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Remaja putri beresiko anemia dan defesiensi zat besi karena mereka kehilangan zat besi saat menstruasi. Sebagai calon ibu bagi penerus bangsa, penting untuk memperhatikan kesehatan remaja putri, termasuk anemia defisiensi besi. Pencegahan anemia pada usia muda bermanfaat bagi kesehatan remaja dan kemampuan kognitif mereka, serta untuk generasi berikutnya salah satunya adalah pencegahan stunting. Tujuan pada pengabdian ini adalah melakukan pendidikan kesehatan tentang anemia, pemberdayaan dan simulasi pembuatan jus bayam merah dan kurma dalam upaya pencegahan dan penanggulangan anemia pada remaja putri di SMK NU 4 MA’ARIF PAKIS. Metode dalam kegiatan pengabdian ini adalah pemberian pendidikan kesehatan tentang anemia dan simulasi pembuatan jus bayam merah dan kurma. Hasil dari pengabdian ini adalah peningkatan pengetahuan tentang anemia yang didapatkan dari hasil pre test 6,58 dan hasil post test 9,34. Berdasarkan hasil diatas dapat disimpulkan bahwa tujuan untuk meningkatkan pengetahuan tentang anemia tercapai serta pemberdayaan dengan pembuatan jus bayam merah dan kurma tercapai.

The purpose of this article is to demystify jus cogens rules by trying to map their legal contours. After defining jus cogens and providing a theoretical scaffolding drawn from elementary works on legal theory, the household jus cogens prohibition of genocide is analysed in light of such notions. As a result, jus cogens norms are characterised both as primary rules of behaviour and as secondary rules of change for legal production, constituting an international public order that serves as a tool for international law to safeguard human security.

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Este artigo tem a finalidade de analisar o instituto do jus postulandi no âmbito do Direito Processual Trabalhista, refletindo acerca de sua compatibilidade com o princípio da paridade de armas e de um verdadeiro sentido de acesso à justiça. Para tal análise, foram utilizadas as pesquisas bibliográficas, por meio da legislação vigente, súmulas e jurisprudências, além de doutrinas. A metodologia utilizada foi a dedutiva, resultando em uma pesquisa qualitativa.

