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This article offers a new argument that there must be something rather than nothing, grounded in the PSR. Inspired by the rationalist tradition running from Parmenides to Spinoza and Leibniz, I argue that there must be something rather than nothing because the contrary would constitute a violation of the PSR. In particular, I argue that, if there was nothing, there could be no sufficient reason for it, since nothing at all would exist to serve as a sufficient reason. Therefore, given the PSR, something must exist after all. After presenting and explaining this new argument, I consider a series of objections and replies, and develop some of its broader philosophical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to Sandel (2009) —viz. that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an "explosion" of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that justice often requires that candidates who are sufficiently qualified for jobs be hired via lottery on the basis that this is the best way to recognise each candidate's equal moral claim to access meaningful work. In reaching this conclusion I consider a variety of potential objections from the perspectives of the employer, of the most qualified candidate, and of third parties, but ultimately reject the idea that a person's status as the most qualified candidate can explain why they ought to be appointed over other sufficiently qualified candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late nineteenth century, scholars have formulated theories about the role and placement of organs in the St. Matthew Passion, using them to interpret the work's theological message and anchor broader ideas about how Bach positioned his other players and singers for performances in the Thomaskirche. The church housed two permanently fixed organs: a large one in the west gallery and the misleadingly labeled swallow's nest organ in a gallery on the east wall. The latter, smaller organ has become the central point in debates about the Passion, leading to a variety of interpretations. The current evidence, reviewed here in substantial detail, does not unequivocally prove any of the main theories. Yet not all are equally strong, By examining the history of scholarship on the St. Matthew Passion and by carefully reexamining the evidence, we can grow more aware of weaknesses stemming from the enduring influence of older scholar ship, based on questionable premises, outdated information, or seemingly unintentional misreading. The results argue strongly against one of the most common theories, which posits a small auxiliary role for the east gallery organ, along with a "third choir," for most of Bach's performances. Proponents of this theory have sometimes harnessed it to add another layer of theological symbolism to Bach's music. This too is questionable. Musical evidence may also argue against it. Bach's changing approach to scoring the chorale "O Lamm Gottes, unschuldig in the opening movement shows that the melody does not work in dialectic opposition to the two main choruses, as sometimes claimed, but emerges from within the group. In place of this theory, two alternatives stand out: either the full separation of the two choirs beTween the two galleries of the Thomaskirche or the positioning of all performers in the west gallery, with no role for the east gallery or its organ for any of Bach's Passion performances. Though neither fully accounts for every detail in the evidence nor answers all possible objections, they do offer more satisfying explanations than the alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We access most of our most cherished beliefs via testimony. Philosophy is no exception. We treat spoken and written philosophical testimony as evidence for philosophical claims. Nonetheless, this paper argues that philosophical testimony is unable to justify philosophical beliefs. If testimony is the only evidence we have to justify philosophical beliefs, this entails skepticism about philosophy. Call this the testimony challenge. First, the paper argues that philosophical testimony does not meet the conditions under which evidence can justify our beliefs. Second, it shows that philosophical testimony cannot provide preemptive epistemic reasons as science and mathematics do. Finally, it answers the self‐defeat objection and a set of objections aiming to block the thesis that philosophical testimony does not justify philosophical beliefs. The paper aims to rethink the role of philosophical testimony in philosophy and reinforce the skeptical worries raised by methodological and disagreement challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After examining the problem that gratuitous suffering poses for Nietzsche's notion of life affirmation, I mount a skeptical response to this problem on Nietzsche's behalf. I then consider an orthogonal objection to Nietzschean life affirmation, which argues that the need to justify life is symptomatic of life denial and show how strengthening the skeptical defense sidesteps this worry. Nietzsche's skepticism about our all‐too‐human, epistemic position thus aids his project of life affirmation in two ways. First, it suggests that we are unable to determine reliably whether a given instance of suffering is, in fact, gratuitous. Second, it provides a corrective to the moralistic need to redeem life, showing that all attempts to justify life as a whole are epistemically fraught. Before concluding, I examine Nietzsche's reasons for advancing such an epistemological argument and suggest how we might approach life affirmation