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The European Union’s effort to stabilize its near abroad cannot meaningfully be detached from the United States’ policy of maintaining a strong presence in post-Cold War Europe. The United States has bolstered EU efforts: with the intervention in Bosnia beginning in 1995; likewise with the intervention in Kosovo in 1999; and the decision to enlarge NATO â€" made by and large by the United States in the face of widespread European scepticism â€" created the security framework for the subsequent enlargements of the EU. Conversely, the United States has frustrated the EU policy process: notably so by insisting on the compatibility of the CFSP and ESDP with NATO and US designs. This paper will assess the ENP in light of American designs for European security. Did the ENP evolve in transatlantic harmony or was it a source of transatlantic tension? What is the current status of the ENP in relation to predominant issues such as energy security and missile defence? And, finally, looking ahead, is the ENP compatible with US long-term planning for Eurasia?The first part of the paper will trace the development of the ENP and investigate the points at which Atlantic policy-makers were in dialogue. How did the ENP anticipate American reactions, and how did American policy-makers receive the policy initiative? To what extent was the ENP perceived as something new (distinct from past neighbourhood policies) and also compatible with NATO partnership programs?The second part of the paper provides a snapshot of current affairs and notably two security issues that are at the forefront of transatlantic relations. One is the question of securing reliable supplies of energy for Europe. This was on the NATO Riga summit agenda and is built into the ENP by virtue of its relationship to transit countries such as the Ukraine and to alternative suppliers in the Caucasus. The second is the question of missile defence where the United States outside of multilateral forums seek to develop an American capability in Central Europe. Amidst Russian protests and European concerns, is the ENP a bridge between Russia and the EU?The third and final part of the paper looks to the future and notably the way in which American security planners foresee the United States’ engagement in Eurasia. The Pentagon recently created a new African Command, complementing the Central Command and the European Command (under which NATO falls). What is the logic of this new arrangement? Can the ENP serve as a kind of mechanism facilitating a transatlantic division of labour along geographical lines? If so, are the European states willing to do so? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "The International Politics of Failing States" prepared for presentation at the "46th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii from March 1 to 5, 2005. The paper discusses the securitization of failed states with evidence from the U.S., Great Britain and Germany. The author says that the failed states discourse assists to create a bridge between development and security policy.

The post-Cold War era has been characterized by a dramatic expansion of the international security agenda to include "new" wars, the role of non-state actors as security threats, the concept of "human" security, security aspects of globalization and development, and other trends, all of which add to the traditional security agenda. Although the US and Europe generally agree on the importance of these issues, they also show an increasing amount of divergence regarding whether military force is an appropriate solution. And when both sides do agree the need for military force, as in the interventions in Iraq (1991) and Kosovo, they often dispute other aspects of these operations, such as their multilateral dimension, the role of strategic bombing, protection of civilians, and so on. The increasing involvement of the EU in security affairs, largely through its European Security and Defense Policy, suggests this trend may intensify. Accordingly, this paper explores nature of such divergence and its implications for transatlantic security relations. It notes in particular the limits of several contending explanations drawn from realism (differences in power and interests) and liberalism (differences in historical experience and cultural/institutional development), and focuses instead on processes associated with learning-by-doing to explain the emergence of a European approach to international security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to systematically reconstruct the transformation of the West in order to be able to better understand how the normative foundation of the transatlantic relationship is changing through new patterns of securitization/desecuritization. Especially since 9-11, the state and future of the transatlantic relationship has been discussed passionately in both political and academic circles. The cohesiveness of the transatlantic community (of values, as it were), by and large taken for granted since the heydays of the Cold War is apparently becoming problematic. Linking US and European interests and identities the “West” purports to represent a central semantic category â€" but with a rather diffuse meaning. We propose to conceptualise the West as an empty signifier, as a placeholder for a non-defined universality with the power to integrate different interests and identities because of its emptiness. It is this very semantic structure, opening up different ways of relating to the West, which has made it possible to conceive of it as a distinct, yet unspecified form of normative order. While the content of the West thus remains unspecific, the patterns of relating to it change over time. We will reconstruct the discursive practices effecting such a gradual transformation in terms of dynamics of securitization/desecuritization, of naming potential and possible threats to the West articulated within the Transatlantic space. This opens up a perspective on transformations within the West as a political order treating change not only as an irritation measured against the past but also as the creative source of institutional consequences shaping the future. Changing ascriptions of threat, for example the transformation from a bipolar system with nuclear threats by superpowers to a multipolar system with asymmetric threats by terrorists, may trigger gradual transformations not only in the patterns of securitization/desecuritization but also in the institutional structure of transatlantic relations, especially as far as its classical institutional manifestation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is concerned. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush Administration faced serious constraints in its attempts to build a broad military coalition in the months preceding the March 2003 invasion. This paper examines the factors that contributed to U.S. authority prior to the war, which is defined here as the particular pattern of European states' consent to and dissent from U.S. requests for contributions. The central argument is that the normative component of public opinion—referred to here as domestic policy legitimacy—interacts with states' economic capabilities to determine ally states' responses to U.S. diplomatic requests, and that authority was degraded in part because U.S. policy departed from broadly accepted international norms of legitimacy—in this case, norms regulating the use of force in the international context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the terms through which 'political Islam' is understood in International Relations theory and practice. European and American understandings of 'political Islam' rely upon commonly held secular definitions and assumptions about religion and politics. Secularist epistemology produces a particular kind of 'religious' subject and a specific understanding of 'normal politics' that lends a particular coloring to the politics of Muslim-majority societies. These secularist understandings of 'political Islam' condition contemporary European and American foreign policy toward 'Islamic' political actors and movements in two ways: first, the appearance of 'Islam' in 'political' practice is equated with fundamentalism and intolerance, and second, the forms and degrees of separation between Islam and politics that do exist in contemporary Muslim-majority societies either do not appear at all or appear only as ill-fitting imitations of a Western secular ideal. I conclude that 'political Islam' should be understood as a modern language of politics that challenges and at times overturns fundamental assumptions about 'religion' and 'politics' that are embedded in Western forms of secularism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the transatlantic dimension of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It argues that the EU's growing strategic role in the countries and regions of its periphery has significant implications for the US and transatlantic relations. It analyzes the extent to which US and EU interests coincide or conflict in particular parts of the European neighborhood, as well as the prospects for transatlantic cooperation in Europe's "near abroad." It also considers the larger implications of ENP for the US and global order. Contrary to the predominant neo-realist view, I argue that ENP and the EU's growing strategic engagement in its periphery represent a potential challenge for US global hegemony and leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of relations between the United States (US) and Europe tend to take US foreign policy as a given, and proceed to examine those areas in which the US and Europe or the European Union (EU) have found common ground or are in disagreement. However, the inputs to these US foreign policy outcomes have received relatively little attention. This paper focuses on one foreign policy input in the US side of US-Europe relations: the role of state and local governments in shaping US foreign policies in areas that are of concern to the Europe and the EU. The objective is to answer three questions. Which aspects of US-Europe relations have an important local government dimension? How do local governments try to influence US-Europe relations? In which policy areas do key local governments share views that are more closely aligned with European positions than with US foreign policy? The results will provide insight into two broad international relations themes. The first is the extent to which non-state actors (like subnational governments and international organizations) are eroding the sovereignty of nation-states. The second is to add the US-EU case to the growing body of literature on the influence of state and local governments in US foreign affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States currently plays a key role in shaping the European security enviroment and future agenda. But the events of 911 and the war on Iraq have raised fundamental questions about what role the United States sees for itself in Europe and in Europe’s role in the world. This paper examines developments in the Bush Doctrine and assesses the likely way forward in US policy and the impact this will have on transatlantic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates in security studies in the U.S. and Europe have drifted almost completely apart. In Europe it is common to present the theoretical landscape in terms of, say, critical security studies, the Copenhagen School, traditionalism and feminism. In the U.S. it is more common to see the major debate within security studies as being the one between offensive realism and defensive realism! Previously, almost all theoretical inventions in IR were made in the U.S. Currently, distinct theories are widely associated with places like Aberystwyth (Critical Security Studies), Paris (Bigo’s Bourdieu-inspired work) and Copenhagen (securitization). The new European approaches differ not only from security studies in the US, they also stand apart from most work done in other parts of the world. Are these theories peculiarly ‘European’ and if so, why? The paper aims at explaining the emergence of these European security theories. The explanation draws partly on the political context in the different regions, and partly on features of the intellectual fields, International Relations and Security Studies. The theories are also assessed briefly as to their relevance and usefulness. To what extent are they bound to local, European problems or relevant to the issues that are addressed elsewhere and vice-versa for the theories that flourish in the U.S. and the periphery respectively? Can they travel to the other parts of the world in a helpful role? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent crisis in the transatlantic relationship is the next stage in the dialectics of power that have characterized the relationship between the United States and Europe since the end of WWII. This time however the crisis has been deeper than anything seen before and this paper will seek to account for this in a broadly Gramscian framework. Three things are new this time: the determination of the United States to assert its authority within a less multilateral framework; the refusal by key European countries not to be coerced; and finally the post-Cold War context within which this is happening which makes the United States less willing to co-operate with Europe and Europeans less willing to be subordinated to the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine four fundamental questions concerning US allies and partners in Europe: How is the United States perceived by elites/public opinion? Why does this matter -- how do these countries figure in US interests? How can consequences for the United States be measured? What can/should the United States do to influence the impact on US interests [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivist theories of securitization are built on a foundation of communicative action tenets. While this represents an important and innovative advance in international relations theory, securitization ignores some of the components involved in a successful communicative act. Williams (2003) calls for securitization theory to incorporate the hitherto ignored effects of mass media and in this paper we answer this call. We first show that securitization's specification of leaders' speech acts and audiences' legitimative discourse presumes mass media actors are indifferent in how they convey leader representations and justifications of crises. We take this presumption as an empirical question and execute a study of whether the national presses of ally countries differently emphasized the frames Bush invoked in their news coverage of key September 11th speeches. We show from comparisons of chi-square distributions and regression analyses that, far from being passive conveyers of speech frames, the national presses of the US, Canada, France, Britain and Ireland (1) did not convey all of Bush's securitizing problem representations and response justifications proportionate to the extent Bush invoked them in his speeches, and (2) that for each national press factors based on professional norms and/or organizational routines increased the likelihood that a speech sentence would be conveyed in a news story. We discuss the implications of our findings for how securitization theory should conceptualize media actors when redressing this gap in its explanatory models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the roles different countries play in the process of globalization, which brings to light the complexity of conditions globalization gives rise to. It specifically examines the notions of "sender" and "receiver" societies, i.e. the division between those countries that promote globalization (e.g., the U.S and Western Europe) and those countries that become involved in the process or are greatly influenced by it (e.g., Eastern Europe, Latin America). First, the paper establishes a framework for understanding the uneven character of globalization. It examines the imbalance in the timing and scope of the different facets of globalization, such as economic winners and losers, political changes, and cultural resilience. Second, the paper addresses the character and timing of global progression. It analyzes different models of globalization, such as globalization as evolution and revolution; and globalization as a purposeful or inevitable phenomenon. Finally, the paper examines a variety of responses to globalization. It identifies the diversities between and among "sender" and "receiver" societies. Most importantly, the paper draws attention to those countries that exhibit the elements of both "sender" and "receiver" societies or lie at the crossroads of influences from powerful international actors (e.g., Russia). The issue at stake is whether and how forces of globalization take over domestic processes, which allows for more precise measurements of change and complexity and for comparative treatment of diversities in response. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the emergence of “Korean Beauty”, a cosmetic surgery/fashion trend which seemingly incorporates a ‘white’ aesthetic into an idealized representation of Korean national corporeality, can serve as a site for critiquing and complicating the racial authority of international relations. Interpreted as an aesthetic regime, “Korean Beauty” has been commercialized over the last decade across Korea and Asia through popular culture exports like television dramas, films, beauty products, and more heavy-handed phenomenon like cosmetic surgery tourism. The popularization of “Korean Beauty” has generated a great deal of industry and desire around various “whitening” cosmetic procedures, clothing lines, dietary and dating regimes and, in broader terms, transitions Korean identity into grander narratives of middle-upper class “cosmopolitan” living, individual happiness, and the virtues of “modern” consumption. At the same time, the celebration of “Korean Beauty” remains firmly ensconced within the discursive