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There has been a significant response to the war in Ukraine on the part of the European Union (EU). Particularly noteworthy is its support for Kyiv via measures in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and especially in the defence field. It has provided substantial assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility (EPF); the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the EDIRPA common procurement instrument; and its military assistance mission (EUMAM Ukraine). These initiatives show how, in the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the CSDP has made unprecedented, yet still only partial steps to allow the EU to progress towards moving beyond its traditional status as a small power.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1325-1356 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. CSDP: Between a common and differentiated policy. - II.1. CSDP as a common policy of the EU. - II.2. Differentiated integration in CFSDP. - III. PESCO's microcosm of differentiated integration. - III.1. The awakening of the "Sleeping Beauty". - III.2. Participation in PESCO. - III.3. PESCO projects. - IV. PESCO: Contributing to a common security and defence policy? - IV.1. General principles in EU CFSP and their enforcement. - IV.2. Consistency in relation to differentiated integration in PESCO. - IV.3. Sincere cooperation in relation to differentiated integration in PESCO. - V. Conclusion- | (Abstract) The use of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by the European Union to manage defence cooperation between its Member States is the most recent example of Differentiated Integration (DI) in the EU. Yet differentiation may come at a price. The main aim of the present Article is to assess to what extent defence cooperation under the umbrella of PESCO can be cut up in pieces and yet still be considered a common defence adhering to the EU's general principles of consistency and sincere cooperation. The question, therefore, is whether DI in PESCO is limited by these principles, and consequently, whether the CSDP, despite the differentiation, still contributes to a common policy. In short, the question is whether there is a tension between commonness and differentiation in EU security cooperation.

Existing insights into recent defence integration, including against the backdrop of Russia’s war, largely stem from EU governance studies. Although these studies might not explicitly delve into the EU’s politico-strategic role, when combined with the broader framework of International Relations (IR), they imply the EU’s effective progression, at least relatively, as a defence actor. However, a closer analysis of certain key developments and transatlantic dynamics suggests a persistent lack in the political and strategic dimensions of EU defence policy. This disparity arises when IR concepts are tailored to fit the EU context in integration studies.

There has been a significant response to the war in Ukraine on the part of the European Union (EU). Particularly noteworthy is its support for Kyiv via measures in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and especially in the defence field. It has provided substantial assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility (EPF); the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the EDIRPA common procurement instrument; and its military assistance mission (EUMAM Ukraine). These initiatives show how, in the wake of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the CSDP has made unprecedented, yet still only partial steps to allow the EU to progress towards moving beyond its traditional status as a small power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The place of the military in the development of defence policy has long been a problem to Canada's central organization for defence. While the primacy of civilian politicians has never been in doubt, the organization of military input to decision-making has been revised several times and remains in question. In 1947, Defence Minister Brooke Claxton reorganized the Canadian central organization for defence by creating the Chiefs of Staff Committee (csc), appointing a permanent chairman, Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, in 1951. While some historians have considered the csc's "Command Age" to have been a golden one, recent analyses have been more critical but have not assessed the csc as an institution. This article looks in depth at the csc's management of continental air defence during the 1950s and 1960s – Canada's single most important defence project. It argues that the csc failed to provide objective advice to ministers. Under Foulkes, it carefully edited analyses submitted to Cabinet, manipulated reviews, and suppressed dissent in order to support its preferred manned interceptor option. As a result, the ministers and the senior public service lost confidence in the armed services, setting the stage for a massive reorganization in the 1960s that was aimed at strengthening the role of civilians in defence policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leadership is crucial for the success of a collective actor in reaching common goals. Its relevance is particularly visible in the EU, due to the difficulty in managing and converging a wide range of interests, especially in the intergovernmental field of defence. This article analyses Franco-German transactional leadership throughout the evolution of the EU's security and defence policy, with a focus on the effects of Brexit. By highlighting the concept of leadership in international relations, this study identifies Franco-German actions and strategies within the Common Security and Defence Policy, reflecting on how these have shaped European defence and how Brexit changed existing dynamics. We conclude that France and Germany have led the EU's security and defence project, albeit with limited success, with a shift towards a successful relaunch of EU defence in the aftermath of Brexit, aided by doubts over NATO and war in Ukraine. At the core of that limited success and representing the main obstacle lay diverging interests and strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates presidents' foreign and defence policy activism under Portugal's premier-presidential system from 1982 to 2021. First, the article discusses the extant literature on intra-executive conflicts in semi-presidential systems. Then, it provides an overview of Portugal's experience with semi-presidentialism since 1976 and the powers of the Portuguese president. The third section describes all significant foreign and defence policy presidential interventions from 1982 to 2021 that resulted in disputes with the prime minister. This section estimates presidents' and prime ministers' ex-ante preferences over the issues at stake. We verify which preference is closest to the ex-post content of the policy implemented – if it is the president's, it counts as a presidential win. We identify the formal and informal means by which presidents acted. Informal means are essentially going public tactics. In addition, we inductively pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions under which presidents intervene and succeed. The article's main findings are two: first, the president's second term, absence of a strictly unified executive and a majority cabinet are separately necessary but jointly sufficient for presidential interventions to occur; second, formal powers are a necessary but insufficient condition for presidential victory. Finally, we speculate on the policy, institutional, and electoral consequences of presidential activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marilena Koppa. The Evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy: Critical Junctures and the Quest for EU Strategic Autonomy. St Antony’s Series. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022 // https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99158-6.

