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This article examines the relationship between journalists and politicians in Iceland. I illustrate how there are limitations in the existing journalist-source relations literature when it comes to studying journalist-politician relations in a small state like Iceland. Frameworks built on dichotomies between professional and non-professional settings need to be reconfigured to examine the Icelandic case. To do this, I introduce research from "small state studies", focusing on multifunctionalism and personalism. My study is based on 93 interviews with Icelandic journalists and politicians. Findings illustrate that journalists and politicians in Iceland are mainly mobile and autonomous generalists. The journalist-politician relationship in Iceland can be defined in terms of deep social closeness and, at the same time, professional distance. This is in stark contrast to the professional closeness between journalists and politicians that much of the existing journalist-politician research from larger democracies has shown. Iceland's social ecology can make impartiality and critical coverage difficult to achieve. The world's smallest states are routinely absent in research on journalism and politics. My study adds the small state of Iceland to the knowledge base concerning journalist-politician relations and illustrates how existing frameworks need to be expanded to examine these types of relations in other small states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between journalists and politicians in liberal democracies is traditionally conceptualized as highly institutionalized, based on mutual dependence, and grounded in a shared culture of jointly respected role relations. While this conceptualization provides a fruitful framework to understand the relation between mainstream journalists and politicians, it falls short in explaining the way outsider politicians such as Beppe Grillo, Donald Trump, Thierry Baudet, or Nigel Farage address the mainstream media. Thus, this article rethinks the relation between journalists and politicians in the light of the Western political-media environment in the 2010s, where the rise of authoritarian populism, the fragmentation of media audiences, and the fading boundaries around the journalistic profession have substantially changed media–politics relations. This article aims to make a theoretical contribution by conceptualizing the relation between outsider politicians and mainstream journalists as an ongoing negotiation over legitimacy. Central in this conceptualization is a classification of five strategies which outsider politicians use to delegitimize mainstream journalists: attacking their character, connecting them with other institutions which are seen as illegitimate, attacking their ethical standards, challenging the claim that journalists work in the public interest, and questioning the beneficial consequences of their work. The consequences of these delegitimation strategies are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study discusses changes in the relationship between local journalists and local politicians in the Czech Republic as a consequence of the professionalization of political communications at national as well as local levels following the so-called Velvet Revolution of 1989. This phenomenon has been studied widely in Western democracies but is relatively new in the Czech Republic. Politicians’ improved communication skills and the employment of communication professionals in politics influence trust – a key component in the relationship – between politicians and journalists. The article is based on semi-structured interviews with 10 journalists and 11 politicians from different Czech localities, which aim to explore how these actors understand and maintain levels of mutual trust. First we describe key components of trust and explain why in the era of professionalized political communication trust is perceived as more threatened than in the 1990s and we conclude by exploring the three most important threats to trust as identified by our interviewees.

As Chinese politicians hold the power to control the dissemination of political information, beat journalists must guard their relationship with the authorities to expand the boundaries of news reporting; that is, to gain more access to political information and report more sensitive news. What remains a puzzle is how beat journalists can possibly expand these boundaries. Data from participatory observation and in-depth interviews with journalists reveal that in order to gain more access to political information, they not only serve as political advocates but also seize the opportunity to act as watchdogs. To report more sensitive news without being sanctioned or denounced by the authorities, they coordinate with peers both within and outside the news organization.

In an era of post-truth and disinformation, the crucial relationship between journalists and politicians is under increasing pressure. Some politicians publicly question the media's role in spreading inaccurate and false information, and journalists have reason to be critical of politicians too, as they can easily disseminate falsehoods online. This study deals with how politicians and journalists perceive each other's role in spreading disinformation, drawing on surveys with political journalists (N = 148) and local politicians (N = 452) in Belgium. We find that 33 percent of politicians, in particular right-wing politicians, blame journalists for spreading "fake news". Journalists, in turn, are even more critical of politicians: 58 percent of the journalists blame politicians in general, 75 percent blame radical left politicians, and 90 percent blame radical right politicians for spreading disinformation. Importantly, journalists' views of politicians' role in spreading disinformation impact their relationship. Although journalists who believe politicians add to the spread of disinformation are not necessarily less likely to interact with politicians, they are significantly more negative about their interactions with politicians. Such perceptions potentially add to the tense relationship