1. IntroductionIn recent years, one of the old, yet controversial doctrines of the law of neutrality -called "unwilling" and "unable"[1] doctrine- has been reformulated in the jus ad bellum discourse, according to which some states may use force in self-defense against non-state terrorist actors operating within the territory of host states based on the unwillingness or inability of the territorial state to control them. The unwilling or unable doctrine has one of the lowest standards with which it determines when non-state terrorist organizations can legally be attacked in third states based on the right of self-defense,[2] even though the legality of such use of force against non-state actors in weak host states, without the consent of the host state, is unclear. In the context of legal positivism, this article seeks to prove whether the current sources of international law allow states to recourse to the unwilling or unable doctrine in the host state. Since these concepts have not been mentioned in any legal document (besides Article 17 of the Rome Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention) or even international case law, it is not clear whether it is possible to accept such use of force in international law despite its prohibition in the UN Charter, denying its legitimacy by most publicists, very little occurrence of it in the practice of states and subjectivity of the concept of unwillingness or inability. The International Court of Justice and some scholars also deny the legality of the use of force in an ineffective host.This article seeks to critically examine and demonstrate the evolution of the use of force in the name of self-defense against non-state actors in the territory of host states, which is justified by the unwilling and unable doctrine. The purpose of this research is not only to identify the unwilling and unable doctrine but also to offer a practical solution to the challenges regarding extra-territorial self-defense against non-state terrorist organizations.Research Question(s)This article, by examining de lege lata, seeks to verify whether treaties, customary laws, and international judicial practice allow states to legally resort to the unwilling and unable doctrine in another state (the host state). In other words, has the unwilling and unable doctrine become a part of international law (as it exists)? Moreover, does the doctrine provide a legitimate way to use transnational self-defense against non-state actors, particularly in a situation where the host state is willing to repress the non-state actors but is unable to do so? Based on which criteria is it determined that the host state is unwilling or unable to fight the threat posed by the non-state actors? Finally, is it possible for the acting state to make this decision unilaterally or does the host state also play a role in this regard? MethodologyThe article has used descriptive and analytical research methods. The necessary data has been collected through the library research method by reference to relevant books, essays, and international judicial decisions. FindingsThis article shows that although the right to self-defense in ineffective host states may be desirable in light of the contemporary security and safety threats, the existing data about the doctrine is incomplete and has many gaps. The "unwilling" and "unable" doctrine presents a significant challenge to the “rule of law” in international law. This doctrine based on self-judgment theories in international law and providing exceptions to the jus ad bellum regime, not only leads to the instability of this regime, but also its legal justifications are a serious attack on the fundamental legal concepts that are generally accepted in international law. This article, with a legal positivist look, believes that any resort to the "unwilling and unable” doctrine is subject to the following criteria: an armed attack according to Article 51 of the Charter, lack of control of the host state over its territory, proof of inability and unwillingness of the host state by the victim state, act of the victim state with the consent and cooperation of the host state, giving the host state a reasonable time to effectively deal with the non-state actor, and the inability of the host state based on duty of due diligence, lack of cooperation by the host state and refusal to accept international assistance. ConclusionAccording to the above, the inevitable conclusion is that it’s very difficult to balance the unwilling or unable doctrine with the jus ad bellum regime. This doctrine lacks both a legal underpinning and a clear, distinct content. The criteria for the unwillingness and inability, the legality of self-defense, and the permissibility of resorting to force in an ineffective host state do not have a valid basis in either treaty law or customary international law; It is not mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter, nor have the states accepted it sufficiently. The International Court of Justice and the most highly-qualified publicists have also refused to recognize such use of force. Due to the change in the nature and power of terrorist organizations, the rules in this field remain unclear and this field is replete with legal uncertainty. It is not surprising that the UN charter is not able to provide clear answers for these situations.Despite the relative success of the jus ad bellum regime in preventing armed conflicts between states, the mentioned doctrine undermines the legal framework regulating prohibition on the use of force and poses a threat to the UN Collective Security System. The doctrine distorts the concept of imminence and damages the definition of armed attack[3] 3 enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter by lowering the threshold for the justifiable use of force in self-defense. It also destabilizes the fundamental principle of necessity in self-defense. Finally, by providing weak governing standards for the victim state may make unilateral decisions as to the necessity of the use of force, in spite of the disapproval or unwillingness of the host state, the doctrine extremely over-privileges the interests of the powerful states at the expense of the rights and interests of typically weaker host states. Consequently, it should be acknowledged that the doctrine created to address the limited and specific threat of transnational terrorism cannot be a justification for weakening the regime designed to maintain international peace and security.If we apply this doctrine, any state will be allowed to start military operations simply on the pretext of the host state’s inability to suppress a terrorist group. Accepting to such a view by the international community and allowing to create this new legal order will lead to a fundamental change in the UN system if it is not completely damaged. By granting discretion to any state to adopt unilateral actions in the war on terror, through the unwilling and unable test, it simply ignores some fundamental provisions of the Charter (Article 39) and challenges the entire Collective Security System of the Charter. Creating unwritten exceptions to the principle that prohibits the use of force not only causes problems for the integrity of international law but also leads to disorganization in international law.Finally, within the framework of the lex lata, the only point that can be said regarding self-defense against attacks by non-state actors in situations, lower than the threshold that the ICJ has stated in the Nicaragua case, is that such actions are undoubtedly illegal. In the framework of the Lex ferenda, we believe that the customary law is evolving regarding the applications of Article 51 of the UN Charter, defensive action in the territory of target states, and the use of force against non-state actors in host states. Even in the light of Lex ferenda, it cannot be said that the unwilling and unable doctrine is currently an established rule of international law.[1]. Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 52, (2012), at 483,505.[2]. Sjöstedt Britta, “Applying the Unable/Unwilling State Doctrine – Can a State Be Unable to Take Action?”, Heidelberg Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, (2017), at 39.[3]. Craig Martin, “Challenging and Refining the Unwilling or Unable Doctrine”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 52, (2019), at 460.

