Search

This paper studies major issues in American-Iranian relations in the last 25 years. The central question of this work is to what extent the American policy of containing Iran has been successful? Among the issues that are examined are: The effect of sanctions on Iranian internal politics. Iran’s political/military role in the region. The impact of Iran on the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. Iranian attempts to develop WMD capabilities. In addition to extensive secondary and media sources, American government documents are utilized in researching this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed paper will examine regional conflict and conflict resolution in the post-Cold War Middle East. Specifically, the focus will be on Iranian policy towards a regional US ally, Saudi Arabia. During the 1990s Iran tried twice to reach an accommodation with its long time rival. The first attempt in 1991 failed, but the second, in 1997, met with considerable success. The two states now have stable diplomatic relations, they cooperate in OPEC and they have consciously tried to play down issues that have proven divisive in the past, such as Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States and Iran’s involvement in the Abu Musa dispute. As a rogue state, or a member of the axis of evil, Iran’s policy in this vital region is important in its own right. However, it is also representative of a dynamic that exists in other parts of the Middle East and the developing world. States like Iran, which can be referred to as regional challengers, are involved in three sided conflicts. Not only must they deal with their local rival, they must face the political, economic and military power of US hegemony. Other examples in the region include Syria and the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. Outside the region China (vis-à-vis Taiwan) and North Korea (vis-à-vis South Korea) can also be included. Despite the pressure that has been placed on regional challengers, these conflicts have generally persisted. This suggests a complex interaction between the global balance of power and factors at the domestic and regional levels. This interaction has important consequences for regional conflict and for the United States as it tries to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to fight the war on terror. This paper will explore these factors and their impact on conflict resolution through a structured, focussed comparison between Iran’s first attempt to accommodate Saudi Arabia under President Rafsanjani and the present policy of President Khatami. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Could an Iranian regime which had developed the capacity to build a nuclear weapon be "deterred?" What might be the requirements of such deterrence? What would both Iran and its foes have to do to promote stability? This paper will explore these questions beginning with an exploration of the internal political landscape of Iran, and how that influences critical choices made by the regime. The paper then examines Iran's nuclear programme, within the context of domestic decision-making as the key driver. Third, the paper discusses Iranian culture and negotiating behaviour and how these might affect the question of deterrence. Finally, the paper asks what it all means for attempts to deter Iran should it ever become a nuclear weapons state - either a latent or an overt one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While negative incentives (sanctions and other forms of coercion) are deeply rooted in the theoretical structures on which international relations scholarship rests, and in associated research, much less attention has been devoted to the impact that positive inducements might have as tools for eliciting behavioral change on the part of international adversaries. The theoretical bias flows from the doctrinal paradigms that have dominated the discipline (realism and neo-realism); it also reflects the political obstacles facing those who would appear to be rewarding misbehavior in other nations. The outcome, however, is that positive inducements are under-theorized and under-researched, and that our understanding of foreign policy options is correspondingly impoverished. This paper will develop a theoretical framework within which the role and effectiveness of positive inducements could be captured. I will argue that these inducements can be conceived of within the terms of, either, (a) an exchange model, or, (b) a catalytic model. In the first case, the purpose of concessions to an adversary is to elicit a finite qui-pro-quo, with no expectation of fundamental change in its goals and priorities. In the second case, a more basic and longer term goal is pursued: altering the adversary's basic priorities, by affecting the structure of interests and incentives within that political and social system. The paper will develop the causal assumptions imbedded in both models. Further, it will apply these two models to a discussion of strategies for achieving nuclear restraint on the part of Iran and North Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the diplomatic engagement of the EU3 (Germany, France and the UK) with Iran, in the context of growing regional and international concerns about the Iranian uranium enrichment programme and Tehran's perceived regional hegemonic ambitions. Drawing on the academic literature on coercive diplomacy/strategic coercion, this paper examines EU3 negotiating strategy and that of Tehran, focusing on three key elements: demands, threats and time frame. The central argument is that the Iran case is a unique, if not anomalous example of coalitional coercive diplomacy, in which the states engaging in diplomatic negotiations lack either the military capabilities or political will to threaten coercion, and the states making threats are not engaged in diplomacy. Nonetheless, the Iran issue provides an interesting case-study which highlights the possibilities and limitations of coalitional coercive diplomacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asserts that conflicting interpretations of salient international institutional norms can have a deleterious affect on the security of nation-states. By looking at the written norms governing the nuclear fuel-cycle in Iran as regulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations, and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, I will demonstrate that the policies of these two transnational governing bodies are in disarray due to contradictory interpretations but that they are still an important part of international norm adherence regarding nuclear fuel-cycle policy. Through an analysis of the Iranian government’s adherence to international agreements regarding their nuclear energy program as well as the United States and Russian policymakers’ understanding of their adherence, this paper will shed light on how diverging policies are influencing Iranian nuclear policy. For example, over the past thirty years Iran has primarily followed the guidelines set forth in the NPT but it was conducting covert nuclear research program for eighteen years. Iran contends that according to Article IV of the NPT the nuclear fuel-cycle is their “inalienable right.” The United States disagrees, asserting that as an NPT signatory Iran needs to get nuclear fuel from other sources. The dual-use capability of the technology is at the heart of the dilemma. Conflicting interpretations regarding Iranian adherence to international agreements have resulted in foreign policy clashes. These disagreements are negatively influencing the effectiveness of non-proliferation which could have dire consequences globally. In conclusion, this analysis will discuss some of the difficulties and potential outcomes of the dilemma. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this paper is to offer a better understanding of Iran's relations to the West in general and the ‎United States in particular. By examining the social content of values, concepts, and images that have been ‎constructed in Iran's historical discourses and are now a part of the official state discourse, the paper illustrates how ‎both Iran and the United States reproduce each other as the enemy. The paper argues that the basis for the ‎construction of this mutual animosity is in the representational practices of each state rather than some objective, ‎tangible reality.