Rekonstrukcija jednog spora: delezova kritika kantove upotrebe zajedničkog čula

Jedan od glavnih Delezovih prigovora Kantu jeste da ovaj nije uspeo transcendentalno polje da oslobodi elemenata empirije, odnosno sensus communisa. Ovaj tekst nastoji da pokaže zbog čega je i na kojim mestima Kantu bilo potrebno da u pomoć prizove sensus communis – naročito u trećoj svojoj Kritici – te zbog čega Delez sensus communis vidi kao skriveni temelj Kantove konstrukcije. Upravo zbog uvođenja sensus communis u argumentaciju Kant, prema Delezu, ne uspeva u istorijskom zadatku filozofije: da započne filozofiju bez pretpostavki, te ostaje zatočenikom dogmatske slike mišljenja koja počiva na prirodnosti mišljenja, dobroj volji za mišljenjem i neupitnoj želji za istinom.
One of the major Deleuze’s objections directed to Kant states that Kant has not managed to free the transcendental field from empirical elements i.e., from sensus communis. In this study we show why Kant needed the help of sensus communis, and in what places he did that use that help (especially in his Third Critique), and also why Deleuze sees sensus communis as a hidden foundation of Kantian philosophy. Deleuze is convinced that the introduction of sensus communis is the very reason why Kant is not able to offer the solution to the task that history has given to philosophy: Kant does not enter philosophy free of presuppositions and he remains shackled to a dogmatic notion according to which thought hinges on naturalness, good will and unquestionable striving towards truth.