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This paper attempts to answer whether the property of "efficacy" can be attributed to constitutive rules. In particular, according to Di Lucia, I will point out some problems that the "semantic conception of efficacy" has concerning constitutive and regulative rules. Then, the main goal of the paper will be to reflect on the possibility of the efficacy of constitutive rules by means of a complex case that the semantic conception seems to disregard: The case of the cheater. Does the action of the cheater show the inefficacy of constitutive rules? Does she play the game while breaking the rule? Can the semantic conception of efficacy explain this situation, or do we need a more flexible concept of efficacy that takes nomotropism into account? These are some of the questions I will try to answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a comment from the author on the work of Mark Ashton, commenting the former's article "Education for Capability: A Critique." Views on conceptual analysis; Concept of a person's capability to fulfill his tasks and responsibilities; Discovery of a hidden message in the author's work in what Ashton cites as a highly satirical passage.

Research into intuitive interaction often builds on the development of a definition and clear-cut criteria. The present paper suggests an alternative, more phenomenological approach. In line with the User Experience perspective,we focus on the experiential phenomenon and subjective feelings related to intuitive interaction. Our analysis makes use of insights from psychological research on intuitive decision-making and user research in Human--Computer Interaction. As a result, we suggest four components of intuitive interaction (Gut Feeling,Verbalizability, Effortlessness, Magical Experience) and a research framework of relevant influencing factors. Given that intuitive interaction relies on the transfer of previously acquired knowledge, one suggested influencing factor is the domain transfer distance, i.e. the distance between the application domain and the source domain of transferred prior knowledge. Our theoretical model assumes a differential effect of the domain transfer distance on the four components of intuitive interaction. An empirical study (n = 152) substantiates the suggested components and theoretical considerations on the special effect of the domain transfer distance. As assumed, Gut Feeling, Verbalizability, Effortlessness and Magical Experience were all relevant for participants' subjective understanding of intuitive interaction. In line with our model of domain transfer distance, usage scenarios with higher transfer distance were perceived as better representatives of intuitive interaction and characterized by Gut Feeling/Magical Experience, whereas lower transfer distance scenarios were characterized by Verbalizability/Effortlessness. The present paper offers a number of contributions for research and design. Besides providing a better understanding of the phenomenon of intuitive interaction and underlying mechanisms, we discuss how design can profit from these insights (e.g. specification of the desired experience, design for innovation). Limitations of the present study and implications for future research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents four papers included in a symposium on women philosophers. The role of cognitive distortion in the problem of women in philosophy is central to all four papers. Each of them brings out a different way in which cognitive distortion short circuits women philosophers professional recognition. In today's professional vocabulary of denigration and dismissal, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, queer theory, and other contemporary critical discourses are merely applied philosophy, that is, second-rate. Philosophical competence, therefore, does not require familiarity with them.

