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South Korea is Japan’s most natural ally in East Asia. Both nations share the same primary military benefactor, the United States. Their geographic proximity makes them natural allies in offsetting China’s growing power and unknown intentions. In spite of this natural need to ally, relations remain strained primarily over Japan’s historical occupation of Korea. This paper examines the political issues that need to be resolved in order for Japan and South Korea to work together and the potential for such reconciliation in light of South Korea’s drift away from its American ally and Japan’s open embrace of the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US, South Korean, and Japanese interests in coping with North Korea’s nuclear agenda overlap, but there also are substantial differences. Each country’s policies shall be assessed in terms of its bilateral objectives versus North Korea. Based on that assessment, the historical record of trilateral cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea and the prospects for future cooperation shall be evaluated. In addition, North Korea’s responses to each category and its options shall be analyzed. In each of these instances salient domestic and international factors shall be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration has been progressing rapidly in Northeast Asia, particularly among Japan, China, and South Korea, and a large volume of industrial and cultural products flow across the region. Despite high-level economic integration, the three countries have not developed an institutional arrangement to stabilize regional politics. To the contrary, Japan and the other two countries continue to dispute over issues related to Japan?s wartime past, including controversies over Yasukuni shrine and Japan?s history textbooks. Based on the constructivist approach, this paper explains why the three countries fight over these issues, focusing on state identity and politics of recognition. Japan developed its state identity mainly through interactions with the United States. Japanese leaders emphasize that Japan, as a liberal democratic country, has developed a pacifist stance after World War II. They want other countries to recognize that their actions, including the prime minister?s visit to the shrine, are consistent with the pacifist stance. In contrast, the memory of Japan?s past colonial rule plays an important part in China and South Korea?s state identity formation. State leaders in each country denounce the colonial rule as unjust invasion while praising past nationalist leaders? fight against it as patriotic. They demand Japan?s current leaders to recognize (acknowledge) wrongdoings of Japan?s colonial rule, opposing any actions that imply Japanese leaders? support for or tolerance of the colonial rule. Through the analysis of the current controversies between the three countries, this paper develops a theoretical discussion of identity and recognition in international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines institutional design and change of financial regulatory systems as one of significant post-crisis financial reform efforts in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea. There has been a plethora of research concerning financial reform not just in the academic works but also in policy prescriptions from international financial institutions such as IMF and BIS. However, while most works emphasize the benefits of prudential regulation through financial reform, their emphasis has been put on its significance per se rather than on the conditions under which financial regulatory systems can be better designed and implemented as planned. Similarly, economic literature on this topic has been basically apolitical, not being able to take into account how diverse actors can strategically initiate, transform or resist reform efforts. Economic crises and subsequent reform efforts in post-bubble Japan, post-1994 Mexico and post-1997 South Korea provide a great opportunity to examine the similarities and differences in financial reform processes and outcomes. This is so since, despite differences in their pre-crisis financial systems, there had been considerable similarities among them such as (a) use of financial regulation as a primary policy instrument for economic adjustment and development, (b) the prominent role of state, especially finance ministries, in financial sectors, and (c) the timing of crises and financial reforms since mid-1990s. However, did Japan, Mexico, and Korea adopt similar post-crisis institutional settings for financial regulation because of pre-crisis similarities and international norms of prudential regulation? If not, why did they choose different institutional designs? To what extent have the post-reform regulatory systems been successful in prudential regulation? In order to answer these questions, this paper challenges previous works that emphasized organized interest groups and their influence on reform politics. Rather, it takes seriously the role of unorganized public that has been largely underestimated because of its lack of information and collective action problem and the conditions under which political leadership had to serve the public. It also questions the role of international actors and norms in financial regulation. Given the fact that even the most arm?s-length financial regulation leaves considerable room for subjective assessment of regulators, international norms and best practices are likely to be mediated by national institutions and conflicts among actors. Finally, this study compares the post-reform institutional changes of