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This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation that allows scholars to address democratization and autocratization as related but obverse processes. We introduce a dataset that captures 680 episodes of regime transformation (ERT) from 1900 to 2019 and offers novel insights into regime change over the past 120 years. The ERT has three main advantages over other approaches. First, it avoids problematic assumptions of unit homogeneity and constant as well as symmetric effects. Second, it integrates key insights from qualitative studies by treating regime change as a gradual and uncertain process. Third, the ERT is based on a unified framework for studying regime transformation in either direction. The dataset differentiates between four broad types of regime transformation: liberalization in autocracies, democratic deepening in democracies, and autocratization in both democracies and autocracies (democratic and autocratic regression). It further distinguishes ten patterns with distinct outcomes, including standard depictions of regime change (i.e. democratic transition or breakdown). A minority (32%) of ERTs produce a regime transition, with the majority of episodes either ending before a transition takes place or not having the potential for such a transition (i.e. further democratization in democratic regimes or further autocratization in autocratic regimes). We also provide comparisons to other datasets, illustrative case studies to demonstrate face validity, and a discussion about how the ERT framework can be applied in peace research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emergency powers are widely, and justly, criticized as threats to the rule of law. In the United States, forty-three declared emergencies give the executive vast authority to exercise power unencumbered by standard legal and procedural requirements. A long tradition of executive use of emergency powers to erode civil liberties amplifies fears of executive overreach. Yet this, we argue, is only part of the picture. We examine how emergency powers can be used for good. We argue that under certain limited conditions, political actors can legitimately invoke emergency powers to transform public policy. In addition to widely accepted requirements of crisis severity, transparency, and time limits, we argue that broad consensus and a reformulated non-discrimination requirement are essential to the proper use of emergency powers for societal transformation. We analyze recent high-profile exercises of emergency powers by the U.S. executive to fund a wall on the southern border and to forgive billions in student debt, as well as the European Union's (EU) extraordinarily frequent and broad use of emergency powers in the last three years in response to COVID-19 and Russia's Ukraine invasion. We conclude that the U.S. measures fail under our normative framework, while the EU measures offer a promising template for the transformative use of emergency powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many decades, scholars assumed voluntary compliance and citizens' commitment to a regime's principles and values to be critical for regime stability. A growing literature argues that indoctrination is essential to achieve this congruence. However, the absence of a clear definition and comprehensive comparative measures of indoctrination have hindered systematic research on such issues. In this paper, we fill this gap by synthesizing literature across disciplines to clarify the concept of indoctrination, focusing particularly on the politicization of education and the media. We then outline how the abstract concept can be operationalized, and introduce and validate an original expert-coded dataset on indoctrination that covers 160 countries from 1945 to the present. The dataset should facilitate a new generation of empirical inquiry on the causes and consequences of indoctrination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent do countries protect the rights of transgender people? How does this differ from legal protections countries offer sexual orientation minorities? What conditions are beneficial for advancing trans rights? Limitations in data availability and accessibility make answering these types of trans-specific questions difficult. To address this shortcoming, I introduce a new dataset. The Trans Rights Indicator Project (TRIP) provides insight into the legal situations transgender people faced in 173 countries from 2000 to 2021. The dataset currently includes 14 indicators that capture the presence or absence of laws related to criminalization, legal gender recognition, and anti-discrimination protections. I then use this data to discuss the global status of transgender rights throughout the period and compare these trends to sexual orientation rights. Finally, I conclude with a preliminary analysis of three institutional and cultural factors that may help explain variation in transgender rights throughout the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of literature investigates whether increasing the number of women in legislative office translates into policies that benefit women in society. This research builds upon theories about descriptive and substantive representation. However, these theories may not travel well to authoritarian contexts, where we see some of the largest gains in women legislators in recent years. This article unpacks the link between women's descriptive representation, healthcare spending, and health outcomes by regime type. Using a sample of 169 countries