Employment of Natives in Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines.

This study investigates the use of native forces in counterinsurgency (CI) operations in order to determine effective and ineffective employment roles. This study reviews the effective employment and the effective use of native forces in CI operations in Malaya during the period 1948-1961, and the ineffective use of native forces in Laos during the period 1954-1971. The study describes experiences of the Philippine Army using native forces in CI operations during the period 1946-1981. The author was a participant observer for many of these events. The study finds: 1) that the Philippine Army effectively employed native forces in such roles as guides and scouts, porters, informants, security forces, and as members of regular combat units; 2) that the Philippine Army effectively used lessons learned from the British experience in Malaya and avoided ineffective roles for native forces from lessons learned from the French and American experiences in Laos; 3) that careful supervision, avoiding personal conflicts of interests, and integration of effective programs of psychological operations and civic action are essential to effective use of natives in CI operations. The study concludes that the experiences of the Philippine Army in the use of native forces for CI operations have general application to future CI operations in situations with similar cultural and political environments. The study recommends the testing of concepts, development of doctrine for use of native forces in CI operations, and inclusion in appropriate contingency plans and training.