‎ ‎ ‎ ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first part of this paper will critically examine the main arguments that have been laid out by various scholars as major incentives for countries to acquire nuclear weapons. It will be shown that many arguments are underdeveloped in terms of theory-building and that many of the suggested motivations need further clarification and specification for a more comprehensive understanding of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The second part of this essay will then use Iran as a case study to test the assumptions put forward by various scholars as to what really determined Iranian behavior in its quest to acquire nuclear weapons. Many of the variables, such as ‘bargaining chip’, ‘domestic turmoil’, ‘public opinion’, ‘scientific momentum’ and ‘leaders personality structures’, are ill equipped to explain Iran’s incentives to obtain nuclear weapons. A better explanation is a realist argument that contends that Iran needs to deter against enemies such as Iraq, Israel and the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the nature and intersections of power, ideology, and knowledge by analyzing the history of the nationalist aspirations and political struggle of the Kurds. I analyze the different strategies and outcomes of the Kurdish movement in three countries where the vast majority of all Kurds reside ? in Iran, Iraq and Turkey ? through the lenses of several theories and approaches to civil and ethnic conflict: deprivation/ psychological/ grievance based, rationalist/ structuralist, and discursive/ constructivist. I embark on this exercise to explain the central puzzle: (1) what explains the durability and perseverance of separate Kurdish identity and struggle for self-determination given that historically Kurds have always been divided between several different nations and there has never been an independent Kurdistan (which resulted in an absence of some important unifying characteristics among the Kurds living in different countries, such as language and culture); and (2) why the states they inhabit have consistently treated their struggle as a major threat to their hegemony (sovereignty and integrity). As I draw conclusions about different outcomes in the three countries, I attribute the most explanatory power to a combination of two variables: relative state strength and international factors (both regional and global). Finally, I draw some tentative conclusions about the prospects for future configuration of the Kurdish situation with particular attention given to the recent developments in Iraq and the changing situation in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explain and predict the Iranian behavior in the current crisis over its nuclear program. James and Ozdamar (2005, 2008) developed a foreign policy behavior model for the comparative foreign policy analysis that is based on systemism (B ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the most recent U.S. and international public opinion surveys regarding perceptions of Iran's foreign relations and nuclear program and support for specific measures, including the use of force, to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability. While these various publics' preferences on how to deal with Iran's nuclear programdo not necessarily reflect their respective leaders' views, they can constrain and otherwise influence their governments' policies. Multi-country surveys taken during the past several years have shown predominantly negative views of Iran, particularly among non-Muslim publics, as well as widespread concern about Iran's acquisition of nuclear arms. Despite this broad concern, only about a third of foreign publics on average support tough countermeasures against Iran, including economic sanctions and military action, if it continues to defy U.N. strictures against its enriching nuclear fuel. The most popular measure is to employ "only diplomatic efforts," supported by about two-fifths on average. The U.S.public, in contrast, is relatively hawkish on Iran. Three-fifths of Americans support tough countermeasures (45% economic sanctions and 15% military action), if Iran continues to enrich nuclear fuel in defiance of the U.N. The U.S. public's support for military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons roughly doubles (from nearly one-fifth to about two-fifths) when military force is stipulated as a last resort -- the only available option that could prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Surveys taken last year in Iran found no more than one-fourth of Iranians supported their country pursuing development of nuclear weapons in lieu of normal relations and economic assistance from the U.S. and other countries. The economic incentives part of a package to be offered Iran should be publicized to enhance the position of moderate Iranian leaders proposing reduced tension with other countries and a better life for Iranians. However, negotiations at the highest level should be approached cautiously, so as not to legitimize the present Iranian government's objectives, until there a signs that these have been modified and become acceptable to the U.S. and its friends in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that coercion theory made a wrong prediction in the Libya case and that it is likely to be wrong with respect to Iran and North Korea as well because three of its assumptions are flawed. First, the assumption that a good understanding of ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that, whilst the notion of hierarchy is a useful for for conceptualising the demands for 'ldeadership' of the EU by its largest member states, there are profound limits to its potential within the EU. Drawing on the case of negotiations w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Union (EU) negotiations with Iran over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear enrichment program has been one of the most high-profile instances of an attempted joint or collective foreign policy operation undertaken by EU member states. This paper exami ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between globalization and Islam. Globalization’s focus on market forces, new technology and new discources of democracy and human rights have different impacts on parts of the Muslim world. It has become evident that globalization has created two contradictory processes, namely homogenization and fragmentation (localization) of global values, democracy, ethnicity and identity. Islam, as a rich and diverse fiber, empowers Muslims to cope with these issues in different ways. What are major historical, socio-political and economic factors that shape the understanding and manifestation of Islam in different parts of the world? It is asserted that there are different zones of Islam, each of which are framed by their respective national culture and diverse historical experiences. This paper will focus on Iran (as the representative of the Persian Zone) and Saudi Arabia (as the representative of the Arab Zone) and elaborate on the diferences between those two zones in regards to coping with the forces of globalization. The main question is: What significance do reactions of both zones to the forces of globalization have to our understanding of ‘globalization’ per se? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the last decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has signed major energy agreements with Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Sudan â€" all countries that have a deteriorating political relationship with the United States. Are bilateral agreements between the PRC and certain energy exporters driven by a desire to engage in “soft” balancing against the United States? In this paper, we argue that increasing political tension between the United States and energy exporting states can drive them to seek non-American markets as part of a strategy for reducing dependence on the United States. As the second largest energy importer in the world, the Chinese market is an attractive substitute. Moreover, the PRC views sufficient energy access as vital to national security, and is interested in establishing an energy supply that is relatively immune to American political pressure. We conduct time series analyses to empirically demonstrate that - for the top twenty oil exporting states between 1996 and 2005 - increasing political tensions with the United States are positively correlated with subsequent energy agreements with the PRC. As part of our analysis, we control for the overall deterioration in relations between the United States and the sample of energy exporters, as well as the broad increase in the number of Chinese energy agreements with these states. Data on Chinese energy agreements are drawn from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency. Measures of political tension between the United States and energy exporters are