from 2000 to 2018, we find that the percentage of women legislators is associated with increased healthcare spending across all regimes. However, women's health outcomes do not improve with women's descriptive representation in closed autocracies. Meanwhile, the results for democracies and electoral autocracies are similar, suggesting that even limited vertical accountability through semi-competitive elections may facilitate substantive representation of women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This symposium challenges the common perception that authoritarian regimes are less resilient than democratic ones because they lack the sources of democratic resilience. We focus on Russia, a personalist authoritarian regime, which has demonstrated a surprisingly high level of resilience during its war against Ukraine. We argue that for a territorially large and diverse country such as Russia, the critical dimension of resilience is manifested in maintaining central control over the entire territory of the country during times of crisis. Contributions in this issue explore the sources and limits of Russia's territorial resilience. We argue that, while the personalist regime in Russia has demonstrated coping and adaptive dimensions of resilience, its transformative dimension remains questionable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a country becomes more autocratic, does it affect the relations between ethnic groups in a systematic way? Cross-national and case-based research witnesses how autocratization (the opposite of democratization) is becoming increasingly prevalent, particularly in societies where ethnic relations are politicized and polarized. However, we still lack sufficient knowledge on how autocratization might have an impact on ethnic relations. The paper advances previous autocratization and ethnic studies. It hypothesizes that if a country autocratizes, this further deteriorates its ethnic relations (ethnocratization). It substantiates this claim through a mixed-method design. It starts with a longitudinal analysis at the ethnic group-level, to demonstrate how ethnic discrimination and domination are more probable during autocratization episodes. Next, it examines a collection of international reports on the predicament of ethnic majorities and minorities in countries undergoing autocratization episodes, to identify two causal mechanisms as the main incentives and justifications of the incumbent (and autocratizing) elites: ideological legitimation and authoritarian experimentation. This research encourages scholars on autocratization and ethnic studies to join their efforts, to investigate how democracy and ethnic inclusion can decline in parallel and, thus, to show the reasons why they should advance together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many democracies around the world face the challenge of democratic recession and autocratization as democratically elected incumbents increasingly show autocratic tendencies. Existing research has mainly focused on the circumstances under which these autocratizing incumbents erode democracy and on the structural factors explaining the resilience of democratic institutions. Much less is known about the actors within those institutions and when they stand up against the autocratizing incumbent to defend democracy. In this article, we present a novel theoretical framework of democratic defence that focuses on the interaction between the incumbent, institutional elites, and citizens. Developing a two-level model of democratic defence, we show how the democratic defender's personal interests, repression by the incumbent, the perceived ambiguity of the autocratic action, and the perceived credibility of the democratic defender interact to affect the occurrence of democratic defence. The resulting framework can guide future research on the role of specific actors in defending democracy. We demonstrate the utility of our framework with illustrative case studies of (attempted) democratic defence in Senegal (2011–2012) and Poland (2017–2018). An actor-based approach of democratic defence is crucial to understand what actions domestic and international actors can take to prevent (further) democratic recession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multiple well-known democracy-rating projects—including Freedom House, Polity, and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)—have identified apparent global regression in recent years. These measures rely on partly subjective indicators, which—in principle—could suffer from rater bias. For instance, Little and Meng (2023) argue that shared beliefs driven by the current zeitgeist could lead to shared biases that produce the appearance of democratic backsliding in subjectively coded measures. To assess this argument and the strength of the evidence for global democratic backsliding, we propose an observable-to-subjective score mapping (OSM) methodology that uses only easily observable features of democracy to predict existing indices of democracy. Applying this methodology to three prominent democracy indices, we find evidence of backsliding—but beginning later and not as pronounced as suggested by some of the original indices. Our approach suggests that the Freedom House measure particularly does not track with the recent patterns in observable indicators and that there has been a stasis or—at most—a modest decline in the average level of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past decade, analyses drawing on several democracy measures have shown a global trend of democratic retrenchment. While