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We investigated the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and communicative cooperation. Specifically, we examined whether communicative cooperation is affected by the ToM ability of one's cooperative partner as well as their own. ToM is the attribution of mental states to oneself and others; cooperation is the joint action that leads to achieving a shared goal. We measured cooperation using a novel communicative cooperation game completed by participants in pairs. ToM was measured via the Movies for Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) task and fluid intelligence via the Raven task. Findings of 350 adults show that ToM scores of both players were predictors of cooperative failure, whereas Raven scores were not. Furthermore, participants were split into low- and high-ToM groups through a median split of the MASC scores: high-ToM individuals committed significantly fewer cooperative errors compared to their low-ToM counterparts. Therefore, we found a direct relationship between ToM and cooperation. Interestingly, we also examined how ToM scores of paired participants determine cooperation. We found that pairs with two high-ToM individuals committed significantly fewer errors compared to pairs with two low-ToM individuals. We speculate that reduced cooperation in low--low ToM pairs is a result of less efficient development of conceptual alignment and recovery from misalignment, compared to high--high ToM dyads. For the first time, we thus demonstrate that it is not all about you; both cooperative partners make key, independent, contributions to cooperative outcomes.

Abstract Background Cornelia de Lange (CdLS), Fragile X (FXS) and Rubinstein–Taybi syndromes (RTS) evidence unique profiles of autistic characteristics. To delineate these profiles further, the development of early social cognitive abilities in children with CdLS, FXS and RTS was compared to that observed in typically developing (TD) and autistic (AUT) children. Methods Children with CdLS (N = 22), FXS (N = 19) and RTS (N = 18), completed the Early Social Cognition Scale (ESCogS). Extant data from AUT (N = 19) and TD (N = 86) children were used for comparison. Results Similar to AUT children, children with CdLS, FXS and RTS showed an overall delay in passing ESCogS tasks. Children with CdLS showed a similar degree of delay to AUT children and greater delay than children with FXS and RTS. The CdLS, FXS and RTS groups did not pass tasks in the same sequence observed in TD and AUT children. Children with CdLS (p = 0.04), FXS (p = 0.02) and RTS (p = 0.04) performed better on tasks requiring understanding simple intentions in others significantly more than tasks requiring joint attention skills. Conclusions An underlying mechanism other than general cognitive delay may be disrupting early social cognitive development in children with CdLS, FXS and RTS. Factors that may disrupt early social cognitive development within these syndromes are discussed.

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Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson's influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle's alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary security landscape, hybrid threats represent a complex and multifaceted challenge, blending conventional military tactics with unconventional methods such as disinformation and cyber attacks. Through this article, we propose to identify and present the nature of hybrid threats, exploring their various forms and the way they undermine national security. GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence) helps countering hybrid threats using geospatial data to provide critical insights and enhance situational awareness. This article examines how GEOINT techniques are employed to combat disinformation, highlighting the role of geospatial data in verifying information, tracking the spread of false narrative and supporting strategic responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants' early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues (Apperly & Butterfill, Psychological Review, 116, 953-970 ; Apperly, ; Butterfill & Apperly, Mind & Language, 28, 606-637 ). This has issued in a number of new findings (Apperly et al., Psychological Science, 17, 841-844 ; Back & Apperly, Cognition, 115, 54-70 ; Qureshi et al., Cognition, 117, 230-236 ; Samson et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36, 1255-1266 ; Schneider et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 433-438 , Psychological Science, 23, 842-847 , Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 433-438 , Psychological Science, 23, 842-847 ; Surtees & Apperly, Child Development. 83, 452-460 ; Surtees et al., British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30, 75-86 , Cognition, 129, 426-438 ; Low & Watts, Psychological Science, 24, 305-311 ; Low et al., Child Development, 85, 1519-1534 ). The present paper shows that the theoretical arguments offered in support of Apperly's account are nevertheless unconvincing, and that the data can be explained in other terms. A better view is that there is just a single mindreading system that exists throughout, but which undergoes gradual conceptual enrichment through infancy and childhood. This system can be used in ways that do, or do not, draw on executive resources (including targeted searches of long-term memory) and/or working memory (such as visually rotating an image to figure out what someone else sees). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The concept of neurodiversity draws upon scientific research, and lessons from practice and lived experience to suggest new ways of thinking about neurodevelopmental conditions. Among the formative observations are that characteristics associated with neurodevelopmental conditions are part of a "broader phenotype" of variation across the whole population, and that there appear to be "transdiagnostic" similarities as well as differences in these characteristics. These observations raise important questions that have implications for understanding diversity in neurodevelopmental conditions and in neurocognitive phenotypes across the whole population. Method: The present work examines broader phenotypes using seven widely used self‐report assessments of traits associated with autism, ADHD, dyslexia, Developmental Coordination Disorder/dyspraxia, tic disorders/Tourette's, cortical hyperexcitability associated with subclinical epilepsy, and sensory sensitivities. A representative sample of 995 adults (aged 17–77) in the UK completed self‐report measures of neurodiversity, wellbeing, generalized anxiety, and depression, and cognitive abilities (nonverbal intelligence and executive functioning). Results: We used