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The article discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit case Briscoe v. City of New Haven which deals with employment discrimination and impact liability. The U.S. Supreme Court case Ricci v. DeStefano is also examined. The prohibition of discrimination by public and private employers based on race, color, religion, and other terms is outlined in Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act.

The article discusses the Ricci v. DeStefano case, which is popularly known as the "New Haven fire Fighter's case" in the U.S. It examines how the Ricci decision affects current employment practices, especially validated selection metrics. It discusses the legal standards for evidencing that a given selection device is job-related, and how validation process, is generally carried out. It analyzes the impact the Ricci decision has had on employer defenses proclaimed on validated test results.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Ricci v. DeStefano over the move by New Haven, Connecticut to discard the results of the firefighting promotion tests in 2003. It was ruled that the city violated the disparate-treatment provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The city was warned by a legal counsel that Title VII liability on the basis of race may arise if it certified the results. Employment discrimination decisions are said to be affected by the ruling. The court reportedly applied the strong-basis-in-evidence standard strictly.

The article discusses a court case, Frank Ricci v. DeStefano, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court constrained the application of the disparate impact doctrine. Ricci with other firefighters filed a suit against the City of Connecticut for alleged violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Cause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the City not to certify the examination results violated Title VII of the Civil Rights but did not violated the disparate impact theory.

The article focuses on the application of disparate impact theory of discrimination in the Ricci versus Stefano court case. The court case has reportedly caused an argument between the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the definition of disparate impact as an act of discrimination. It explains that in the U.S. federal law, disparate treatment against minorities and Caucasians is banned.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano which involved a claim of race discrimination. It provides information about the race discrimination in employment is in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It presents that Title VII prohibits all race discrimination in employment and constitutionality of the disparate impact provision.

In this article the author discusses the uncertainty resulted from the U.S. Supreme Court case, Ricci v. DeStefano, regarding employment discrimination. It offers an overview of the purpose and development of Title VII and the modern approaches to claims. It discusses the weaknesses in the ruling of the Supreme Court and examines the post-employment discrimination decisions of the case and the conflicts facing courts and employers in interpreting the basis in evidence standard in the future.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP ") 24(a)(2) permits third parties whose interests are not adequately represented by existing parties to intervene in ongoing litigation to protect those interests. This Comment considers whether intervention can and should be used as a tool for nonparty racial minorities in the fight for social justice. Ultimately, it posits that in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Ricci v. DeStefano, minority intervention is imperative- not only to give voice to minority interests and to influence the outcome of "reverse discrimination" litigation, but also to avoid forfeiture of related claims in future suits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of masculinities theory within the context of the case Ricci v. DeStefano, a race discrimination case in New Haven, Indiana which involved a conflict between two theories of Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964. It explains why the Supreme Court's decision portrayed the firefighter hero as white and male and explores the implications of the case and its political reverberations. It offers suggestions to public employers on how to evaluate candidates for firefighting and supervisory positions in the future.

The article discusses the court case, Ricci v. DeStefano, a case of race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. It provides an analysis of the case and contends that the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII are unconstitutional. The author also argues that the court should solve discrimination by declaring the disparate-impact provision of Title VII null and void.

The article discusses a court case wherein the Supreme Court addresses the reverse discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the U.S. It states that the firefighter Frank Ricci and several others brought suit against the City of New Haven, Connecticut after the city discards the test results that would have made petitioners eligible for promotions. The petitioners claim that the respondents violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ricci v. DeStefano, the New Haven firefighters case, raised questions about the constitutionality of the disparate impact provisions of federal employment discrimination law. This Article draws on the Court's subsequent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin to clarify disparate impact's constitutionality. In Fisher, no Justice expressed concern about Texas's decision to promote diversity at the state university by admitting the top percent of the state's high school graduates--state action that is race-conscious in purpose, but race-neutral in form. Approval of the percent plan in Fisher shows that under equal protection law of the Roberts Court disparate impact law is not unconstitutional in purpose, as Justice Scalia suggested in Ricci. In Fisher, the Court has demonstrated that government may change the selection standards in competitive processes without triggering strict scrutiny if the government acts (1) with a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity; (2) the government requires a selection standard that is appropriate for the context; and (3) the standard does not classify individuals by race. These principles are satisfied in the ordinary case of voluntary disparate impact compliance in which an employer specifies conditions for employment in advance of evaluating applicants for the job in question, as well as in prospective remedies that courts ordinarily order for violations of Title VII. Fisher clarifies that the problem in Ricci was New Haven's procedurally irregular means of complying with disparate impact law: the government discarded the test results of a group of applicants who had invested significant time in studying for a promotion exam, and explained this decision in terms which left the disappointed applicants with the impression that government was discarding their scores to advance the interests of another racially defined group. By avoiding a constitutional judgment and finding New Haven's manner of complying with the statute unlawful disparate treatment, Justice Kennedy warns that interventions designed to heal social division should be implemented in ways that endeavor not to aggravate social division. Disparate impact law can promote equal opportunity, increase employee confidence in the fairness of selection criteria, and so reduce racial balkanization; but for disparate impact law to do so, Justice Kennedy seems to be saying in Ricci, disparate impact law needs to be enforced with attention to all employees ' expectations of fair dealing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers updates on cases related to the Ricci v. DeStefano case and reflects on what the Ricci ruling has meant over time. It says that users and developers of selection procedure have not learned much from Ricci v. DeStefano or relevant case law on legal defensibility. It mentions that selection procedure users and developers should have evidence to support the choice of particular assessments.