these democracy measures use radically different methodologies, most partially or fully rely on subjective judgments to produce estimates of the level of democracy within states. Such projects continuously grapple with balancing conceptual coverage with the potential for bias (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000). Little and Meng (L&M) (2023) reintroduce this debate, arguing that "objective" measures of democracy show little evidence of recent global democratic backsliding.1 By extension, they posit that time-varying expert bias drives the appearance of democratic retrenchment in measures that incorporate expert judgments. In this article, we engage with (1) broader debates on democracy measurement and democratic backsliding, and (2) L&M's specific data and conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do mutually reinforcing cleavages harm democracy? Evidence from specific cases suggests that autocratization can be related to the predicament of ethnic groups, if ethnicity is politicized and involves resource distribution. However, we know little about whether this is a cause of autocratization more broadly. The article demonstrates that, with increasing inequalities between ethnic groups, a country experiences a decline in its level of democracy and higher propensity to start autocratizing. The analysis thus advances previous contributions, focusing on individual inequalities and power-sharing institutions as explanations of democratization or democratic quality, in two ways. First, isolating autocratization as downturns in democracy levels and the onsets of related timespans (autocratization episodes), and comparing the impact of (economic, political, and social) types of inequalities between ethnic groups. Second, adopting a global sample of (democratic and non-democratic) countries since 1981, with an original data collection integrating expert surveys with survey data. Quantitative evidence confirms most expectations, particularly on economic inequalities between ethnic groups, and – although less precisely – economic, political and social dimensions combined. The findings have important implications for political regime and ethnic studies, showing that preventing the mutual reinforcement of sociocultural and economic cleavages is key to stabilize democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article discusses the limitation of rights due to pandemics. It analyzes from a constitutional standpoint the holding of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Das BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT) from April 2022 as a symptom of moral panic disguised through an analytical process. Though it focuses on this case, it sheds light on the moral panic that characterized many countries' approaches during the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 27, 2022, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that a provision to provide proof of vaccination against COVID-19, recovery from COVID-19, or a medical exemption to COVID-19 vaccination as a condition of employment in the health and care sectors was constitutional. In the name of the necessity to protect life--which is undoubtedly the supreme value--the German Federal Constitutional Court was dragged after the global moral panic and has given a hand to disproportionately trampling human rights. It refused to recognize an alternative means of submitting negative COVID-19 tests as a condition of working with vulnerable people and as a less restrictive means of reaching the goal of protecting vulnerable people. It did not give weight to the autonomy of the individual, including vulnerable people, to take risks. It did not accord the due weight to the injury to livelihoods, career losses, the interruption of academic studies, and the breach of bodily integrity. It needed to adequately address the legitimacy of the sacrifice of the individual for the collective good. The failure to satisfy the requirement of proportionality could indicate the underlying intention of the ruling--putting pressure on people to get vaccinated. The COVID-19 pandemic crisis illustrates the great potential of coercive public health powers to infringe on civil liberties and the fragility of human rights when faced with danger to health. This Article advances the case for demonstrating greater respect for peoples' autonomy to take health risks before establishing coercive measures--which curtail fundamental rights--to prevent or reduce the spread of infectious diseases. The Article sets forth principles the state should consider before limiting constitutional rights and claims that people around the world should not be deprived of their choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De-democratization may take the form of executive-led attacks as well as incremental decrepitude, gradual emptying of underlying constitutional values, and state inertia. Contrary to general wisdom, both exogenous erosion and endogenous decay are heavily affected by informality. As courts are often the first institutions affected by de-democratization, this Article analyzes informality in erosion and decay of judicial institutions. It argues that such institutions interact with democracy in two core directions. The first one is endogenous and describes the decay of democratic judiciaries as a result of a long-term incongruence between formal and informal judicial institutions. The second direction captures the gradual erosion of informal institutions that have positive effects on judicial democratic resilience. These two processes, decay and erosion