financial regulatory system in these countries by looking at the interaction between well-established pre-crisis regulators and newly established regulatory agencies. This study can contribute to a better understanding of how financial regulation is designed and under what conditions it is implemented as designed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia (for the purpose of this paper, China, Japan, and South Korea) may be described as the most dynamic region today. Some Asian scholars like Cho Myungrae, Sum Ngai Ling and Tao Lai Po-wah assert that Northeast Asia is a potential bloc. Some Western scholars; Simon and Gartzke, Waltz to some extent, and especially Huntington lend support to the above. This paper attempted to investigate the truth to the above claim using variables like trade, cultural affinities, common memberships in IGOs, and the BOP/fear factor (of the hegemon). The findings of this paper question the strength of the Korea-US and Japan-US alliance. Does peace between China, Japan, and South Korea prove Huntington's "shared foundation of culture"/"cultural-consciousness" ideas or simply prove the liberal peace theory. Or is Northeast Asia a marvelous example of a combination of both ideas. Northeast Asia is a test of this. Can we refute formation of a bloc simply because there is no formal agreement? Could it be invisible, operating on oriental-styled informal, familiarity-based structures rather than western formal ways. If so, is this the beginning of a future alliance? The uniqueness of this paper is it takes into consideration both Asian and western scholars' views and discusses implications of a Northeast Asian alliance. In addition, the paper adresses implications of the above for American foreign policy - should the U.S. prevent the formation or prepare for it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how and to what extent the international norm concerning the prohibition of the death penalty plays a role in East Asian democracies. In stark contrast to the worldwide abolitionist trend, the death penalty remains most entrenched in Asia, where more than 90 percent of all known executions take place. Why does the norm against the death penalty, which is apparently so important for most parts of the world, seem to have no impact on East Asia? How do domestic factors ? political leadership, public opinion, and institutional structures ? contribute to the rejection of the universally promoted human rights norm? With regard to the three major democracies in East Asia at different stages of the anti-death penalty movement (South Korea, most active in the abolitionist movement; Taiwan in the middle; and Japan least active), it investigates what accounts for the current varying impact of the norm in the same region. Analyzing how public and elite opinion interact with each other on capital punishment and what roles domestic institutional structures play, this paper aims to assess norm diffusion and to measure the norm?s capabilities and limitations for helping to shape new death penalty policy in this region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Comparative Analysis of the Migration Policies in Singapare, South Korea, and Japan: Political Economy and Institutionalist ApproachesThis paper mainly aims to explain the variance of the labor migration policies in three countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. As most Asian countries imported a model for labor migration policy from the German work permit system, which can be categorized as ?exclusionary model,? those three countries also adopted the exclusionary model of migration policies, which admits migrant workers only for limited economic sectors, and never provides them with civic and political rights. Even though they share the German-styled exclusionary model, each country?s model on migrant workers is a little bit different. Whereas Japan is strictly maintaining the exclusionary model of migration policies under the belief of ?homogeneous society?, Singapore is holding the relatively open position within the exclusionary model. The South Korean model is located in the middle of Singapore and Japanese systems. Therefore, I would like to raise the question, how we can explain the difference of migration policies in three countries in this paper. While lots of comparative analyses of migration policies have been made, these literatures overwhelmingly focus on Western countries. Few studies based on Asian countries have been achieved. Thus, I will attempt to extend the comparative migration studies based upon Western cases to the Asian cases by following Gary P. Freeman?s work on migration politics of Austrailia, Canada and the United States. Freeman introduces the approach of political economy and institutionalist perspective, and applies them to three Western cases. According to him, political economy perspective deals with who become winners and losers from migration, and how these benefits and costs have impacts on various actors including states with regard to migration policies, while institutionalist approach can be argued that the concept of rights and values as a result of the historical evolution both in nation-states and international organizations affect the migration policies in democratic states. I do not assume that the assessment of two approaches is dichotomous, for example entirely correct or incorrect. The one of goals in this paper is to assess the relative significance of two approaches in explaining the difference of the migration policies in Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. In addition, I will try to examine to what extent the main approaches used in Western