confirmatory factor analysis to test whether variation and covariation was better characterized (1) by traditional diagnostic labels, or (2) transdiagnostically according to similarities in functions, behaviours, or phenomena. Results indicated that neurodiversity characteristics were best explained using a bifactor model with one general "N" factor and four condition‐specific factors. Conclusion: This was the largest examination to date of the factor structure of broader phenotypes relevant to neurodevelopmental conditions. It provides critical benchmark data, and a framework approach for asking systematic questions about the structure of neurocognitive diversities seen in the whole population and in people with one or more diagnoses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent evidence that young children seem to both understand false belief in one sense, but not in another, has led to two-systems theorizing about mindreading. By analyzing the most detailed two-systems approach in studying social cognition--the theory of mindreading defended by Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill--I argue that that even when dutifully constructed, two-systems approaches in social cognition struggle to adequately define the mindreading systems in terms of signature processing limits, an issue that becomes most apparent when investigating mindreading in infancy. I end the article by developing several challenges that face any two-systems account of mindreading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Minimal theory of mind (ToM) is presented in the theory of mind literature as a middle ground between full-blown ToM and mere behavior-reading. Minimal ToM seems to be a useful construct for studying and understanding the minds of nonhuman animals and infants. However, providing an account of minimal ToM on which minimal mindreading is significantly less demanding than full-blown mindreading yet more than just a behavior-reading process is a challenge. In this paper, I argue that to address this challenge, we need to depart from the traditional framework of mindreading in more radical ways than offered by current minimal theory of mind accounts. First, I explain the traditional view of mindreading on which mental state attribution is treated as essential for mindreading and analyze the general respects in which it makes mindreading demanding for the mindreader, such as requiring the mindreader to have concepts of mental states, engage in inferential reasoning processes involving mental states, and form meta-representations. Then I discuss and critically evaluate two accounts of minimal ToM and argue that these accounts either do not depart sufficiently from the demanding requirements of traditional mindreading or risk becoming re-descriptions of behavior-reading accounts. Finally, I present an alternative Millikanian account of minimal ToM that avoids this risk while departing more radically from the traditional view of mindreading by providing a way for minimal mindreaders to represent the mental states of others and respond to them without engaging in conceptual mental state attribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision-making processes leading to governmental measures affecting international trade involve socio-cognitive processes, biases, and sociocultural factors. The legal prohibition of discrimination against imported products constitutes a fundamental principle of World Trade Organization (WTO) law, but discrimination against foreign products is widespread. This study explores the contribution of social cognitive and sociological literatures to international trade scholarship concerning the "national treatment" obligation. Ingroup favoritism bias, related cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, and sociocultural processes, such as "loyalty norms", facilitate and support discrimination against foreign products. One of the most contested issues regarding the interpretation of GATT Article III concerns the role of regulators' intention in establishing a violation of this provision. The approach undertaken by the WTO Appellate Body is characterized by a preference for the "objective" test of regulators' intention (focusing on intention revealed in the regulatory measure itself), and a reluctance to take into account regulators' "subjective" intentions, discerned from regulators' statements and a variety of other sources. In contrast to the WTO Appellate Body's approach, this contribution suggests that once presented with credible evidence regarding key-role regulators' intentions, manifested in both the regulatory measure itself and in a variety of other items of evidence, it is desirable that WTO tribunals assign adequate probative weight to such intentions. In addition, where it is credibly proven that ingroup favoritism norms prevail in the key role regulator's social environment, it is advisable to grant some probative weight to such social norms. Assigning a probative weight to regulators' subjective intentions and relevant norms is justified by the significant influence of intentions and norms on the prospects of discriminatory behavior. The article highlights three principal types of regulators' mindsets: mindful, mindless, and bias-resisting. Mindful regulators deliberately intend to restrict internal sale of foreign goods through discriminatory measures. Mindless regulators do not aim to discriminate against imported goods, and the disparate impact influences of their regulations are relegated to the background. Bias-resisting regulators intend to grant equal treatment to domestic and imported products and resist ingroup biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author(s): Katherine Ellis [sup.1] [sup.2] [sup.5] , Chris Oliver [sup.1] , Chrysi Stefanidou [sup.1] [sup.3] , Ian Apperly [sup.4] , Jo Moss [sup.1] [sup.5] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.6572.6, 0000 0004 [...], We directly assessed the broader aspects of sociability (social enjoyment, social motivation, social interaction skills and social discomfort) in individuals with Cornelia de Lange (CdLS), fragile X (FXS) and Rubinstein-Taybi syndromes (RTS), and their association with autism characteristics and chronological age in these groups. Individuals with FXS (p < 0.01) and RTS (p < 0.01) showed poorer quality of eye contact compared to individuals with CdLS. Individuals with FXS showed less person and more object attention than individuals with CdLS (p < 0.01). Associations between sociability and autism characteristics and chronological age differed between groups, which may indicate divergence in the development and aetiology of different components of sociability across these groups. Findings indicate that individuals with CdLS, FXS and RTS show unique profiles of sociability.