between journalists and politicians we are increasingly observing and could have important ramifications for political news-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Palabra Clave is the property of Universidad de la Sabana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Icelandic Review on Politics & Administration is the property of Institute of Public Administration & Politics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper investigates how parties spread news from traditional media on their social network accounts to engage followers. In particular, we address why parties would choose to include in the 'media digest' they carefully craft for their followers also content from 'hostile' media outlets and journalists. We analyze 4,586 Facebook posts published by the main Italian parties during the 2019 European election campaign, assessing the impact on readers' engagement of counter-attitudinal and pro-attitudinal content from either hostile or friendly media. Our results show that parties skillfully exploit friendly and hostile sources alike to alternatively engage or outrage their followers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation that the communicative environment has undergone in recent decades poses a challenge for the media in relation to their audiences, as trust is sensitive to social, economic, cultural, and technological changes. The aim of this research is to deepen the understanding of the reasons and factors that influence the loss of trust in the media by audiences who traditionally trusted news more (young people and adults aged 25-54), examining the relevance of disinformation and polarization in discrediting the media. Firstly, the state of the issue is reviewed from the theoretical point of view and the data provided, among others, such as the Digital News Report and several studies about the global loss of trust in other institutions, with special reference to the Edelman Trust Barometer. Secondly, the article adopts a qualitative methodology to investigate the motivations and expectations of citizens regarding the media. Specifically, three discussion groups were held in various Spanish cities. To ensure representativeness, sociodemographic diversity was considered, including gender, age, and educational level criteria, among others. Among the findings, it stands out that one of the main reasons for distrust towards the media is the perception that news is biased for political or economic reasons. The Covid-19 pandemic, which was rife with disinformation, has influenced attitudes towards the media and the way news is consumed. Once the pandemic was overcome, trust in the media decreased and participants sought alternative sources of information. However, some differences in perceptions and consumption habits are noted depending on age and educational level. Finally, the research indicates that distrust extends well beyond the media ecosystem, affecting all institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before his permanent suspension from Twitter, former President Trump's use of Twitter to harm, harass, hurt, or embarrass individuals was well documented, with academics and mainstream news outlets referring to him as a cyberbully. The current study reports a quantitative content analysis of Trump's Tweets between 2016 and 2019 to determine whether his aggressive behavior online could be considered cyberbullying. Additionally, this study also sought to ascertain Trump's most frequently used cyberbullying tactics. The results highlight that although Trump frequently employed explicit hostility, name-calling, and rumor-mongering, his behavior on Twitter was not repetitive enough to meet the criteria that researchers often use to define cyberbullying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores politicians' subjective views of the mediatisation of politics and the implication it has for their satisfaction with democracy. Based on previous research, we hypothesise a negative effect of their perception of media influence on their evaluation of the news media's performance as a public informant. These perceptions directly and indirectly influence politicians' satisfaction with democracy. The relationships were tested with a Structural Equation Model (SEM) based on comparative survey data from politicians in seven democracies (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland). Results show that a strong influence runs from politicians' perception of the media's performance as regards public information to their satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. This influence is stable across countries. The SEM thus may provide a good explanation for why some politicians attack legacy media and excessively use social media to communicate with voters. Results also point to risks of media-driven democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can political leaders' anti-media rhetoric increase journalists' vulnerability to non-state violence? Despite the abundance of anecdotal evidence, research on whether and how politicians' verbal attacks against the "lying press" and "fake news" lead to non-state violence against journalists is limited. This study makes the case that features of the political landscape where anti-media proponents emerge explain why discourse increases journalists' vulnerability to attacks. Because anti-media discourse is common in contexts where mechanisms of accountability for non-state violence against the press are already weak and electoral competition is fierce, what politicians say can be particularly consequential. Discourse legitimizes non-state attacks, signals to transgressors that violence will not be prosecuted, and paves the way for electorally motivated violence. I capitalize on case narratives collected by local human rights monitoring organizations and media transcripts to build an original dataset of anti-media messages and non-state attacks against journalists in Venezuela (2002–2013). Using survival and instrumental variable models, I show that politicians' messages are positively correlated with non-state physical attacks against journalists, that the estimated effect of