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How does China signal foreign policy intentions to domestic and international audiences during territorial conflicts? While China can signal its resolve by provoking nationalism at home, doing so may risk appearing threatening to neighbouring countries in the region. We argue that China resolves the dilemma by sending different types of messages to domestic and international audiences. Focusing on China’s maritime conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, we examine China’s narratives regarding the maritime disputes through the analysis of state-run media. Our findings from text mining and topic analyses of more than 31,000 state media reports from 2002 to 2021 suggest that China signals to the international audience on international cooperation emphasising diplomatic and peaceful resolutions while relatively less so in domestic media. The analyses have implications for how China signals foreign policy intentions amidst rising nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the evolution and hybrid nature of Chinese classical dance (gudianwu), exploring its development since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and its role in promoting national identity. It argues that the integration of elements from Soviet ballet and traditional Chinese theatre has created a unique dance form that challenges essentialist notions of Chineseness, presenting gudianwu as a product of postcolonial modernity.

This article focuses on China's policy response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Pelosi's action triggered a surge of popular nationalist sentiments in China, but the response of the Chinese government was far less tough than what many popular nationalists had expected. The article argues that the Chinese government's policy choice in response to Pelosi's visit to Taiwan did not depend on the demands of popular nationalists, but rather was based on a cost-benefit analysis according to its perceptions. The influence of popular nationalism on the government's foreign policy choices has been exaggerated owing to an overestimation of the government's reliance on nationalism for its regime legitimacy, and an underestimation of the government's control over public opinion and nationalist activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the complex process of symbolic boundary-making of 'Hongkonger' cultural identities through the lens of the controversial 2015 film Ten Years, which is a celebrated omnibus production comprised of five short segments that picture a dystopic end to Hong Kong's cherished way of life in the year 2025. The article is premised on an interdisciplinary approach engaging with cultural studies and film studies. On one hand, it explores how Ten Years functioned as a boundary object, a vast terrain within which cultural identities of what it means to be a Hongkonger are constructed, banished, imagined, and performed under the rubric of bodily performatives. On the other hand, it offers blurring encounters into unfamiliar and precarious territories where the formation and formulation of Hongkonger identities and sense of belonging are negotiated, evacuated, and inhabited. In the end, the key tropes in Ten Years suggest that boundary work in post-Umbrella Hong Kong affectively negotiates with state-level nationalism advocated by the central government in Beijing through establishing and reformulating notions of 'localism' and Hongkonger identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how the nationalist, business-centric, elite-led and labour-subsuming logics of development in contemporary China are mirrored in contingent and locally-mediated ways in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In China's present 'de-revolutionary' moment [Wang, 2006], non-elite populations are conceived as labour inputs to be used and moulded in the pursuit of national development through market means. This same developmental ethos, mediated by a plethora of Chinese and non-Chinese actors, underpins the authoritarian tendencies of BRI-branded projects across the world. While authoritarian practices in China have both Leninist and capitalist genealogies and drivers, I argue here that Global China's most tangible and remarkable impacts on international authoritarianism are found in the practices required to secure capital accumulation along the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's power grows, a widespread perception is that China is more willing to respond to nationalist demands and act assertively in international incidents. In reality, China has not supported and accommodated nationalism in all events but has cooled down nationalism in some cases. An important unanswered question is, why does the Chinese government demonstrate selectivity when responding to nationalism and take different foreign policies concerning nationalism in various incidents? This article provides a coherent and testable framework to answer this question and uses five cases to test the congruence and validity of the analytical framework. The core argument is that the primary concern of the Chinese government in dealing with nationalism is its legitimacy. When policymakers perceive severe threats to China's regime security and stability, they will open a 'safety valve' to embrace nationalism, allowing nationalism to unleash its anger under the government's monitor and escalating disputes to defend national interests and appease nationalism. When there are few threats to the regime, three factors will affect China's choice: the economic value of the diplomatic relationship, elements of China's core interests, and the viability of reaching an agreement that sets aside the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic unleashed a torrent of conspiracy