in nonrational terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is, on a given moral view, an agent‐centered restriction against performing acts of a certain type if that view prohibits agents from performing an instance of that act‐type even to prevent two or more others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act‐type. The fact that commonsense morality includes agent‐centered restrictions is often seen as a decisive objection to act‐consequentialism. Despite this, I'll argue that agent‐centered restrictions are more plausibly accommodated within an act‐consequentialist framework than within the more standard side‐constraint framework. For I'll argue that when we combine agent‐relative act‐consequentialism with a Kantian theory of value, we arrive at a version of consequentialism—namely, Kantsequentialism—that has several advantages over the side‐constraint approach. What's more, I'll show that this version of consequentialism avoids the disadvantages that critics of consequentializing have presumed that such a theory must have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, nature has often been thought to be structured by essential forms providing the generic features of natural things and thus the foundations for scientific explanations. In contrast, human history and the social domain have been thought to be the realm of ever‐changing appearances, where contingency prevails. The paper argues that the existence of essential forms is compatible with the contingent, mind‐dependent and historical character of the social world, and that essential forms can also be found in the social domain. Two categories of entities are discussed that suggest themselves to be identified as social forms, namely social kinds and social identities. To this end, it is shown that standard arguments for the existence of essential forms also apply to the social domain, and objections to the existence of social forms are rebutted. Particular attention is paid to the explanatory appeal of social forms. The paper concludes by suggesting that, far from being oppressive, essential social forms are presupposed by liberating social practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent criticisms of medicine converge on fundamental questions about the aim of medicine. The main task of this paper is to propose an account of the aim of medicine. Discussing and rejecting the initially plausible proposal according to which medicine is pathocentric, the paper presents and defends the Autonomy Thesis, which holds that medicine is not pathocentric, but sanocentric, aiming to promote health with the final aim to enhance autonomy. The paper closes by considering the objection that the Autonomy Thesis is overly permissive and allows many highly controversial procedures as legitimate parts of medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics of Divine Command Theory (DCT) have advanced the counterpossible terrible commands objection. They argue that DCT implies the counterpossible 'If a necessarily morally perfect God commanded us to perform a terrible act, then the terrible act would be morally obligatory.' However, this counterpossible is false. Hence, DCT is false. Philipp Kremers has proposed that the intuition that the counterpossible above is false is due to conversational implicatures. By providing a pragmatic explanation for the intuition, he thinks that DCT proponents can then maintain that the counterpossible is actually true. In this article, I argue that Kremers's conversational implicature response fails because (a) there is good reason to think that no conversational implicature arises given what critics of DCT have expressed, (b) a competent reader would not understand the critics' utterance that TCC is false as implicating that TCC* is false, and (c) the counterpossible terrible commands objection can be easily modified to be immune to the conversational implicature response by cancelling any potential implicature. Thus, an appeal to conversational implicatures cannot save DCT from the counterpossible terrible commands objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: A rational will is a free will A free will stands under the moral law Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law In this paper, I attempt to defuse two prominent objections to this argument. Commentators often worry that Kant has not managed to establish that we are rational beings with wills in the first place, and that he equivocates in his use of 'free' between premise 1 and 2. I argue that both of these objections can be overcome, and thus seek to offer some hope for Kant's approach in Groundwork III. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ideal Worlds objection is an objection that purports to identify a potentially fatal flaw in some of our most influential moral theories: including, among others, rule consequentialism, Kant's Law of Nature Formula of the Categorical Imperative and Scanlonian contractualism. In this article, I offer an account of the objection, a survey of some of the ways defenders of affected theories have sought to avoid it, and the problems that those responses can encounter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anselm described god as "something than which nothing greater can be thought" [1, p. 93], and Descartes viewed him as "a supreme being" [7, p. 122]. I first capture those characterizations formally in a simple language for monadic predicate logic. Next, I construct a model class inspired by Stoic and medieval doctrines of grades of being [8, 20]. Third, I prove the models sufficient for recovering, as