On a stakeholder model of corporate governance

Rationales for a stakeholder model of corporate governance are based on enlightened self-interest, moral imperative, and/or externalities. Of these, the externalities rationale holds the most promise to justify a stakeholder focus. Recent evidence, however, indicates that the benefits of a stakeholder focus are limited because the social costs of many corporate activities already are internalized. Potential benefits also must be weighed against the costs, which include increased potential for conflict, waste, and managerial self-dealing. I conclude by advocating for the traditional governance model based on shareholder interests, with allowance for managers to deviate from this model in limited circumstances when the external impacts on other stakeholders are large. To constrain managerial opportunism, such deviations should be defended with a new type of double bottom line reporting, which augments traditional financial reporting with a statement of the social benefits of any deviations from shareholder value maximization. KEYWORDS corporate governance, CSR, ESG, externalities, shareholders, stakeholders JEL CLASSIFICATION D23,G30,K42,M14,P12
1 | INTRODUCTION A stakeholder model of corporate governance promises to solve many corporate and societal problems. Firms that focus on stakeholder needs instead of only shareholder interests will engage [...]