SAFE: A General Secure and Fair Auction Framework for Wireless Markets with Privacy Preservation

With the prosperity of wireless and mobile communications, the allocation of wireless resources, e.g., spectrum channels, femtocell access permissions, and resource blocks of D2D connections, has become a matter of great concern, which leads to the emergence and popularity of electronic auction. However, the lack of privacy protection and fairness guarantee in the existing market has posed great obstacles to user participation in electronic auctions. Without privacy protection, users will be worried about the unauthorized exposure of their commercial secrets, which may hurt their payoffs in the long run. Without fairness guarantee, selfish/malicious users may prematurely abort the auction to avoid unsatisfactory payment, thus causing loss to honest users and wasting system resources. Furthermore, the lack of fairness guarantee will incur an exchange dilemma, where mutually distrusting parties may refuse to initiate the goods/money exchange, hindering the market-clearing of auctions. Although extensive efforts have been made to develop privacy-preserving auction mechanisms for wireless markets, the fairness issue, to the best of our knowledge, has never been taken into account in the context of auctions. Moreover, a truly practical framework that can be applied to most mainstream auction formats is also missing in the literature. In this paper, we present the first general framework, named SAFE, for representative auctions in (but not limited to) wireless markets. SAFE achieves a wide range of security goals with much higher efficiency than existing solutions. Furthermore, SAFE ensures auction fairness in a trust-free manner by developing a full set of carefully-designed modular protocols that can be easily adapted to any auction format. We implement the SAFE framework over a simulated Ethereum network. Extensive experimental results confirm that SAFE can indeed achieve high economic efficiency in terms of social welfare and participation satisfaction at very low com