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Recently, in 'An inquiry on Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī's authorship of Al-manṭiq al-kab $ \bar{\iota} $ ι ¯ r (MS Aḥmad iii, no. 3401)', we refuted the quite common view among historians of Arabic logic as to attribute Al-manṭiq al-kab $ \bar{\iota} $ ι ¯ r (Major [book on] logic) to Fakhr al-dīn Rāzī; however, in that paper, we could not identify the real author of the book. In this paper, we try to show that Al-manṭiq al-kab $ \bar{\iota} $ ι ¯ r was written by Burhān al-dīn Nasafī (1203–1288), who authored another book, Sharḥ Asās al-kiyāsa whose logical part is very similar to Al-manṭiq al-kab $ \bar{\iota} $ ι ¯ r in the following significant features: the titles of chapters and sections, the style of writing, some technical as well as some non-technical terms, many sentences word by word. None of these features we find in any other Arabic logical work. So, Al-manṭiq al-kab $ \bar{\iota} $ ι ¯ r and Sharḥ Asās al-kiyāsa are so close to each other that we might most possibly identify the authors of the books as the same scholar, i.e. Burhān al-dīn Nasafī. Fortunately, this has been verified recently by two manuscripts of a medieval Arabic logical book. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our societally extractive age, sport science risks being swept up in the intensifying desire to commodify the experiences of those that scientists proclaim to study. Coupled with the techno-digital revolution, this stems from a vertical (onto)logic that frames the sporting landscape as a static space filled with discrete objects waiting for us to capture, analyse, re-present and sell on as knowledge. Not only does this commodification degrade primary experience in the false hope of epistemological objectivity, it reinforces the unidirectionality of extractivism by setting inquirer apart from, and above of, inquiry. Here, we advocate for a different, more sentient logic grounded in the relationality of gifting as understood in indigenous philosophies. This foregrounds an ecological orientation to scholarship that sets out neither to objectify or describe that which is of concern, but to correspond with its becoming. On this, there are three threads we cast forward. First, in a corresponsive sport science, inhabitants are not objects of analysis, but lines in-becoming, who in answering to others, form knots in a meshwork. These knots constitute communal places in which inhabitants have joined with the differentiating coming-into-being of others. Second, knowledge is not authoritatively (re)cognitive, but humbly ecological; not produced vertically through imposition, but grown longitudinally in responsively moving from place to place. Third, research does not follow a vertically extractive (onto)logic, but is a practice of participant observation. This perspective appreciates that we, sport scientists, are also lines in-becoming that form parts of the knots in which we seek to know. In coda, our thesis is not a call for more qualitative or applied research in the sport sciences. It is a call to response-ably open up to that which sparks our curiosity, answering to what is shared with care, sensitivity and sincerity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers insights on threads on topics related to a corresponsive sport science. Topics discussed include the changes in perception while reading such threads, the importance of a form of knowledge suggested by the author and the field of sport science as a whole, and the influence of curiosity and care on the approach to science and coaching.

This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding academic gender gaps is difficult because gender-imbalanced fields differ across many features, limiting researchers' ability to systematically study candidate causes. In the present preregistered research, we isolate two potential explanations—brilliance beliefs and fixed versus growth intelligence mindsets—by comparing two fields that have inverse gender gaps and historic and topical overlap: philosophy and psychology. Many more men than women study philosophy and vice versa in psychology, with disparities emerging during undergraduate studies. No prior work has examined the contributions of both self-perceptions of brilliance and fixed versus growth mindsets on choice of major among undergraduate students. We assessed field-specific brilliance beliefs, brilliance beliefs about self, and mindsets, cross-sectionally in 467 undergraduates enrolled in philosophy and psychology classes at universities in the United States and Canada via both in-person and online questionnaires. We found support for the brilliance beliefs about the self, but not mindset, explanation. Brilliance beliefs about oneself predicted women's but not men's choice of major. Women who believed they were less brilliant were more likely to study psychology (perceived to require low brilliance) over philosophy (perceived to require high brilliance). Findings further indicated that fixed versus growth mindsets did not differ by gender and were not associated with major. Together, these results suggest that internalized essentialist beliefs about the gendered nature of brilliance are uniquely important to understanding why men and women pursue training in different academic fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a remarkable push for the use of positionality statements—also known as reflexivity statements—in scientific-journal articles and other research literatures. Grounded in reputable philosophical traditions, positionality statements are meant to address genuine concerns about the limits of knowledge production. However, there are at least three reasons why they should be avoided in scholarship. First, it is impossible to construct credible positionality statements because they are constrained by the very positionality they seek to address. Second, positionality statements are unnecessary because reducing bias—positional or otherwise—in scientific