Sequencing Negotiating Partners: Implications for the Two-Level Game.

In the late 1990s, Japan and South Korea concluded their first bilateral FTA agreements in completely opposite sequences despite similar domestic pressures. Japan, concluded an "easier" FTA (relatively weak opposition by domestic interests) with Singapore first and then concluded a more "difficult" FTA (relatively strong opposition by domestic interests) with Mexico. South Korea concluded a more difficult FTA first with Chile and then moved to Singapore. This paper argues that these differences in sequence account in part for the different contexts in which Japan and South Korean played their respective two-level games in their more difficult negotiations. The pre-existence of the Singapore FTA dampened domestic pressure from Japanese business interests to get into the bilateral FTA game. Thus, Japan could approach the more difficult FTA negotiation knowing that a "no agreement" outcome would not fundamentally increase domestic pressure. This alternative to no agreement put the Japanese in a stronger international bargaining position. South Korea negotiated its harder case without a pre-existing bilateral FTA, knowing that the relative domestic pressure to get in the FTA game would increase without an agreement. This relatively worse bargaining position created a context in which South Korean conceded more to the Chileans and were forced to utilize higher side payments in order to gain support for the agreement domestically. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]