges from both the Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States of America (USA), played out, and why formal adjudication has been a primary tool for the EU and several of its member states to assert their authority and manage contestations at the local, national and EU level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reform of the Russian domestic natural gas sector has been discussed for several decades but has not been carried out. The state-controlled energy company Gazprom holds a dominant position in the domestic market, supplying the population with gas, carrying out societal functions, and in return getting privileges from the state. Recently, however, independent gas producers have increased their market shares and are lobbying for liberalization. While Gazprom might gain from reform, it continues to warn against the dangers of altering the gas market structure too abruptly. Analyzing Gazprom’s reasoning through an ideational analytical lens, this article finds that Gazprom’s reluctance to change can be explained not only by its interests but also by norms and beliefs. Reform studies should take note of Gazprom’s idea of “keeping the country together,” not least because the company has a sounding board in the President, who makes the final decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the results of evidence-based research into the behaviour of Gazprom and the relevant behaviour of the Russian government in selected countries of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Belarus). The authors’ aim was to determine the scope of involvement by the Russian government in problems that have arisen in supplying these states, and the degree to which these issues have been linked with Gazprom’s conduct and Russia’s foreign policy toward the countries. Another interest was to seek out the key factors that may determine this behaviour in particular environments. To address these goals, the authors monitored specific indicators defined by the strategic approach to energy security (indicators that uncover governmental support, the linking of foreign policy to gas supplies, and misuse of a dominant market position). The core of the research underlying the paper was organized as a set of individual idiographic, theory-guided case studies. Data were gathered from official documents, statistics, articles, analytical studies, and from semi-structured interviews with experts. The exploration revealed that Gazprom has behaved in such a way as to indicate that it is being used as a tool of foreign policy, but the primary factor controlling its behaviour remains the environment in which the company is operating. Two points were crucial: implementation of the IEM rules and—above all—the diversification of sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central argument which is advanced by this article is that, whilst there is no outright obligation in Brussels I which prevents parallel proceedings between a court action and arbitration between the same parties and concerning a similar cause of action, the revisions in the recast Brussels I, along with the Gazprom interpretation of key non-revised parts of Brussels I, do certainly provide improved support for international commercial arbitration. These do so by giving more scope to national courts to restrict Parallel Proceedings; through anti-suit injunctions issued by an arbitral tribunal; through finding parties taking parallel court action to be in breach of the arbitration agreement; and by giving primacy to the arbitral award where it is irreconcilable with a parallel court judgment. The authors particularly demonstrate that this is made possible because of a changed (diminished) role which is given to the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) post Gazprom and Brussels I. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although officially Russian state-owned energy companies operate as independent entities, their actions often lead to suspicion that they are acting as a tool of Russian state foreign policy. Countries on the southeastern borders of Europe – Bulgaria and Greece – are prime examples of where this might be the case, since they not only have a central position in Russia’s plans to penetrate European markets through new transport infrastructure but are also part of competing plans for routing non-Russian gas to Western markets. The main focus of the present research is on the natural gas and oil sectors, as these are the traditional foundation of Russian energy exports to Europe. The aim of this paper is thus to provide an objective, evidence-based analysis of Russian activities in the natural gas and oil sectors of Greece and Bulgaria in order to establish whether its actions have been implicitly or explicitly politicized and have served to strengthen Russian influence in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The growth strategies of the two largest so-called independent Russian gas producers – Novatek and Rosneft – as well as developments in international markets and changing domestic energy needs have put pressure on the present Russian gas sector model dominated by Gazprom. The three companies are involved in a struggle over export liberalization as well as the conditions in the domestic market. Liquefied natural gas is top priority for Novatek and Rosneft’s main gas focus is on eastern Russia and Asia, but there is still room for considerable tension with Gazprom. The government wants to both improve Russia’s position in export markets and maintain stable domestic supplies, including to socially disadvantaged regions and institutions. Gazprom is insisting that if further access to export markets is granted to the Independents, then they must take greater responsibility for domestic market obligations. On the other hand, the key Independents seem intent on stopping or slowing down their expansion in the domestic market in order to prioritize export sales, and will certainly not take broader domestic supply responsibilities without better access to export markets. The balancing of policies involves strong players on the Russian economic and political scene, all with ties to the Kremlin. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article we focus on the interconnection of the natural gas infrastructure in Eastern Europe. We identify three distinct factors that together deeply influenced the contemporary trends at the regional gas market: the gas crises at the security level, the European energy policy at the policy level, and the unconventional revolution at the economics level. Within this framework, we analyze the contemporary infrastructure development and its contribution to the change in the market design from bilateral long-term arrangements toward hub-based short-term trading. Finally, we elaborate on the additional obstacles that slow down this market transformation as well as identify its “winners” and “losers”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing number of scholarly works in the field of archaeology and heritage studies have been investigating the role of culture in relationship management. By assessing the use of heritage and repatriation of archaeological finds by multinational Gazprom, a natural gas company, in the Russian Federation, this paper contributes to this heritage diplomacy research by critically repositioning some of its core paradigms and its predominant emphasis on interstate diplomatic processes. As explored in this paper, archaeology and heritage are cultural technologies that have to be framed in the broader statecraft policies of the nation state, and are enmeshed with different types of power and include a plethora of agents. By exploring a case study investigating the corporate security initiatives of a resource extraction and transport giant in Russia, this paper contributes to the extensive literature on neoliberalism, corporate social responsibility and federalism in newly developing economies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines Russian competitiveness in the global natural gas industry. Topics discussed include the legal and logistics challenges facing Russia's natural gas exports and the factors affecting the Russian natural gas sector's international competitiveness, including the globalization of the hydrocarbon trade, the economic sanctions imposed against the country and the European Commission's (EC) legal moves against the Russian gas company, Gazprom.