literatures does not hinge on the biographical details of individual scholars but on the integrity of the collective process of truth-seeking. Third, by asking scholars to disclose information about themselves, positionality statements undermine the very norms and practices that safeguard the impartiality of research. Instead of asking individual scholars to issue subjective declarations about their positionalities, scholarly communities should focus on improving the rules of intersubjective competition at the heart of scientific progress. In our view, the most productive path to increasing representation and reducing positional bias in research is to protect the freedom of scholarly inputs while insisting on methodological transparency and rigor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite experience‐based expertise being increasingly common in health care, what experiential knowledge consists of remains a topic for debate. Here I propose a philosophical approach to clarify experiential knowledge, drawing on an analogous debate in philosophy of mind, which similarly targets the intuition that experience may generate unique knowledge. I outline the philosophical debate and explicate some relevant ideas for health care, so as to (a) evaluate whether and to what extent this analogous debate is helpful, and (b) supplement existing ideas on experiential knowledge with a philosophical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a bibliographic selection on non-classical logics, which have proliferated in the last 60 years. These logics include logical systems such as non-monotonic logics, free logics, and intuitionistic logics. The article is divided into three inquiry sets: foundation, applications, and permanence, and offers a representative selection of theoretical production in this field. Various authors and relevant works in the field of non-classical logic are mentioned, addressing topics such as second-order logic, temporal logic, and abduction logic, among others. Applications of logic in social sciences and computational decision-making are also mentioned. [Extracted from the article]

This article is about the evolution of logic and the inclusion of fallacies as active components in argumentation and debate. It emphasizes the need to develop a logical theory of the use of fallacies and legitimize them as part of modern reasoning. Additionally, it mentions the existence of different research communities in logic, each with different approaches and perspectives. The text also mentions the need to counteract fallacies in reasoning, especially in the context of media and social networks. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of developing a new logic that integrates fallacies and mentions advances in big data and theories of universal distortions as factors that allow for this next step. [Extracted from the article]

Lurking behind every conception of intelligence—whether an implicit (folk) or explicit (expert-generated) conception—is an underlying theory of meaning that specifies the form the theory of intelligence does and, indeed, can take. These underlying theories of meaning become presuppositions for the conception's form. The theories of meaning have different origins—for example, psycholinguistic, philosophical, and anthropological. This essay reviews the different underlying theories of meaning and proposes a new historical causal-chain theory of conceptions of intelligence. The underlying theories of meaning affect the flexibility and modifiability of laypersons' (implicit) and experts' (explicit) conceptions of intelligence. As a result, these historical causal chains have profound but largely invisible effects on societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The undertaking in this article is primarily to recall the basic meaning of enlightenment as a self‐active thinking movement. I show that enlightenment is not something to be taught, but rather the encouragement to think for yourself and, subsequently, to think anew; and this applies to the same degree to children and adults. I suggest a childist critique of enlightenment by addressing, first, enlightenment's overlooked adultist conception, giving, second, a brief practical insight into the children's polylogue, and, finally, re‐adjusting the understanding of enlightenment by referring to Hannah Arendt's considerations about world‐building and John Wall's thoughts about play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common periodisation in Ash'ari kalām is Ibn Khaldun's distinction between the early and late periods over al-Ghazālī. Although some consider this as an artificial and unrealistic periodisation, we do not think so. For, it is not possible to understand and make sense of the logic and necessity of periodisation without knowing what exactly distinguishes these periods from each other and what kind of great differences and changes occurred in the latter period. The most important factor that distinguishes the theological activities of the two periods is undoubtedly the Peripatetic philosophy that left its mark on the second period. The direct relationship established by the Ash'ari theologians of the late period with philosophy has been the source of many changes in theology. These changes have manifested themselves in many areas from the understanding of method in theology to the theory of definition, from the use of evidence to the theories of nature, intellect and soul, most importantly from the notion of the Omnipotent God (al-Fā'il al-Mukhtār) to the metaphysics of possibility-necessity, and from the cosmology of substance-accident to al-umūr al-'āmma as the main subject-matter of metaphysics. Finally, the changes in the process that started with al-Ghazālī and evolved with Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī brought theology to the brink of philosophization, and at the end of the process, theology turned into a universal (metaphysical) discipline. This situation naturally led to a convergence between the