of informal judicial institutions, should not be overlooked. While they are less visible, slower, and often unintentional, they are as dangerous as frontal executive-led attacks on courts, because they significantly increase the window of opportunity for politicians who wish to downgrade the substance of democracy or even implement a regime change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates on the causes of Indonesia's recent democratic decline have mostly focused on institutional, political and attitudinal–behavioural causes. By bringing the rural political economy dimension into this conversation, this article presents another picture of the illiberal turn in Indonesian democracy. Specifically, it examines the implications of elite control over land and coal resources on democratic quality. Based on in-country fieldwork materials and relevant secondary data, it analyses instances of episodic repression, the contraction of democratic spaces and the corrosive effects of coal-fuelled intra-elite clientelism by looking at the elite control of land resources and the influence of political and economic elites benefitting from the coal industry in elections and the broader political arena. Finally, it also discusses the capitulation of key agrarian social movement actors to state interests and its impact on the movement's ability to resist democratic regression. This elaboration shows how the current contour of elite control over rural resources contributes to the declining quality of Indonesian democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State weakness is often emphasized as a key determinant of democratic breakdowns. However, previous studies have failed to appreciate how different aspects of state weakness pose different challenges. Against this backdrop, we examine the relationships between two fundamental dimensions of state capacity (coercive capacity and administrative capacity) and different modes of democratic breakdown, i.e., incumbent-driven and nonincumbent driven takeovers. We propose that coercive capacity mainly enables containment of rebels and coup-plotters, which reduces the risk of nonincumbent takeovers. Conversely, we expect that administrative capacity mainly serves to prevent executive aggrandizement, which reduces the risk of incumbent takeovers. Global analyses of democratic breakdowns between 1789 and 2020 support only the second expectation. Coercive capacity, reflected by territorial control and military personnel per capita, usually drops below accepted significance levels for both modes of democratic breakdown. In contrast, indicators of meritocracy, impartial public administration, and predictable enforcement that proxy administrative capacity show a significant, negative relationship with the risk of democratic breakdown, but only for incumbent-driven takeovers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments across the globe implemented severe restrictions of civic freedoms to contain the spread of the virus. The global health emergency posed the risk of governments seizing the pandemic as a window of opportunity to curb (potential) challenges to their power, thereby reinforcing the ongoing, worldwide trend of shrinking civic spaces. In this article, we investigate whether and how governments used the pandemic as a justification to impose restrictions of freedom of expression. Drawing on the scholarship on the causes of civic space restrictions, we argue that governments responded to COVID-19 by curtailing the freedom of expression when they had faced significant contentious political challenges before the pandemic. Our results from a quantitative analysis indeed show that countries who experienced high levels of pro-democracy mobilization before the onset of the pandemic were more likely to see restrictions of the freedom of expression relative to countries with no or low levels of mobilization. Additional three brief case studies (Algeria, Bolivia and India) illustrate the process of how pre-pandemic mass protests fostered the im-position of restrictions on the freedom of expression during the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is under threat across the globe and a third wave of autocratization manifests in democratic regression and authoritarian hardening. However, although universities have been important pro-democracy hotbeds, the nexus between academic freedom and autocratization has generated little scholarly attention. This article presents the first systematic investigation of the influence of academic freedom on the onset of autocratization. In particular, it reveals how academic freedom protects regimes from an onset of autocratization and argues that more academic freedom reduces the risk of autocratization by imprinting a pro-democracy bias on students and researchers. This article's research design combines two studies. Study I tests whether graduates that were socialized under more academic freedom develop more democratic support, which I analyse using data from the World Values Surveys and linear fixed effects models. Study II tests whether more academic freedom reduces the onset probability of autocratization using V-Dem data and binomial-response GLMs. This article finds evidence that while high levels of academic freedom reduce the probability of an onset of autocratization, low levels also reduce the probability of an onset. Overall, the article highlights the crucial role of academic freedom for democracy, especially in times of severe threats to democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with how practices of knowledge production