The coming into force of the Brussels I Recast on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and the recent development in the Gazprom case appears to have ignited the debate on the position of anti-suit injunctions in the European judicial area. Although anti-suit injunctions have been prohibited by the CJEU in the Turner and West Tankers cases, it has been argued that anti-suit injunctions may be permissible in the context of arbitration under the new Brussels I Recast, the current EU instrument regulating the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. It is therefore necessary to examine the position of anti-suit injunctions under the new legislative framework. This article will also examine the relationship between arbitral anti-suit orders and the Brussels I Regulation and its Recast. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the power relations that increasingly prevail and the mistrust that the Ukrainian crisis has exacerbated since 2014, the natural gas industry lies at the center of political tensions between the European Union and Russian Federation. However this deterioration in relations has its origins in endemic structural problems from before the 2014 gas crisis. The piping of Russian gas and the rising price of the gas delivered in Ukraine (two issues that are hard to separate), the application of new EU legislation, the system used by Gazprom to set different prices for natural gas, and the payment by Ukraine of what it owes for Russian gas have been hotly debated. Light is shed on these issues, which have set Russians, Europeans and Ukrainians at odds. Different viewpoints are presented and compared by taking into account political, economic, geographic and historical aspects so as to better understand the different stances adopted in the “natural gas dialog". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Tokyo-based economist and a noted western economic geographer, both specializing in the hydrocarbon resources of Russia, apply the framework of governance studies in an effort to gain a deeper understanding of the recent changes in the country's energy policy-making. The authors argue that, unlike the international relations paradigm prevailing in studies of Russia's energy policy, the country's multiple roles in the international energy arena (as producer, consumer, exporter, importer, and transit state) warrant a more nuanced approach, reflecting Russian energy policy's flexibility over time and diversity across space. This paper endeavors, therefore, to apply a political economy and governance perspective to an understanding of the significant changes in Russia's energy policy-making regarding its dynamic energy relations with the Northeast Asia (NEA; China, Japan, and South Korea). In exploring the complex interactions between Russia's internal energy policy-making and its emerging energy relations in NEA, the authors addresses three key questions, namely: (1) how Russia's Asian energy policy corresponds to its domestic needs, (2) how much coherence in energy governance and cooperation exists between Russia and the Northeast Asian states at the institutional and organizational levels, and (3) the extent to which Russia's expectations for increased energy cooperation with the Northeast Asian states are likely to materialize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interview with president of the World Politics and Resources Fund and chairman of the Management Committee of the International Group of Companies, known as "SoyusNefteGaz," Yuri Shafranik is presented. He discusses challenges facing the Russian gas industry as of 2013, particularly the global financial crisis. He also discusses Russian national energy resources, the shale gas industry, and Russian cooperation with the U.S. and China.

