'Åtgärder som befrämja rikets försvar och överensstämma med flaggans värdighet' : En undersökning av Sveriges marinstrategi våren 1941

Denna uppsats undersöker Sveriges marinstrategi i händelse av krig med Tyskland respektive Sovjeteunionen våren 1941 utifrån Chefen för Marinens instruktioner för krigsfall I respektive II.
This paper explores Swedish naval strategy during the Second World War (1939-1945), an area that has not seen significant research. This paper focuses on how Swedish maritime forces were to be used in case of war with Germany (War Plan I; Krigsfall I), and with the Soviet Union (War plan II; Krigsfall II). This paper focuses on Swedish planning during the spring of 1941. The period after the fall of France (June 1940) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was a period where both Germany and the Soviet Union possessed what could be described as strategic freedom of action. This means large parts of their armed forces could have been used for operations against Sweden. The basis for each potential conflict was different: Germany occupied Norway and Denmark and could launch a ground invasion of Sweden directly; meanwhile Sweden and the Soviet Union were still separated by Finland and the Baltic Sea. Maritime forces would therefore play very different roles in the two War Plans. No official plans in case of war with the western Allies existed at the time, and hence this has not been explored here. The conclusion of this paper is that Swedish naval strategy at the time was somewhat offensive and focused on gaining sea control, at least in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothnia, to maintain freedom of action to be able to conduct troop movements along the Swedish coast, to the island of Gotland, and to Finland.