discourse on violence is largest in highly competitive electoral districts, and that electoral campaigns amplify the degree to which messages increase the incidence of attacks by party loyalists. I also show that the longer politicians sustain anti-media discourse, the more likely it is to increase journalists' vulnerability to attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A free and independent press monitors government actions, broadcasts public grievances, and facilitates debate and dissent among citizens. Because of this, some executives run interference—censoring newspapers, harassing journalists, and shutting down media outlets—whereas other executives do not. What explains this variation? We argue that executives decide to repress or to respect the press based on the sanctions they anticipate from two important constituencies: courts and citizens. We expect that attacks are less likely when courts can make adverse rulings and when citizens can vote leaders out of office. In addition, we suggest that these constraints can function as substitutes; we anticipate the reductive effect of judicial independence wanes as the level of electoral democracy rises, making courts vital to protecting journalists in less democratic systems. We evaluate these expectations using panel data on executive branch attacks on the press in 175 countries, from 1949 to 2016, and find strong support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how Brazilian women journalists claim gender-related issues influence the risks they experience in their professional routines and private life. Data was collected through 31 semi-structured interviews with female professionals who experienced episodes of violence during the course of their work between 2019 and 2020. Our investigation emphasizes (a) the connections between the political context and increasing hostility toward women journalists; (b) the impact of aggressions on production routines, family lifestyles, and emotional setbacks; and (c) how the lack of organizational support from news companies is associated with resilience and protection strategies. The results reveal that harassment and violence include physical threats and remarks about appearance, age, and sex life. Avoiding specific assignments or sources is among the journalists' resistance strategies. Women journalists also describe implications on family routines and even dating practices to escape work-related abuse. Some interviewees claimed that news organizations are not prepared to support victims and that there is a government-sponsored "hate machine." To extend beyond a descriptive account, the article discusses a set of factors characterizing the Brazilian media system that promote a thriving hostile environment, such as the male-led structure of news organizations and dependence on government funding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research continues to find gender inequality in politics and political communication, but our understanding of the variation in the degree of bias across systems is limited. A recent meta-analysis reveals how, in countries with proportional representation (PR), the media pay considerably more attention to men politicians. In plurality systems, this bias is absent. The present study proposes a new explanation for this finding, emphasizing how the size of electoral districts moderates both the demand for and supply of women politicians in news reporting. Analyzing more than 600,000 news appearances made by Norwegian and British MPs from 2000 to 2016, we produce a detailed picture of gender biases in news visibility that speaks in favor of single-member districts in plurality systems. Although PR is generally recognized as advantageous for the political representation of women, our findings call for a more nuanced understanding of the link between electoral systems and gender equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contemporary media environment represents the greatest challenge ever to journalism's legitimacy. Surveys conducted in different parts of the world highlight a decline in trust in news media. Due to the numerous changes in the news media environment, different investigative tools are required to grasp the mechanisms underlying news media trust from those adopted so far. This article provides a review of existing media trust research and argues that it is necessary to investigate news media trust (also) from a qualitative perspective because today understanding media trust is as crucial as measuring it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Analisi: Quaderns de Comunicacio i Cultura is the property of Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This experiment extends the research on the relationship between elite hostility toward the press and public support for journalism. Using a national U.S.-based sample (N = 235), the project analyzes how an online "mash-up" video of hostile rhetoric and behavior attributed to multiple politicians elicited emotions of anger and fear as conditioned upon news trust. Analyses also examined the extent to which these threat-based emotions, in turn, promoted increased intentions to support the press. Results confirm that exposure to elite hostility toward the press can indirectly prompt intentions to support the press, showcasing fear as the operative negative emotion for propelling support for the press. Furthermore, this study's modeling of elite hostility's indirect effect on press support is shown to be strongest among those with relatively high in trust in their preferred news sources. The study findings have implications for maintaining and building public support for journalism in the contemporary media landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The antagonist relationship between the people and mainstream media constitutes an integral dimension of populism. Recently, this relationship has been articulated through the concept of "anti-media populism," which foregrounds populists' vision of the mutual integration between mainstream media and other elites. Mobilizing an emergent strand of sociologically oriented populism theory, this article premises that there is