metaphysical thought and theological thought. It is one thing to say that theology is the most honourable and supreme science, and it is another to reveal that it is universal. In this context, al-Ghazālī declared and substituted the Islamic theology as a religious universal discipline for the first time. Actually, this substitution has a hidden philosophical/metaphysical meaning and message. Al-Ghazālī 's characterisation of theology as a universal science can also be interpreted as a challenge to both the sciences of the field it belongs to and the sciences outside itself, with its disciplinary encompassing and priority for theology. It should not be forgotten that theology, while confronting and coming to terms with philosophy and metaphysics, integrating with the subjects it has taken into the field of study, on the other hand, it has to maintain and protect the religious character it belongs to and represents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Ballantyne's (in press) review on the philosophy and psychology of intellectual humility (IH), he observes that it is not possible to ascertain whether IH is 'good' for people. In our commentary, we describe a way to tackle this ambiguity by advancing and testing an IH-health hypothesis. We first describe the humility-health hypothesis and the ways in which it may map on to IH. Next, we describe a growing literature speaking to the possibility of an IH-health hypothesis. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of whether we can distinguish between IH and humility in the context of psychological well-being and psychopathology and how IH might contribute to positive therapeutic outcomes. Through examining the relevance of IH to well-being and psychopathology, we may be able to illuminate whether and to what extent IH is 'good' for people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present three studies to examine intellectual humility (IH) contextualized to existential challenges across cultures. With samples (N = 1714) drawn from three regions (United States, Hong Kong, Netherlands), we explore the benefits and drawbacks of various configurations of IH and commitment to beliefs. In two studies, we created a measure of IH contextualized to existential concerns (Study 1; N = 344 adults in the U.S.), replicated its factor structure, and identified distinct profiles of belief commitment and IH (Study 2; N = 340 adults in the U.S.). Then, in our primary study (Study 3; N = 1030 adults from the U.S., Netherlands, and Hong Kong), we examined evidence for the cultural generalizability of the measure and profiles. Implications for future research on the measurement of IH, its manifestation across cultures, and its relevance to the existential domain are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We respond to Ballantyne's feature article on intellectual humility from the viewpoint of being interventionists in psychology (Worthington) and political science (Garrett). Philosophers differ from interventionists in discipline, method, and goals. While, philosophers usually seek to describe what is true as uncovered by the methods of analytic (or existential) philosophy, interventionists seek to help diverse people solve problems, cope with unsolvable problems, or build virtue or character. Consequently, philosophers and interventionists often conceive of IH differently. In this article, we argue that interventionists benefit from mixed definitions of IH and would be constricted by a definition like the one favored by Ballantyne, which localizes the experience of IH within the individual as a pursuit of truth. We offer three examples that illustrate how a mixed definition of IH that recognizes the social nature of IH better equips interventionists to help the wide range of clients they serve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intellectual humility is commonly thought to be a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that guides our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth and avoid error. Over the last decade, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers have begun to explore intellectual humility, using analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, implications, and value. This review describes central questions explored by researchers and highlights opportunities for multidisciplinary investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses fragmentarily preserved views of Empedocles, that, in the author's opinion, represent the antecedents of deviations from the anthropocentric vision of the world and anticipate the majority of later attempts at scientific, philosophical, and legal modifications of the status of all living beings. Empedocles, namely, claims that all beings think, i.e., that they have understanding or consciousness. He is, moreover, portrayed as a proponent of the thesis that plants as well have both intellect and the ability to think, and that they are driven by desire and have feelings, sadness and joy. According to him, the idea that the whole nature is akin not only has a vital-animal meaning but, to a certain extent, a mental meaning. Empedocles urged his disciples to abstain from consuming ensouled beings, since it is in the bodies of these beings that penalized souls reside. He believed that he himself was one of them who had been killed and eaten, and that it is by purification that prior sins in connection with food should be treated. Empedocles' case shows that humans are living beings that err, and that they owe to animals justice based on mutual kinship. Aside from living a pure life, practicing the recommended katharmoi, and abstaining from flesh in any version, the path to the salvation of the soul leads through two additional dimensions. The first is being revealed in the important phrase of the sage from Acragas that one should fast from evil. And secondly, the wealth of divine thoughts is connected with being happy, just as those who have vague opinions about the gods are wretched. Eventually, the "Sicilian Muse" believed that if people live in a holy and just manner, they shall be blessed in this life, even more so after leaving this one, because they will achieve happiness that will not be temporarily, and be able to rest for eternity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The formal principle of the Reformation, sola Scriptura , has sometimes been thought to imply that the Reformed minister and church member need not concern themselves with the use of reason and philosophy in matters of faith and theology. This misconstrued understanding of sola Scriptura led to a low regard for reason in matters of faith among Reformed folk. A low regard for reason, in turn, gave anti-intellectualism and fideism a foothold in local Reformed churches and left secularism and its progressive ideas unchallenged as it infiltrated the minds of Reformed church members, especially at churches in bigger cities and close to universities. This phenomenon can be addressed by establishing apologetics training platforms at local Reformed churches where church members can be trained to better defend the truth against secularism. To establish apologetics on a local church level, however, one must first retrieve the correct role of reason in matters of faith. This article accordingly embarked on an historical retrieval within the broad Reformed tradition. Different Reformers and subsequent Reformed theologians were examined to retrieve the proper relationship between faith and reason. This was accompanied by a focus on other relevant themes such as the concept of common notions and the three acts of the intellect. Through an historical retrieval, this article consulted the primary sources of figures in the Reformed tradition spanning from the early 1500s to the early 1700s. Additionally, modern interpreters of these figures have also been introduced for their insights. It became evident that reason plays a ministerial role in matters of faith. Moreover, the concept of common notions establishes a grounding for the undeniable role of reason in dialogues with secularism. By introducing the three acts of the intellect , the discussion also moved on to function as a critique of mainstream secularism, as it pertains to its disordered approach to reality in the form of expressive individualism. Although this article is the first of two in a series, it nevertheless accomplished its own end to emphasise the need for apologetics on a local church level and to retrieve the role of reason in matters of faith. Contribution: As a historical retrieval within the Reformed tradition, this article fits perfectly within the scope of In the Skriflig. It reminds the Reformed minister of the rich heritage within the Reformed tradition regarding the relationship between faith and reason, and brings it to bear on the challenge of secularism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article calls for gerontologists to engage with visual methods in qualitative research as an innovative tool for community-engaged research that has potential to advance social justice in gerontology. Reflections about using visual methods from the intersectional standpoint of the authors, 3 younger women of color, are presented. In Working the Hyphen , J. Yeh shows how interpersonal dynamics are fundamental to visual methods and that attention to identity can provide new insights into aging while also reconstituting existing power dynamics that researchers must carefully consider. In Employing Elicitation Techniques With Experts , L. Reyes discusses how a colonial lens limits understandings of civic participation and erases contributions of Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) older adults, proposing that elicitation techniques offer opportunities for BIPOC older adults to contribute their expertise to the research process and dissemination of findings beyond an academic audience. In Pedagogy and Practicality , H. S. Versey describes promises and complexities of scaling visual methods on multiple levels—teaching future generations of researchers the philosophy and practice of photovoice; negotiating university and community relationships through a service-learning project; and navigating identity between herself, her students, and research participants. In sharing our self-narratives, we integrate reflexivity into the research process and challenge power dynamics in knowledge construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: A discussion of the philosophy of pragmatism and how it can underpin and integrate nursing education, practice, research and policy across the nursing profession. Background: Although the concepts of plurality, truth, fallibilism, subjectivity and meliorism have been discussed across foundational philosophical literature, the relation of these concepts across various facets of the nursing profession have not been thoroughly articulated in the nursing literature. Design: Critical theoretical reflection. Data sources In this article, we draw from literature written on the philosophy of pragmatism from 1907 through to 2021. Implications for nursing: We propose an integrative approach for the nursing profession where education, practice, research and policy speak and contribute to each other through a lens of pragmatism. In this approach, education has a relationship with practice and practice has a direct line to research where nurses on the front lines can engage with pragmatic inquiry. Researchers in return can inform frontline nurses and policymakers of evidence emerging in areas pertinent to practice. These relationships are made possible through integrated knowledge translation by including all stakeholders at every point of knowledge generation. Each facet of the nursing profession is filled with stakeholders of nursing knowledge, who are invested in its utility. Although it requires focused effort to integrate knowledge across the profession, pragmatism calls for action in the face of challenges in hope for a stronger body of nursing knowledge and