PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHENTICATION OF 5G DEVICES IN MOTION USING PLANAR REFLECTORS

Network authentication between users is commonly performed through the process of exchanging cryptographic keys. However, this security practice could leave users vulnerable if an eavesdropper managed to ascertain these private keys and the manner that they are exchanged. As a result, alternative security methods can add new factors to uniquely authenticate trusted users and improve network security. Through signal multipath, previous research analyzed the time delay measurement between a channel tap’s indirect path from a physical reflector and that same channel tap’s direct, line-of-sight path to uniquely establish a stationary user’s identity to their physical position. Because these channel taps are dependent on the location of network users, an eavesdropper faces a difficult challenge to precisely imitate the same tap delay to gain unauthorized access. This thesis explores how tap delay measurements incrementally change as an authenticated user moves within a space. Through statistical analysis, our research aims to determine an acceptable tap delay interval that network users can use to track and maintain authentication for various speeds through a coverage area.