Federal law has long prohibited not just intentional discrimination by employers, but also practices that have an unintentional disparate impact on minorities. A cryptic passage at the end of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano may signal a sea change for this disparate- impact doctrine. Ricci, a lawsuit about a civil-service exam for firefighters, received widespread attention as a case about intentional discrimination. We show that the opinion also can be read to suggest a new affirmative defense for employers facing claims of disparate impact. Before Ricci, disparate impact was a purely no-fault doctrine. An employer was liable if its employment practice had an unlawful disparate impact, even if the employer did not know about the impact or did not intend to subject its employees to an unlawful practice. The focus of litigation was not on the employer's state of mind, but rather on the aspects of the employment practice. if the defense suggested by a careful reading of Ricci is taken seriously, however, a broad category of disparate-impact cases may turn on what the employer knew when it took the challenged action. if the employer uncovered no reason to think that the practice would have an unlawful disparate impact, it may be immune from liability for its past actions. This would be a dramatic development, and if accepted it would open up an entirely new direction for this area of law. This Article parses the language of Ricci to show how it points to the new affirmative defense. We explain the significance such a defense would have for employers, employees, and disparate-impact theory more generally. We also examine and critique alternative readings of Ricci that do not entail the new defense discussed here. Ultimately, we conclude that while Ricci may foreshadow a new view of disparate impact, the Supreme Court's confusing decision can be given varying interpretations that will take further litigation to sort out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence on employment discrimination. It considers three cases that challenge the employment discrimination doctrine and these are Ricci v. DeStefano, Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc. and AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen. In these cases, unlawful discrimination has been questioned by the court. The establishment of disparate treatment and intentional discrimination have also been reexamined in these cases.

The article discusses U.S. government agencies in relation to the disparate impact strand of antidiscrimination law as of 2014, focusing on the ability to challenge allegedly harmful employment, education, and housing policies without having the burden of proving intentional discrimination. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and several U.S. Supreme Court cases are addressed, including Ricci v. DeStefano which deals with Title VII of the nation's Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The distinction between antisubordination and anticlassification has existed since the 1970s and has been frequently invoked by scholars to advocate for certain readings of antidiscrimination law. The anticlassification principle prohibits practices that classify people on the basis of a forbidden category. In contrast, the antisubordination principle allows classification (or consideration of, for example, race or sex) to the extent the classification is intended to challenge group subordination. While most scholars writing about antisubordination and anticlassification have done so in the context of equal protection, this Article systematically applies antisubordination and anticlassification values to assess recent developments in employment discrimination law and explore how they might tell us something about the trajectory of employment discrimination jurisprudence. In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. DeStefano, a landmark Title VII case, and in 2008 Congress passed two new laws: the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA). These changes potentially undermine the very normative foundation of employment discrimination law. This Article argues that the major employment discrimination statutes have until recently had a substantial antisubordination orientation, in that they were designed to respond to a history of discrimination and incorporate many provisions that expressly take account of forbidden traits (through doctrines like disparate impact and reasonable accommodation). This Article then explores how recent changes to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII, and the enactment of GINA may imperil the underlying normative foundation of employment discrimination law by turning toward and emphasizing anticlassification values at the expense of employment discrimination's antisubordinationist foundation. The Article concludes by evaluating the turn, questioning whether the antisubordination/anticlassification distinction is the most apt framework for evaluating employment discrimination law, and suggesting a few changes that may help preserve the valuable antisubordination foundations of employment discrimination law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes which involves class action law. It provides information regarding the substantive antidiscrimination law which is restatement of the law according to the courts. It also explains earlier court decisions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Ricci v. DeStefano. It focuses on the treatment of substantive laws in Wal-Mart decision.