Benardete presents a version of Zeno's dichotomy in which an infinite sequence of gods each intends to raise a barrier iff a traveller reaches the position where they intend to raise their barrier. In this paper, I demonstrate the abstract form of the Benardete Dichotomy. I show that the diagnosis based on that form can do philosophical work not done by earlier papers rejecting Priest's version of the Benardete Dichotomy, and that the diagnosis extends to a paradox not normally classified as a dichotomy. I show how the form is exploited to generate paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents characteristics of practices in the humanities that can be manifested through specific forms of counseling, namely spiritual or pastoral counseling and philosophical counseling. Through the comparative analysis of the two practices, interdisciplinary links are identified, reflected at the conceptual and applied level, with both their similarities and differences being highlighted, in order to emphasize the originality and the capacity to adapt to the requirements of the field from which they come. The paper supports the new trend of involvement in communities of specific counseling practices by expanding their application potential from person to group and community, with the help of an adaptation process necessary to achieve the goal in order to bring the practice of counseling to as many persons and to community or society in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper justifies the concept of ’’thematic structure‘‘ or ’’order of knowledge‘‘ over the traditional ’’classification of sciences‘‘ due to the uncertainty of many classification criteria. The thematic structure of science has, of course, various levels and various dimensions. Arguments against any forms of separating the humanities from sciences in the traditional sense of the term are presented and discussed. Equally unacceptable are attempts at sharp separation of technical disciplines and humanities. The thematic structure of humanities is not created by some material aspects but rather through the interest – or problem-oriented aspects. In addition to the natural sciences and the humanities there exists an important sphere of sciences on artefacts or, using the term by H. Simon, the sciences of the artificial. For the contemporary research activities is typical what could be denoted as ’’interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary complex.‘‘ The paper traces a set of epistemological criteria for the justification of the relative independence of a scientific discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A form of metaphysical humanism in the field of philosophy of technology can be defined as the claim that besides technologies' physical aspects, purely human attributes are sufficient to conceptualize technologies. Metaphysical nonhumanism, on the other hand, would be the claim that the meanings of the operative words in any acceptable conception of technologies refer to the states of affairs or events which are in a way or another shaped by technologies. In this paper, I focus on the conception of technologies as problem-solving physical instruments in order to study the debate between the humanist and the nonhumanist ways of understanding technologies. I argue that this conception commits us to a hybrid understanding of technologies, one which is partly humanist and partly nonhumanist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As software developers design artificial agents (AAs), they often have to wrestle with complex issues, issues that have philosophical and ethical importance. This paper addresses two key questions at the intersection of philosophy and technology: What is deception? And when is it permissible for the developer of a computer artifact to be deceptive in the artifact's development? While exploring these questions from the perspective of a software developer, we examine the relationship of deception and trust. Are developers using deception to gain our trust? Is trust generated through technological 'enchantment' warranted? Next, we investigate more complex questions of how deception that involves AAs differs from deception that only involves humans. Finally, we analyze the role and responsibility of developers in trust situations that involve both humans and AAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that self-locating information cannot be evidentially relevant to a non-self-locating hypothesis. The other, a basic tenet of Bayesian confirmation theory, is the thesis that an ideally rational agent updates her credence in a non-self-locating hypothesis in response to new information only by conditionalization. I argue that we can disprove these two theses by way of cases that are much less puzzling than Sleeping Beauty. I present two such cases in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued in this paper that amalgamating confirmation from various sources is relevantly different from social-choice contexts, and that proving an impossibility theorem for aggregating confirmation measures directs attention to irrelevant issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of possible worlds in philosophy is hard to overestimate. Nevertheless, their nature and existence is very controversial. This is particularly serious, since their standard applications depend on there being sufficiently many of them. The paper develops an account of possible worlds on which it is particularly easy to believe in their existence: an account of possible worlds as pleonastic entities. Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence can be validly inferred from statements that neither refer to nor quantify over them as a matter of conceptual necessity. Definitions are proposed that ensure that this is the case for possible worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call such arguments no-best-world arguments. In this paper, we discuss ability-based objections to such arguments; an ability-based objection to a no-best world argument claims that the argument fails because one or more of its premises conflict with a plausible principle connecting the applicability of some type of moral evaluation to the agent's possession of a relevant ability. In particular, we formulate and evaluate an important new ability-based objection to the most promising no-best world argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the claim that there is a deep tension between the principle of countable additivity and the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. The claim that such a tension exists has recently been challenged by Brian Weatherson, who has attempted to provide a countable additivity-friendly argument for the one-third solution. This attempt is shown to be unsuccessful. And it is argued that the failure of this attempt sheds light on the status of the principle of indifference that underlies the tension between countable additivity and the one-third solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticizes Soames's main argument against a variant of two-dimensionalism that he calls strong two-dimensionalism. The idea of Soames's argument is to show that the strong two-dimensionalist's semantics for belief ascriptions delivers wrong semantic verdicts about certain complex modal sentences that contain both such ascriptions and claims about the truth of the ascribed beliefs. A closer look at the formal semantics underlying strong two-dimensionalism reveals that there are two feasible ways of specifying the truth conditions for claims of the latter sort. Only one of the two yields the problematic semantic verdicts, so strong two-dimensionalists can avoid Soames's argument by settling for the other way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and 'persist' by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like 'Socrates' or 'London'. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take to be the best alternative available for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer 'no' and internalists tend to answer 'yes'. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn't be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn't be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

