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J. Abbink produced a new bibliography on Ethiopian-Eritrean studies in society and history. It is a by- product of research he did on these countries in the past five years and is the ultimate volume in the series. The volume covers the period from 2016 to July 2022 and contains all the crucial references to recent work in history, archaeology, sociology, anthropology, economics, agricultural studies, politics, international relations, environmental studies, religious and cultural studies. Also prominent are themes like the Nile Basin, (regional) conflict, food (in)security, gender relations, demographic developments, urban life, arts & crafts, and pastoral societies.A brief introduction situates the bibliography in the wider field of Ethiopian-Eritrean studies and clarifies the underlying criteria of inclusion and organization of the references. As much as possible, the individual references also contain a link to their digital publication website. The work is concluded with an author name index and is published as an E-book only.

This paper offers a political analysis of the development of the TPLF-induced armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and considers the international responses in media and international policy circles. The extension of the conflict by the TPLF after the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the federal government on 28 June 2021 (followed by its retreat from Tigray) did not lead to an easing of the fighting. On the contrary, the TPLF used scorched-earth tactics, perpetrated substantial abuse of civilians (mass killings, burning down villages, destroying and looting hospitals, health centres and other economic infrastructure), and created food scarcity, hundreds of thousands of IDPs and hugely aggravated humanitarian problems in the Amhara and Afar regions. In spite of this unilateral TPLF extension of the armed conflict, the responses of international policy circles, notably from the Western ‘donor countries’ and the UN, have been negative towards the federal government and mild on the TPLF.This paper explores aspects of this paradoxical and problematic approach and argues that it will not lead to a political or other solution of the conflict, especially not in view of the undiminished belligerent strategy of the TPLF. The Ethiopian federal government and its leader PM Abiy Ahmed, having been confirmed in power after a relatively successful and credible parliamentary election on 21 June 2021, are pressurized by much of the global media and Western policy makers for the problems in Tigray – including the ‘famine’ declared by TPLF - and urged to negotiate. The TPLF, incorrectly identified with the people of Tigray as a whole, is not held to account. But an overbearing Western approach based on the threat of sanctions (by the US government) and on what often seem ‘neo-imperialist’ demands, as evident from serious interference in the conflict - even by a number of UN individuals (expelled from the country on 30 September 2021) - will not contribute to political negotiations or dialogue, restoration of peace, or rehabilitation of the war-torn regions, neither to stability in Ethiopia. Not only improved media reporting, based on solid local (Ethiopian) information and checking sources, but also a fundamental reset of certain UN and Western donor country policies on Ethiopia, are needed.RésuméCette étude propose une analyse politique du développement du conflit armé induit par les TPLF dans le nord de l'Éthiopie et examine les réponses internationales dans les médias et les cercles politiques internationaux. L'extension du conflit par le TPLF après le cessez-le-feu unilatéral proclamé par le gouvernement fédéral le 28 juin 2021 (suivi de son retrait du Tigré) n'a pas conduit à un apaisement des combats ; au contraire. Les tactiques de la terre brûlée, les abus sérieux contre les civils (meurtres en masse, incendies de villages, pillage et destruction des hôpitaux et autres infrastructures économiques), la pénurie alimentaire, des centaines de milliers de déplacés internes et des problèmes humanitaires extrêmement aggravés dans les régions d'Amhara et d'Afar en ont été le résultat. Malgré cette extension unilatérale du conflit par le TPLF, les réponses des cercles politiques internationaux, notamment des pays « bailleurs-de-fonds » occidentaux et de l'ONU, ont été négatives envers le gouvernement fédéral mais modérées envers le TPLF.