theories across different social media platforms. Parallel to this conspiracy wave was a heightened sense of nationalism, which manifested through both in-group solidarity and perceived out-group threats. In this study, we examine how individuals' use of government social media to gather political information correlated with nation-related conspiracy beliefs during the pandemic. Data were collected from 745 subjects in China and analyzed through path analyses, which allowed us to examine the direct association with political information consumption from government social media and the indirect association with nationalism on conspiracy beliefs. The results indicated that the use of government social media to gather political information was associated with greater beliefs in nation-variant COVID-19 conspiracies, both directly and through different mediations of nationalism. Our findings highlight the importance of examining government social media use and how nationalism can have differentiated mediation effects on beliefs in conspiracy theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current scholarship on Chinese public perceptions of international affairs tends to highlight the growing hawkishness and nationalistic tendencies in popular public opinion during the Xi Jinping era. Whereas these studies tend to deal with cases and contexts directly involving China, little is known about how the Chinese public responds to geopolitical crises in which China is not a direct participant. Our study attempts to address this gap by examining how Chinese social media commentators narrated and debated Russia's war in Ukraine—a major geopolitical event that has shaped China's interests but thus far has not directly implicated China in the conflict. Our analysis, drawing on online commentaries during the first six months of the Russia-Ukraine war, finds that the dominant narratives are still rooted in China-centric objectives and experiences. These nationalistic sentiments, however, diverge when it comes to advocating for China's positions on this war, ranging from direct support of Russia as part of China's battle against the West, to a cautionary position of learning from Russia's mistakes, to support for Ukraine as rooted in China's own experiences with foreign aggression. All these positions are distinct from the official stance of ambiguity in this conflict, highlighting the possibility of alternative, albeit still nationalistic, perspectives presenting themselves on social media despite strict censorship. This analysis contributes to our understanding of popular expressions on international affairs in the Xi era and, specifically, of the different manifestations of Chinese popular nationalism in contexts outside of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Australia relations have experienced a rapid deterioration in the past half-decade. From genial ties centred around trade and exchange, the relationship has descended into mutual hostility, prompting the editor of China's Global Times to notoriously liken Australia to a blob of gum on the bottom of a shoe. To explain the deteriorating relationship, scholars have proposed numerous ideas, pointing to factors as wide-ranging as 'Chinese influence', poor diplomacy efforts, and ontological (in)security touched off by neoliberal governmentality. The current paper examines these ideas in a literature review, then synthesises such ideas to provide its own explanation of why things 'went wrong'. It also addresses corollary questions such as why Australia adopted a uniquely assertive China policy, and why this occurred specifically around 2017. We argue that the breakdown in relations can be attributed to the rise of nationalist, sovereignty-oriented movements in the West, and the spillover effect this had on Australian leadership; the profound uncertainty attending the election of Trump and his isolationist tendencies; and the shift to a more rigid, authoritarian approach to foreign affairs under Xi. This perspective adds to the literature by identifying failings on both sides while underscoring significant yet underappreciated global trends, such as nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on Chinese football fans' reactions to the Japanese national team and their fans' behaviour during the World Cup 2022. Despite the historical and contemporary problems that make friendly relations with Japan difficult to achieve, football fans in China largely welcomed the good performance of the Japanese national team. This attitude may be described as 'thin cosmopolitanism' because Chinese fans' major frame of reference was still nationalistic. For them, the impressive performance of the Japanese national team means that Asians and the 'yellow race people' can also play good football. However, the Japanese fans, whose cleaning up of stadia received wide coverage during the World Cup, were criticized by the Chinese fans who interpreted the Japanese fans' action as reinforcing the existing global racial order. The findings of this paper help reveal the limits regarding football's role in contributing to a more cosmopolitan worldview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is often considered as motivated by a desire to challenge the international status quo, a challenge the West is trying to mitigate. Social constructivists account for this challenge via a norm of nationalistic assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy; a norm constructed in the synergetic relationship between China's Communist Party and its nationalist movement. However, this work argues that Chinese foreign policy is motivated, in part, by nationalist pressure arising from an antagonistically symbiotic relationship between the Communist Party and China's nationalist movement. This understanding is significant as it indicates