shared problem across the sciences is to make sense of correlational data coming from observations and/or from experiments. Arguably, this means establishing when correlations are causal and when they are not. This is an old problem in philosophy. This paper, narrowing down the scope to quantitative causal analysis in social science, reformulates the problem in terms of the validity of statistical models. Two strategies to make sense of correlational data are presented: first, a 'structural strategy', the goal of which is to model and test causal structures that explain correlational data; second, a 'manipulationist or interventionist strategy', that hinges upon the notion of invariance under intervention. It is argued that while the former can offer a solution the latter cannot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific essentialism holds that: (1) each scientific kind is associated with the same set of properties in every possible world; and (2) every individual member of a scientific kind belongs to that kind in every possible world in which it exists. Recently, Ellis (Scientific essentialism, ; The philosophy of nature ) has provided the most sustained defense of scientific essentialism, though he does not clearly distinguish these two claims. In this paper, I argue that both claims face a number of formidable difficulties. The necessities of scientific essentialism are not adequately distinguished from semantic necessities, they have not been shown to be necessities in the strictest sense, they must be relativized to context, and they must either be confined to a subset of scientific properties without warrant or their connection to causal powers must be revoked. Moreover, upon closer examination (1) turns out to be a trivial thesis that can be satisfied by non-kinds, and (2) is inapplicable to some of the most fundamental kinds in the basic sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the insights on the influence of religion on the concept of Ereignis. In this context, the author provides a relatively straightforward reading of the otherwise inaccessible and obscure material. This paper highlight the continuity of the thought in a key-area of philosophy throughout a lifetime. It also presents valuable insights into the nature of reference and meaning in existentialist philosophy. It anchors the author's thought and ideas closely in the German Romantic tradition.

Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the truth of the latter claim, which are also arguments for the truth of the former claim as I interpret it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the argument of four-dimentionalists that their metaphysics is much higher in terms of philosophy than the three-dimensionalists. They believe that the basic philosophical elements of the world are 4D or temporal parts of which familiar objects such as trees and papers exist through time by the fusions of the temporal parts. On the contrary, the three-dimensionalists claim that the world is composed of subatomic particles which have no temporal parts.

Abstract: Compound terms play a surprisingly key role in the organization of lexical ontologies. However, their inclusion forces one to address the issues of completeness and consistency that naturally arise from this organizational role. In this paper, we show how creative exploration in the space of literal compounds can reveal not only additional compound terms to systematically balance an ontology, but can also discover new and potentially innovative concepts in their own right. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Responds to Jim Stone's argument that the combination of three-dimensionalism (TD) and counterpart theory (CT) leads irresistibly to absurdity. Attempt to show that Stone's arguments are not persuasive; Presentation of one form of TD-CT combo; Defense against the relevant criticisms from Stone's paper; Presentation of a theory combining TD and CT.