now a need to complement current understandings with inductive and qualitative research, attentive to how anti-elitist citizens ascribe meaning and value to mainstream media and to the specificity of the contexts in which anti-media populism manifests. Through interviews with members of a recent anti-elitist grassroots mobilization in Norway--the Enough is Enough! movement--this study explores how anti-elitist citizens articulate both overarching sociopolitical narratives and specific narratives of media-elite integration. The article demonstrates how a bottom-up, inductive, and context-sensitive approach serves to both nuance and contradict any singular understanding of anti-media populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populist politicians increasingly accuse opposing media of spreading disinformation or "fake news." However, empirical research on the effects of these accusations is scarce. This survey experiment (N  = 1,330) shows that disinformation accusations reduce audience members' trust in the accused news outlet and perceived accuracy of the news message, while trust in the accusing politician is largely unaffected. However, only individuals with strong populist attitudes generalize disinformation accusations to the media as an institution and reduce their general media trust. The phrase "fake news" does not amplify any of these effects. These findings suggest that politicians can undermine the credibility of journalism without much repercussion—a mechanism that might also threaten other authoritative information sources in democracies such as scientists and health authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we argue for making the frequently invoked notion of "crises of journalism" itself the proper subject of sociological analysis. Based on a case study of a public controversy over an adversarial TV interview with a well‐known politician on Austria's public service broadcaster ORF, we provide an analysis of the practical use of crisis claims in metajournalistic discourse. Drawing on ethnomethodology, interactionism, and situational analysis and suggesting the discursive trajectory as an analytic tool, we show that crisis accounts serve as an instrument of politicizing journalistic expertise, i.e., as a discursive strategy of mobilizing heterogeneous actors to impose interpretations of how journalism ought to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This explorative study contributes to the theoretical debate on political incivility beyond the domination of Western-centric approaches while connecting the bodies of literature in political philosophy and media research. It offers empirical evidence of Bolsonaro’s delegitimizing criticisms and uncivil expressions toward the press, some specific news outlets, and individual journalists during the first two years of his presidential mandate in Brazil. It concludes that Bolsonaro displayed the complete repertoire of the defining elements of political incivility in liberal democracies vis à vis the delegitimization of the press. He also unprecedently pushed the limits of civility in political discourse by employing the entire arsenal of verbal manifestations of impoliteness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As populist campaigns against the media become increasingly common around the world, it is ever more urgent to explore how journalists adopt and respond to them. Which strategies have journalists developed to maintain the public's trust, and what may be the implications for democracy? These questions are addressed using a thematic analysis of forty-five semistructured interviews with leading Israeli journalists who have been publicly targeted by Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The article suggests that while most interviewees asserted that adherence to objective reporting was the best response to antimedia populism, many of them have in fact applied a "strategic bias" to their reporting, intentionally leaning to the Right in an attempt to refute the accusations of media bias to the Left. This strategy was shaped by interviewees' perceived helplessness versus Israel's Prime Minister and his extensive use of social media, a phenomenon called here "the influence of presumed media impotence." Finally, this article points at the potential ramifications of strategic bias for journalism and democracy. Drawing on Hallin's Spheres theory, it claims that the strategic bias might advance Right-wing populism at present, while also narrowing the sphere of legitimate controversy—thus further restricting press freedom—in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many parts of the world, journalists tend to see themselves as playing an important role for the betterment of democracy. But what happens when newsmakers are faced with the question of whether to report, and how to report, on ultra-right actors? Whereas on one side, journalists are supposed to report on anything that is relevant, on the other, by reporting on it, they risk amplifying its significance. This dilemma becomes more complex when journalists deal with players who inhabit a grey zone in between legitimacy and deviance, as the ultra-right actors studied here. Although the kind of questions that newsmakers face might be similar to those they encounter when covering far-right populists or even terrorists, the fact that the ultra-right (at least in a country like Italy) has been historically tolerated as part of the normal political dialectic, raises additional concerns. Thus, the fundamental question is how reporters approach those who are known for their fascistic ideologies, yet who at the same time may be organized in political parties or cultural organizations, thus recognized by the state and somehow normalized in the public sphere. The empirical contribution is based upon data from in-depth interviews with 23 Italian journalists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens to journalists when hit by a pandemic in a country governed by authoritarian media regulations? We examine journalists' experience in Turkey's mainstream and alternative media and find that while the pandemic has deepened their economic