Although the energy trade is the single most important element of nearly all European countries’ relations with Russia, Europe has been divided by both worldview and practice. Why, in the face of the common challenge of dependence on imported Russian gas, have national reactions to such vulnerability varied so dramatically across the continent? And why have a handful of French, German, and Italian corporations somehow taken responsibility for formulating the energy strategy – and thus the Russia policy – for essentially all of Europe? The resolutions of these two puzzles are, I show, interlinked; they also demand theoretical innovation. With several case studies – of Gazprom's decision-making during the 2006 and 2009 gas crises, and of the response of western and central Europe to their gas dependence – I find that: firms are driving these political outcomes; those firms are motivated by profits but employ sociological conventions along their ways; and firms generally seek the necessary inter-firm, cross-border cooperation that will deliver corporate performance. Finally, I conclude that the field will ultimately require a framework that puts firms at its center. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The main purpose of this article is 1) to analyze the current status of the Russo-Korean pipeline natural gas (PNG) project; 2) to discuss major issues involved in this project; 3) to demonstrate costs and benefits of the projects from the viewpoints of various participants; and, 4) to forecast the future of this project. Mainly through literature review, the authors show that the idea of the Russo-Korean PNG project began to be discussed among the related parties in the early 1990s, and several feasibility studies have been undertaken since then. Though there has been a complex interplay among Russia, China, North and South Koreas, the pipeline from Vladivostok is ready to connect if North Korea can be viewed as a reliable partner. Although there is a fundamental convergence of interests among major participants from economic as well as political points of view, political risks will be incalculable, once the required investments are made. This is because North Korea will have additional leverage over South Korea by having the pipeline within its own territory. In addition, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea are in a situation of trilateral monopoly negotiation. In this situation, North Korea and Russia can demand to increase prices until the marginal benefits of South Korea equal zero. In addition, Observers may argue that the separation of political and economic issues can reduce the risks involved in this project, but historical experiences strongly suggest that it will not be possible. Price volatility of the PNG and transit fees is another issue as shown in the Ukraine case, which increased the transit fees over 100% in less than two years. In short, the Russo-Korean PNG project may be seen as a very attractive business arrangement from an economic point of view, but the political costs will be insurmountable unless North Korea becomes a reliable partner, which may not be realized for a long time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes why formation of policy networks, which is an effective tool of European policy in different spheres, have lost significant part of its positive functions from the point of view of guaranteeing European energy security in case of European-Russian gas policy networks. This can be explained by the absence of effective international regime in gas trade as well as by failed transition to democracy, market economy and rule of law in Russia. As a result of this, German, Italian and French leaders involved into European- Russian gas policy networks face serious moral, legal and political dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the level of understanding and trust between Russia and China. Topics include the working visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to China from October 11-12, 2011, the agreement of the majority of Chinese experts to discusses the media between two governments, and the decision of both the country against the discussion of gas during the visit of Putin.

Rising gas production from nonconventional deposits in North America and the possibility of growth in the rest of the world pose a serious challenge to Russian energy interests. Although Russia has the largest proven gas reserves and is the number one exporter of fossil fuels, its position as a dominant gas supplier to the European Union (EU) is diminishing. This article examines the main problems of Russia's gas sector in the context of the shale gas revolution and the liberalization of the EU gas market. The article also analyses the perspectives of Russia's energy relations with EU countries and formulates some recommendations for them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. It examines governmental negotiations surrounding the project and comments on the involvement of oil companies Gazprom and Unocal and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The author also reflects on how military and political aspects of the Afghan War have impacted the project. Other topics addressed include pipeline security, particularly in Afghanistan and North Pakistan, and funding for the project.