ultimately profession. Conclusion: Pragmatism is an apt philosophy to underpin and integrate nursing education, practice, research and policy across the nursing profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Probabilistic information is used increasingly, from medical research to weather forecasting. The relationship between probability and causality requires an acceptable philosophical account. Social work, which contributes to healthy wellbeing, increasingly uses language of probabilistic causal relationships between harms and subsequent limitations to healthy functioning. This paper explores causal understandings of probabilistic knowledge using concepts of the theologian, Thomas Aquinas. Social welfare terminology regarding risk (such as factors that are 'causative of' child abuse) is explored using epistemological concepts from scholastic philosophy. Aquinas' anthropological concepts related to modern 'risk science' and his concepts of rationality, harm and prudence are applied to contemporary social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic similarity often generates positive interactions between host‐country nationals (HCNs) and co‐ethnic expatriates in multinational corporations (MNCs), but the potential causes of conflict between these groups are under‐studied. In two studies, we tested whether Chinese HCNs' attitudes towards expatriates are associated with the implicit theories of ethnicity held by HCNs—essentialism (i.e., believing ethnicity has an immutable essence) versus constructivism (i.e., believing ethnicity to be malleable/socially constructed)—as well as expatriates' ethnicity, which we operationalised as Chinese (co‐ethnic) versus Scottish (other‐ethnic), and expatriates' cultural upbringing, operationalised as Chinese (local) versus American (foreign). In Study 1, HCNs who endorsed an essentialist perspective of ethnicity expected co‐ethnic (vs. other‐ethnic) expatriates to demonstrate greater ingroup identification and favouritism towards them irrespective of the expatriates' cultural upbringing. In Study 2, HCNs primed with the essentialist view expected co‐ethnic (vs. other‐ethnic) expatriates to demonstrate greater ingroup identification and favouritism towards them irrespective of the expatriates' upbringing, whereas those primed with the constructivist view expected expatriates with local (vs. foreign) upbringing to demonstrate greater ingroup identification and favouritism towards them irrespective of their ethnicity. These findings advance international management literature by providing a nuanced understanding of the interactions between HCNs and co‐ethnic expatriates that are influenced by essentialist beliefs about ethnicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is about Ahmet Mahmut Suphi's work called İslâm Düşüncesinde Ahlâk Felsefesi: Akılcılar ve Tecrübeciler. The work is based on the question: Do Islamic thought have a moral philosophy? In this context, it is stated in the work that the Aristotelian framework is not applicable for all moral orientations. Since, according to the work, that a moral philosophy cannot be addressed without metaphysical principles, it has been analysed the possibility of a moral philosophy emerging either from the basic principles and theories of the Mu‘tazila as rationalists, or of the Sufis as empiricists. In the last chapter, the theories of Ikhwan al-Safa and Ibn Miskawayh, which centres mainly on reconciling both approaches, are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the influential evidence-based practice (EBP), to the increasingly persuasive evidence-informed practice (EIP), in the last decades, the field has sought to adequately allocate scientific evidence within social work's practice. While this development suggests a move away from positivism, it is less clear towards where. Thus, this article advances classical pragmatism as a plausible philosophy of science for the treatment of evidence to account for this transition and the way forward. Pragmatism regards humans and their contexts as part of a continuity, constantly changing each other, always becoming. As such, it challenges what counts as 'evidence' and demands healthy awareness and criticism of preferences and biases, whether personal or contextual, in the self and in the subjects of interest. This opens up the door to plurality, to harness practical reason to solve practical problems, turning indeterminate situations into determinate ones, thereby generating warranted assertions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a response to Ballantyne's summary evaluation of the intellectual humility (IH) literature. This response offers ideas for helping resolve existing conceptual disagreements through allowing ongoing empirical insight to inform conceptual refinement. In addition, options for overcoming the problems Ballantyne highlights with self-reported measures of IH are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world has been familiar with the diagnosis of stroke since the year 500 BC, as well as with the therapeutic value of physical exercise (early physical therapy). However, exercises were incorporated to promote recovery after stroke in the late 1920s, and matured into an orderly practice in the late 1940s. The synthesis of the reviewed literature suggests that this late date of emergence was, to a great extent, because of the development of relevant knowledge, specific (post-war) timing and the emergence of health professional pioneers that led this practice. This article documents the unique historical trajectory of these preconditions. This brief review demonstrates how war pushed physical rehabilitation to the threshold of being able to provide neurological rehabilitation. It also discusses the contribution of the health professional pioneers to post-stroke rehabilitation, in light of today's more accepted approach of evidence-based practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solve by abduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]