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Optimal unemployment insurance in a matching equilibrium
Optimal unemployment insurance in a matching equilibrium
- Source :
- Journal of Labor Economics. Jan, 2006, Vol. 24 Issue 1, p109, 30 p.
- Publication Year :
- 2006
-
Abstract
- This article considers optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium matching framework where wages are determined by strategic bargaining. It compares the outcome with the standard Nash bargaining approach, which can be interpreted as union wage bargaining with an insider/outsider distortion. It also shows that a coordinated policy approach, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, generates a much greater welfare gain than a policy that simply varies UI payments by duration.
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 0734306X
- Volume :
- 24
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Gale General OneFile
- Journal :
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- edsgcl.141494731