Ever since the infamous Port Arthur massacre, Australia has not only lacked mass shootings, but has seen a dramatic decline in firearm-related homicides nationwide following a significant overhaul in its gun laws. As a result, legal commentators, political pundits, and scholars from around the globe have consistently argued that the United States is missing out on crucial gun law reforms that Australia implemented without any noticeable recourse. These reforms included, among other things, gun ownership licensure, a national firearm registry, and a ban on 'military-style' weapons, such as assault rifles. Nevertheless, the contention that the United States ought to either adopt or substantially mirror the radically imposed firearm laws of Australia is based on a precarious misunderstanding of American constitutionalism and a blatant example of 'jumping the gun' on policy reform as a whole. Moreover, as this article will defend, the right to keep and bear firearms should evidently be viewed as a fundamental predicate of international jus cogens norms, including the individual right to self-defense and the imperative that citizens ought to have the unfettered ability to rebel against a tyrannical government. Therefore, not only should the United States be the nation that sets the global standard for firearm policy, but the argument that it should change its ways in comparison to Australia must suitably be put to rest, once and for all., I. INTRODUCTION Firearm policy has been one of the most contentious and divisive topics for decades. (1) From those who believe that personal gun ownership is questionable in the modern [...]

This paper argues that the principles of just war theory are ambiguous, with too many exceptions justifying a cycle of violence that puts children at risk. This is undertaken through a cultural legal analysis of Neon Genesis Evangelion, particularly its presentation of child soldiers. The children within the narrative were conscripted into an armed galactic conflict where human survival relied on an adolescent hero. Neon Genesis Evangelion reveals the ambiguities of just war theory’s first limb, jus ad bellum, by highlighting excessive exceptions. The circular violence in the narrative depicts a model of violence that impacts children. This analysis contributes to the discourse on just war theory in the contemporary atmosphere of fractured global relationships.

In June of 1945, the International Military Tribunal (ITM) formed in London, faced the problem of a non-yet existing legal armor for the Nazi crimes. Two new rules were widely accepted there. First, a new category of war crimes, the “crimes against humanity” was legally defined. Second, the ex-ante rejection of the defense line “I was following orders” or Führerprinzip (the principle of the duty to obey every order given by the military leader). In the first part of this paper, I will present in brief, the historical and legal context of the rejection of Führerprinzip as a defense line of the Nazi defendants in Nuremberg trials as also in Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, where the same legal context was enacted. Next, I will expose a short history of conscientious objection in war ethics and the International Law on Human Rights that supports it. This exposition reveals that objection to criminal orders has the status not only of a right, but also of a duty for the soldiers on either side of the war. In the third part, the Rawlsian view on conscientious objector will be exposed as the meeting point of a broadly Kantian conception of war ethics and the existing International Law frame. In the final part I will present some philosophical aspects of jus in bello theory, as also the critique of its importance, and its contribution to the reification of the moral importance of conscientious objection in wartime and the rejection of Führerprinzip.

Just War Tradition, also called Just War Theory, provides the ethical framework that governs when a state can resort to force (jus ad bellum), conduct during conflict (jus in bello), [...]

Copyright of Canadian Yearbook of International Law is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Undoubtedly, jus cogens or preemptory norm is always recognized as the highest source of international law. Nevertheless, the judicial review of International Court of Justice caused doubt in the absolute priority of jus cogens when violation of jus cogens and immunity are simultaneously argued in a case. Especially, in the cases concerning the Arrest Warrant (Congo v. Belgium 2002) and the Jurisdictional Immunities (Germany v. Italy 2012), ICJ tried to separate procedural and substantive norms and declared that the norms of immunity and jus cogens are different in nature, thus they couldn’t oppose each other but immunity as a procedural norm could prevent deciding about merits. In this article, by using descriptive – analytic method, the rationale behind the decision of ICJ is analyzed in order to know that if immunity is considered procedural and jus cogens is recognized as substantive norm in international law and how these norms interact. Evaluation of doctrine shows that there is no certainty about the quality of the separation of procedural and substantive norms and their proof in international law. Therefore, the court’s decision in choosing the approach could cause an insecurity in the peremptory place of jus cogens.

Over the years, our perspective on cultural heritage has undergone changes. The field has become more diverse, requiring solution-focused approaches to address the underlying problems associated with cultural heritage. One significant challenge is the issue of restitution, which is considered a major failure of international cultural heritage law. How can international cultural heritage law completely heal historical wounds instead of merely offering empty hopes to those who have suffered? Simply acknowledging past wrongs by offending states is insufficient, and it does not align with the fundamental legal principle that where there is a wrong, there should be a remedy (ubi jus ibi remedium). Despite the considerable growth in the jurisprudence of international cultural heritage law, there remains a pressing need to consolidate the legal framework to facilitate the restitution of stolen or looted cultural objects. This article argues that the prohibition of plunder and pillage of cultural property constitutes a jus cogens rule of international law. Its violation therefore gives rise to an unconditional obligation to restitute such property.