Summary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led Tigray Regional government, are marked by bias, incompleteness, lack of context understanding, credulity and an anti-federal goverment attitude. The conflict, provoked by an unannounced and treacherous nightly attack by TPLF forces on federal army troups stationed in Tigray to protect the Region, was the result of misplaced power-mongering by the TPLF, and its building up of tension with the federal Ethiopian goverment. The 4 November attack led to a major federal army response. Five days after the attack by TPLF, on 9 November 2021, over 800 Amharic-speaking civilian inhabitants of the town of Mai Kadra in Western Tigray were killed by TPLF-affiliated forces and militias in a gruesome manner – a classic case of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Perpetrators mostly fled to Sudanese refugee camps. These two events - the 4 November attack and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ - were defining dramatic moments in the war. While the conflict unfolded, leading to defeat of the TPLF forces on 28 November 2020 with the taking over of the regional capital Meqele and the flight of the TPLF leadership, many leading Western media and news websites focused on the aftermath and the effects of the fighting in Tigray Region and its population, easily shifting sympathy twards the perceived ‘underdog’ (TPLF). This was followed by hastily written statements by foreign policy makers in EU, USA and UN circles, leading to an emerging policy narrative whereby essential details of the context, the nature of the adversaries, the reasons of the conflict were sidelined. These Atlantic community spokespersons shifted to ‘blaming’ the federal Ethiopian government and ‘demanding’ all kinds of measures from it. Notable was the international community clamouring for ‘unlimited and full access’ for humanitarian aid to ‘prevent famine’, and demand a halt to all hostilities. But meanwhile it did not deliver much aid itself and did as if making it conditional on the federal government following their orders. Part of the international media, several academic associates and researchers who saw acces to their research sites blocked, and diverse TPLF associates in various international organizations continued to fuel the flames of this approach, next to the ‘digital activism’and the production of fake news reports by pro-TPLF persons in Ethiopa and especially in the Tigrayan ‘diaspora’ in the West.All this led to serious misperceptions and unfair bias on the part of the Atlantic countries and the UN vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which endangered integrity, balance, and a proper perspective on causes and consequences, as well as to policies that seemed akin to ‘development aid blackmail’ and sanctimonious lecturing of a fragile, low-income African developing country. In the exercise, the detailed press statements, reports and explanations by Ethiopian parties, including the government and reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, are routinely neglected or doubted. In contrast, the statements and international messages by TPLF remnants and advocates, marked by a high degree of unreliability, exaggeration and very often lacking truth content, are used uncritically. On the basis of a number of telling examples, this paper describes the above process, analyses the emerging Atlantic discourse and some of its mistakes and wrong assumptions. It thereby pleads for a more balanced, critical approach to the incomplete reporting and wilfull misinformation from questionable sources so as to have the media and Atlantic policy makers develop a more responsible approach.Résumé: parti TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front), sont marquées par des préjugés, des incomplétudes, un manque de compréhension du contexte, la crédulité et une attitude contre le gouvernement fédéral. Le conflit, provoqué par une attaque nocturne inopinée et perfide par les forces tigréennes contre les troupes de l'armée fédérale stationnées au Tigré pour protéger la région, était le résultat d'une politique de la force mal jugée par le TPLF et sa montée des tensions avec le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien. L'attaque du 4 novembre a évoquée à une réponse directe de l'armée fédérale. Cinq jours après l'attaque du TPLF, plus de 800 habitants civils de langue amharique de la ville de Mai Kadra dans le Tigray occidental ont été tués, le 9 novembre 2021, par des forces et des milices affiliées au TPLF d'une manière horrible - un cas classique de «nettoyage ethnique», et les auteurs ont pour la plupart fui vers les camps de réfugiés soudanais. Ces deux événements - l’attaque du 4 novembre et ce «nettoyage ethnique» - étaient des moments dramatiques cruciales de la guerre. Alors que le conflit se déroulait, conduisant à la défaite des forces du TPLF le 28 novembre 2020 avec la prise de contrôle de la capitale régionale Meqele et la fuite des dirigeants du TPL, de nombreux médias et sites Internet occidentaux de premier plan se sont concentrés sur les conséquences et les effets des combats dans la région du Tigray et sa population, la sympathie se déplaçant facilement vers le «perdant» perçu (TPLF). Cela a été suivi par des déclarations écrites à la hâte par des décideurs politiques étrangers aux cercles de l'UE, des États-Unis et de l'ONU, menant à un récit politique émergent dans lequel les détails essentiels du contexte, de la nature des adversaires et des raisons du conflit ont été mis de côté. Ces portes-parole de la communauté atlantique sont passés à toujours «blâmer» le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien et à «exiger» toutes sortes de mesures de sa part. Il convient de noter que la communauté internationale toujours réclamait un «accès illimité et complet pour l’aide humanitaire» pour «prévenir la famine» et exigeait «‘l’arrêt de toutes les hostilités, mais entre-temps, elle n'a pas fourni beaucoup d'aide et semble la conditionner à ce que le gouvernement fédéral suive ses ordres. Une partie de la presse mondiale, plusieurs universitaires qui ont vu l'accès à leurs sites de recherche bloqué, et divers associés du TPLF dans diverses organisations internationales ont continué à alimenter les flammes de cette approche, à côté de «l'activisme digitale» et de la production de «fake news» et rapports douteux de personnes pro-TPLF en Ethiopie et en particulier dans la «diaspora» tigréenne en Occident. Tout cela a conduit à de graves perceptions erronées et à des préjugés injustes de la part des pays atlantiques et de l'ONU vis-à-vis de l'Éthiopie qui ont mis en danger l'intégrité, l'équilibre et une bonne perspective des causes et des conséquences, ainsi qu’a des politiques qui semblent s'apparenter à une approche sur base de «development aid blackmail» et des discours moralisateurs envers un pays africain pauvre et en développement fragile. Dans l'exercice, les déclarations de presse détaillées et les explications de la part de l’Éthiopie, y compris le gouvernement et le Premier Ministre réformiste Abiy Ahmed, sont régulièrement négligés ou mis en doute. En revanche, les déclarations et les messages internationaux des défenseurs du TPLF, marqués par un degré élevé de manque de fiabilité, d'exagération et souvent dépourvus de contenu véridique, sont utilisés sans critique. Sur la base d'un certain nombre d'exemples révélateurs, cet article décrit le processus ci-dessus et analyse le discours atlantique émergent et certaines de ses erreurs et hypothèses erronées. Il plaide ainsi pour une approche plus équilibrée et critique du reportage incomplet et de la désinformation afin que les médias et la politique atlantique développent une politique plus responsable.