Predictivism asserts that novel confirmations carry special probative weight. Epistemic pluralism asserts that the judgments of agents (about, e.g., the probabilities of theories) carry epistemic import. In this paper, I propose a new theory of predictivism that is tailored to pluralistic evaluators of theories. I replace the orthodox notion of use-novelty with a notion of endorsement-novelty, and argue that the intuition that predictivism is true has two roots. I provide a detailed Bayesian rendering of this theory and argue that pluralistic theory evaluation pervades scientific practice. I compare my account of predictivism with those of Maher and Worrall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Kris McDaniel argues that ordinary physical objects are fusions of monadic and polyadic tropes. McDaniel calls his view “TOPO”—for “Theory of Ordinary Physical Objects”. He argues that we should accept TOPO because of the philosophical work that it allows us to do. Among other things, TOPO is supposed to allow endurantists to reply to Mark Heller’s argument for perdurantism. But, we argue in this paper, TOPO does not help endurantists do that; indeed, we argue that anyone who accepts TOPO should reject endurantism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main question of the paper is that of what vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons fail to answer the question of what vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part of semantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is an inconsistency view on vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to criticism of the Kripkean account of logical truth in first-order modal logic. The criticism, largely ignored in the literature, claims that when the box and diamond are interpreted as the logical modality operators, the Kripkean account is extensionally incorrect because it fails to reflect the fact that all sentences stating truths about what is logically possible are themselves logically necessary. I defend the Kripkean account by arguing that some true sentences about logical possibility are not logically necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative religious ethics is a complicated scholarly endeavor, striving to harmonize intellectual goals that are frequently conceived as quite different, or even intrinsically opposed. Against commonly voiced suspicions of comparative work, this essay argues that descriptive, comparative, and normative interests may support rather than conflict with each other, depending on the comparison in question, and how it is pursued. On the basis of a brief comparison of the early Christian Augustine of Hippo and the early Confucians Mencius and Xunzi on the topic of“human nature,” this paper advocates a particular account of comparative religious ethics, and argues for the complexity of the idea of“human nature.” Different elements of this family of concerns are central to religious ethics generally, and to theories and practices of moral development and personal formation specifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors present an introduction to the new interdisciplinary area of aesthetic computing and proceed to define this area with examples from each of their own disciplines, practices and research. While several decades of publication and work have resulted in significant advancements in art as implemented through technology, less emphasis has been placed on studying the converse issue of art's effect on computing, or "aesthetic computing." The authors present their individual work in this area and then follow with brief criticism of one another's work to elucidate different perspectives on the idea. By approaching the topic of aesthetic computing in this manner, the paper serves as an introduction to and survey and analysis of the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. W e find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of' notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the mind and language of an omniscient being from a supervaluationist perspective. Two questions hall receive special attention. How ought the supervaluationist explicate the concept of omniscience? And what ought the supervaluationist expect an omniscient speaker to say about a Sorites series? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out to re-examine the famous Wax Tablet model in Plato's Theaetetus, in particular the section of it which appeals to the quality of individual souls' wax as an explanation of why some are more liable to make mistakes than others (194c-195a). This section has often been regarded as an ornamental flourish or a humorous appendage to the model's main explanatory business. Yet in their own appropriations both Aristotle and Locke treat the notion of variable wax quality as an important part of the model's utility in dealing with mistake. What, then, is its status for Plato? 1 shall argue that the section on variable wax quality is there to suggest to the reader a tempting way of misinterpreting the model. This will highlight the distinctive character of the model in its original version, and provide an unusual example of a philosopher describing how not to read one of his own doctrines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carol Gilligan's temporally embedded caring subjects reason in terms of relationships with and forward-looking responsibilities to others, and consider how their decisions will shape future ties. Subsequent work in philosophy and economics has had difficulty developing these aspects because of an underlying social ontology that excludes them. This paper draws on a heterodox tradition, post-Keynesianism, to develop an alternative social ontology and an analysis of material life that takes time fully into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kripke claims that certain kind terms, particularly natural kind terms, are, like names, rigid designators. However, kind terms are more complicated than names as each is connected both to a principle of inclusion and an extension. So, there is a question regarding what it is that rigidly designating kind terms rigidly designate. In this paper, I assume that there are rigidly designating kind terms and attempt to answer the question as to what it is that they rigidly designate. I then use this analysis of rigidly designating kind terms to show how Kripke's reasoning regarding the necessity of `Hesperus is Phosphorus' can be extended to statements involving kind terms like `Water is H2O' and `Tigers are mammals'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author will argues that much of this literature is based upon a mistake. The philosophy of language generally has no jurisprudential consequences. The fact that so many philosophers of law have thought otherwise has seriously hampered progress in the field, and not just because time, effort, and paper have been wasted. The philosophy of language appears to have jurisprudential consequences because of a mistake, which the author calls "Dworkin's fallacy" in honor of the most famous philosopher of law to have succumbed to it. This article will analyze the fallacy and describes its negative effects.