relate to the international politics of transitional justice (TJ). It argues that quantitative scholarly studies—called for in response to the anecdotal and normative studies that prevailed in early TJ scholarship and which, it is argued, continue to shape TJ sub-fields such as the study of local justice—are themselves committed to the normative framework and the goals of TJ that they seek to provide the tools to challenge. Applying a 'politics of methods' lens, the article foregrounds the interpretive work of surveys and the methodological choices of large-N impact studies which circle these works back to narrowly defined ideas of what TJ ought to be. The conclusions show how these 'politics of methods' contribute to the decontestation of an inherently political choice and practice, and predetermine what policy and practice options are considered useful, relevant and even imaginable. As such they shape that which they claim only to examine. Contributing to both critical methodological debates in International Relations and nascent scholarship on the research–policy–practice nexus in TJ, the analysis provides an under-examined example of the co-constitutive relationship of what is considered to be detached knowledge production and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the World was busy mitigating the disastrous health and economic effects of the novel coronavirus, a less direct, but not less concerning peril has largely remained unexplored: the COVID-19 crisis may have disrupted some of the most fundamental social and political relationships in democratic societies. We interviewed samples resembling the national population of Denmark, Hungary, Italy and the US three times: in April, June and December of 2020 (14K observations). We show that multiple (but not all) measures of support for the political system decreased between April and December. Exploiting the panel setup, we demonstrate that within-respondent increases in indicators of pandemic fatigue (specifically, the perceived subjective burden of the pandemic and feelings of anomie) correspond to decreases in system support and increases in extreme anti-systemic attitudes. At the same time, we find no systematic trends in feelings of social solidarity, which are largely unaffected by changes in pandemic burden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven court-packing occurs when politicians manipulate the composition of courts in order to assure a quick implementation of policies. Although this tends to negatively affect judicial independence, it is not per se a first step towards regime change. Second, regime-driven court-packing happens when politicians alter the composition of the courts with the goal of eroding democracy. In this case, court-packing's negative effect on judicial independence has a systemic negative effect on different dimensions of liberal democracy. Relying on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, we conceptualize these two types of court-packing by comparing two cases: Carlos Menem (1989–99) in Argentina, seeking judicial support to carry out pro-market economic reforms, and Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) in Venezuela, seeking to control the judiciary in the context of democratic backsliding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

During the Great Recession, European democracies underwent major political changes, from the spread of institutional discontent to the rise of radical populist parties. The erosion of democratic satisfaction in EU member states after the exogenous shock of the economic crisis is a significant phenomenon that requires innovative analysis and explanation. This article develops a new conceptual and empirical framework that examines how democracies are affected by exogenous shocks and the determinants of resilient democracies. The study explores the notion of democratic resilience, conceptualized as democratic resilience as the system characteristics which successfully adapt to or overcome democratic delegitimization processes after a shock. The analysis provides a classification of democracies by trajectory, distinguishing between preventive, recovered, and damaged democracies, and identifies which political characteristics have successfully increased or decreased democratic resilience. External political efficacy and economic satisfaction are highlighted as indispensable components and mediators of political and economic contextual features for a more resilient and stable political system during economic crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Democracy often confronts citizens with a dilemma: stand firm on democracy while losing out on policy or accept undemocratic behavior and gain politically. Existing literature demonstrates that citizens generally choose the latter—and that they do so deliberately. Yet there is an alternative possibility. Citizens can avoid this uncomfortable dilemma altogether by rationalizing their understandings of democracy. When a politician advances undesired policies without violating democratic rules and norms, people find ways to perceive the behavior as undemocratic. When a politician acts undemocratically to promote desired policies, citizens muster up arguments for considering it democratic. Original survey experiments in the United States, and 22 democracies worldwide, provide strong support for this argument. It is thus not deliberate acceptance, but a fundamentally different perceptual logic that drives the widespread approval of undemocratic behavior in today's democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]