confines of a staunch post-colonial nationalism that interprets the globalization and popularization of Korean cultural representations/products as an indicator of successful national competition and developmental progress. Adding to this, “Korean Beauty” makes claims to a regionalist politics, in which it seeks to unite an imagined ‘Asia’ through cultural representations alternative to the United States and Europe. In short, the goal of “Korean Beauty” is not only to represent ‘the Korean people’ as ‘new and improved’ in Korea’s own reflexive national gaze, but, following Leo Ching’s theorization of Japan, presumes to function as a cultural authority and model of emulation for ‘the rest’ of Asia in contradistinction to the ‘West’.Mobilizing Anne McClintock’s critique on the premature and obfuscatory celebration of the “post” in postcolonial studies, this paper attends to the signs and implications of an emerging Korean exceptionalism as postcolonial reason. This exceptionalism enacts postcoloniality as international relations with a context that does not employ the common first-third world dialectic, and which complicates theorizations of “hybridity” and “mimicry.” The goal is to advance a discussion on neo- and comparative colonialisms, which does not assume “a repeat performance of colonialism” and which requires “more complex terms of and analyses of alternative times, histories and causalities…to deal with complexities that cannot be served under the single rubric of postcolonialism” (McClintock, 1995). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception, the Western Sahara conflict has been imbedded in a regional struggle with international implications, involving most of the key regional actors, as well as outside powers seeking to balance their interests with all parties concerned. Thus, the Western Sahara is at the center of any foreign policy toward the Maghreb region. This is the case for the US, even though the Maghreb remains peripheral, or for the European Union, mainly France and Spain as central actors.This paper will discuss the evolution of American and European policies towards the Western Sahara, in particular, and with the Maghreb, in general, i.e., the interaction of these policies with each of the regional actors, namely, Algeria, Morocco, and the SADR. The paper will also analyze the influence of other policies on the resolution of the conflict, or lack thereof, including the “war on terrorism,” as well as the process of democratization in the region and other developments in the Middle East. It will be argued that the conflict resolution if conducted to its conclusion within the UN framework would constitute for the US an example of its capacity to resolve conflict within the international system and for the EU an opportunity to affirm its intrinsic external policy, when its overall foreign policy appears scattered if not atomized by the different influences pursued by the EU Member States. However, considering the proximity of the Maghreb to Europe, and the general approach to solving issues at the European Union level, this could constitute a breakthrough for an external policy in the making, contrasting with the negligible influence of the European Union regarding the Middle East peace process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines America?s foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe during the presidencies of George H.W. and George W. Bush. Both father and son occupied the Oval Office as Washington?s relations with its most stalwart ideological, economic, and military allies accommodated new and largely uncertain geopolitical realities. George H.W. Bush brought a wealth of experience to his management of the transatlantic partnership as he navigated an uncharted post-Soviet morass. A veteran of the Cold War, though not necessarily a Cold Warrior, H.W. Bush struggled to redefine U.S.-European relations in the absence of an overarching Communist threat. This paper argues that H.W. Bush, influenced by his own personal history and leadership style, crafted a mostly clever response to vexing issues such as German reunification, Eastern European democratization, and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A decade after H.W. Bush reaffirmed the importance of the transatlantic partnership, his son, George W. Bush, alienated many European allies, whose policies diverged from the White House?s on matters such as Iraq?s alleged WMD program, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the saliency and utility of the United Nations. With a different personal history and leadership style than his father, W. Bush revamped U.S. policy toward Europe as the transatlantic partnership struggled to reconcile American primacy, European integration, and international terrorism. While both Bushes claimed to value the transatlantic alliance, this paper uses theories of cognition and leadership to explain the variance in their policies toward Washington?s European allies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to critically examine the purported values gap that has emerged between Europe and the United States in the aftermath of the divisiveness over the Iraq war as well as the ensuing debates over Robert Kagan?s Mars/Venus caricature. The paper shifts the level of analysis from elite rhetoric to mass public opinion by studying two primary sources of survey data: The German Marshall Fund?s Transatlantic Trends and The Pew Surveys. Our focus is on three broad areas of global governance: support for multilateral institutions, economic globalization and the fight against terrorism. Using survey questions that gauge mass attitudes in these three areas we attempt to highlight citizens? values and opinions about some of the most pressing issues that affect global society today. In addition to the comparative analysis of European and American values at the mass level, we also focus on how mass attitudes compare with those of the political elite on both sides of the Atlantic. The paper is organized into three sections. The first section offers a critical review of the recent literature on the state of transatlantic relations and shows that the missing element in many of these debates are the voices of the actual citizens. Affiriming the normative significance of public opinion, the second section sets up a conceptual and theoretical framework in which we link ideas from democratic theory and global governance to new approaches in discourse analysis. The final part of the paper employs this framework to analyze the data and to draw conclusions about the future of transatlantic cooperation on global issues with a secondary goal of assessing the extent to which there is divergence or convergence in key attitudes and values across the Atlantic or a from another perspective, a creeping obsolescence of transatlantic dialogue in the first place. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2002 several statements have been presented where is argued that the West has broken, divided and even corrupted. In this paper the interplay of academic discussion on the broken West and politics is analysed. Using intertextual reading on the uses of the notion of the West the common traces but also differences of scholarly and political discourses are mapped and asked if the rhetoric of crisis has had influence on the politics and how it has been tried to heal. The beginning of scholarly discussion can be dated back to Robert Kagan?s famous article ?Power and Weakness? in which he describes Americans as Martians and Europeans as Venutians for emphasizing fundamental difference between the United States and Europe. The main argument concerns power ? the resources as well readiness to use it ? to keep and bring order to the world. Europe is presented as weak, naïve and impotent power while the US instead has remained the only powerful nation that is capable and ready to solve the problems of international order. The Franco-German resistance for the 2003 Iraq War brought US-Europe discord first time to headlines and opened up way to popularizing Kagan?s slogan. Since that the characterization has already taken life of its own separate from Kagan?s text as always happened to this kind popularized slogan. Kagan?s article was followed of tens of addresses strengthening and broadening image of the broken West published in leading journals and by leading scholars. From constructivist perspective, springing up this kind notion of the broken West is highly interesting. Pointing that something going wrong within the West has serious impacts because by ?building up the rhetoric of crisis, the debate may actually force the both Europeans and Americans to confront problems they might otherwise prefer not to face? as Erik Jones writes. The broke has been pointed, named and explained. Interestingly during past few years it seems that for many scholars outcomes of discussion have been too much and many have started to downplay significance of the trans-Atlantic rift and spoken for new partnership. The discourse on the broken West has become too self-fulfilling that it has required counter-reaction. It has open up Pandora-box which content has not been possible to predict and thus even for those who open up the box it is now necessary to close it but is it anymore possible.In this paper first the recent discussion on the notion of the West is covered: what is the West that is under discussion, what has then according to the scholars separating the US and Europe and how is the future seen? It appears also that for many for many the final aim has not been for deepening the gap but waking up both parts and declaration for need of the change. Second, it is concentrated to investigate in what context the notion of the West is used in current political discourse and asked if new views of the renewed partnership have influences on political relations or is the West remaining absent from US-European partnership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Barber has portrayed Jihad and McWorld as related, yet competing, processes, there are ways in which rampant global capitalism goes hand in hand with the creation of post-modern identity communities. Modern imagined communities are tied by common understandings of history, to a homeland, and through state institutions or non-state religious, political, and cultural organizations controlled by the group. Instead of any kind of hegemonic agreements of what constitutes communal identity, post-modern communities are characterized by the ability of individuals to opt into and out of groups, fashioning their self-identities from bits and pieces of cultural and communal life. Increasingly even the elements selected are not controlled by the identity community, but instead are driven by global capitalism. To explore how globalization contributes to reformulations of individuals? relationships to identity communities, this paper will examine the growing use of Islamic banking in Muslim communities in the United States and Europe. The demands for Islamic banking are increasingly met by Citigroup, HSBC, and other large multi-national banks, which are developing specific accounts, loans, and investment opportunities for Muslim customers. The paper will compare these banks with immigrant and Christian banks, trying to determine both who is using these banks and how it fits into their own self-identity as well as mapping out how globalization is impacting the banks? missions. It will also put Islamic banking into context with other expressions of post-modern identity communities, such as media targeted towards Muslims, much of which is also owned by multi-national corporations, and the role of Islamic-oriented web-sites and cyber-communities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Israel has been weak in developing long-term and holistic grand-strategies. Weaknesses in grand-strategic thinking in Israel are also evidenced by inadequate Israeli policies towards the European Union.Israel looks up to distant America and keeps its political distance from nearby Europe. Israel behaves as if it were an island in the