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The current economic realities of the business world require firms to focus on all areas of organizational activities necessary to implementing a chosen course of action. It has been asserted that deploying information technology strategy can be quite helpful in engendering sustainable growth, greener corporate environment, and promoting environmental consciousness. In corporate governance, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are saddled with the responsibility of designing firm's strategies for competitiveness and they do this based on their assessment of risk involved, the long term nature, and uncertainty connected with IT strategies. This study therefore examined whether IT strategy moderates the nexus between CEO equity based compensation and firm's competitiveness. To investigate this, the study used firm-level secondary data of 106 quoted firms on the Nigerian Exchange Group for the period 2011 - 2020. Ordinary least square and panel data estimation techniques were used. The Hausman test conducted to choose between fixed effect and random effect models revealed the appropriateness of the random effect model. In the OLS and random effect models, the coefficient of CEO equity compensation was negative, implying that higher CEO compensation is not contemporaneous with higher firm's competitiveness. However, this estimate is not statistically significant and so the weight of this negative relationship is rather insignif icant. The introduction of IT strategy as a moderator into the model produced positive interaction effect on firm's competitiveness. Overall, there is the tendency for CEO compensation to enhance firm's competitiveness in the presence of IT strategy. Accordingly, IT enabled greener corporate environment encourages competitiveness and firm's sustainable growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study is conducted to assess the impact of corporate governance on the firm performance and to study the mediating role of agency cost in the association between corporate governance and firm performance. 74 non-financial companies are selected as a sample for the study. The data from 2017 to 2022 is assessed in the study. Regression analysis is used to assess the direct impact of corporate governance on agency cost and firm performance. Mediation is assessed using Sobel Test. The finding of the study revealed that better corporate governance leads to better firm performance. Results also showed that stronger governance decreases agency cost which in turn leads to better firm performance. This study is unique in a way that it studied the mediating role of agency cost in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The study will help the companies to recognize the importance of strong governance structure in order to increase financial performance. The study will also help to identify the role of agency cost on financial performance and to recognize that agency cost can be reduced via better corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to corporations in other countries, the role that party organizations play in Chinese firms is distinctly unique. This paper presents empirical evidence of a positive effect of party organization embeddedness on corporate environmental performance. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms operating in regulated industries and those with a stronger cultural system of environmental protection. The study also reveals that the embedding of party organization enhances corporate environmental performance through reducing agency costs and increasing access to environmental subsidies. Overall, this paper emphasizes the importance of the unique arrangement of corporate party organizations in China and provides policy implications for improving the distinct Chinese corporate governance system, promoting green development, and advancing ecological civilization. • The party organization embeddedness has a significantly positive effect on corporate environmental performance. • Regulated industries and cultural system of environmental protection exacerbate the effect. • The mechanisms include reducing agency costs and increasing access to environmental subsidies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Road network requires timely maintenance to keep pavement surface in good condition for reduction of fuel consumption with the limited budget. This study focused on development of pavement preservation strategies in the road network considering multi-objective optimization of agency cost and environmental impact (in terms of CO2 emission). Field data from long-term pavment performance (LTPP) database were used to quantify the impact of pavement preservation treatments (crack seal, chip seal, and thin overlay) on the changes of surface roughness. The emission rate functions of vehicles with respect to speed and pavement surface condition were developed using Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES) with the updated tire rolling resistance coefficients. The multi-objective optimization problem was solved using the Simulated Constraint Boundary Model (SCBM) method. The final solution was recommended based on the minimized distance from the utopia point to the Pareto front. The results show that the optimization solutions are affected by the available budget, existing pavement condition, truck traffic, and unacceptable level of pavement roughness. For multi-objective optimization of minimizing both agency cost and CO2 emission, the recommended preservation treatments among different segments is a combination of crack seal and thin overlay in most cases. These findings can be used by highway agencies to make road maintenance decisions considering the tradeoff between agency cost and environmental impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agency cost is a behavioral corporate finance problem that has an important place in finance literature. While it is often discussed in the current literature, Turkey oriented relative literature is quite limited. In this study, the agency costs before, during, and in the post-2001 financial crisis era are examined between companies with foreign owners and others by using cross-section regression analyzes and marginal effects based on these analyzes. The obtained findings show that there is a significant difference between the two firm groups in terms of agency costs during the 2001 financial crisis, before and after the crisis. The findings obtained do not show any change in different robustness checks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The life of Family Businesses is largely limited to the generational transition (on average 30% of these survive the second generation, 15% of these to a third, and 1% to the fourth). Objective: to analyze success and failure factors in successions from the literature. Method: to developed said analysis from a descriptive approach. The document review process completed the following stages: definition of the objective, bibliographic search, consultation of