Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard

MLA

Corbett, Charles J., et al. “Optimal Shared-Savings Contracts in Supply Chains: Linear Contracts and Double Moral Hazard.” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 163, no. 3, June 2005, p. 653. EBSCOhost, widgets.ebscohost.com/prod/customlink/proxify/proxify.php?count=1&encode=0&proxy=&find_1=&replace_1=&target=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&scope=site&db=edsggo&AN=edsgcl.128038475&authtype=sso&custid=ns315887.

APA

Corbett, C. J., DeCroix, G. A., & Ha, A. Y. (2005). Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard. European Journal of Operational Research, 163(3), 653.

Chicago

Corbett, Charles J., Gregory A. DeCroix, and Albert Y. Ha. 2005. “Optimal Shared-Savings Contracts in Supply Chains: Linear Contracts and Double Moral Hazard.” European Journal of Operational Research 163 (3): 653. http://widgets.ebscohost.com/prod/customlink/proxify/proxify.php?count=1&encode=0&proxy=&find_1=&replace_1=&target=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&scope=site&db=edsggo&AN=edsgcl.128038475&authtype=sso&custid=ns315887.