precarity, journalists further suffer from bodily and political precarity. In the context of Covid, the body emerges as a site on which precarity with multiple dimensions (economic anxiety, illness, and state violence) is inscribed. Under the conditions of what we deem political precarity, most journalists cannot speak truth to power as the pandemic is politically instrumentalized. This retheorizing of precarity dewesternizes the term by connecting it to state-induced forms of violence relying on relations of political recognition and value ascription. We urge journalism and media labor studies to refrain from Eurocentricism and technological determinism that center the standard employment model and the disruptive cultures of technology at the expense of body and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing literature on the impact of "fake news" accusations on legacy news outlets suggests that the use of this term is part of a much larger trend of increased and delegitimizing media criticism by political actors. However, so far, there is very little empirical evidence on how prevailing politicians' delegitimizing media criticism really is and under which conditions it occurs. To fill these gaps, we present results of a content analysis of media-related Facebook postings by Austrian and German politicians in 2017 (N = 2,921). The results suggest that media criticism, in general, is actually rare and that about half of it can be described as delegitimizing (i.e., characterized by incivility or absence of argumentation). Most often, media criticism is used by populist politicians, who accuse "the media" in general of bias and falsehoods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we use institutional theory to explore to what extent public service media (PSM) rely on institutional links and on tight coupling with the environment to develop new products for digital news. This framework is especially relevant for understanding how PSM innovate, as they differ from commercial media, and the mimicry of industry trends can lead to tensions with their public service mission. Thirty-six interviews were conducted with senior managers, editors, and other professional roles involved in project development at eight PSM organizations in six European countries. The results indicate that to reduce uncertainty, PSM follow two partially complementary approaches: mimetic isomorphism, i.e., relying on what is seen as best practice by other players within their sector, and tight coupling, i.e., closely connecting with the environment (especially with the audience). Other PSM are the most important source of inspiration, as relationships are close and organizational forms are similar. In contrast, digital-born media are considered to be successful in attracting younger audiences but differ greatly from PSM. In summary, PSM do not simply mimic other players perceived to be successful but consider their own specificities in terms of audiences, purposes, strengths, weaknesses, and public service mission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various countries have seen a rise in populist rhetoric used by politicians, parties, and movements to discredit journalists, news outlets, and “The Media.” Research indicates that such rhetoric affects the public’s perceptions of the news media, posing a real challenge to professional journalism. Unlike other targets of populist criticism, journalists find themselves required to mediate that criticism to the public, which puts them in a particularly awkward position. Drawing on thematic analysis of 40 semistructured interviews with Israeli journalists who have been publicly scrutinized by Israel’s prime minister, this article suggests that journalists’ interpretation of traditional journalistic norms, and particularly the ethos of objectivity, leads them to amplify the accusations against them, while refraining from refuting them. As journalists confuse objectivity with passivity, the populist criticism turns into a sophisticated form of “soft” censorship, which uses imagined audiences to manipulate journalists’ professional norms against them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism research usually addresses politicians as part of the criticized elite, but neglects the media. This study explores populist attitudes against the media and their relation to political populism. The study validates the proposed antimedia populism scale and shows that antimedia populist attitudes apply to a specific and small group of German society. Confirming a relationship between political populism and antimedia populist attitudes, the results indicate that citizens who have developed a populist worldview tend to evaluate the media in congruence with this overall ideology and include the media in their conception of a detached elite. Moreover, antimedia populist attitudes are more common among individuals with feelings of relative deprivation and those with antipluralist and authoritarian submission attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The popularity of populist parties has increased worldwide, and disproportionate media attention for these parties arguably fueled their success. We empirically test our theoretical argument that political satire—with its humor, focus on internal contradictions, and lack of journalistic principles regarding objectivity and facticity—may be an effective antidote to populism's success. Using a representative panel survey that functions as a natural experiment in the context of the Netherlands, we show that consumption of the satire show Zondag met Lubach (ZML) indeed lowered support for a right-wing populist party (PVV), its leader (Wilders), and the perceived capability of this party. Specifically, this study shows how satirically revealing the "weak spot" of populism (i.e. lacking concrete treatment recommendations) lowers populist support particularly among citizens already inclined to vote for populist parties. These findings have important democratic implications as they reveal that satire can have a real-life impact on the political decisions that voters make. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special issue makes the argument that, in order to understand journalistic production and consumption in an increasingly complex digital world, journalism studies must employ research designs that combine methods from different academic perspectives and disciplines. In particular, we propose increased collaboration with scholars working in information technology, the arts, psychology, and data science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critical exploration of the emergence and manifestations of a phenomenon we refer to as "factional" or "succession" journalism within the state media in the context of the tussle over the succession of the late former Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe. Using the state-controlled Chronicle daily newspaper as a case study, we seek to examine the role and influence of editors and journalists in the negotiation of power in the context of reporting a contested succession of Mugabe in 2016. We locate "factional journalism" in the context of the capture of the state media by the ruling party and the virtual erosion of journalistic agency in the state media institutions. We argue that whereas the onset of the "Zimbabwe crisis" spawned the creation of different and polarised forms of journalism in the country (i.e. oppositional and patriotic journalism; see Ranger, 2005. "The rise of patriotic journalism in Zimbabwe and its possible implications". Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 2: 8–17; Chuma 2008. "Mediating the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe: competing journalisms in a society at the crossroads". African Journalism Studies 29 (1): 22–41), within the "patriotic journalism" camp also emerged a new strand of "factional journalism" linked closely to the fierce contest for the succession of Robert Mugabe within Zanu PF. We also argue that the succession issue presented a poignant moment at which political journalism at the public media became subordinate to whichever faction held sway in the information/media portfolio in government, and which faction deployed its allocative powers to reward and punish specific forms of political reporting. We apply a limited qualitative content analysis of news stories on the succession issue and complement this with qualitative in-depth interviews with journalists reporting on the subject. This approach arguably provides a much more holistic picture of the factors at play in the production of political content on the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of right-wing populism in various countries poses difficult challenges to journalism: While populists themselves often accuse journalists of being biased against them or even of lying, critics allege that the mainstream media cover populism too extensively and normalize it. We reconstruct an understudied perspective on this problem: how journalists publicly discuss how to deal with right-wing populism. A qualitative analysis of metajournalistic discourses in the German press was conducted to identify typical narratives concerning the relationship between right-wing populism and the media, criticism of the way right-wing populism had been covered, and recommendations or demands concerning the "right" approach. Overall, the analysis reveals a rather uniform narrative about right-wing populism in Germany, and similar conceptions of how to deal with it were found. Most journalists make a clear distinction between the right and wrong way to cope with right-wing populism and emphasize the need for professional norms such as objectivity. Finally, we critically discuss some aspects that may inform metajournalistic reflection on how to cover right-wing populism, but that were absent from the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political coverage is strongly influenced by interactions between journalists and political actors. Especially for political actors, these interactions present an opportunity to increase their influence on the news. However, what strategies political actors use in their attempts to steer political journalists when exchanging with them has not been studied comprehensively and on a broad basis. Furthermore, some studies suggest that interactions are dominated by political actors, while others conclude that journalists are at least equally influential. Building on extant research, we first draw an inventory of strategies used by political actors in their exchanges with journalists and investigate their importance based on a mixed-methods study. Our study was conducted in Austria and included a full sample of N = 173 political journalists surveyed with a standardized instrument, and open interviews with 10 additional journalists and 10 political actors. Results show that politicians build political alliances, network with specific journalists, and use intimidation as strategies to control the interactions. In the survey, journalists mentioned basing exchanges on political alignment as the most important strategy. While this strategy indeed helps politicians to control coverage, networking strategies benefit journalists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Journalist–source relationships and interactions are interpreted in this study as crucial mechanisms for linking different arenas in a deliberative system. To unravel these source networks, 106 semi-standardized interviews with journalists as well as public relations (PR) professionals from government delegations and non-governmental organizations were conducted on-site three United Nations (UN) climate change conferences between 2010 and 2013, and an online survey was administered during the conference in 2015. The analysis shows that most journalists maintain close relationships with their home country delegation. However, journalists experienced in climate conference coverage also maintain more direct and informal relations to delegations from other countries and to non-governmental organizations while less experienced journalists exhibit loose and more formally mediated relationship to these actors. Moreover, journalists focusing on commentary rather than on event-related reporting have the most variegated and informal networks, thus