Atlantic Ocean rather than a nation neighboring the enlarged EU. Yet, the EU is Israel's economic, cultural and, in many respects, political hinterland. Israel enjoys special status in the EU, a status that grants Israel extensive rights in many areas such as research and development and economics. Lack of a grand-strategy towards the EU is a serious omission, which can easily carry a high cost for Israel's international standing and security, as well as damage to Israel's scientific-technological, and economic development. This paper tries to help meeting this Israeli need by suggesting some foundations for an Israeli grand-strategy towards the EU. It does so by exploring the main misperceptions in Israel and the EU, analysing deep disagreements and suggesting some principles for an Israeli grand-strategy towards the EU. Hopefully, this paper can also help the EU to develop a high-quality grand-strategy towards Israel, which can advance the values and interests of both sides. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

?Corporate Social Responsibility? (CSR), the voluntary and 'beyond compliance' commitment of (multinational) companies for society and the environment, is increasingly discussed in International Relations literature. It is above all understood as a means of business or at least private governance in the 'anarchic' international environment: while on the one hand CSR opens opportunities to tackle the challenges of globalisation and sustainable development alike, it is a concomitant of the relocation of authority from sovereign states to non-state entities (Cutler/Haufler/Porter 1999, Hall/Biersteker 2002, Bernstein/Cashore 2004, Pattberg 2004, Reinicke/Deng 2000 etc.). This view touches important aspects, however, it does not go far enough: Firstly, CSR is not only a business-based form of governance; non-business civil society stakeholders are crucial for stimulating CSR and for making it effective and legitimate. Secondly, CSR is not an exclusively private mode of governance either. It is shaped within institutional contexts designed by (above all industrialised) nation states. Despite the very definition of CSR as a voluntary type of business 'governance' (e.g. European Commission 2001, 2006), public 'government' (Rosenau 1992) may play a role, too. This is the case e.g. when states require internationally operating enterprises to disclose their non-financial (social, environmental) development and performance in annual reports, thus setting indirect incentives for improving corporate sustainability through transparency vis-à-vis consumers. Systematically, 'implicit' and 'explicit', 'stimultated' and 'regulated' CSR may be differentiated, depending on the type of state intervention (Wolff/Barth 2005, Matten/Moon 2004). Using this analytical framework, the paper compares institutional contexts and public policy regimes in the US and the European Union pertaining to Corporate Social Responsibility. We discuss the impacts the US and European regimes on governing corporate behaviour beyond the nation state. In our conclusions we finally relate these insights to the debate on creating an international framework for corporate responsibility. Generally, the paper takes a neo-institutionalist perspective and draws from experience gained within a major EU research project on the effectiveness of CSR (cf. at www.rare-eu.net). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that, even after the end of the Cold War, (neo-)realist theory continues to highlight important mechanisms of international politics. The strengths and boundaries of neorealist explanations have to be carefully explored not only for explanatory purposes but also to arrive at responsible recommendations for policy. The paper takes recent developments in the European security order as its focus and argues that the development of an autonomous EU military capability for crisis intervention (ESDP) can be conceived as part of a balancing process against preponderant U.S. power. Together EU member states aim at increasing their autonomy from the U.S. and each member state contributes to this process depending on its individual traditions of security and defence policy. Member policies towards creation and design of ESDP thus constitute a form of ?constrained balancing?: they are directed towards the common goal of maximizing autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, yet constrained by the enduring effects of past security policies as they have become embedded in international and domestic institutions. Building on neorealist and historical institutionalist thought the paper develops an analytical framework and uses a structured focused comparison of UK and German policies towards ESDP to explore the framework?s strengths and weaknesses. It concludes by outlining possible future scenarios and briefly discussing important policy implications. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to show the extent to which regional architectural membership changed as a function of the end of the Cold War and as resistance to American hegemony increased across regions outside of Europe. The paper builds on two previous efforts to map IGO architectural arrangements prior to the end of the Cold War era. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the source and significance of the transatlantic divide between the U.S. and Europe. The paper examines several explanations such as Robert Kagan’s argument that American preferences for unilateralism and European preferences for multilateralism stem from underlying power positions. Drawing on John Ikenberry’s work, the essay notes that multilateralism is often a successful tool of great powers. The paper then considers Charles Kupchan’s argument that great powers inevitably decline. With Europe on the rise and eager to play a more dominant role, Kupchan suggests more conflict can be expected. As evinced by a widening cultural gap on issues such as the death penalty, Kupchan envisions strains in the transatlantic alliance that only conscientious policymakers can mute. While sympathetic to Kupchan’s argument, the essay takes issue with his assessment of European cohesiveness and the extent of the values gap. Through the analysis of climate change politics, the paper concludes that domestic political processes and institutional configurations undermine transatlantic cooperation and accentuate values differences, particularly on issues such as the use of force. Like Kupchan, the essay suggests that policymakers can mitigate these problems, but success will require appeals to respective domestic polities that compromises are necessary to further the common good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a long-lasting period of economic growth and catching-up efforts with the US technological leadership, in the 90th major European economies entered a trend of slow growth, and patchy technological progress. Literature identifies the source of thi ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Realism has always been considered one of the safest foreign policy strategies that a nation can follow. Focusing on one's own self interest and the interests of their countrymen has always guaranteed a level of security and consistency that has earned the favor of so many U.S. officials. Now, some of the nations that provided the United States, Great Britain, and other European powers with the most economic or regional control years ago, are the same nations that monopolize our mass media as the plague of international security today.Some of modern histories most notorious revolutions and rebellions have spurred out of years of external meddling and oppression. The Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the 1979 revolutions in both Iran and Nicaragua are the direct result of U.S. intervention and realist tactics. The United States has never had a clear foreign policy except for the cries of liberty and democracy that have carried our nation against every enemy from Nazism to Communism, from Terrorism to Despotism. However, every conflict seems to end in the same confusion surrounding the actual objective of the United States government; is the main objective oil or freedom?The solution is a new look on the workings of the world, that actual promotion of liberalism and constant support for the will of the people, rather than using realist tactics, will eventually result in greater economic and political gain for the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relations between the European Union (EU) and the U.S., with focus on the position of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It examines whether the rift is deepening towards heading the transatlantic relations from alliance to partnership. The author questions whether the ideas of global war against terror, shaping global trade environment, and spreading American model of democracy help to maintain the tie.

The US- Adriatic Charter, an initiative in the spirit of the 1998 U.S.-Baltic Charter, was proposed jointly by the Presidents of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to President Bush at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. It was signed by four ministers of foreign affairs in Tirana on May 2, 2003. Charter as a diplomatic project had two objectives -- to secure the open door NATO policy and to provide framework for the cooperation and mutual support of candidate countries. On both of these two accounts it was successful. The Charter partners made strong commitments on such areas as democratic reforms and the creation of the conditions for NATO membership. Additional effect of the Charter is the very real progress made in mutual relations of the countries of South East Europe by improving the security conditions in the region. US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership is a successful example of cooperation among small states with common interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on some of the new programs and priorities adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001. It notes that the U.S. almost immediately placed its primary foreign policy focus on responding to the global threat of terrorism after the said attacks. It mentions the creation of an Action Against Terrorism Unit by the OSCE within the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria in December 2001.

The article presents an analysis of diplomatic and military policies of the U.S. and their impact on the EU-NATO-U.S. relationship. One of the innovations in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS02) document is its implied recognition that states are not the only actors that exercise power in the world. Also discussed are interrelated issues and trends affecting the relations between the U.S. and Europe, including the unpopularity of American policy in the continent.

Among the many frustrations hampering cooperation between Western allies is the transatlantic gap in defense capabilities. Many analysts find little reason for hope that the gap might close in the near future due to the growing differential in aggregate defense spending between the United States and Europe. In recent years, however, Spain set an intriguing precedent for small states entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Defying economies of scale, Spain used progressive institutions at domestic and international levels along with creative geopolitics to engage both the United States and traditional powers in Europe. The result was that Spain, without dramatic increases in defense spending, still managed to narrow the transatlantic gap along vital dimensions. These included increased participation in the development of high technology defense and aerospace systems as well as a stronger, independent voice in global affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looks at issues surrounding the crisis of the transatlantic security community. Example of structural changes in world politics; Analysis of the policy disagreements between the U.S. and Europe; Claims on the contemporary crisis in U.S.-European relations.