internal mathematics, the famous ontological argument of Anselm, and show that argument to be, on this formalization, valid. Fourth, I extend the models to incorporate a modality fit for proving that any item than which necessarily no greater can be thought is also necessarily real. Lastly, with the present approach, I blunt the sharp edges of notable objections to ontological arguments by Gaunilo and by Grant. A trigger warning: every page of this writing flouts the old saw "Existence is not a predicate" and flagrantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Arts Magazine is the property of Thamar University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the advance of the Open Access (OA) movement, most scholarly production can only be accessed through a paywall. We conduct an international survey among researchers (N = 3304) to measure the willingness and motivations to use (or not use) scholarly piracy sites, and other alternatives to overcome a paywall such as paying with their own money, institutional loans, just reading the abstract, asking the corresponding author for a copy of the document, asking a colleague to get the document for them, or searching for an OA version of the paper. We also explore differences in terms of age, professional position, country income level, discipline, and commitment to OA. The results show that researchers most frequently look for OA versions of the documents. However, more than 50% of the participants have used a scholarly piracy site at least once. This is less common in high-income countries, and among older and better-established scholars. Regarding disciplines, such services were less used in Life & Health Sciences and Social Sciences. Those who have never used a pirate library highlighted ethical and legal objections or pointed out that they were not aware of the existence of such libraries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might understand its nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Adab Al-Kufa is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Does Seneca entirely reject the utility of dialectical study for moral improvement? No, I argue here. Focusing on Letter 87, I propose that Seneca raises and disarms objections to formal Stoic arguments to help moral progressors avoid backsliding and advance towards ethical knowledge. I trace this method back to Chrysippus and show that reading Letter 87 in this Chrysippean framework yields a satisfying explanation of its otherwise puzzling features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Higher-order thought (HOT) theory says that a mental state is conscious when and only when represented by a conceptual, belief-like mental state. Plausibly, HOT theory predicts the impairment of HOT-producing brain areas to cause significant deficits in consciousness. This means that HOT theory can be refuted by identifying those brain areas that are candidates for producing HOTs, then showing that damage to these areas never produces the expected deficits of consciousness. Building this refutation is a work-in-progress, with several key components of it already existing in the literature (e.g., Boly et al. in J Neurosci 37(40):9603–9613, 2017; Kozuch in Mind Lang, 37(5):790–813, 2022). This article pulls together and supplements these earlier components so as to provide a comprehensive lesion-based argument against HOT theory, one which offers extra data and arguments in support of it, and which also addresses common objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted a question seldom addressed in a straightforward manner by political theorists: whether populism is intrinsically anti-science. This article identifies three different ways in which populist actors worldwide have grounded their scepticism, distrust, or hostility to scientific inputs, to the extent that they are relevant for political action: (1) they raise a moral objection against scientists who have been allegedly corrupted by foreign interests, turning them into enemies of the people; (2) they present a democratic objection against the technocratic claim that scientific experts should rule regardless of the popular will; and (3) they employ an epistemic argument against scientific reasoning, which is said to be inferior to common-sense and folk wisdom, and antithetical to the immediateness of political action. While these objections have been wielded in a selective and unsystematic way, they all speak to the core feature of populism, which is the people versus elites divide: the moral objection targets scientists as members of an elite in cahoots with alien powers; the democratic objection targets an unelected elite that seeks to undermine the people's rule; the epistemic objection questions that the standard to validate knowledge-claims is a complex and detached-from-ordinary-experience rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of GesR: Gesundheitsrecht is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Laborde contrasts Default Republicanism with Labordian Republicanism. The latter view 'answers' the Probabilistic and the Anti-Psychology Objections to Default Republicanism. The former objection holds that the mere possibility of unconstrained intervention does not matter for unfreedom, whereas the latter contends that it is by virtue of the experience-independent fact of servitude that one is unfree. I argue that people sympathetic to these objections should have reservations about Labordian Republicanism. In any case, republicans should reject the Anti-Psychology Objection. More generally, Pluralist Republicanism might be preferable to Labordian Republicanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sufficientarian theories of distributive justice are often considered to be vulnerable to the 'blindness to inequality and other values objection'. This objection targets their commitment to holding the moral irrelevance of requirements of justice above absolute thresholds of advantage, making them insufficiently sensitive to egalitarian moral concerns that do have relevance for justice. This paper explores how sufficientarians could reply to this objection. Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of the aforementioned objection comes from relational, and not distributive, inequalities, different strategies are open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other, strategies of 'internalizing' and 'externalizing' relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework are explored. In turn, I suggest that both strategies fail in their standard versions, but argue that a particular 'hybrid view' about justice is an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained increasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are storytelling creatures, that stories shape our self‐conception, and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework. While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative, it is generally understood to be more than a chronological listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory relationships among these events—a story of how events lead to other events. However, specifying the nature of this explanatory relationship has proven difficult. As critics have pointed out, narrativists often resort to simplistic notions of narrative when faced with criticism. The concept of narrative explanation needs to be elaborated in a way that is both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from being considered narratives and nonrestrictive enough to accommodate ordinary lives that may not be particularly story‐like. In this paper, I review existing accounts of narrative explanation and propose a teleological account, according to which narratives consist of goal‐directed explanations of a sequence of events. I argue that a teleological account of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify the concept of "narrative" in the context of the narrative self by addressing the most common objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review is the property of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In his contribution to this special issue, Hindriks considers the Security Principle, an account of pro tanto obligations based on our account of reasons (Gunnemyr and Touborg 2023a). According to the Security Principle, you have a pro tanto obligation not to perform an action that makes a harm more secure. Hindriks raises two objections to this account. First, that it is too flexible; second, that it gives wrong verdicts when agents are robustly unwilling to act in a certain way. Here, we respond to Hindriks' objections and argue that Hindriks' account, the Threshold Principle, gives counterintuitive verdicts in preemption and low-probability cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are two kinds of defences for the Phenomenal Principle in the literature, namely, the epistemological one (e.g. H.H. Price) and the semantic one (e.g. Frank Jackson). I argue that neither consolidates the Phenomenal Principle. I particularly demonstrate that the appearance verb in premise 1 of the argument from illusion is not used in the phenomenal sense as it is used in the Phenomenal Principle, which renders the argument essentially invalid. To avoid invalidity, the proponents either give up the phenomenal use, which makes the argument unable to serve its original purpose, i.e. inferring an unusual existence, or they insist on the phenomenal use in all premises of the argument, which will trivialise the argument. I also demonstrate that a similar objection applies to the argument from appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“A Defence of Berkley’s ‘Master Argument’”. Berkley’s so-called “master argument”—through which he proves his principle esse est percipi—has been submitted to mixed criticisms by various commentators. Some defend its validity from the perspective of their own interpretations, while some claim that the argument is fallacious due to several objections. This article defends the master argument against three objections raised by Russell, Pitcher and Tripton. These could be respectively characterized as “the objection of the confusion of the perceptive act with the perceived object”, “the objection of the confusion of the concept of the object with the object itself”, and “the objection of the solipsism of the present”. I present my own reading of the master argument in order to avoid misunderstandings and claim that the correct understanding of this argument requires considering the following issues: the clarification of the Berkeleyan concepts of idea and perception; the explication of the intentionality of perception, understood as its intentional direction towards intentional objects (ideas); and the distinction between two levels of intentional direction of mediated experience (of an idea through another one)—that is, a level directed towards the concept or mental representation as its immediate intentional object, and another level directed towards the represented object as its mediated intentional object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humeans are to be compelled to accept it, and consequently, the second premise will have to be stronger to