Religiously inspired violence is a global phenomenon and connects to transnational narratives, necessitating comparative analysis of socio-historical context and patterns of ideological mobilization. Northeast Africa hosts several radical-extremist and terrorist groups, mostly of Muslim persuasion, tuned in to these global narratives while connecting to local interests. Christian radicalism and violence also occur but are less ideologically consistent and less widespread. I examine key aspects of the current role and ideological self-positioning of Islamist radicalism in state contexts, comparing Somalia, affected by Islamist violence since the late 1990s, and Ethiopia, where Islam's mobilization followed a different path and where the state so far contained politicization and open radicalism of Muslim groups. A brief contrastive case from Nigeria is also provided. It is observed that Islam, while of course not ‘equaling’ violence, easily provides a militant political theology, frequently instrumentalized in conflicts and situations of (perceived) grievance, and via mimetic rivalry then becomes radically ideological. Securitized response patterns of state authorities toward militancy play a role in furthering violent radicalization. I follow a sociological-anthropological approach but also refer to key aspects of national-legal frameworks regarding state and religion, next to societal and political bases of Muslim militant mobilization for collective aims and self-presentation.

‘Good governance’ has been defined as a necessary condition for (economic) ‘growth’ and ‘development’ not only in in developing world but also in the wealthier, developed nations. This paper seeks to sociologically explore the ‘articulation’ of the ideology of good governance of the post-1991 Ethiopian federal state with versions of legitimate authority, just rule, accountability, economic fairness, etc. with reference to some local ethnic societies in Southern Ethiopia. Similarities and differences will be discussed so as to show that the concept of ‘good governance’ is multi-dimensional and ambivalent, evoking local notions (and expectations) of a just order and the rule of fairness among citizens as well. In the context of Ethiopia, its constant reiteration as a policy aim may thus also have contributed to citizens’ renewed claim-making as well as their rediscovering their own (cultural) notions of just governance.

In this paper I discuss food, cultural identity and development among the agropastoral Suri people of Southwest Ethiopia. Their food system is discussed in its actual form and in its process of change, accelerated since a decade or so. The theoretical concern of this paper is with issues of identity formation and continuity through the materiality of food and food systems, in the context of varying assumptions underlying discourses of development. The Suri people remain at the margins of the modernizing Ethiopian state and experienced a decline in food security, health and wealth in the last decade, coinciding with growing inter-group tension and new state developmental plans which devalue the agro-pastoral mode of life. State support or investment is in massive sugar and other mono-crop plantations and in enterprises by foreigners and private capitalists, not matched by parallel investment in local economies of agro-pastoralism and crop cultivation. Some of the effects on the production system, diet and ‘food sovereignty’ of the Suri are described so as to highlight the challenges they face, including growing internal differentiation, pressure on modifying their food system and the increasing sale and use of alcoholic drinks. Observing the, often ambivalent, changes in the Suri food pattern and food consumption shows the challenges they face in (re)defining group identity, responding to internal tensions and to state-capitalist modernizing schemes that impact their way of life.

State mega-infrastructure projects in developing countries evoke challenges to citizenship and reconstruct the imagery of statecraft. The Ethiopian government's construction of a large dam in the Omo River evoked contesting accounts of development and legitimate governance among a variety of actors. Debates between relevant actors centre on classic topoi of the 'development' discourse but present seemingly irreconcilable views. In the process, discourses of technocratic expertise claiming to evade 'politics' as well as culturally grounded socio-economic narratives are mobilised. They are juxtaposed here to develop an anthropological interpretation of the discursive positions, connecting the analysis to a consideration of precarious citizenship and coercive state consolidation in Ethiopia. © 2012 European Association of Social Anthropologists.

