Nuclear Proliferation and Implications for Victory.

The foundations of nuclear strategy and deterrence were well-established during the Cold War, when two superpowers and several regional powers possessed nuclear weapons. All sides apparently understood the rules of the road and shaped their behavior to conform to practices that produced relative stability for decades. A fundamental precept of deterrence was related to the concept of victory, which held that victory in any practical sense is not possible or meaningful when nuclear-armed states use nuclear weapons.However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to radical regimes and possibly to non-state actors has put this framework under stress. This paper will elaborate a framework -- as defined in Victory in War: Foundations for Modern Military Policy (Cambridge, 2007) -- for understanding the nature of victory in war and apply that framework to cases in which regional powers such as North Korea or Iran possess nuclear weapons. The central question is whether the possession of nuclear weapons by such powers should alter U.S. calculations of victory, and more critically whether the possession of nuclear weapons by non-state actors -- of which al Qaeda is the most worrisome -- should alter how the United States calculates its ability to achieve victory.This paper will thus seek to understand how the United States, the premier nuclear state, can bridge the divide in balancing capabilities between traditional deterrent powers and non-traditional adversaries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]