databases, establishment of search strategy and selection criteria, organization of information, and writing. Results and conclusions: the succession problem starts from the conflict of interests between the family business systems (company, family, and property), arising situations such as: informality, loose discipline, assumptions of permanence, nepotism, grasp, among others. Finally, a succession plan was developed considering the factors that influence the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Many farm producer organizations pursue growth and complexity in response to price volatility, industry consolidation and other external developments. Consequently, as ownership is dispersed and control is delegated, members may face increasing agency cost. In spite of the potential to impact performance and even survival, empirical attention to agency problems in farm producer organizations is limited. The purpose of this paper is to address the gap in the literature with an empirical study. Design/methodology/approach: With survey responses from 365 farm producer organizations in the USA, the author uses a two-limit tobit model to estimate the relationships of six ownership and governance characteristics (i.e. board size, management size, director independence, manager independence, CEO independence and non-member ownership) to agency cost, which is proxied by the operating expense ratio. Findings: While controlling for heterogeneity in scale and technology, the author finds positive relationships of board size, management size and CEO independence to agency cost. The novel result illustrates there is a significant cost to the adoption of non-traditional ownership and governance characteristics by farm producer organizations. Practical implications: The presence of agency cost serves as motivation to farm producer organizations to implement new or adapt old agency mechanisms. One recommendation is to reconsider the payment structure of non-member CEOs. There may not be enough incentive to inspire an upstream bias, which is perhaps possible by linking CEO performance to price, patronage and member-oriented performance measurements. Originality/value: Agency cost is rarely studied in relation to farm producer organizations. Recent contributions in the empirical literature lacked an explicit connection of ownership and governance characteristics to agency cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses one aspect of patent pools that has not received much attention—a patent pool's role in stabilizing a cartel of downstream producers. This article first reviews the problem of cartel cheating. Any potential mechanisms that a cartel can use to increase its stability face three main challenges: (1) the cost of management, (2) agency costs, and (3) the requirement of secrecy. This article argues that the vertical licensor–licensee relationship inherent to a patent pool would contribute to more effective monitoring of compliance with cartel agreements by licensees. It also argues that the aggregation of patents in a patent pool would better effectuate the punishment of cartel cheating. The article's main finding that a patent pool is uniquely suited to manage a cartel is a reminder that an overly permissive view of patent pools can invite anticompetitive hazards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, we establish a panel threshold model which the threshold variable is internal control, and analyse the nonlinearity relationship between dividend and agency cost. The result shows:There exist threshold effects between dividend and agency cost based on internal control. Cash dividend can reduce agency cost when internal control quality is higher than the threshold, otherwise, cash dividend will no longer have any effect. That means, a valid internal control is the foundation of dividend governance function. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics result implies that, companies with higher internal control quality than threshold are popular. This paper proofs that agency theory is effective in Chinese market, and higher internal control quality higher propensity to pay. So we disagree with the previous hypothesis of "result" and "substitution" between internal control and dividend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, it is aimed to reveal the relationship between the agency cost and board structure of 18 manufacturing industry within the BİST corporate governance index firms between 2006 and 2016. Agency cost is represented with free cash flow and growth opportunity ratio, the board size, number of independent members and CEO duality are represented board structure. According to the empirical results, there is a negative relationship between the board size and agency costs, a positive relationship between the number of independent members and agency costs. However, there is no significant relationship between the CEO duality and the agency costs. The results revealed that the board structure has a significant impact on firms' agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Drawing on an agency theory approach, this paper examines conflict of interests and the resulting agency costs in the provision of urban public transport services in Istanbul's public transport system, particularly the private bus and minibus operators' relationship with local government. The agency problem in Istanbul's urban mobility system shows itself most explicitly in private bus and minibus operators because of the net-cost (NC) contract model in place. The private bus and minibus operators' relationship with local government is examined as a case study of agency relationships. Conceptually, government transport authorities and transport operators, together with the passengers, are the main actors of this urban public transport system. They all have distinct needs, interests and requirements and interact with each other, all embedded in a specific institutional environment. Service quality provided by public transport operators depends on the positive interactions between these actors. Whereas passengers demand reliable, affordable, safe and comfortable mobility services, private bus and minibus operators aim to increase their revenue and maximise their profits. In contrast to this, government bus operators provide in-house bus services without much concern for profitability. Regulators or local authorities, on the other hand, are expected to set up an institutional environment where passengers' and operators' expectations are met in a satisfactory manner. Empirical analyses and interviews with key agents demonstrate that agency costs are shown to be the result of misaligned interests between the government transport authority and private operators that lead to reduced service quality in terms of safety, comfort, reliability and affordability. We conclude that the agency costs of current NC contracting on passengers in Istanbul has deficiencies and propose instead a performance-based gross-cost (PrGC) contracting model. PrGC contracting can alleviate agency costs by changing the incentives of operators