that western policies are paradoxically factoring in the emergence of a challenger China. © 2023 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Representing the nation in sports mega events has become a highly contested issue with the acceleration of the transnational movement of athletes. This research has examined Chinese people's attitudes to the naturalization of football players. The article discusses the findings in the context of the qualifying stages for the 2022 FIFA Men's World Cup by presenting and analysing data collected from semi-structured interviews and social media extracts. Two main issues were debated by Chinese people concerning the identity of naturalized athletes. One was the ethnicity of the naturalized footballers in relation to nationality, with some people questioning whether they belong to China and can represent China. The other issue concerned the players' skills and ability which influenced considerations of how much they could help China to qualify for the World Cup Finals. In relation to Chinese nationalism, national identity and Chinese sports, this study reveals, through the window provided by the presence of these naturalized footballers, how football, instrumentalism, nationalism and naturalization have been inextricably linked and have interacted with one another within the current context. The article analyses how pragmatic values have negotiated with ethno-cultural nationalism and impacted on the Chinese public's attitudes towards naturalized athletes, their image being presented in variable and dynamic ways by football fan netizens after each qualifying game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inaccessibility of ChatGPT to Chinese users has fueled public conspiracy theories surrounding the technology. We conducted a critical discourse analysis of 1,576 relevant Weibo posts to identify these conspiracy theories and the sociocultural and political factors at play. Our findings reveal four major themes, including a profound distrust of foreign high technology, nationalist fervor, disconcerting allegations of AI development, and sensational assertions of government manipulation of the fertility rate. More importantly, we observe that the escalation of nationalist sentiments in the online sphere exacerbates the spread of conspiracy theories, reflecting public concerns about the country's technological progress and global reputation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the Chinese party-state's production of visual racism towards Uyghurs as a discursive foundation for its ethnic policy, as globally reproduced and disseminated by non-state actors. The paper draws from theoretical literature on the relationship between visual politics and affect, stressing the need for visual literacy to reflect on how images emotionally affect audiences' identities and insecurities. It focuses this analysis on education texts in China's post-2012 'de-extremification' and 're-education' campaigns, specifically on how images tell stories about life-or-death security issues that define Chinese identity. Chinese education about Uyghurs tends to frame Uyghur identities as racialised, culturally external existential threats to be defeated by state violence or teaching them to be Chinese. However, Uyghurs' own visibility strategies in global advocacy counter the party-state's imagery by centring their lives and experiences. The article shows how these strategies can be used as resources for teaching about Chinese politics and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we discuss the Confucian tradition in today's multicultural China from two perspectives: that of the mandatory school curriculum, which represents 'official knowledge', and that of students from ethnic minority and/or religious backgrounds who are located on the cultural margins in China. The analysis draws on curricular narratives of the Confucian tradition for six major school subjects and semi-structured interviews with a group of university students from non-Han ethnic minority and/or religious backgrounds, whose lived experiences are rarely included in the national curriculum narrative. The analysis suggests that the interpretation of the Confucian tradition is a monopolising and dominant discourse that reinforces the cultural hierarchy between different cultural groups. However, the students appear to regard the Confucian tradition as only one culture and worldview in China, which can benefit from the critical reflexivity of other cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of the rising tension between Hong Kong and mainland China, Hong Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam blamed the city's education system for its inability to develop a sense of 'I am Chinese' national identity and vowed to step up 'national education' from preschool. This article explores how 188 young preschool teachers perceived their national identity and viewed the applicability of national education in Hong Kong preschools. Data were collected using both quantitative and qualitative measures. The findings showed that even though the participants strongly resisted their Chinese identity, they agreed that national education could be introduced in preschools if it would be rendered rational and apolitical. Nevertheless, they suspected that the administration's motive behind national education was political indoctrination. They also noted several pedagogical difficulties. Finally, the implications are discussed against the changing socio-political context, serving as lessons for local and international readers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This editorial introduces a themed section that focuses on the production of gender discourse and representations in the midst of tightening social and cultural control in China's