The way how Russia ignores the EU's quest for liberalization and sustains a control over markets and supplies is directly related to her use of gas as leverage. Russia's strategy affects many European and non-European countries during all stages: demand, supply and transit. It is not, however, possible to generalize a common statement that the EU's position is based on a policy of market liberalization while Russia pursues an opposing strategy of increased state control. Russian energy strategy leads markets in Europe; sets tone for energy supplies at homeland and abroad, benefiting from a variety of means. This article shows how a symbiotic relationship between the Russian state and Russian energy companies emerge from a structure in which trade, markets and international politics have been embedded within the state interests and firm behavior. It identifies the economic and geopolitical trends with regard to recent developments of Russia's strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the Turkish-EU negotiations for the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement and the Turkish-EU membership talks to problematize Turkish leaders' tendency to establish linkages between their country's geo-strategic value and the EU accession process. It argues that Turkey's ability to gain strategic leverage depends on the formation of a winning coalition inside the EU in favour of its membership, which among other things, depends on the presence of a joint strategic outlook on the specific issue area. In the case of Nabucco negotiations, short of such consensus, there emerged an anchor credibility dilemma which both prevented linkages between geopolitical position and the accession process, and stalled strategic cooperation in energy security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A eulogy is presented for the Russian politician Viktor Chernomyrdin.

A transcript is provided of a Russian conference which was held on the topic of energy industries and the environment. Discussion and commentary is presented from individuals such as Yuri Shafranik, head of the Supreme Mining Council of Russia, Oleg Shamanov of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Aleksandr Ginzburg of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The article focuses on the development of oil and gas projects in Sakhalin Island, Russia. It states that in 2009, significant events in the field of Russian oil and gas industry took place as the Sakhalin Energy Investment Co. Ltd. (SEIC) launched the Sakhalin-1 and -2 projects oil and gas projects. It notes that the second term of Russian President Vladimir Putin was centered on oil and gas resource control. Moreover, issues connected with the Phase 3 of the Sakhalin-2 project are discussed.

This article discusses how policies dealing with the reduction of carbon emissions will affect the Russian natural gas industry. The article notes that Russia was hopeful that the climate change summit held in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009 would produce a policy to further cut carbon emissions around the world because it believes that it is necessary to mitigate the impact of climate change on human life. The article explains that natural gas is the most environmentally friendly of all the fossil fuels with lower emissions than oil or coal.

The relations between Russia and the EU countries have undergone an important distancing last years; even though, it is since 2007 when the bilateral ties reached the lowest level in the last two decades. Both the Russian and the European governments, still maintain different interests and priorities on international order affairs and have opposite postures in the way they must tackle many of the current regional and global problems. In addition, the energetic pressures and the bilateral negotiations with every European country represent strategies which Russia maintains toward Europe and have brought positive results. Nevertheless, the containment policy carried out toward Russia has prompted the beginning of the Russian rearmament. Both parts have a clear relation of dependence between themselves, and the current conditions might be adequate to change their situation of tension and prevailing mistrust. The major mistake of Europe toward Russia has been not considering a place for this Slavonic country inside the regional and international order, after the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes in detail the gasfields of East Siberia and the Russian Far East. In analyzing the prospects for their development, the author compares different concepts and introduces the reader to the positions of academics from the Siberian Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The development of gas deposits for the gasification of the region and for export is deemed a prerequisite for solving the problems of eastern Russia's socio-economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few years a number of developing countries have emerged as global economic powers. This resulted from a rise in oil and commodity prices, foreign direct investments and a global shift in production. Much of this growth has been guided by governments and under the control of state corporations leading to the phenomenon of statist globalization. Most observers see the emergence of developing countries in the context of nation-centric power struggles. But statist globalizers are part of the transnational capitalist class integrated at levels of production and finance. the result is a deepening of globalization, not a return to nation-centric competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a comparative view concerning the fiscal policies in Russia pertaining to its oil sector, with the relevant measures in Australia, Canada, Norway, Great Britain and U.S. It provides an analysis on the net present value shares resulting from the oil deposit development accruing to the government and to investors in the Russia before 2007 and from 2008 to January 2009. It concludes that the incentives made by the tax system and the extent of risk sharing between the taxpayer and the government are the two of the two most relevant factors in the fiscal regime design for oil producers and for any risky economic activities in general.

