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President Nixon's Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program

Authors :
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Tucker, Jonathan B.
Mahan, Erin R.
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Tucker, Jonathan B.
Mahan, Erin R.
Source :
DTIC
Publication Year :
2009

Abstract

A lesser known but equally dangerous element of the superpower competition involved biological weapons (BW). By the late 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union had both acquired advanced BW capabilities. The U.S. BW arsenal comprised two types of lethal antipersonnel agents; three types of incapacitating agents; and two types of anticrop weapons. The Army also developed two toxins, highly poisonous chemicals produced by bacteria and other living organisms. According to U.S. military doctrine at the time, the stockpile of lethal biological weapons served as an in-kind deterrent against enemy biological attack and, if deterrence were to fail, provided a retaliatory capability when authorized by the President. Soon after President Richard M. Nixon took office in January 1969, Members of Congress pressured the administration to clarify U.S. policies on the use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), as there had been no comprehensive review of this issue area in more than 15 years. Nixon announced his new policy on biological warfare at a press conference an the White House on November 25, 1969. "Biological weapons have massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences," he declared. "They may produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations." In recognition of these dangers, he continued, the United States had decided to destroy its entire stockpile of biological agents and confine its future biological research program to defensive measures, such as vaccines and field detectors. The monograph is divided into the following segments: The Decision to Launch a Policy Review; The National Security Study Memorandum Process, including Divergent Agency Positions, The Pentagon Divided, External Political Pressures, and The NSC Principals Meeting; The President's Decision; Toxins -- A Major Loose End, including Policy Review on Toxins and The President Decides; and Consequences and Legacy.<br />Case Study Series. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Case Study 1.

Details

Database :
OAIster
Journal :
DTIC
Notes :
text/html, English
Publication Type :
Electronic Resource
Accession number :
edsoai.ocn832076177
Document Type :
Electronic Resource