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Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result. NBER Working Paper No. 16140
- Source :
-
National Bureau of Economic Research . 2010. - Publication Year :
- 2010
-
Abstract
- This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms--Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment--are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.
Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- ERIC
- Journal :
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publication Type :
- Report
- Accession number :
- ED510625
- Document Type :
- Reports - Evaluative