cases can explain non-Western cases. By doing so, I believe that this study will broaden the understanding of the migration policies in non-Western countries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore the reasons behind similarities and differences in post-crisis financial regulator regime in Japan and South Korea and the reasons for the variation in the endurance and depth of that reform over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea?s international position is a complex mix of pressures. Focused overwhelmingly on the last vestige of the Cold War ? its unresolved division of the peninsula into North and South ? South Korea must also manage its alliance with the United States, devise a modus vivendi with a massive and dynamic China, and resolve its relationship with Japan. To that end, over the past decade, a fairly clear South Korean grand strategy has emerged, one that emphasizes economic over military issues, accommodation rather than confrontation of China, and a slowly evolving alliance with the United States. The centerpiece of this grand strategy has been a strategy of engaging North Korea economically while downplaying the nuclear issue. This paper will make three main points. First, in terms of overall national security strategy, South Korea has committed itself to a strategy of interdependence and engagement with North Korea. As a result, South Korea?s engagement strategy will continue to have consequences for regional policy toward North Korea, for the U.S. role in the region, and for China?s influence. Second, South Korea?s development has depended on being deeply engaged in the regional and global economy, and this orientation has actually increased in the wake of the Asian financial crisis a decade ago. Indeed, South Korea ? as with many East Asian states ? has increasingly begun to look regionally for its economic partners, especially to China, and away from the United States. Third, South Korea firmly desires to continue its close relationship with the United States. However, South Korea?s national priorities are regional, and differ from Washington?s global priorities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1990s, Japan and South Korea concluded their first bilateral FTA agreements in completely opposite sequences despite similar domestic pressures. Japan, concluded an "easier" FTA (relatively weak opposition by domestic interests) with Singapore first and then concluded a more "difficult" FTA (relatively strong opposition by domestic interests) with Mexico. South Korea concluded a more difficult FTA first with Chile and then moved to Singapore. This paper argues that these differences in sequence account in part for the different contexts in which Japan and South Korean played their respective two-level games in their more difficult negotiations. The pre-existence of the Singapore FTA dampened domestic pressure from Japanese business interests to get into the bilateral FTA game. Thus, Japan could approach the more difficult FTA negotiation knowing that a "no agreement" outcome would not fundamentally increase domestic pressure. This alternative to no agreement put the Japanese in a stronger international bargaining position. South Korea negotiated its harder case without a pre-existing bilateral FTA, knowing that the relative domestic pressure to get in the FTA game would increase without an agreement. This relatively worse bargaining position created a context in which South Korean conceded more to the Chileans and were forced to utilize higher side payments in order to gain support for the agreement domestically. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When, in September 2003, the U.S. requested that its allies dispatch troops to the Iraq war campaign in a show of support, both its partners in Asia complied. Although the rationale behind the decision was ?for the national interest? in both Japan and South Korea, the domestic context and public reaction surrounding the troops dispatch issue were greatly different. In contrast to the huge stir created in Korean domestic politics, there was not much debate or opposition noticeable in Japan. The question then is why the ?national interest? argument rang hollow in the Korean public?s ears while Japanese citizens tended to unconditionally support their government decision. Existing accounts have speculated on (1) the unraveling of the U.S.-Korean alliance versus the strong ties between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi and (2) the recent surge of anti-American sentiments in Korea. Yet, despite the different state of alliance relations, both the Japanese and Korean governments swiftly and aggressively decided to send troops to Iraq, even going against public opinion in the case of South Korean president Roh. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation that takes seriously the domestic-international linkage in alliance politics, focusing on the type of issue linkage created by gaiatsu (external pressure), the domestic political context, and rhetorical entrapment of leaders through their previous interactions with the public. I argue that the Japanese domestic political scene was able to absorb the Bush administration?s demand for troops since the issue was linked diffusely to a wide array of agendas such as redemption for the painful criticism of ?checkbook diplomacy? during the first Gulf War, the expected quid pro quo assistance from the U.S. on the question of kidnapped Japanese in North Korea, and the LDP?s push for a greater role for the Self Defense Forces. In Korea, however, the troops dispatch issue was linked specifically and solely to the U.S.?s cooperation toward South Korea?s North Korea policy, a topic already highly contested in domestic politics. The issue became further polarized into pro- versus anti-alliance debates in Korea with the additional fuel of Roh?s perceived ?betrayal? by succumbing to U.S. pressure and overturning his previous anti-sadae (revering the great powers) rhetoric. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas Japan uses market-based reforms to reduce the costs of publicly financed health insurance and long-term care insurance systems, South Korea and Taiwan have instead expanded the public sector role in health care and health insurance, even in the face of fiscal crises and political instability. The commonalities and differences in approaches to markets in health care policy demonstrate how the connection between democracy and markets remains mediated by domestic institutions and the extent to which strategic incentives in areas beyond health policy give rise to reform coalitions. This paper examines domestic institutional transformations in the context of the effect of recent reforms on protections (and exposures) for people in poverty in all three countries. The argument draws on comparative historical institutions but focuses on the importance of Thelen's concept of transformations more than static cross-national comparison. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia is often regarded as having an uneasy atmosphere, with tensions between the countries making the region sometimes look unpeaceful. North Korean arms tests and other aggressive gestures also contribute to this view, as well as tensions between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. My study tries to look closer at the development of the relations between the most important states in the region, China, Japan and South Korea, assuming that the above-mentioned conflicts are not dominating the relations between the three countries. The study tries to assess changes in the triadic and dyadic relations which don not get as much attention as the conflicts, but will also have an impact on the future relations in the region.These changes are studied by using the concept of Security Community that has been first developed by Karl W. Deutsch and later been elaborated by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The larger goal of my study is to examine the long term stability of the peace between the three countries. A pluralistic Security Community is defined as a community of states having "dependable expectations of peaceful change". Whilst Deutsch developed the concept of the Security Community with reference to the North Atlantic region, Adler and Barnett and Amitav Acharya expanded the scope of the concept to other regions in the world. They also based it on constructivist ideas, giving it more theoretical rigidity, and added the idea of a development pattern with different stages in building a Security Community from nascent to mature. This now allows to study Security Communities that have not fully developed yet, such as in Northeast Asia. Following this concept, the key factors in the development of a Security Community are transactions, norms and institutions. In my work I study the changing relations of the three countries by looking at changes in these factors in different issue areas, with special focus on the development in the maritime domain, which seems to display a case of change towards closer co-operation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asian countries, which consist of a former socialist (China) and two capitalist (South Korea and Japan) countries with large populations, have become the fast－growing economies. They have shown relatively high levels of corruption situation in comparison with their economic influences in world economy. Specially, China is facing a serious corruption problem which prevents politico－economic development and social consensus in the long run.Recently, the hypothesis that a market－oriented democracy is the best model for economic development is accepted among many scholars. It suggests that the strategies for economic growth should be based on market principles and political democratization in the long term. From the perception that market－oriented democracy is the best solution for economic development, people in Northeast Asian countries recognize that state intervention, which undermines a self－regulating market, should be minimized in the economic sectors, and bureaucratic corruption that hinders socio－cultural progress should be eliminated in every sphere of society.Market－democracy advocates argue that the fundamental causes of Northeast Asian countries corruption originate from the immaturity of political democratization. They propose the formation of Northeast Asian anti－corruption regime as a desirable instrument of improving their corruption levels. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yuko Kawato studies anti-base NGOs’ normative arguments and their impact on policy, with special attention to how state policymakers perceive the NGOs and their anti-base arguments. Social movement and international relations literatures have not sufficiently studied state officials’ perceptions of NGOs and their arguments, which may influence the process through which normative arguments may change policy. Based on the social psychology literature, Kawato proposes that the two processes are persuasion and conformity. The more the policymakers accept NGO participation in policymaking, and the better the perceived normative argument quality, the more likely persuasion becomes. In persuasion, policymakers adopt certain norms and redefine their interests, ultimately changing policies. In conformity, policymakers accept NGO demands due to pressure from the public that becomes mobilized with normative arguments; the change in policy does not reflect the policymakers’ private acceptance of the norms. Kawato expects persuasion and conformity to produce different policy outcomes â€" persuasion will lead to more complete, broadly applied, swiftly implemented, and enduring policies. Kawato will present research results from her fieldwork in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the inauguration of the Koizumi administration in 2001, China and Korea (ROK) have repeatedly protested against the visits by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. After he stepped down as Prime Minister last September, new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's first official visits to China and Korea helped to reduce, to some extent, the anti-Japanese sentiment in both countries. Although he promised to construct a new relationship of 'strategic reciprocity' with China during his subsequent visit to Beijing in October, his public statement concerning the so-called 'comfort women' issue before the Diet session had revealed his conservative stance on 'statist' nationalism in Japan. After the end of World War II, the Japanese government established and pursued the fundamental national doctrine of maintaining the Japan-US security alliance and gaining economic prosperity under the peace constitution. In other words, Japan adopted and pursued the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' as the political symbol of "Small Japan." However, the doctrine has undergone some changes under strong pressure from the conservative leaders like Former Prime Ministers, Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Junichiro Koizumi. Currently, Prime Minister Abe clearly shows his political will to change the gear in a step-by-step manner from 'Small Japan' to another stance, even if not of "Greater Japan." Even if Mr. Abe maintains "strategic ambiguity" vis-a-vis the neighboring countries, his assertively conservative agenda to change basic political values in Japan, as illustrated in his catch phrase "Beautiful Japan" might cause the neighbors to become more concerned about Japan's future. Their cyclical cautiousness toward Tokyo may very well have a negative impact on the ongoing attempt to build an East Asian community encompassing Japan, China, South Korea, and other countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do we account for the different changes in alliance cohesion after the Cold War? That is, how do we account for the weakening of the US-South Korea alliance and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance after the Cold War?During the Cold War period, the major purpose of the US-Japan alliance was to maintain peaceful order in response to the Soviet and Chinese threats in Northeast Asia, and the US-South Korea alliance was aimed more at deterring aggression by North Korea. After the Cold War was over, most realist theories of international relations would have predicted that the US-Japan alliance would become weaker as the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist bloc, had disintegrated: as the Soviet Union disappeared, the Japanese military capabilities were sufficient to defend Japan against the residual minimal threat from Russia without assistance from the United States, although China remained a major consideration in the overall Japanese threat assessments. Furthermore, the economic power relationship between Japan and the United States, which was an equally competitive one rather than a hierarchically subservient one, also was expected to contribute to the disintegration or weakening of the alliance. In addition, due to the increasing threat of North Korea with its nuclear weapons program after the Cold War, the US-Korea alliance was expected to become stronger. However, the reality was different.In 1995, the United States made it clear in the Nye Report that Washington had no intention of disengaging from the region either in political or security terms, or of reducing its security cooperation with Tokyo. In the 1997 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, Japan began to consider the support of the United States as essential to its own growing political power in the world. The United States also regarded Japan as an essential partner for undertaking its strategies in the Asia-Pacific region. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Japanese dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to overseas has become more widespread, including areas like Afghanistan and Iraq. Also recently the two countries became closer in their military operations through force realignments. In the case of South Korea, after the Kim Dae Jung government’s Sunshine policy was initiated in 1998, the US-South Korea alliance became a more troublesome one. The different perceptions of two countries towards North Korea loomed large, and after the North-South Korea Summit Meeting in 2000, the friction became even larger. Even at the Six Party Talks in 2005 aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, which includes the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea, Christopher Hill, the current US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the head of the American delegation to the talks, criticized South Korea for not cooperating with the United States.In explaining changes in cohesion of both alliances after the Cold War, my theoretical framework consists of the concepts of critical juncture and security culture. That is, I argue that when there came out critical junctures (i.e., the