retain validity. I shore up the case against Humeanism by providing revised premises along with new defences of them. I show why this also provides a lesson for non‐Humeans about the epistemology of causal relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research explains and analyzes the term "contrary to analogy" (Khilaf al-Qiyas) according to scholars of u'ūl al-fiqh, shows the places in which they use it, and clarifies the surrounding problems and suspicions related to it, Then the research discusses the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) and those who followed him in denying the existence of rulings contrary to analogy in the Shari'ah, and presents their evidence and objections that they addressed to the majority of scholars of u'ūl al-fiqh. In addition, the study tried to rectify what some contemporaries missed, and pointed out the defects in their writings on the topic. The research concluded with a set of results, the most prominent of which is that the term "contrary to analogy" is used in two senses: the first is the provisions contrary to their analogues because it is excluded from the general rules. The second is the provisions that analogy cannot be applied to them, and that the course of the scholars of u'ūl al-fiqh who use the term is correct and does not entail any problem. Moreover, the study clarified that those who negate the term "contrary to analogy", acknowledge its existence in other places, but in different forms, which means that most of their objection is directed to the use of the term, with the caveat that the disagreement between these two viewpoints is not a purely verbal one, rather, it has practical effects, and that the use of this term and what is in its meaning is not limited to the late scholars, but rather it was mentioned by the Imams of Ijtihad in the first centuries. Furthermore, the study provided that the objection to the use of the term "contrary to analogy" cannot be directed to all the rulings mentioned in contradiction to analogy, as some of them are agreed upon that they are excluded from the rules, and that the course of the majority aligns with the modern legal view of differentiation between the rule and the exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of FinanzRundschau is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Pierre-Sylvain Regis, once a well-known defender of Cartesianism, offers an unusually rich and innovative refutation of Spinoza. While many of his early modern contemporaries raised narrower objections to particular claims in Spinoza's Ethics , Regis develops a broader anti-Spinozistic position, one that threatens the very core of Spinoza's metaphysical ambitions and offers a philosophically robust alternative. However, as with any far-reaching philosophical commitment, Regis's gambit comes with substantive costs of its own, including creating instabilities within the core of his own philosophical system. Far from diminishing the significance of Regis's anti-Spinozism, this critical appraisal helps us better appreciate both the conceptual pull of Spinozism within early modern metaphysics and one sweeping, albeit costly way of escaping its orbit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal law abolitionists claim that legal punishment cannot be morally justified and that we should therefore abolish criminal law. While this is still a minority position in the current debate, the number of proponents has been increasing, and even opponents have developed a certain degree of sympathy for such claims in recent years. Yet one of the reasons many remain hesitant regarding the abolition of criminal law appears to be the lack of a thought-through alternative, in addition to abolitionists disagreeing considerably amongst themselves on what an alternative should look like. I will call this the missing alternative objection. To address this central concern, I will argue in this paper that the most prominent versions of abolitionism actually converge on the same alternative core to criminal law — even though they are driven by vastly different motivations. This core that current abolitionist theories converge on is two-fold: first, the claim that the state should compel offenders to provide restitution for the victim; second, the claim that restorative processes should be used wherever possible when addressing criminal wrongdoing. This common core is enough to reject the missing alternative objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Parfit's Mixed Maxim Objection against the Formula of Universal Law Reconsidered" examines Derek Parfit's criticism of Kant's Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and its implications for Kantian ethics. Parfit argues that FUL should be revised and that the concept of a maxim should be abandoned. However, contemporary Kantians have not taken Parfit's criticism seriously and believe that his project is too different from Kant's to engage in fruitful dialogue. The article explores Parfit's "Mixed Maxims Objection" and proposes a response to it, arguing that a notion of maxims as policies can still be ethically evaluated. The author distinguishes different versions of the objection and focuses on the version that poses a fundamental challenge to Kant's ethics. They argue that Kantians can respond to some versions of the objection but must address the version that questions the bridge between evaluating maxims and evaluating actions. The article concludes that it is possible to evaluate maxims as policies while making plausible judgments about the morality of actions. [Extracted from the article]