This article explores the recent history of the United Kingdom—Australia defence relationship in context of the Australia—United Kingdom—United States (AUKUS) submarine agreement. Drawing on defence and foreign-policy white papers as well as public polling, it analyses the framing and significance of the UK as a defence partner in the early 21st century, tracing changes against the unfolding War on Terror, the rise of China as a major power, the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum. The article shows that insecurities about the US alliance and the perceived threat from China corresponded with a turning back towards the UK as a source of safety, drawing on the imperial nostalgia evident in Brexiteers’ “Global Britain” campaign to normalise the dynamic. The article argues that imperial nostalgia works to neutralise Australian anxieties about overdependence on the US by conceptualising the former colonial parent as an equal ally within the AUKUS triad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European citizens' attitudes towards defence are a fundamental element of common identity in the EU's aim of becoming a unitary international actor. In Spain, since the early 2000s, the Spanish Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have developed a public policy to promote defence culture to influence Spanish society's views, perceptions, opinions, etc., towards defence and military policies. However, this approach is flawed because, despite being defined as part of the Spanish citizens' political culture, these institutions reduce this concept to 'knowledge' or 'awareness of its importance'. Therefore, the understanding of the Spanish defence political culture has been ill-analysed. Hence, a political culture related to defence issues can be best explained within the political culture framework, from which an ideal type, in the Weberian sense, can be established. Thus, based on previous studies, using survey data and both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (EFA & CFA), we test five sub-models to explain this political culture. This research is relevant to the study of the defence political culture because it reaffirms the existence of different cultural subtypes and civil–military relations and shows that the cultural gap in the convergence of values must be worked on in a segmented manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2022 Finland and Sweden took the historical decision to apply for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One month later, after a three-decade long opt-out, Denmark voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to join the European Union (EU) common defence policy (CSDP). Combining organised hypocrisy with post-functionalism, the article focuses on the normative and pragmatic concerns underlying states' interaction with international institutions. Empirically, the article analyses the long-term political-institutional dynamics between Nordic countries, the EU CSDP and NATO since the end of the Cold War, and how they have been reshaped by the crisis provoked by the Russian attack on Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the "Zeitenwende" (turning point) in German security and defense policy declared by Chancellor Olaf Scholz. It examines the current state of this turning point, specifically in the Bundeswehr, the German Armed Forces, and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the foreign intelligence service. It highlights significant shortcomings in the procurement of military equipment by the Bundeswehr particularly during key events like the Russian aggression against Ukraine.