The article presents forecast on the Russia’s future gas exports to Europe on the basis of projections of Russian gas production, domestic consumption in the Russia, gas demand in major European markets and the further development of transport infrastructure linking in two regions. It also includes a brief discussion of Russia’s gas imports from third countries in relation to its export capabilities. It suggests that Russia will be able to retain its market share in European gas markets, with Gazprom (Otkrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Gazprom) to remain the key player in future of European energy markets.

The article presents the results of the American economist’s research regarding the Eurasian network of natural gas pipelines. The study focuses on the considerable detail in the political importance of Russia’s substantial market power and its efforts to develop that power in 2008 and 2008. The study highlights the role of Gazprom (Otkrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Gazprom) as natural gas supplier to Europe and as the core of a monopoly controlling exports of natural gas from Russia and Central Asia.

The article examines the rise of direct state control in the Russia’s oil industry in light of international experience, noting the country’s unusual position among major oil-exporting countries in the extent of private ownership of its oil industry. It presents argumentation to the impact that in current Russian circumstance the political elite’s objectives to maintain monopoly on power and drawing resource rents may be serve better by allies who controlled private companies than by state concerns. Moreover, it suggests that any judgment that the oil industry will in time be wholly nationalized is premature.

The article reports on the study that examines the factors shaping the current debate regarding construction of a nuclear power station in the eastern of Mahileu, Belarus. The author analyzes the role played by a significant increase in the price of imported oil and gas from Russia and increasingly strained political relations between the two countries. It outlines the discussion within the country regarding energy and economic issues, the new power station, the new relationship with Russia, as well as offers a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of the nuclear power option.

The article reports on the overall trends in Russia's natural gas production in the years following the country's ruble devaluation and financial crisis. According to the author, the country's natural gas production has been rising from a low-water mark in 1997, showing a new situation in the industry. He added that the accounts are based on systematic observations, discussions/interviews with industry executives, and a review of industry sources focusing on factors affecting domestic supply and demand as well as the export capacity, regional patterns of production, obstacles of crude oil extraction, and major pipeline construction projects.

A key supplier of energy holds political power over an energy user. Paradoxically, however, the opposite can also be true. Examples include the relationship since the 1970s between the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the West, the 1980s debate about the building of a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe, and the American confrontation with Japan in 1940 and 1941. Among the possible explanations for such a paradox: a supplier's fear of profit loss, fear of desperate acts by the energy user, the possibility that a supplier becomes addicted to other goods produced by the energy user, and the relationship among large debtors, lenders, and investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Russia's natural gas consumption in the context of stationary energy use, particularly the close linkage between electricity and heat supply. This interdependence will largely determine the prospect of domestic demand and will restrict the extent of adjustment. The author also investigates the constraints on gas production, exports, and imports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the revenue from Russia's oil exports, Russia has moved from its near-bankrupt status after the August 1998 financial collapse to a situation where it is now a financial powerhouse. Although revenue from natural gas exports is not as large, Russia's natural gas pipelines into Europe bring Russia immense political clout. Putin has used Russia's oil and gas skillfully so that the country is once again a superpower—emphasis on power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gazprom's long-term production capacity has been a source of concern both domestically and internationally. It has resisted major development projects out of concern for their high marginal costs and uncertainty over future domestic and international prices. Now the Russian natural gas and power industries are undergoing reform that has potentially far-reaching consequences for European gas supply and energy security. Given the scale of domestic sales and losses, the future profitability of the domestic market will be the determining factor in Gazprom's decisions for investment in future production. Subsidized domestic prices will not allow Gazprom to cover the high marginal costs involved in developing the new major fields that will guarantee domestic and export supplies. Therefore the program of domestic gas price deregulation, long advocated by Gazprom and newly accepted by the Russian government, will help guarantee EU energy security by encouraging new development through protection against guaranteed losses on the domestic market and also by driving down domestic demand through greater conservation, industrial efficiency, and fuel substitutions, which will increase the supplies available for export. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]