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SELFISHMIGRATE: A Scalable Algorithm for Non-clairvoyantly Scheduling Heterogeneous Processors

Authors :
Im, Sungjin
Kulkarni, Janardhan
Munagala, Kamesh
Pruhs, Kirk
Im, Sungjin
Kulkarni, Janardhan
Munagala, Kamesh
Pruhs, Kirk
Publication Year :
2014

Abstract

We consider the classical problem of minimizing the total weighted flow-time for unrelated machines in the online \emph{non-clairvoyant} setting. In this problem, a set of jobs $J$ arrive over time to be scheduled on a set of $M$ machines. Each job $j$ has processing length $p_j$, weight $w_j$, and is processed at a rate of $\ell_{ij}$ when scheduled on machine $i$. The online scheduler knows the values of $w_j$ and $\ell_{ij}$ upon arrival of the job, but is not aware of the quantity $p_j$. We present the {\em first} online algorithm that is {\em scalable} ($(1+\eps)$-speed $O(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2})$-competitive for any constant $\eps > 0$) for the total weighted flow-time objective. No non-trivial results were known for this setting, except for the most basic case of identical machines. Our result resolves a major open problem in online scheduling theory. Moreover, we also show that no job needs more than a logarithmic number of migrations. We further extend our result and give a scalable algorithm for the objective of minimizing total weighted flow-time plus energy cost for the case of unrelated machines and obtain a scalable algorithm. The key algorithmic idea is to let jobs migrate selfishly until they converge to an equilibrium. Towards this end, we define a game where each job's utility which is closely tied to the instantaneous increase in the objective the job is responsible for, and each machine declares a policy that assigns priorities to jobs based on when they migrate to it, and the execution speeds. This has a spirit similar to coordination mechanisms that attempt to achieve near optimum welfare in the presence of selfish agents (jobs). To the best our knowledge, this is the first work that demonstrates the usefulness of ideas from coordination mechanisms and Nash equilibria for designing and analyzing online algorithms.

Details

Database :
OAIster
Publication Type :
Electronic Resource
Accession number :
edsoai.on1106199397
Document Type :
Electronic Resource