Conventional wisdom holds that the transatlantic relationship has changed fundamentally since the end of the cold war. Diverging power disparities, cultural predilections, and national interests have prompted America and the states of Europe to adopt incompatible foreign policy orientations that make cooperation increasingly difficult. Until Europe becomes powerful enough to balance the United States militarily, the former partners? foreign policies will continue to diverge and joint action will remain illusory. This article rejects the conventional wisdom to demonstrate that while cultural incompatibilities do lie at the heart of the transatlantic rift, a particular type of communication that takes place in specific institutional settings can ameliorate the effect of these incompatibilities. The effectiveness of this model is illustrated through an in-depth case study analysis of transatlantic efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. The conclusion extends this analysis to the recent transatlantic divisions over the war in Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas European foreign policy used to be defined through the alliance with the United States, it is now clear that this one-sided orientation is no longer sufficient. This is especially the case for global environmental governance, where Europe stands in most negotiations, almost by default, against the United States. The core examples are the almost universally recognised biodiversity convention of 1992, its Cartagena protocol on safety in the trade of genetically modified organisms, the Basel agreement on the transboundary shipment of hazardous waste and their disposal, and, most crucially, the Kyoto protocol to the UN framework convention on climate change. All these agreements have been rejected by the United States of America. In this situation, we argue that if Europe wants to make progress in environmental and other issue areas, it needs new and stable alliances, in addition to the old transatlantic linkage. We will direct attention towards possible partners in Asia and primarily address the great powers of Asia: Japan, China and, in particular, the world’s largest democracy, India. We argue for a twofold strategy. Internally, Europe must unite more strongly. The old Kissinger question still has to be answered: which phone number does the US president?or the prime minister of India?have to call if he or she wants to get Europe’s opinion? The European Union must improve the coherence of its foreign policy, primarily through becoming further communitised. The office of a EU president could take joint responsibility for foreign and security policy in the medium term. Externally, Europe needs to reform its foreign policy and rethink well-trodden paths. This applies in particular to redefining the traditional North-South antagonism in international negotiations, which hardly corresponds any longer to the reality of the international system in many policy areas. New international partnerships between the European Union and the large Southern democracies could redress the traditional confrontation between the group of Western industrialised countries and the ‘Group of 77’, possibly pointing out solutions if global governance projects should threaten to fail because of unilateral rejection by the USA. The political drifting apart of the ‘First World’, the dissolution of the ‘Second World’ and the political, economic and social differentiation of the ‘Third World’ thus offer scope for the recharting of world politics. The development of a multilateral global governance structure requires a strong global alliance of democratic players: many recent environmental treaties?but also the international criminal court, the anti-landmine treaty and other examples?show that Europe and the Bush administration often no longer act together but rather against each other. The European Union must therefore look for other partners?to complement rather than replace the United States of America. We argue that increased dialogue and more intensive political co-operation on the part of Europe with the world’s biggest democracy, India, could be one element of such a reorientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses comparative data analysis to examine the differences between European and American attitudes towards foreign aid. I compare data from the Eurobarometer and World Values Survey with data on the U.S. from both the PIPA and Council on Foreign Relations polls. Given important cross-national differences in knowledge and support of foreign aid spending, I develop competing hypotheses based on core values, national interest, and ignorance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US approach to ESDP is a useful illustration of how American views towards European Security have developed since the early 1990s and since 9/11. From the outset successive administrations have been consistent in warning of the dangers of wasteful duplication, divisive discrimination and divorce inducing decoupling. To prevent such developments Washington instituted the Berlin plus framework institutionalising EU functional dependence and political deference. The NATO Reaction Force robs the Headline Goals of much of its purpose. Despite this, for Washington ESDP continues to subtract more than it adds to European security. As a result the US has changed its policy approach. The Bush administration’s tone has become emollient not because it has got its way but because it no longer considers this an important topic in its priorities post 9/11. As a case study then it illustrates the changing way in which Europe, European security and NATO are viewed in Washington. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-Americanism is a phenomenon that has received increasing attention in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and more recently with the invasion of Iraq. However, despite its wide use, anti-Americanism is used often as a polemic term, and then often inconsistently. We attempt to provide a clearer and more consistent definition of anti-Americanism. Then, using newly released Eurobarometer data from the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003, we observe the prevalence of anti-American attitudes among the peoples of Europe, and what leads to these attitudes. We find that ideology, nationalism, attachment to a supranational Europe, the security concerns of Europeans, and U.S. behavior on the international stage are all strong predictors of anti-American attitudes. We then draw inferences about the effects of anti-Americanism. We find that anti-Americanism leads to an erosion of support for NATO and increased support for a defense arrangement led by the European Union, with no noticeable effect for support of defense led by national governments. Furthermore, anti-Americanism is increasing in Europe, which implies this trend of decreasing popular support for NATO and increasing support for an EU-led defense will continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]