entertainment industry and digital media landscape. In various ways, the two articles featured case studies that exemplify how the production of gender discourses and representations in this context emerges from the interplay of state control, the market, and the digital realm and unfolds against the rise of platform capitalism and techno-nationalism. Both articles center on the intricate and sometimes contradictory configurations of gender within China's state-market nexus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"'Us' and 'Others': The Chinese Diaspora in Japan and the Negotiation of Their Membership in the Sphere of Chineseness" examines the way first-generation Chinese diaspora in Japan make sense of their relationships with the Chinese nation. With empirical evidence collected from both the in-depth interview with 69 informants and the media ethnographic observation with 26 research participants, this thesis contributes to conceptualize the diasporic experiences as well as the identity politics of the Chinese diaspora who live in a crucial era – while we have witnessed China's rise and its transition from a diminishing to a returning power, as a response to this Japan has continuously articulated a "China threat" discourse, which not only further promotes its ethno-nationalistic ideology, but also directing the ethnicity-based marginality toward the Chinese diaspora in Japan. In this context, this thesis contributes to present that while these events create complex Sino-Japanese power dynamics, the presence of digital media means that the Chinese diaspora in Japan are influenced by them in a new way – "new" in the sense that the digital mediation fills those power and forces into every dimension of their lives, making their daily reality a constant identity negotiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Plato Goes to China: The Greek Classics and Chinese Nationalism" by Shadi Bartsch explores the thriving study of Greek classics in China and the reasons behind it. Bartsch argues that the belief that the West is shaped by its classical antiquity, similar to how China is shaped by its own, has guided Chinese engagement with the West. The book examines the reception of Western classical antiquity in China, from Jesuit missionaries to modern conservative thinkers, and how it has influenced Chinese intellectual history. Bartsch also discusses the appropriation of ancient texts to challenge the legitimacy of liberal democracy and construct alternative visions of modernity in the context of rising nationalism. The book provides important insights into contemporary Chinese thought and offers a broader framework for analysis and critique. [Extracted from the article]

"From Culturalist Nationalism to Conservatism: Origins and Diversification of Conservative Ideas in Republican China" by Aymeric Xu is an intellectual-political study that explores Chinese conservative thought from the late Qing dynasty to the Republican period. The author challenges the notion that conservatism did not exist in China, arguing that Chinese conservatism is a polysemic term that attributes different values and judgments to liberalism, capitalism, industrialization, statism, social hierarchy, democracy, and Westernization. Xu identifies four typologies of Chinese conservatism: liberal conservatism, antimodern conservatism, philosophical conservatism, and authoritarianism. The book highlights the importance of the culture-politics nexus in modern China and examines the diverse perspectives within the conservative movement. While conservatism ultimately failed in Republican China, there has been a revival of New Confucianism in recent years. However, the book suggests that conservatism is unlikely to become an adequate political strategy in China. Overall, this well-researched book contributes to the understanding of modern Chinese thought and intellectual history. [Extracted from the article]

This document is a review of two separate books. The first book, "Always Faithful," is praised for its comprehensive and diverse perspective on the evacuation of Kabul and the US war in Afghanistan. The reviewer recommends it to anyone interested in these topics or war in general. The second book, "Plato Goes to China: The Greek Classics and Chinese Nationalism," focuses on the fate of ancient Greek classics in China and the regime's campaign to discredit them. The reviewer acknowledges the political and intellectual repression in China but highlights the resilience of the Chinese people and the continued commitment to universal values. [Extracted from the article]

The central government and local governments in China constitute "laboratory nationalism", which is different from "laboratory federalism". As a planner, the central government first organizes small-scale policy trials, then imitates the successful policies on a larger scale. To illustrate the process, we take the gradual regional opening as a typical case, then develop a two-stage "trial-extension" game model incorporating the central government and two local governments. Laboratory nationalism's domination depends on actions of the central government at two stages: (1) offering proper incentives to the eligible district at the beginning; (2) in the end unifying local policies to the one which has proven to be successful. We demonstrate that under certain conditions, laboratory nationalism can improve on decentralized outcome. • Centralization of social decision-making is a common trend. • China's policy innovation is organized like Laboratory Nationalism, different from Laboratory Federalism. • China usually adopts small-scale experiments before expanding the scope. • The central government designs policy innovation rules for local ones, and the pros and cons are mixed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]