DIPLOMACY ON TRIAL: JUSTICE, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE PURSUIT OF PROSECUTION AGAINST LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIALS

Since the inception of the U.S. War on Drugs in the 1970s, the United States has faced the challenge of balancing the interests of justice and diplomacy when dealing with Latin American government officials corrupted by the illicit drug trade. This thesis identifies, categorizes, and assesses examples of U.S. responses to this challenge into a range of options that the United States can take to pursue prosecution against wanted Latin American officials. These options, which range from the least forceful option of foreign prosecution to the most forceful option of using military intervention, each contain different tradeoffs between the reward of prosecuting a high-level actor and the risk of damaging bilateral cooperation. This thesis finds that the United States commonly conducts and should continue to conduct “arrests of opportunity,” which refers to when U.S. law enforcement officials arrest wanted Latin American officials after they enter a U.S. jurisdiction, because it balances legal pragmatism with respecting foreign sovereignty. Additionally, the United States also has an option to “turn a blind eye,” or take no prosecutorial option at all, but this option is a decision best made behind closed doors with serious consideration given to potential political consequences.