There are two important strategies in computer-assisted reading and analysis of text (CARAT). The first relates to the classification process, and the second pertains to the categorisation process. These two often-interrelated operations have been regularly recognised as essential components of text analysis. However, the two operations are highly time-consuming. A possible solution to this problem calls upon more inductive or bottom-up strategies that are numerical and statistical in nature. In our own research, we have been exploring a few of these techniques and their combination. We now know, through our own past research and others' work, that the classification methods allow a good empirical thematic exploration of a corpus. More specifically, in this paper we shall concentrate on the problem of assisting the automatic categorisation of small segments of a philosophical text into a set of thematic categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the claims made by both Freudian psychoanalysic thought and Husserlian phenomenology about the unconscious. First, it is shown how Husserl incorporates a complex notion of the unconscious in his analysis of passive synthesis. With his notion of an unintentional reservoir of past retentions, Husserl articulates an unconscious zone that must be activated from consciousness in order to “come to life.” Second, it is explained how Husserl still does not account for the Freudian unconscious. Freud's unconscious could be called, in phenomenological terms, a repressed retentional zone that differs from both near and far retention. Finally, an analysis is offered for the significance of this psychoanalytic argument for phenomenology. Does phenomenology provide a complete account of the psychical life of the subject without the Freudian unconscious? Does phenomenology suggest, as is often done, that Freud's “discovery” of the unconscious is a fantastical invention? Or, does the Freudian unconscious represent a true stumbling block for phenomenology? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the first section of this paper, I articulate Jaegwon Kim's argument against emergent downward causation. In the second section, I canvas four responses to Kim's argument and argue that each fails. In the third section, I show that emergent downward causation does not, contra Kim, entail overdetermination. I argue that supervenience of emergent upon base properties is not sufficient for nomological causal relations between emergent and base properties. What sustains Kim's argument is rather the claim that emergent properties realized by base properties can have no causal powers distinct from those base properties. I argue that this is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Descartes conceives of theoretical reason in terms derived from practical reason, particularly in the role he gives to the passions. That the passions serve – under ``normal'' circumstances – to preserve the union of mind and body is a well-known feature of Descartes's defense of our native make-up. But they are equally important in our more purely theoretical endeavors. Some passions, most notably ``wonder,'' provide a crucial source of motivation in the search after truth, and also serve to reinforce memory. Our cognitive successes and failures can also be tracked by passions and trains of passions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers and analysis of Ernest Sosa's Virtue Perspectivism. Although Sosa has been credited with fathering the influential contemporary movement known as Virtue Epistemology, I argue that Sosa imprudently abandons the reliabilist-based insights of Virtue Epistemology in favor of a reflection-based, ``perspectival'' view. Sosa's mixed allegiance to reliabilist-based and reflection-based views of knowledge, in fact, leads to an unwelcome tension in his thought which can be relieved by recognizing that his reflection-based view is in fact an account of the cognitive state of understanding, rather than an account of knowledge. Sosa makes matters difficult for himself because he expects too much, as it were, from the concept of knowledge, and in the process burdens his view with elements of reflection it does not require. To solve the problem, I suggest that Sosa needs to develop a two-tiered epistemology which recognizes that knowledge, on the one hand, and understanding, on the other, both have necessary and sufficient conditions unique to themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Roy Sorenson's argument against vague objects. Sorensen's argument, which is explicitly spelled out in Section I of his paper, goes like this: The blob must have a boundary; If a spherical cavity grows from the center of the blob, the blob's outer boundary is completely unaffected as long as some of the blob remains; As soon as nothing remains of the blob, the blob's boundary goes out of existence all at once; Lemma: The blob's boundary goes out of existence instantaneously; Conclusion: The blob goes out of existence instantaneously.