Are certain characteristics of dispute resolution procedures associated with higher levels of procedural justice? We address this question through a quantitative analysis of real-world experiences of 194 professional legal representatives with the objection procedures of 81 Dutch administrative authorities. In our analysis, two general procedural characteristics are taken into account: the involvement of an independent third party and the extent to which the procedure is focused on the conciliation of competing interests. The involvement of an independent third party was not associated with higher levels of procedural justice. Procedures that were perceived to be more focused on the conciliation of competing interests were evaluated as more procedurally just, even more so in disputes where the administrative authority was perceived to have a higher degree of discretion and in disputes that ended in a negative result for the litigant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom's simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the SIM-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the SIM-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam's brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the SIM-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson's, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2021 Mauritius/Maldives (preliminary objections) case, the Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) rejected Maldives' first and second preliminary objections to jurisdiction, which were based on the Monetary Gold principle. However, the Special Chamber's reasoning regarding the Monetary Gold principle in this case is questionable. This article discusses the application of the principle in this case. After introducing the background to the maritime delimitation dispute between Mauritius and Maldives, this article explores the evolving jurisprudence of the Monetary Gold principle and its constitutive elements. It goes on to analyze the application of the Monetary Gold principle in the Mauritius/Maldives case and criticizes the Special Chamber's approach, arguing that the Maldives' first and second preliminary objections should have been upheld. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I show that their objections to the Timing Argument fail as attempts to refute the argument in its most challenging form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an ordinary partnership, as a rule, all partners have management authority. This management authority is regulated as a substitute rule of law in Article 625 of the Turkish Code of Obligations (TCO). On the other hand, by granting the right of objection to “managing partners” in the 2nd paragraph of Article 625 of the TCO, the problems that may arise from the individual administration were tried to be prevented, and a bridge was built between the individual administration and the administration, so to speak. There are many controversial issues in both Turkish law and comparative law regarding the right of objection, which is of great importance in terms of ordinary partnership management. In fact, many of the issues that have been discussed for a long time in comparative law have not been sufficiently discussed in Turkish law. In this article, the owner of the right of objection and its addressee, whether there are pre-conditions for the use of the right of objection, the validity conditions of the objection, the situations in which the objection will be considered invalid and the legal consequences of the objection are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that moral principles, construed as moral generalizations, can be genuinely explanatory. Specifically, I present and respond to a challenge according to which moral generalizations are explanatorily redundant. In response, I present and defend an explanatory dimension of moral generalizations that is based on the idea of unification. I do so in the context of motivating a realist-friendly moral explanatory pluralism (i.e., the view that there can be many, equally legitimate, explanations of moral facts). Finally, I appeal to the same theoretical resources to tackle an objection from explanatory circularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research deals with the imperative, whether it requires immediateness or not, discussing the scholars' views, and focusing on editing the place of their disagreement about the issues related to it. then, various statements of scholars with their fundamentalist evidence and stating the objections and responses contained therein are mentioned, and the impact of this dispute on the branches of jurisprudence One of the most prominent findings is that the disagreement in this issue results in many jurisprudent issues, including the permissibility of delaying the payment of zakat to its beneficiaries, as some said: the imperative is immediate and said that postponing the end of the year is forbidden. Others said: immediateness is not beneficial even if it is done after a while, and other issues mentioned are the subject of the research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify the content of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-conceptual perception. This paper addresses this concern by turning to Ned Block's work in contemporary philosophy of perception. Using Block's arguments, I propose that we have an independent empirical route to specify the content of a non-conceptual perception which is not subject to the ‘myth of the given’ objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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