Epistemic Conservatism: Evaluation and Defence

We have many beliefs, yet we cannot immediately show sufficient supporting evidence for many of them, nor are we able to point to reliable sources from which many of our beliefs originate. Take for example beliefs such as that I am awake, that I like coffee, or that studying philosophy is not forbidden by law. Nonetheless, we hold on to such beliefs and we do not seem to be unreasonable for doing so. Epistemic conservatism can explain why this is so. This principle says that if a person, S, in fact believes a proposition, P, then S is epistemically justified in holding on to the belief that P unless there is something that defeats this justification. Although there a number of arguments in favour of conservatism –such as that it is cognitive efficient and explains our intuitions about lost evidence and memory beliefs, many philosophers think epistemic conservatism is implausible. Among them are Richard Foley, Hamid Vahid, David Christensen, Richard Feldman, and Matthew Frise. In this dissertation I have evaluated their objections against epistemic conservatism, subsequently formulating the following eight criteria for a plausible version thereof: Criterion 1: avoiding infinite regression A plausible principle of justification does not require a person S to believe an infinite number of propositions in order for a belief that P to be justified for S. Criterion 2: avoiding circularity A plausible principle of justification avoids circularity, such that the belief that P is not justified by a chain of reasons that is grounded in the belief that P itself. Criterion 3: avoiding arbitrariness A plausible principle of justification is able to explain the difference between a justified and an unjustified belief. Criterion 4: avoiding the fallacy ad ignorantiam A plausible principle of justification avoids arbitrariness as a consequence of the fallacy ad ignorantiam. This means that the principle explains the difference between passing judgment and suspending judgment. Crite