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The evidential relevance of self-locating information.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Oct2013, Vol. 166 Issue 1, p185-202. 18p. - Publication Year :
- 2013
-
Abstract
- Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that self-locating information cannot be evidentially relevant to a non-self-locating hypothesis. The other, a basic tenet of Bayesian confirmation theory, is the thesis that an ideally rational agent updates her credence in a non-self-locating hypothesis in response to new information only by conditionalization. I argue that we can disprove these two theses by way of cases that are much less puzzling than Sleeping Beauty. I present two such cases in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *PHILOSOPHY
*REASONING
*CONFIRMATION (Logic)
*BAYESIAN analysis
*HUMANITIES
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 166
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 90272424
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0033-2