An essay is presented on the concept of post-racialism and the relationship between political power, equal protection, and democracy in the U.S. as of May 2012. Several cases are examined where the U.S. Supreme Court allegedly restricts the ability of racial minorities to effectively use their elected political power, including the affirmative action case City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., and the fire department promotions test case Ricci v. DeStefano.

The article discusses several court cases involving employment discrimination in the U.S. in October 2008. It highlights the court case Ricci v. DeStefano wherein the court found that there was no violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 in the decision of New Haven to give an examination for filling the higher ranks of its fire department. Also explored are the Supreme Court's rulings in the cases Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc. and AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen .

The article argues on the shortcomings of the disparate-impact doctrine and recommends steps for improving the system. It examines the court case of Ricci v. DeStefano and the impact on the law, gives a background on the Title VII's disparate-impact doctrine, and provides its view on the applications of the Equal Protection Clause. Also mentioned are the requirements in the level of scrutiny, the conflict between equal protection and disparate-impact liability, and issues in racial balancing.

For decades, the Supreme Court has sharply divided in equal protection race discrimination cases. As commonly described, the Justices disagree about whether the Equal Protection Clause is properly interpreted through a colorblind anticlassification principle concerned with individualism or through an antisubordination principle concerned with inequalities in group status. This Article uncovers a third perspective on equal protection in the opinions of swing Justices who have voted to uphold and to restrict race conscious remedies because of concern about social divisiveness which, they believe, both extreme racial stratification and unconstrained racial remedies can engender. The Article terms this third perspective on equal protection concerned with threats to social cohesion the antibalkanization perspective. Employing this triadic model of equal protection, the Article demonstrates how Justice Kennedy reasons from antibalkanization values in the recent cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. i and Ricci v. DeStefano. There Justice Kennedy affirms race-conscious facially neutral laws that promote equal opportunity (such as disparate impact claims in employment discrimination laws) so long as the enforcement of such laws does not make race salient in ways that affront dignity and threaten divisiveness. The Article's triadic model identifies alternative directions equal protection doctrine might develop, and enables critique. A final section raises questions concerning the principle's logic and application. Have those who interpret equal protection with attention to balkanization enforced the principle in an effective and evenhanded way? In this spirit, the Article concludes by suggesting that the antibalkanization principle could be applied to cases of concern to minority communities that do not involve challenges to civil rights laws (for example, government use of race in suspect apprehension). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the affirmative action and reverse discrimination involved in race discrimination cases such as Gratz v. Bollinger, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 and Ricci v. DeStefano. It discusses the development of the control of the Supreme Court on gender discrimination issues and the circuit split in the evaluation of gender-based affirmative action. Also included are the disputes involving race-based affirmative action and reverse discrimination and how they are applied to gender bias.

The article discusses the court case Ricci v. DeStefano, 2009, wherein the City of New Haven, Connecticut was found to be in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by disregarding the test results of firefighters for purposes of promotion, as it did not also classify blacks as eligible for promotion. The City argued that their reason was precisely to avoid defying the said Act. The Supreme Court ruled that the City's action signified a decision based on racial prejudice.

Two aspects of the constitutional transformation Bruce Ackerman describes in The Civil Rights Revolution were on a collision course, one whose trajectory has implications for Ackerman's account and for his broader theory of constitutional change. Ackerman makes a compelling case that what he terms "reverse state action" (the targeting of private actors) and "government by numbers" (the use of statistics to identify and remedy violations of civil rights laws) defined the civil rights revolution. Together they "requir[ed] private actors, as well as state officials, to . . . realize the principles of constitutional equality" and allowed the federal government to "actually achieve egalitarian advances in the real world." Within the frame of Ackerman's study, these features of the civil rights revolution worked in tandem, perhaps even synergistically, helping to generate the period's remarkable changes in voting, employment, and education. But as this essay shows, at least in the case of employment discrimination, reverse state action quickly became a threat to government by numbers. In the 1970s, no sooner did numerical measures take hold in preventing, settling, and remedying employment discrimination than courts faced claims that these measures violated the very laws pursuant to which they had been adopted. Exactly when and where state action adhered ultimately helped decide the viability of the numerical approach in the new employment discrimination regime. The eventual tensions between the "government by numbers" and "reverse state action" strands of Ackerman's account raise questions about the content and viability of the civil rights revolution he documents. They also underscore the importance of refining his theory's account of what he terms consolidation, synthesis, and judicial betrayal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]