This paper argues that our folk-psychological expertise is a special case of extended and enculturated cognition where we learn to regulate both our own and others' thought and action in accord with a wide array of culturally shaped folk-psychological norms. The view has three noteworthy features: (1) it challenges a common assumption that the foundational capacity at work in folk-psychological expertise is one of interpreting behaviour in mentalistic terms (mindreading), arguing instead that successful mindreading is largely a consequence of successful mindshaping; (2) it argues that our folk-psychological expertise is not only socially scaffolded in development, it continues to be socially supported and maintained in maturity, thereby presenting a radically different picture of what mature folk-psychological competency amounts to; (3) it provides grounds for resisting a recent trend in theoretical explanations of quotidian social interaction that downplays the deployment of sophisticated mentalizing resources in understanding what others are doing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Cornelia de Lange (CdLS), Fragile X (FXS) and Rubinstein-Taybi syndromes (RTS) evidence unique profiles of autistic characteristics. To delineate these profiles further, the development of early social cognitive abilities in children with CdLS, FXS and RTS was compared to that observed in typically developing (TD) and autistic (AUT) children.Methods: Children with CdLS (N = 22), FXS (N = 19) and RTS (N = 18), completed the Early Social Cognition Scale (ESCogS). Extant data from AUT (N = 19) and TD (N = 86) children were used for comparison.Results: Similar to AUT children, children with CdLS, FXS and RTS showed an overall delay in passing ESCogS tasks. Children with CdLS showed a similar degree of delay to AUT children and greater delay than children with FXS and RTS. The CdLS, FXS and RTS groups did not pass tasks in the same sequence observed in TD and AUT children. Children with CdLS (p = 0.04), FXS (p = 0.02) and RTS (p = 0.04) performed better on tasks requiring understanding simple intentions in others significantly more than tasks requiring joint attention skills.Conclusions: An underlying mechanism other than general cognitive delay may be disrupting early social cognitive development in children with CdLS, FXS and RTS. Factors that may disrupt early social cognitive development within these syndromes are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of mind (ToM) is an essential ability for social competence and communication, and it is necessary for understanding behaviours that differ from our own. Research on bilingual children has reported that 3- and 4-year-old bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM tasks. Research suggests that adult bilinguals also might outperform monolinguals; nevertheless, this effect has yet to be established. Here, we tested bilingual and monolingual adults on the director task. Results showed that bilingual adults outperformed monolinguals in response to perspective-dependent trials of the director task, but not in response to control trials. This suggests that bilingualism is associated with individuals' ability to take into account the perspective of another person. In addition, the number of cultures that participants were exposed to, regardless of whether the participant was bilingual or not, was also associated with ToM performance. Overall, the findings suggest that linguistic and cultural experience have an impact on ToM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People including Nameera Akhtar, Mark Appelbaum and Ian Apperly who the author would like to thank for the assistance in the creation of the journal "Child Development Perspectives" in 2012 and 2013 are mentioned.

We delineate the sequence that typically developing infants pass tasks that assess different early social cognitive skills considered precursors to theory-of-mind abilities. We compared this normative sequence to performance on these tasks in a group of autistic (AUT) children. 86 infants were administered seven tasks assessing intention reading and shared intentionality (Study 1). Infants responses followed a consistent developmental sequence, forming a four-stage scale. These tasks were administered to 21 AUT children (Study 2), who passed tasks in the same sequence. However, performance on tasks that required following others' eye gaze and cooperating with others was delayed. Findings indicate that earlier-developing skills provide a foundation for later-developing skills, and difficulties in acquiring some early social cognitive skills in AUT children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the philosophical concept of believe belief, desire and the prediction of behaviour. It mentions a perceived tension between naturalism and the ostensible subject matter of the discourse and also discusses the situation that focusing on linguistic items sentences and terms, but parallel problems arise which relates to mental correlates beliefs and concepts.

This article explores crossover literature, that is, literature transcending age boundaries and, in particular, the boundaries between adult and child readership. This article suggests that texts transcending age boundaries are not a recent phenomenon-adults have almost always existed in children's literature as a background authority or a hidden and even active addressee. But it is the changes in a social, historical, and cultural context that call for a new term, crossover, to designate this phenomenon. Central to the discussion of crossover literature is how to conceptualise the different readings that a text can elicit from child and adult readers. Drawing on developments in cognitive literary studies, this article argues that crossover literature is characterised by its potential to accommodate both child and adult readers' different levels of cognitive-affective development, subject to the factor of age. The argument is exemplified with a close analysis of Anthony Browne's picturebook The Big Baby (1995). It is particularly productive and illuminating to discuss how crossover picturebooks can attract both children and adults, contrary to the traditional assumption that picturebooks are merely "kids' stuff." The close analysis of The Big Baby reveals that cognitive literary studies can tease out the implications of the age difference, which are crucial to crossover research, and shed new light on how crossover literature may attract readers of different ages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Positive emotional perceptions and healthy emotional intelligence (EI) are important for social functioning. In this study, we investigated whether loving kindness meditation (LKM) combined with anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) would facilitate improvements in EI and changes in affective experience of visual stimuli. LKM has been shown to increase positive emotional experiences and we hypothesized that tDCS could enhance these effects. Eighty-seven undergraduates were randomly assigned to 30 minutes of LKM or a relaxation control recording with anodal tDCS applied to the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (left dlPFC) or right temporoparietal junction (right TPJ) at 0.1 or 2.0 milliamps. The primary outcomes were self-reported affect ratings of images from the International Affective Picture System and EI as measured by the Mayer, Salovey and Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. Results indicated no effects of training on EI, and no main effects of LKM, electrode placement, or tDCS current strength on affect ratings. There was a significant interaction of electrode placement by meditation condition (p = 0.001), such that those assigned to LKM and right TPJ tDCS, regardless of current strength, rated neutral and positive images more positively after training. Results suggest that LKM may enhance positive affective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I reflect on theory of mind as a field (ToM), how it has developed over the years, and focally on the state of current research and theory. Having begun with preschoolers’ understanding of beliefs and desires, the field now includes research from infancy through late life, contributions and contributors from around the world, research on behavior, conversation, neural correlates, gene-environment contributions, evolution, and the social-behavioral antecedents and consequences of the unfolding trajectories of ToM understanding. Several topics in particular portray the current state of the art and my sense of where theory-of-mind research is likely to head in the near future: progressions of theory of mind achievement; cultural experiences plus experiential influences that shape developmental trajectories; developmental cognitive neuroscience; infant ToM insights; research on ToM developments beyond preschool, including children’s increasing interest in and wrestling with extraordinary minds, such as those of God and super-heroes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand our accounts of how we understand others in order to accommodate these data and explain how such profound disagreements arise amongst informed, rational, well-meaning individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of mind refers to the human capacity for reasoning about others’ mental states based on observations of their actions and unfolding events. This type of reasoning is notorious in the cognitive science literature for its presumed computational intractability. A possible reason could be that it may involve higher-order thinking (e.g., ‘you believe that I believe that you believe’). To investigate this we formalize theory of mind reasoning as updating of beliefs about beliefs using dynamic epistemic logic, as this formalism allows to parameterize ‘order of thinking.’ We prove that theory of mind reasoning, so formalized, indeed is intractable (specifically, PSPACE-complete). Using parameterized complexity we prove, however, that the ‘order parameter’ is not a source of intractability. We furthermore consider a set of alternative parameters and investigate which of them are sources of intractability. We discuss the implications of these results for the understanding of theory of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ratchet effect–the gradual accumulation of changes within a cultural trait beyond a level that individuals can achieve on their own–arguably rests on two key cognitive abilities: high-fidelity social learning and innovation. Researchers have started to simulate the ratchet effect in the laboratory to identify its underlying social learning mechanisms, but studies on the developmental origins of the ratchet effect remain sparse. We used the transmission chain method and a tower construction task that had previously been used with adults to investigate whether “generations” of children between 4 and 6 years were able to make a technological product that individual children could not yet achieve. 21 children in a baseline and 80 children in transmission chains (each consisting of 10 successive children) were asked to build something as tall as possible from plasticine and sticks. Children in the chains were presented with the constructions of the two preceding generations (endstate demonstration). Results showed that tower heights did not increase across the chains nor were they different from the height of baseline towers, demonstrating a lack of improvement in tower height. However, we found evidence for cultural lineages, i.e., construction styles: towers within chains were more similar to each other than to towers from different chains. Possible explanations for the findings and directions for future research are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]