democratization in the late 1980s and the Summit Meeting in 2000 for South Korea, and the Persian Gulf War and the Taepodong missile crisis in 1998 for Japan), the different domestically-based security cultures of South Korea and Japan, which developed after the Cold War, have determined the alliance policies of both countries. The liberal-nationalist culture of South Korea affected its alliance with the United States, causing it to become weaker. The militarist-nationalist culture of Japan strengthened its alliance with the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political life in modern Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is traditionally characterized by a strong central government, influential economic elites, and a relatively homogeneous society. In such settings we would not expect to find much local democratic innovation, but the case of foreign workers in these countries challenges this assessment. Relatively unskilled foreign workers in present-day East Asia face a range of hardships, and existing governments? programs provide little support. Media portrayals of illegal workers ? as in several other industrialized democracies ? reinforce popular suspicion and fear of these foreigners. Yet, host countries? citizens themselves have formed numerous local associations aimed at assisting illegal foreign workers. I evaluate this trend in light of a pragmatic account of political motivation: associative activism. My account makes explicit the process through which some activists, who initially work in concert chiefly to solve specific local problems, eventually form broader political ambitions as they exert pressure on dominant features of the public sphere, especially processes of political representation and opinion formation. These associative efforts illustrate how civil society groups in East Asian countries can play an increasing role in redefining membership rules and state responsibilities for their residents. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines institutional design and change of financial supervisory system as one of significant financial reform efforts in South Korea and Japan. There has been a plethora of research concerning financial reform and supervision not just in the academic works but also in policy prescriptions from diverse policy-related institutions as well as international financial institutions such as IMF and Bank for International Settlements. However, while most works emphasize the benefits of prudential regulation through financial reform, their emphasis has been put on its significance per se rather than on the conditions under which financial supervision can be better designed and implemented as planned. Similarly, economic literature on this topic has been basically apolitical, not being able to take into account how diverse actors under existing institutional constraints and opportunities can adapt, transform, and resist reform efforts. In this regard, economic crises and subsequent financial reform efforts in Japan and South Korea provide a great opportunity to examine the dynamics of financial supervisory reform. Despite differences in their pre-crisis financial system in Japan and South Korea, there had been considerable similarities between them such as (a) use of financial regulation as a primary policy instrument for economic development and structural adjustment, (b) the prominent role of state actors, especially finance ministers, in economic and financial policy-making, and (c) the timing of their financial reforms in 1997-1998. However, did Japan and Korea adopt similar institutional settings for financial supervision and reform because of these similarities? If not, why did they choose different institutional design and what factors determined the institutional characteristics of financial supervision agencies? To what extent have the post-reform supervisory agencies been successful in supervising their respective financial systems? Finally, what can be the regional implicatiions of these changes given the leading role of Japan and South Korea in East Asian surveillance cooperation? In order to answer these questions, this study challenges previous works that have focused on interest groups and their changing influence on the policy-making processes. Rather, it points out that the role of the public that has been largely underestimated because of its lack of information and collective action problem should be taken more seriously, especially when uncertainties over policy outcomes prevails. This study also questions the explanations emphasizing the international actors such as IMF and their increasing influence on domestic policy choices. Given the fact that even the most advanced and arm?s-length financial supervision leaves considerable room for national differences and subjective assessment of inspectors, international norms and best practices are likely to be mediated by national institutions and conflicts among various actors. Finally, this study compares and explains the institutional design and change of financial supervisory system in Japan and South Korea by looking at changing policy preferences of actors under different phases of financial reform?i.e., crisis, reform, and recovery phases?because different phases present varying opportunities and constraints for actors to influence reform processes. By emphasizing political aspects of financial supervision, this study can contribute to a better understanding of the conditions under which financial supervision works better or worse. Also, this study can shed light on the prospects of regional surveillance cooperation. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]