In this paper I examine Quine‘s indispensability argument, with particular emphasis on what is meant by ’indispensable‘. I show that confirmation theory plays a crucial role in answering this question and that once indispensability is understood in this light, Quine‘s argument is seen to be a serious stumbling block for any scientific realist wishing to maintain an anti-realist position with regard to mathematical entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper attempts to link theoretical ideas concerning the relation of agency and structure with empirical research on the transition from school to work. In particular, some of the propositions of structuration theory are assessed in terms of their applicability to empirical research which investigates the impact of individual and structural variables on movement into the labour market, and the way the variables combine to determine entry into labour market segments. The data suggests that structural and individual factors are influential at all levels of the occupational hierarchy, but that the strength of influence varies at different points in the hierarchy. This supports the axiom of structuration theory which asserts that structure and activity are deeply implicated in each other in the process of social reproduction. However, the data further suggests the `duality of structure' principle has to be considerably modified in order to apprehend phenomena such as labour market processes. In this respect we believe that structure and action variables have to be viewed as loci of powers rooted in partly independent ontological domains but which interpenetrate each other in specific empirical areas at particular points in time and space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are the words in out natural language which we use to speak about natural and social phenomena actually laden with preexisting (and hence corrigible) theoretical commitments, full-blown "ontologies," or even metaphysics? Or can we appeal to rules for their use in adjudicating the sense (or otherwise; of any scientific or philosophical innovation? These questions arise most commonly in the context of claims about scientific "transformations." especially "scientific revolutions." Cognitive science, for example, announces such a "revolution" in its conceptualizations of the true nature of the "mind," "thought," "intelligence," "understanding," and so on in this paper I shall orgue that Wittgenstein's reflections on "grammar' enable us to dissolve many of the perplexities that confront us when we invoke Kuhman "incommensurability" in distinguishing between genume scientific revolutions and pseudo-revolutions Indeed, the Kuhnian thesis itself is seen to depend on a range of contestable claims about "words" and "meanings." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on a collection of twelve papers presented to P.F. Strawson on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Celebration of the achievements of notable men; Contributions of Strawson to philosophy.

Focuses on the contents of Alan Gewirth's paper "Reason and Morality". Roots of morality in philosophers; Acceptance of certain evaluative and deontic judgments.

Examines the published papers of philosopher Morris Raphael Cohen on legal philosophy. Place of logic in the law; Role of the courts in making laws; Rationale for the substantive content of legal rules.

The article provides a summary of all of the papers within the issue. The author ties together a common theme among the articles: ideas about "the other." Practical as well as theoretical aspects of "the other" are presented. The author mentions the philosophies of several philosophers including Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, Emile Durkheim, Emmanuel Levinas, Erving Goffman, and Harold Garfinkel. Also mentioned is the development of ideas of the self in respect images of "the other."

The article introduces various essays on humanities. The principle just expressed is intensified in the case of the next five papers. Each of them focuses on one of Kurt Wolff's books: "Moon's on Surrender and Catch. Each writer has a history of involvement with Wolff's work in general and the idea of surrender-and-catch in particular that stretches beyond any single text. All are familiar with his other work, and all know Wolff as a friend, colleague, or teacher. Hence, each chosen text serves as the pivot off of which the author is confronted with the influence of a broader involvement with Wolff's ideas on his or her ways of thinking. The text itself is addressed within this historical thickness within which the writer's contact with it is set. It is appropriate that these essays should have this character. Wolff's work calls uncover and confront the grounds of our perceptions, feelings, conduct, and thoughts. John Dewey said that philosophy is "thinking which has become conscious of itself."