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This article looks at the measures that were adopted in response to the euro crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic and their implications for accountability and democratic legitimacy in the area of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The discussion begins with the legitimacy issues that were facing the EMU/the European Union in the aftermath of the euro crisis, as well as the accountability and transparency arrangements obtained in the area of European Union economic governance. The focus then shifts to the further evolution of the Economic Union (the “E” of EMU), as triggered by the European Union’s response to the pandemic. The relevant section does not purport to provide a detailed exegesis of the powers of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (and their domestic-level, principally technocratic, counterparts) in all sub-fields of EMU. It rather aims to illustrate the significance of their ever-expanding tasks, as well as the need for the exercise of those powers to be subject to robust accountability and transparency arrangements. Accordingly, the discussion of the key features of these novel measures is followed by analysis of the accountability arrangements that are enshrined therein or accompany them, as well as their implications for the legitimacy of EMU/the European Union. It will be shown that, although some progress has been made in terms of accountability and transparency, plenty of gaps remain. The penultimate section will provide a glimpse into what the future may bring for EMU, thereby looking at other suggested reforms that could be implemented in order to further “deepen” EMU. It will be argued that those reform plans emanating from (or under consideration by) the European Union institutions have not always placed enough emphasis on the need for robust accountability and transparency arrangements and that their potentially far-reaching nature bolsters the argument made in this article that such arrangements are indispensable. It wi

Número monográfico: La Crisis en la UEM, La crisis del euro se ha analizado con profusión desde que, con el rescate a Grecia a principios de 2010, la Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM) europea impuso unas políticas de austeridad muy severas a un conjunto de países periféricos. La singularidad de la respuesta de la UEM a la crisis se ha debido en buena parte a su diseño institucional y a la relación de fuerzas que han operado en la misma desde su nacimiento en 1992 y su puesta en marcha en el año 2000. En este artículo se analizan las causas de la adopción de esta política y se estudian los principales argumentos esgrimidos por los defensores e impulsores de la misma. La principal conclusión al respecto es que el diseño institucional de la UEM es profundamente asimétrico y que la política de austeridad aplicada ha beneficiado casi exclusivamente a los países acreedores y a determinados grupos económicos, siendo muy perjudicial para la mayoría de la población europea., The euro crisis has been analysed in depth since, with Greece’s bailout in early 2010, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) imposed severe austerity policies to a set of peripheral countries. The uniqueness of the EMU response to the crisis was due, in a large measure, to its institutional design and the relationship of forces that have operated within, since its inception in 1992 and its start in 2000. This article analyses the causes of the adoption of this policy and studies the main arguments presented by its promoters. The main conclusion in this regard is that the institutional design of EMU is profoundly asymmetrical and the applied austerity policy has benefited almost exclusively the creditor countries and certain economic groups. This policy has proven to be very harmful to the majority of the European population., Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales, TRUE, pub

What are the historical roots of the battle of ideas that shape the euro area asymmetry and why was it conducive to the crisis? What does the response of political authorities to the euro crisis teach us about the battle of ideas that underlies the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations and the present state of distributional conflicts between EU countries? This chapter aims at answering these questions by shedding light on the ideational struggles about the EMU economic governance before, during and, to a lesser extent, after the euro crisis. In the first section, we underline that the institutional design of the euro area is the outcome of ideational struggles, which are unfolding and evolving since the 1960s. The second section analyses the battle of ideas between the different policy players who were fighting to frame the causes of the euro area crisis and the subsequent policy solutions. In our conclusion, we draw links between the battle of ideas that took place during the euro area crisis and the negotiations on the RFF and the MFF.