This work is another instalment of a scholarly bibliography in the social sciences and history of Ethiopia and Eritrea, produced at the African Studies Centre (University of Leiden). It is the fifth and last publication by the author on this subject, and is only published as an E-book (The other volumes - of 1991, 1995, 2003 and 2010 – were first published in print form). The bibliography gives a representative choice of the most important and insightful scholarly contributions (and also some of the more ‘popular’ material written for wider audiences) of the past five years, which have seen a notable acceleration of work and many new insights into the dynamics of the North-East African region. While fairly complete on a number of themes, citing the most authoritative titles, the work is obviously not exhaustive in its coverage. It provides, nonetheless, an essential starting point for research work, reference and teaching on the societies, culture and history of Northeast Africa.

This chapter revisits the issue of elections and democracy in Africa, a theme that emerged as dominant in scholarly discussions in African Studies in the 1990s. The trigger for featuring Ethiopia as a case study was the May 2010 parliamentary elections when the incumbent party, which had been in power since 1991, took 99.6% of all the seats. While the various Ethiopian elections will not be discussed in detail, the political culture or wider context in which they occur - and always produce the same overall result - will be highlighted to demonstrate the enduring mechanisms and problems of hegemonic rule and how difficult it is to create a democratic system that allows for changes in power (i.e. alternation). The relationship between one-party rule and economic development will also be discussed - the latter being a donor obsession that clouds the political agenda. The chapter closes with some reflections on the recurring donor-country dilemmas when it comes to dealing with electoral autocracies, such as Ethiopia.

This book brings together studies on the broad theme of elections and democratization in Africa since roughly 1989. It is based on a seminar held in The Netherlands in February 1997, and includes chapters on both electoral processes, especially the role of foreign observers therein, and the historical and sociocultural backgrounds or contexts of democratization, elections and political legitimacy. Part 1 deals with elections and election observation in Africa in general (contributions by O. van Cranenburgh, S. Ellis, I. van Kessel, B. de Gaay Fortman). Part 2 consists of country studies (M. Doornbos on Uganda, D. Foeken en T. Dietz on Kenya, J. Abbink on Ethiopia, R. van Dijk on Malawi, R. Buijtenhuijs on Chad, and M.-F. Lange on Mali). Part 3 includes a chapter that reflects the discussions held at the seminar between observers, academics and policymakers in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (W. van Binsbergen en J. Abbink); a review of Dutch policies on election observation in Africa during the period 1992-1997 (O. van Cranenburgh); and a discussion of the 1997 general elections in Kenya, where a new approach of election observation was introduced (M. Rutten)

This essay discusses the continued importance that religion holds in African life, not only in terms of numbers of believers, but also regarding the varieties of religious experience and its links with politics and the "public sphere(s)". Coinciding with the wave of democratization and economic liberalization efforts since about 1990, a notable growth of the public presence of religion and its political referents in Africa has been witnessed; alongside "development", religion will remain a hot issue in the future political trajectory of the continent. Its renewed presence in public spheres has also led to new understandings of what religion means and how it figures into both "world-making" and identity politics. This will prolong the challenges associated with the role and status of religion in the "secular state model" found in most African countries. Can these states, while "besieged" by believers, maintain neutrality among diverse worldviews, and if so, how? The paper discusses these issues in a general manner with reference to African examples, some taken from fieldwork by the author, and makes a philosophical argument for the development of a new kind of "secular state" that can respect the religious commitments of African populations.

Somalië zit nog steeds in de frontlijn van 'jihadisme', politieke instabiliteit en humanitaire crisis. In het proces naar politieke stabilisering is Al-Shabaab een enorme stoorzender. Deze beweging, eind 2005 ontstaan, heeft een overwegend criminele agenda, 'gelegitimeerd' door de Islam. Militaire maatregelen om de excessen van Al Shabaab te elimineren zijn een noodzakelijke maar niet voldoende voorwaarde om politieke, economische en educatieve oplossingen voor de Somalische crisis te ontwikkelen.

Between 1904 and 1908 imperial Germany pursued an active policy of genocide in German South West Africa, present-day Namibia. This chapter analyses the manner in which, during the course of the twentieth century, numerous people in varying contexts have sought to use the genocide perpetrated upon the Herero to further their own ends. It charts the manner in which a historical event has come to be deployed for varying and, at times, contradictory interests by German social democrats and English imperialists through to anti-Apartheid activists and postcolonial tribalists. It has been used to strengthen arguments that range from colonial policies through to claims that call for ethnic autonomy and compensation. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract]

A rising against French colonial rule in central Madagascar (1895-1898) appeared in the 1970s as a good example of resistance to colonialism, sparked by France's occupation of Madagascar. Like many similar episodes in other parts of Africa, it was a history that appeared, in the light of later African nationalist movements, to be a precursor to the more sophisticated anticolonial movements that eventually led to independence, in Madagascar and elsewhere. In the light of the later history of nationalism, however, it is instructive to revisit the rising of the 'menalamba' (red shawls) in Madagascar and to reconsider the episode. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract]