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Control over government portfolios is the key to power over policy and patronage and is commonly understood to lie with parties in European democracies. But since the democratic transitions of the 1990s, Europe has had nearly equal numbers of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, and there is evidence that the ability of parties to control government posts in these two regime types differs. As yet, political scientists have a limited understanding of the scale and causes of these differences. In this paper we propose a principal-agent theoretical explanation. We examine our account using data on 28 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies in Europe, and show that differences in party control over government portfolios cannot be understood without reference to the underlying principal-agent relationships between voters, elected politicians, and governments, that characterize Europe's semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I evaluate whether regional citizens are more likely to support greater autonomy because they find the idea of an independent region within Europe to be more viable. The devolution referenda in Scotland in two distinct time periods provide a quasi-experiment in which to explore this observable implication. In the first referendum, a slight majority voted for devolution but the margin was not enough to overcome the electoral threshold set by Westminster. In 1997, though, the result was overwhelmingly pro-devolution. I argue that the fear of independence, coupled with a preference ordering where the second choice for devolution supporters was the status quo, explained the strategic voting behavior in 1979. Increased support for independence, as both a first and second option for Scots, fuelled the dramatic increase in sincere voting for devolution in 1997. I also presented evidence to support the contention that European integration, especially the Scottish National Party's successful framing of the EU as a mechanism to reduce the costs of secession, contributed to this increase in support for independence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the extent and duration of democratic politics in postcommunist Europe, paying particular attention to the possible impact of the European Union. It concludes with a brief discussion of why it is that the postcommunist democracies that are now members of the EU or soon-to-be members register such high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works and distrust of government, parliament, and political parties. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about a postfunctionalist theory of European integration is presented. It summarizes research on political parties, public opinion and identity to explain the conflicts that have structured European tradition. The resulting theory is subscribed as postfunctionalist because the term reflects the agnosticism concerning whether jurisdictions that humans create are efficient. The two most influential theories of regional integration, which are neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, are summarized.

The article examines the relationship between political campaign and party finance laws and corruption. Several problems with campaign and party finance have been cited, including politics does not respond to the laws of supply and demand. It also outlines some of the most common mechanisms that have been proposed to deal with the problems pertaining to financing parties and politicians in some European states such as spending limits on campaigns for public office and the public financing of election campaigns.