Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x Byline: Adib Bagh (1), Alejandro Jofre (2) Keywords: Better reply secure; discontinuous games; Nash equilibrium; payoff secure; reciprocal upper semicontinuity; weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity Abstract: A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games. Author Affiliation: (1)Dept. of Economics, University of California-Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, U.S.A. (2)Dept. of Mathematical Engineering, Universidad de Chile, Blanco Encalada 2120, Santiago, Chile Article History: Manuscript received July, 2005; final revision received June, 2006.