constructed by using Gary King’s 10 Million Dyadic International Events database. Generally, we find evidence for our argument that recent Chinese energy agreements are not just the result of economic interests. Rather, they represent a logical consequence of political incentives in both energy exporters and the PRC that drive them to engage in soft balancing against the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While almost a decade old, Ted Hopf's observation that the democratic peace is an observation in search of a theory still has some validity. In particular, the mechanisms behind the observed lack of war between democracies are poorly understood, making it difficult for scholars to provide a compelling explanation. While there has been some innovative work, particularly with respect to learning and the ability of an increasing number of democracies to cement democratic norms, Müller and Wolff note that normative and structural explanations are monadic explanations for a dyadic phenomenon. Underappreciated in the existing work is the role of identity and the importance this has for driving the democratic peace. With a focus on developing a dyadic democratic peace mechanism and using a case study approach, this paper utilizes the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to examine how identity plays out in the U.S. response to the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs. It finds that in fact identity does play a significant role in how security policy is constructed. The potential implications of this finding, particularly on policy, are significant. If the democratic peace does rely on identity to trigger the constraining norms that limit the escalation of conflict to violence, it is unlikely the democratic peace can be spread by force and it is possible that states nominally democratic can be excluded from the community of democracies if their behavior or significant other aspects of their perceived identity are at variance with the accepted democratic identity standard. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Russian-Iranian ties in the 21st Century, in order to examine the degree to which this continuing relationship is motivated by tactical or strategic considerations. In pursuit of that end, the impacts of a series of variables (both national and international) are investigated. Therefore, this work examines the presidencies in both states, the international context for bi-lateral relations, the role of international organizations, and three aspects of bi-lateral cooperation (military & technological, diplomatic, and economic). In sum, this work's theme is that Russian-Iranian cooperation continues to be strategic, in that a major foreign policy goal of both states is to balance against US power. However, the lack of any long-term commitment, outside of a shared desire to balance US power, is also revealed. This holds significant implications for the future of Russian-Iranian relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have written about narratives and myths in international relations but none has looked at which part of the myth has what Pierre Bourdieux calls “symbolic power”. This paper shows how myths, as a subset of narratives, have the power to mobilize and/or unify a nation-state. More specifically, I will show how the objective of the myth (meaning the goal of the story) mobilizes citizens as opposed to the plot or character. By looking at three transformative periods in Iran: the overthrow of Mossadeq (1951-1953), the revolution and hostage takeover (1979-1980) and the nuclear issue (2003-2006); the data will show that policymakers’ use of a national mythological objective is what motivated the citizens to act. For example, the current nuclear issue in Iran became a top priority to Iranian citizens after United States policymakers pressured Iran to stop developing this capability in 2003 upon discovering Iran’s covert nuclear program. Documented student protests, petitions, and demonstrators all fighting for their “inalienable right” to nuclear energy highlight this unification. By looking at the master myth in Iran (defined as the inner pure vs. the outer corrupter) which has evolved since pre-Zoroastrian times as embodied in speech acts by Iranian leaders and public opinion polls in the country, the data will show that while the national narrative may be the text that is used, the subtext, and therefore the myth objective is what resonates within the populace. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies of diversionary theory focus on domestic determinants of conflict between interstate rivals as well as the strategic behavior of potential targets of diversion. This paper addresses both issues by analyzing the tendency of the US and Iran to use their rivalry for diversionary purposes from 1990 to 2004. Throughout the study, I seek to answer the following questions: Do the US and Iran use their rivalry to divert attention away from domestic political and economic problems? Second, does Iran reciprocate hostile actions from the US or act more conciliatory to avoid becoming the target of diversion. My findings demonstrate that US presidents appear to be more hostile toward Iran as there is a decline in their approval ratings. The same conclusion cannot be drawn for Iran. The findings suggest that Iran neither uses hostility toward the US to divert attention away from domestic problems nor behaves strategically to avoid becoming the target of a potential US diversion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iranian struggle for dominance in the Persian Gulf is not a new strategy, except the current attempt, if any, encompasses larger objectives, and it is not only conflicts with the United States’ regional goals but in a direct opposition and in fact in a collision course with the United States regional policies.Since the establishment of Islamic Republic in Iran, many observers for sometimes argued that the regime tried to "export Islamic Revolution" to other countries, but none of those speculations were realized. In the past three years, due to the development of nuclear research sector, and the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and the support of Hizbullah, a widespread discussions have permeated the academics, police-makers, and military brass among others that Islamic Republic is planning to dominate the Persian Gulf if not the whole of the Middle East. This paper will evaluate and analyzes the circumstances and conditions in Iran and regionally in order to answer such question. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine the current hostilities between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran by sifting the dyad through a pair of theoretically grounded hypotheses. This argument draws mainly upon hegemonic stability theory and offensive realism to demonstrate that U.S. policy towards Iran is a preventative attempt to subvert an aspiring regional hegemon seeking to change the status quo. Using quantitative data on Iran’s material capabilities and ambitions, I contend that Iran is aiming for hegemony in the Middle East, which will bring it into open conflict with the world’s sole superpower. Furthermore, I use this case study as a heuristic to determine whether older theoretical paradigms derived from the history of the European great power system retain their predictive and explanatory power when used to test contemporary systemic dynamics. The evolution of the system from multipolarity to bipolarity and now unipolarity, I argue, calls for new policy prescriptions to reach a détente between the two nations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we explore the cognitive and social psychological foundations of bureaucratic politics and organizational behavior as it pertains to foreign policy decision making. Although Allison, Halperin, and others pointed the way toward a fruitful avenue of research in the decision-making tradition, very few studies have moved beyond this classic literature. We argue that by placing "cognition in context," specifically by incorporating insights from the social cognition literature in psychology, the study of bureaucrats and their institutional constraints can bear fruit in foreign policy analysis. Cognitive explanations such as schema theory and analogical reasoning, for example, may also benefit from being placed in a broader institutional context. We illustrate the utility of this cognition-in-context approach by reference to a range of decision-making cases such as Vietnam, the Iran hostage crisis, September 11th, and the current Iraq war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In late 1950 and early 1951 Great Britain almost engaged in a war against Iran (Persia). After Iran had nationalized the highly profitable Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which ensured the UK obtained oil without having to pay in dollars it did not own) Great Britain mobilized its troops and had an invasion force ready in nearby Kuwait. The Labour Attlee Government hovered over the decision to move ahead with the invasion facing serious domestic problems and having serious difficulty in obtaining American diplomatic and logistical support. British decision making is characterised by frequently alternating between escalation and de-escalation the conflict. The paper will apply psychological control theory to analyzing decision making by the Attlee government. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the U.S. has engaged in an array of informal, back channel, and third-party diplomacy with Iran during this time. This paper aims to offer a critical analysis of these different dimensions of unofficial diplomatic relations with Iran, the purposes for which these methods have been used, as well as how effective they have been in the pursuit of policy goals and objectives. The fundamental obstacle to a more normalized diplomatic relationship between the two states has been a rejection of the legitimacy of either regime in the eyes of the other. The Iranian regime views the United States as an unwelcome meddler in both internal Iranian affairs since the overthrown of Mossadeq in 1953 and of what Iran considers its immediate sphere of influence in the Middle East, while the U.S. perceives the Iranian regime as undemocratic and illiberal, and with ties to extremist political groups both within and outside Iran. In the face of such discord and distrust, understanding the nature of unofficial U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations is of principal importance both theoretically and politically. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Russia and the US are interested in partnership, yet, they make different choices when it comes to their friends and enemies. Countries that the US considers as "rogue states" or "axis of evil" are Russia's friends. This paper will focus on Russian foreign policy toward one of those states - Iran. One of the major concerns for Russian foreign policy since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 has been the spread of terrorism from its Southern borders. Yet, Russia supplies nuclear technology to Iran, a country in its Southern backyard. The US has a major concern over Iran potentially becoming a nuclear power, and yet Russia continues supporting Iran's nuclear program despite the US objections. Why is Russia so much less fearful of nuclear Iran, the state that is much closer to it than the US which is separated from it by thousands of miles? Why Russian foreign policy toward Iran so different from that of the United State's? What does Russia have at stake in Iran? All of these questions will be addressed within the broader subject of cooperation. I will compare different treatment of cooperation by major schools of international relations and how it applies in the case of Russian foreign policy toward Iran. I will argue that constructivism offers an explanation of Russia's cooperation with Iran that encompasses both neorealist and neoliberal treatment of cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rejecting the thesis that Islamic societies and democracy are incompatible, this paper examines Iran's historical attempts at a democratic government in the past century, as well as other Muslim states, and asserts that grounds for a secular democracy in a Muslim society do exist. Iran's current political, intellectual and social trends are examined and the role of culture is taken into account to conclude that Iran is in the process of synthesizing its political and social identity with a secular democratic system. Examining the political and social changes in Iranian society from a historical perspective, the struggle between the rivaling conservative and reformist factions within the political system are analyzed, as well as the role of contemporary intellectual figures and the voting population, and Iran's prospects for the future. In tracing the historical roots of political and social development in Iran, it is argued that an intellectual fusing of ideas drawing influence from both Western and traditional Iranian socio-political thought is taking place. The origins and dynamic of this development are examined, as well as the possible consequences for Iran, the Muslim world and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of Iran?s relationship with Hezbollah can only be fully understood by referring to three distinct frames of reference: the historical evolution of Shi?a Islam in Iran; the formal institutions of governance in the Islamic Republic; and the ideological factions and cross-cutting informal networks within the Iranian clerical establishment. These three frames of reference, or dimensions, are also conditioned by the geopolitical characteristics of the region as well as the immediate context of Lebanese politics, but nevertheless comprise the core factors that have shaped the internal decision-making process of Iran?s leadership. The convergence of these dimensions at various points in time have directly shaped Iran?s relationship with Hezbollah, including the intimate role played by radical Islamist clerics in establishing and supporting Hezbollah as an armed group in Lebanon during the 1980s. Notably, however, they have also combined to push Iran?s policies in a different direction from the late 1980s onward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the field of international relations was taught and narrowly researched in the pre-revolutionary period in Iran but it was in the post-revolutionary era that IR evolved into a more or less independent field of study. Political scientists in Iran have traditionally been interested in political theory, history and political geography. There are two basic reasons for this tendency. First, Iranian mind tends toward idealism and abstractions and second, most political scientists teaching in Iran are European educated. As the field of IR reached greater theoretical sophistication in the early 1980s and a vast body of literature became available, and also as Iranians became far more interested in their country’s foreign relations in the aftermath of the revolution, the field of international relations has become of great interest to both students of politics as well as the average citizen. Compared to two decades ago, extensive translated and authored IR literature exits in Farsi today. There are a number of limitations to the enrichment of IR, however. Among them, inadequate knowledge of the English language by the educated, inaccessibility of the student body to the American/Western educational system, traditional attitudes toward Iranian national sovereignty, deep divisions among top elites regarding the nature of the international system and scarce opportunities for employment in the field of IR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The regional ambitions of Iran received considerable coverage in the regional and pan-Arab press during 2006. Outside of the discussion about Iran and the United States, Arab editorialists in these media outlets largely focused their coverage on three issues - Iran's role in the 2006 war in Lebanon, the controversy over Iranian development of nuclear technology, and concern over the spread of Shia "evangelism" in Sunni states. This paper explores how the subject of Iran was reconstructed and disseminated in Arab media framing. Particular attention is paid to how the issue of Iranian hegemony was debated in the Pan-Arab public sphere in editorials and news commentary across satellite television, newspaper, and online news outlets. The paper also presents how Arab media messages were responsive to Iranian media framing. The paper presents the course of Arab media framing about Iran as a significant process of mediated public diplomacy, domestic political posturing, and a discursive construction of regional strategic relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The foundations of nuclear strategy and deterrence were well-established during the Cold War, when two superpowers and several regional powers possessed nuclear weapons. All sides apparently understood the rules of the road and shaped their behavior to conform to practices that produced relative stability for decades. A fundamental precept of deterrence was related to the concept of victory, which held that victory in any practical sense is not possible