where regulatory and financing mechanisms are not enough to handle NC contracting. Istanbul represents some transferable lessons and implications, especially for developing cities around the world. Highlights • Explores the conflicts of interests between urban transport operators and authorities through agency theory approach. • Gives an empirical application of agency analysis for Istanbul's private operators. • Reveals the agency costs of current net-cost contracting on service quality in Istanbul. • Proposes a performance-based gross-cost contracting to mitigate agency costs. • Provides policy recommendations to reduce the undesirable impacts of agency costs on urban mobility policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a continuum approximation model for the operating cost of demand responsive transit (DRT) systems in large urban networks. Applications of the proposed model shed light on ways demand and characteristics of the DRT system affect major components of cost: fleet, vehicle hours, and vehicle miles traveled. Verifying the relationship with empirical data, results show an accurate approximation of the operating cost for the paratransit system in New Jersey. Furthermore, we develop a systematic approach for evaluating the efficiency of policy implementations for DRTs. Finally, the circumstances where coordinated taxis could be a cost reduction strategy are identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decades, many single carriageway roads in Sweden have been converted to collision-free roads as a cost-effective alternative to conventional motorways. Investigations have concluded that the road type has been successful in reducing the number of fatal accidents, despite increased operation and maintenance costs. In recent years, the focus has shifted to converting narrower roads, which are anticipated to further increase pavement rehabilitation cost but also complicate traffic management during road works. This paper first examines the consequences in terms of road agency and road user costs; second, the possibilities to influence future costs by design alternatives. A life cycle cost analysis was employed to study future costs. The analysis indicated significant increase in life cycle cost compared to a single carriageway road. The analysis of design alternatives also indicated that future agency and road user cost can be substantially improved by finding an optimal alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether firms' political connection affects their corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements and how the effects vary with different political ties, namely symbolic and material connections. These ties reflect different degrees of political embeddedness, interest alignment, network size, and monitoring with the government, and therefore impart divergent effects on managerial incentives for CSR practices. Our analysis indicates that CSR in firms with symbolic connection is much more associated with agency cost than CSR in firms with material connection. We also find that large firms with symbolic connection exhibit lower CSR performance than those with material connection, probably because the former group tends to substitute the prestige of their political capital for the goodwill associated with CSR engagement. These results show that accounting for the effects of different types of political connection on managerial incentives contributes some clarity to the debate about the compatibility of CSR with primary corporate mandates. • We examine whether a firm's political connection affects its CSR engagements • CSR engagement in firms with symbolic connection is associated with agency cost • CSR engagement in firms with material connection is associated with good governance • Large firms with symbolic connections exhibit lower CSR performance [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate strategy has a significant impact on capital structure. In the strategic behavior of enterprises in China, international diversification has become more and more important. Theory suggests that because the economic behavior between countries is not completely related to each other, international diversification is helpful to raise the enterprise's debt ratio. Based on 2009-2011 balanced panel data of Chinese listing corporations, the research on the relationship between international diversification strategy and capital structure shows, international diversification significantly reduced the enterprise financial leverage, contrast to industry diversification; and the reason mainly lies in that transnational management increases agency cost of debt, so international diversification reduced the company's debt ratio. At the same time, the relationship between the level of international diversification and corporate debt ratio is significantly positive for multinational corporations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In many cases, the cost of hiring an agent to acquire information is lower than the cost for the principal to perform that task. However, because of a difference in preferences between the principal and the agent, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent’s expertise. This paper considers the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing him to report truthfully. The larger the private benefit, the greater is the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time, a private benefit may reduce the cost of motivating information acquisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a different preference is desirable. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper investigates the determination of corporate liquidity in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries with emphasis on whether and how national governance (NG) has bearings on corporate liquidity in such countries. Using the Sharia-compliant liquidity measure to examine non-financial firms' liquidity in 22 OIC countries during the period 2000–2016, results reveal that liquidity determination in OIC countries resembles that in other countries. Additionally, NG positively affects corporate liquidity. Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of growth opportunities and leverage, respectively, on corporate liquidity strengthen with NG. Overall, results suggest that NG improves corporate governance in OIC countries. • Liquidity determination in OIC countries resembles that in other countries. • National governance (NG) positively affects corporate liquidity. • NG strengthens growth opportunities' positive effect on corporate liquidity. • NG strengthens leverage's negative effect on corporate liquidity. • NG improves corporate governance in OIC countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the relationship between managers' private profit and agency cost using dynamic modelling methods. We conclude that the agency cost is a concave function of the managers' private profit and that the managers' private profit will lead to more investment cash outflow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]