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Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies Compared.

Authors :
Schleiter, Petra
Morgan-Jones, Edward
Source :
Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association. 2007 Annual Meeting, p1-34. 34p. 8 Charts.
Publication Year :
2007

Abstract

Control over government portfolios is the key to power over policy and patronage and is commonly understood to lie with parties in European democracies. But since the democratic transitions of the 1990s, Europe has had nearly equal numbers of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, and there is evidence that the ability of parties to control government posts in these two regime types differs. As yet, political scientists have a limited understanding of the scale and causes of these differences. In this paper we propose a principal-agent theoretical explanation. We examine our account using data on 28 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies in Europe, and show that differences in party control over government portfolios cannot be understood without reference to the underlying principal-agent relationships between voters, elected politicians, and governments, that characterize Europe's semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association
Publication Type :
Conference
Accession number :
34504595