or meaningful when nuclear-armed states use nuclear weapons.However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to radical regimes and possibly to non-state actors has put this framework under stress. This paper will elaborate a framework -- as defined in Victory in War: Foundations for Modern Military Policy (Cambridge, 2007) -- for understanding the nature of victory in war and apply that framework to cases in which regional powers such as North Korea or Iran possess nuclear weapons. The central question is whether the possession of nuclear weapons by such powers should alter U.S. calculations of victory, and more critically whether the possession of nuclear weapons by non-state actors -- of which al Qaeda is the most worrisome -- should alter how the United States calculates its ability to achieve victory.This paper will thus seek to understand how the United States, the premier nuclear state, can bridge the divide in balancing capabilities between traditional deterrent powers and non-traditional adversaries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1979, the US has said that its problems with Iran are because of three issues: pursuit of WMD, opposing of Arab- Israeli peace process and, Iran’s support of terrorism. One would assume that if Iran proposes a deal accepting to change its policies in these matters, the US would at least consider it seriously. However, this is exactly what the US did not do in 2003. In 2003, Iran sent a proposal to the US proposing: full transparency in its nuclear program, stop of any support to Palestinians and accepting the two state solution in the M.E. In return Iran’s main request was mutual respect. The question is while Iranian proposal was answering all the US requests, why didn’t the US even bother to answer it? This paper tries to answer this question by using the prospect theory as its analytic tool. The main question of this paper is: “How can prospect theory explain the US behavior in rejecting Iran’s proposal?” Was it because of a shift in reference point of US towards Iran? Was it because, while in the domain of gain the US did not want to take risky steps? Or was it because of the framing of the proposal? The answer to these questions are important because: a) It is another test for prospect theory and, b) It will help the future negotiations between Iran and the US. For, Iran can never propose a better deal to US. Therefore, it is very important to know why it did not work. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the responses of the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to Iran's violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), focusing on the stance adopted by members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In February 2006, key NAM members voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council in a move that stunned Iranian diplomats, and seemed to signal a collapse in NAM solidarity on fundamental non-proliferation issues. This paper assesses the significance of this event, analyzing the extent to which it represents a softening in the ideological divide between NAM and Western approaches to third-party non-compliance, and a convergence in attitudes towards the nuclear non-proliferation regime more generally. It draws on the interlinking concepts of international system, international society and global society to help explain these developments, exploring the hurdles and opportunities associated with any attempt to build on the fragile consensus emerging among the NNWS over the need to respond more decisively to NPT violations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces out the history of the relations between the Iranian state and the oil industry from the beginnings in the late nineteenth into the twenty-first century. Even in the early decades of the twentieth century, these relations were influenced by the conflicting demands for economic rationality, economic justice, and nationalism. This caused a series of revisions and renegotiations between the state and the oil companies. With each of these renegotiations, the state has tried to bring the oil industry further under its control. In turn, this led to efforts to mitigate against the dictates of market efficient behavior that maximized profitability and replace them with those designed to maximize regime longevity. This paper argues that since the late 1990s, Iran has experienced yet another revision in the relationship between the state and the oil sector. Under pressure from the IMF and World Bank to begin economic liberalization, Iran took limited steps to loosen control over the oil sector in a way that allowed senior NIOC officials to capture key elements of this previously state-owned enterprise. This engendered broad resentment among the Iranian public sensitive to any hint that their nation?s resources being plundered for private gain while Iran?s economy as a whole remained stagnant. This paper demonstrates, however, that the period of state-capture, when new oligarchs bought-up privatized state-assets, gave way to a period of state revenge, when the entrenched elite used a combination of enticements and veiled threats to bring the oligarchs back into the state?s orbit. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is a rational response for states living in unfavorable security environments and that, as such, it cannot be incentivised away as most of the proliferation literature encourages. The paper compares Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel and finds in each case a similar rationale for nuclear acquisition. Each state faces numerically and (except Israel) conventionally superior military forces and compromised geographic location vis-a-vis the most likely potential adversary. All states have sought to acquire nuclear weapons in order to increase their otherwise weak deterrent capability.This paper argues that because states prioritize security risks higher than other political values, no combination of incentives, economic or otherwise, will dissuade these states from their nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the challenge for the international system should not be on how to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons, but rather on how to manage existence in a world with a multiplicity of nuclear powers.Drawing on lessons from the Cold War, this paper presents several policy recommendations on how to manage a proliferated world, including the importance of diplomatic channels between adversaries and developing enhanced technology for the identification of nuclear material both before and after detonation (to reduce the likelihood of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups of third parties).This paper takes a different tack than most proliferation literature. Most proliferation literature attempts to create incentives to dissuade nuclear aspirants from further pursuing their goal. This paper is distinguished by its recognition of the inherently rational pursuit of nuclear weapons by security deprived states and its proposal of specific policies to minimize the risks of living in a more widely proliferated world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although IR scholars have offered various explanations for the origins of sovereignty, the literature is yet to offer a convincing one. Rejecting the hypothesis to locate sovereignty with Westphalia, this paper traces the emergence of sovereignty to two nineteenth century developments: the dominance of the positivist legal theory and the ascendancy of European states over non-European states. Theoretically, this paper integrates critical legal theory and postcolonial theory into international relations theory. The critical legal theory clarifies how three doctrines that constructed sovereignty (state?s ultimate authority, territoriality, recognition) were directly related to the positivist (as opposed to earlier natural) legal theory. The postcolonial theory illuminates how the positivist legal theory?s construction of sovereignty was related to the legitimization of European and delegitimization of non-European political entities. Sovereignty both justified and enabled Europe? domination over non-European political entities. The empirical part of the paper examines the imposition of extraterritoriality (European states? exclusive jurisdiction over their citizens in non-European states) in Japan, China, Turkey, Iran, and Thailand to provide evidence that positivist legal theory?s attempt to conceptualize the interaction of European states? interaction with the non-European political entities crystallized the doctrine of sovereignty. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the potential expansion of Iran?s influence in Iraq through the country?s Shia population. Despite their predominance, it will argue that Iraq?s Shia leadership remains divided both politically and militarily, answering to numerous internal political, social and regional restraints. This paper will also question the willingness of Iraq?s Shia to cede autonomy to Iran. Iraq's Shia leadership derives their position from local rather than Iranian support. They question the direct role of the clergy in government, and are less internationally-isolationist. Although Iraqi groups have benefited from Iranian support, it will be argued that Tehran's influence over Baghdad?s new government is limited, and that the Shia use Iran to balance the influence of the occupying forces. Finally, it will suggest that Tehran's involvement in Iraq may end up influencing Iran more than it does Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work analyzes the critical role of intelligence in foreign policy. The case study focuses on one of the most significant intelligence failures for the U.S. in the Middle East, the failure to predict the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. This paper discusses the failure to foresee the growing domestic crisis in Iran which led to the toppling of the pro-American monarchy and its replacement by an Islamic Republic hostile to U.S. interests. This was the result of the blinding of American intelligence for strategic, economic, and domestic political reasons. Second, the paper discusses the delicate politics of trying to gain intelligence on an ally. This leads to a discussion on the significance of alliances and the problems in particular of great powers gathering intelligence on regional allies. This paper utilizes secondary as well as primary U.S. government documents. The paper also discusses the structure and institutional norms of American intelligence and how these problems continue to manifest themselves today. This paper would fit well on panels focusing on intelligence studies, American foreign policy in general, as well as Middle East politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History is the documentation of the past. When historians intentionally or unintentionally omit an event from their writings or describe it in a distorted way, it is as if that event has never happened or it occurred differently than it truly did. This paper will discuss the rising trend of underestimation or even denial of the Jewish Holocaust. This paper argues that these efforts are part of an attempt to establish Holocaust denial as an accepted norm in the academia and in international politics. Although most Western democracies still perceive the Holocaust as the manifestation of ultimate evil, this perception is increasingly challenged by some academics and so-called historians, which the paper refers to as Holocaust deniers and falsifiers. It appears that Holocaust deniers and falsifiers are trying to replace the existing knowledge, narrative history, and norms related to the Holocaust with new ones based on lies, in order to re-establish Nazism as an accepted ideology again. Despite their lies and distorted interpretation of historic events, Holocaust deniers gain more and more supporters. One can not dismiss the phenomenon as a marginal, insignificant, and ephemeral trend. The paper will begin by discussing the meaning of international norms and their relations to networks of knowledge; it will define two key concepts: collective memory and historical narrative and will discuss their importance. It will then describe the historical roots of Holocaust denial and its development. In addition, the paper will distinguish between various forms of denial, and will discuss the motives for denial in the West and in the Middle East, using such examples as Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadininejad, rhetoric. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The War on Iraq in March/April 2003 constituted a major conflict in the international relations during the last years. A ?coalition of the willing?, led by the USA, vanquished Iraq in order to enforce UN Resolution 1441 and dismantle the country from assumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The conflict over Iraq triggered a deep crisis within Europe. The continent was split into ?Old Europe?, i.e. Germany and France, and ?New Europe?, i.e. the UK, accompanied by Spain, Portugal, Italy and several EU accession countries. Two years later, Iran has come up on the agenda. The country is blamed to build up hidden nuclear plants and to aspire weapons of mass destruction. It is, again, especially the USA that has for a long time been strongly urging to condemn Iran in front of the UN Security Council. The Europeans, by contrast, have tried to persuade Iran to abstain from acquiring WMDs by providing incentives, and accepted an appeal to the Security Council only as a last resort option. Leading European countries in this process are the so-called ?EU3?, i.e. Germany, France and the UK.Obviously, in both crises, there exists a fundamental difference with regards to the behaviour of the Europeans: during the Iraq crisis, Europe was deeply divided. In the Iran crisis, however, there exists a ?European approach? which has the European states have jointly stood up for also vis-à-vis the US. In both crises, moreover, all relevant characteristics are identical: the dominating topic are WMDs; there exists a perceived ?urgency?; both concerned countries are part of the ?axis of evil?; and there has been no support of a potentially peaceful approach by the US during most of the conflict.The obvious puzzle can thus be framed as follows: why is there a difference in the degree of cooperation among European countries in both crises, given the same policy field and comparable conditions?Common explanation are based on domestic structure approaches, point to learning effects or assume neoralist balancing efforts. The paper however argues that none of these explanations not provide a satisfying answer. This is most importantly due to the fact that ? despite a differing public awareness ? both crises nearly coincide and can thus not be clearly separated. The paper proposes an alternative explanation to the puzzle which is based on rational choice and embedded in a regime theoretical framework. The core argument is that, in both conflicts, the Europeans are in a situation that resembles an assurance game. In this game, the highest individual and collective pay-off is earned by mutual cooperation. In both conflicts, this strategy would provide security gains at minimal, i.e. shared costs, be legitimised by the UN and leave bilateral relations untroubled. The trust dilemma entailed in this game however prevents involved players from cooperating, since hierarchies of preferences are mutually unclear. In a consequence, they opt for non-cooperation and reach their goals at individually higher costs. This what the Europeans opted for in the Iraq conflict, when the ? assumed ? security gain was achieved by sacrificing inner-European relations, a developing Common Foreign and Security Policy and the authority of the UN.A classical mechanism to overcome such information asymmetries is a regime. The paper argues that, in the case of Iran, such a regime existed: the ?Critical Dialogue?. In the case of Iraq, it did not. Hence, the hypothesis of the paper is that, since the Europeans had interacted intensively in the realm of the ?dialogue? since the early nineties, they had acquired reliable information on their mutual preferences over Iran. In the case of Iraq, however, the Europeans were unable to judge effectively whether the other in fact had a hidden agenda or not ? and thus opted for defection instead of cooperation... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Alexander George, "the general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand" (Forceful persuasion, 1997). The Western policy (US and EU) vis-à-vis Iran since the beginning of 2003 is an example of coercive diplomacy.The EU, and more in particular the EU-3 (France, the UK and Germany), regarded the Iranian conflict as a first test-case for the implementation of the EU Security Strategy (December 2003). Also because the US refused to talk to the regime in Teheran, the EU manoeuvred itself in the spotlights of international politics. For nearly two and a half years, the EU tried to convince Iran to give up its extensive civilian nuclear programme in exchange for economic benefits (= coercive diplomacy). The EU effort failed. The Iranian file then moved to the UN Security Council where the US took up the role of coercer.The aim of the paper is to describe and to analyse EU and US policy with respect to Iran since 2003. First of all, what did the EU-3 and US demarches accomplish ? How effective were the EU-3 and the US ? While it is clear that the EU-3 could not convince Iran in the end, the EU-3 action may not have been without accomplishments (gathering information; winning time; forming a consensus in the rest of the world). Secondly, what are the reasons that the EU (and maybe the US too) could not convince Iran in the end ? On the basis of the theoretical literature - more in particular Alexander George, ibid.; Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960; Thomas Schelling, Arms and influence, 1966; Peter Jakobson, Western use of coercive diplomacy after the Cold War, 1998; Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, Why "won" Libya ? in: International Security, Winter 2005/2006 - I have distilled eight factors that are regarded as crucial for successful coercive diplomacy. One of the major objectives of the paper is to match these factors with the Iranian case. This may clarify why (at least) the EU failed. Last but not least, as most of the literature dates back from the sixties and seventies, the more ambitious objective is also to further refine the theory of coercive diplomacy, e.g. which factors are (not) crucial.Methodologically speaking, it will be a qualitative analysis (case-study) based on literature. Thanks to the course I am teaching since last year (Diplomacy) and thanks to my current research project funded by the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research, I am already to a large extent familiar with the literature on coercive diplomacy. Throughout the years, I have also followed the Iranian crisis on a daily basis. The task now consists in matching both. In addition, I am planning to do interviews at the EU in Brussels (as I did before). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine Iran?s relationship with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council since the election of President Ahmadinejad. It will be argued that despite the rise of a more conservative and ideological president, both sides will have a strong interest in maintaining the accommodation that was reached while President Khatami was in office. However, it will also be suggested that this relationship will be buffeted by outside political forces. The paper will discuss the basis of the current accommodation as well the new challenges facing the relationship. The most important of these challenges is Iran?s nuclear program and the growing crisis between Iran and the United States. Other potential complicating factors include the growing power of Iraq?s Shi?a population, and the uncertainties of Iran?s domestic political environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coercive disarmament, defined as the “purposeful and strategic use of threats and incentives to influence the target’s decision to retain a particular class or classes of weapons,” appears to have been a success in Libya and Iraq, while it’s ability to curtail the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran remains uncertain. After clarifying the meaning and strategy of coercive disarmament, this paper seeks to analyze the factors that influenced the effectiveness of coercive disarmament in Iraq and Libya. In future work I plan to expand the case studies to include an examination of coercive disarmament in North Korea, Iran, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil. The first part of the paper develops the theory of coercive disarmament. Drawing on the literature on coercive disarmament and strategic coercion, I propose a definition of coercive disarmament and identify twelve factors that may affect the success or failure of the strategy. I then examine the usefulness of these factors in explaining the case of Iraq—the successful disarmament of Iraq as well as the subsequent failure to prevent a war fought in the name of disarmament. The next part of the paper explores the case of Libya and examines the ability of the factors identified through the Iraqi case study to explain Libyan disarmament. In the conclusion I first discuss what the Iraq and Libyan cases suggest about the prospects for successful coercive disarmament in North Korea and Iran, and I then identify several avenues for future research. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surrounded by rancorous and frequently hostile Arab neighbors, Israel is a frequent and skillful practitioner of realpolitik. Motivated by the omnipresent existential threat posed by its Arab enemies, Israel has long advocated the Doctrine of the Periphery. While maintaining the capacity to thwart regional foes without the assistance of regional partners, Tel Aviv has sought to forge alliances with non-Arab states on the edges of the Middle East. From 1948-1979, Israel found a willing partner and powerful ally in Pahlavi Iran. The 1978-79 Islamic Revolution, with its anti-Semitic vitriol, ended this strategic alliance. Yet, despite Iranian rhetoric vis-à-vis Israel, both states fear their Arab neighbors. Iraq?s September 1980 invasion of the embryonic Islamic Republic forced Tehran?s clerical leadership to revive covertly its strategic partnership with Israel. Throughout eight years of bloody and often stalemated war, Iran frequently found a willing arms supplier in its Israeli enemy. Between 1948-91, the threats posed by hostile Arab regimes, e.g., Iraq, trumped ideological coherence. This paper seeks to analyze Israel and Iran?s strategic partnership, both before and after the Islamic Revolution, and contends that balance of threat theory explains this seemingly unlikely paring. This paper will examine the raison d?etre of this de facto Iranian-Israeli alliance. The analysis will focus primarily on military aspects of this relationship. Salient economic factors will also be included (notably, Iranian hydrocarbon exports). This paper proposes that Israeli and Iranian fears have, in some instances, led to a pragmatic anti-Arab partnership. From 1948-88, the threats posed by Arab states vis-à-vis Iran and Israel trumped ideological motivation in both Tehran and Tel Aviv. Finally, this project posits that Iranian willingness to work with its Israeli enemy suggests that ideologically driven states, when facing existential challenges, behave as rational actors. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work examines the history of the Iranian nuclear program from the 1970s till the present. It also studies the economic, political, and potential strategic impact of a developing country acquiring nuclear capabilities, both civilian and military. In addition the paper examines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ramifications a potential Iranian nuclear program would have on the treaty. Finally the paper examines the ramifications an Iranian nuclear program has on Tehran's foreign policy regarding the United States, the Russian Federation, and the European Union, as well as with its neighbors in the region. This work also takes into account the implications of the upcoming Iranian election on this issue. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inability of states to counter U.S. technological and strategic power on the conventional battlefield requires that states employ an insurgent-style of warfare against U.S. forces. More then any state, Iran has utilized the strategic employment of asymmetry to achieve multiple objectives. Through a combination of militias, insurgencies, terror groups, and organized crime organizations, Iran has built an effective counter to the United States' conventional supremacy. Consequently, Iran's use of non-state armed groups has enormous implications on the future of international security. This paper examines Iran’s use of non-state armed groups to achieve its political and security objectives. It recognizes the use of non-state armed groups as being a critical component to an Iranian security doctrine that is guided by strategic asymmetry. Specifically, it examines: the political and strategic cultures that contribute to the use of non-state armed groups; the structural components that facilitate their use; the operational particulars of the groups which Iran utilizes; the broader implications of their strategic employment. To achieve this qualitative study, this paper uses an architecture for the study of non-state armed groups. This architecture was developed by Professors Richard Shultz, Douglas Farrah, and Itamara Lochard in the US Air Force INSS Occasional Paper (57), entitled “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Policy.” This framework provides four categories of non-state armed groups, and it utilizes six variables for the analysis of individual groups. Analysis leads this study to conclude the following: Iran’s senior leadership sees the exportation of jihadi insurgencies as paramount to achieving its long-term ideological goals. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In developing countries, does the state?s approach to the private sector impact state stability? Under what conditions can economic development programs lead to state instability? In this paper, I will consider these two questions in light of the experiences of Iran and Kuwait during the twentieth century. Through an examination of the private sectors in both of these countries, I will show how economic development policies can easily result in state instability due to the kinds of policies adopted by states ? particularly the way that development planners approach the traditional commercial classes of the private sector. While both countries sought similar development goals in the post-war era, the process of industrialization and economic modernization spelled out an unclear future for the various groups of merchants, traders, and artisans of the private sector that had traditionally dominated the economy for centuries. During the ?development boom? of the 1950s-1970s in the Middle East, state leaders were essentially faced with two options: on the one hand, co-opt or ?buy off? the traditional commercial classes in the economic development program (as was done in Kuwait); or on the other hand, marginalize the traditional private sector to make way for foreign or new state-sponsored entrepreneurs (as was done in Iran). It is my contention that these economic policy approaches made the difference between, in the former, the fostering of a stable regime, and in the latter, the emergence of a fragile state that was ultimately overthrown by a social movement that was heavily funded by these very same commercial classes. Given the diverging results between Iran and Kuwait, the question arises: What factors influence a state?s decision to co-opt or oppose the economic interests of the traditional private sector? Although the decision ultimately lies in the hands of individual economic planners, it is my contention that the state is responding to their (often uninformed) assessment of the relative economic and political strength of the traditional commercial classes.In essence, my paper looks at the differing experiences of Iran and Kuwait to provide insight into the ways in which economic development should (and should not) proceed in developing countries that rely heavily on the informal and ?traditional? sectors of the economy prior to industrialization. Alongside the analysis of my two cases, my study also informs important issues in the literature on social movements and rentier states. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political movements are subject to a number of influences, including that of international events. This paper explores the impact of the Nobel peace prize on domestic political movements. The cases examined here are those of Burma (Myanmar) and Iran, respectively. In Burma, a pro-democracy movement led by Ang San Suu Kyi has been struggling for progress under brutal repression by the military junta, and despite the granting of the Nobel to Ang San Suu Kyi (in 1991), the movement appears to have gained little leverage within Burma itself. In comparison, the reformist movement in Iran may have gained some political capital with the granting of the prize to Shirin Ebadi in 2003, although it may also have generated a backlash among Iranian conservatives. This paper examines the complex interactions of domestic and international processes, to understand whether the Nobel peace prize has had the desired positive effect. In particular, the paper suggests that a high-visibility prize such as the Nobel requires recipients to negotiate many different contending forces to be able to gain any political capital as a result. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1970s the Shah?s Iran and Saudi Arabia experienced the economic and political benefits of being the two American-designated regional policemen of the Middle East, in a policy termed the twin-pillar strategy. In today?s world, a new strategy would encompass pieces of past containment and engagement strategies with Iran, as well as the encouragement of Turkish power and its American alliance in the region than the current containment policy of Iran. 20 years of American sanctions on Iran have failed to change the behavior of the Islamic Republic and have simply invited American companies to creatively skirt sanctions and allowed the government to tightly control economic society. With Iran growing as a regional power with potential for conflicts with neighbors like Turkey and the Caucus Republics, a new strategy is needed to replace the current belligerent posturing that simply retrenches hardliners and invites Iran into non-western partnerships. An analysis of potential conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia indicates that Iran could either be a source of regional instability and conflict or a partner for stability and growth in the region. A ?Shepherd? strategy would do just as the term suggests- shepherd Iran into a more amiable position with regards to the region and the world by offering rewards for good behavior and being strong should Iran choose to defy international norms deemed critical to US interests. The policy prescriptions for Turkey and Iran will be examined in this paper and, as the paper asserts, serve larger American interests in the region. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a growth in unwanted population movements, refugees are increasingly heard as a challenge to the integrity and security of both the sending and hosting states. In many cases, mass movements are frequently employed as foreign-policy tools and refugees have become instruments of warfare and military strategy. Armed exiles have been used instrumentally as ?freedom fighters? and guerrillas to engage in wars of resistance on all continents, and international assistance to refugee in some cases serves to sustain armed rebel movements. Harboring large numbers of refugees also influences domestic politics, particularly in the developing world. Mass arrival put heavy economic troubles on the country of asylum, which often lead to political instability and strong pressures on the government to restrict immigration. The increase in refugee pressures has led to ever-tighter restrictions on the entry of refugees into states fearful of creating ethnic conflict within their own borders and of possible nationalist reaction against asylum-seekers. A climate of fear, disbelief and bitterness has influenced popular reactions not only to refugees, but also to economic migrants. Western publics are concerned that mass migration will threaten communal identity and culture by directly changing the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the population and integrity of their countries. There are many ways in which refugee problems are closely connected to local, regional and international stability and the behavior of international relations today that is going to be a greater concern in the 21st century. Although it is obvious that refugee and security issues are closely linked and do not often command the attention of high level policy-makers, the nature of the security threat created by refugee problems is frequently outside the usual reach and response capacity of defense and foreign ministries. The military force operation and the creation of security alliances are largely irrelevant to such non-military threats to security, and different institutions, techniques and forms of international cooperation are needed to deal with them. What is required are new and innovative approaches towards conflict resolution, external assistance and domestic controls. In the long run, the only effective way of dealing with the problem is to address systematically the conditions that create such movements. In this paper I would like to highlight major concerns that were dealt with the refugees in Iran and draw attention on how the Iranian government coping with the refugee question over the past two decades or so. Moreover, to describe lessons relevant to the international community?s effort to formulate more effective ways of dealing with this issue, as well as to highlight the significant contributions that developing countries can make to this refugee phenomenon such as Iran. Contact me at ov204@cam.ac.uk for further information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]