opening the deliberative system to diverse perspectives and unknown voices more than others. Government delegations vary strongly in their tendency to approach journalists while environmental non-governmental organizations interact with journalists primarily to attract media attention in order to indirectly influence decision makers in national delegations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing from 420 surveys addressed to news media practitioners, 30 in-depth interviews with media executives and 6 focus groups, this article focuses on the institutional dimensions of ethics in journalism and explores the way in which ethical standards are perceived by journalists and other representative groups involved in Spanish news media. The data show that participants ascribe moral obligations to journalistic institutions. Interviewees emphasise the predominance of market-driven interests over ethical values as one of the main threats to journalism. However, differences between the perceptions of journalists and media executives reveal that the latter believe that journalistic ethics pertain to individual journalists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Chinese politicians have the power to control the dissemination of political information, beat journalists must guard their relationship with the authorities in order to expand the boundaries of news reporting - that is, to gain more access to political information and report more sensitive news. What remains a puzzle is how beat journalists can possibly expand these boundaries. Data from participatory observation and in-depth interviews with journalists reveal that, in order to gain more access to political information, they not only serve as political advocates but also seize the opportunity to act as watchdogs. In order to report more sensitive news without being sanctioned or denounced by the authorities, they coordinate with peers both within and outside the news organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the canons of liberal democracy, both political and media systems constitute two spheres which strongly interact but still are separated and fulfill different aims. The actors belonging to these spheres play specific social roles, due to sets of rules called (respectively) the logic of politics and media logic. Politicians are supposed to create and reshape the world gaining electorate support while the media should show, explain and interpret the world in a way that attracts its audience. The two are expected to compete inside their spheres but not with each other. Today, however, the mediatization of politics and politicization of the media have changed the relationship between politicians and journalists. The aim of the article is to describe the phenomenon of redefinition of roles of the main actors of political communication, using content analysis of television political interviews during an election campaign. Elections create a special situation of mutual interdependence of the two entities as well as the need to achieve their specific goals. The authors weigh up whether the changing formula of TV interviews is an element of a broader phenomenon of competition and trial of taking up control in the process of political communication or just incidental behavior typical for the time of an election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how power relations between journalism and political actors vary across the news production process. Applying a process approach, it addresses this issue by exploring journalists’ enactment of the watchdog role in two key moments of news production: the interactional phase and the news-construction phase. The study is conducted in the context of press conferences with the Swedish Government and involves data from question-and-answer sessions and published news content that was initiated by such press conferences. With a low or moderate extent of journalistic aggressiveness in the interactional phase, the results indicate that this moment is characterized by cooperativeness and can be described in accordance with an exchange model. By contrast, the analysis of the published news content demonstrates a high extent of criticism and is in line with an adversary model. Altogether, the findings contribute new evidence to suggest that the power relations between journalists and political actors vary across the moments of news production, and that journalistic autonomy increases in the later phases of the process. The differences in the extent of watchdog-role performance are discussed in terms of a strategic ritual by which news journalism promotes a favorable image of itself as a public watchdog institution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay discusses journalist-source relations but with an emphasis on how such relations influence the understanding and behaviour of politicians. It explores the issue through empirical work conducted at the site of the UK Parliament at Westminster. Findings are based on semi-structured interviews with 60 Members of Parliament (MPs) and 20 national political journalists. The research findings initially confirmed many of the observations of earlier studies in the field. UK journalist-source relations still resemble Gans' (1979) original “tug-of-war” description of an ever-shifting power balance between the two sides. Such interactions, in turn, are reflected in more compliant or adversarial news coverage. Of greater interest here, the interviews also revealed that such relations have come to play a significant role in the micro-level politics of the political sphere itself. This is because reporter-politician relations and objectives have become institutionalised, intense and subject to a form of “mediated reflexivity”. Consequently, politicians have come to incorporate such reporter interactions into their daily thinking and behaviour. As such, journalists are seen as more than a simple means of message promotion to the public. They also act, often inadvertently, as information intermediaries and sources for politicians trying to gauge daily developments within their own political arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]