The Evolutionary Game Study on Emission Reduction Strategies of Non-compliant Port and Shipping Enterprises under Media Participation and Government Supervision

With the development of science, technology, and the economy, China has become the world's largest emitter of carbon emissions. To achieve sustainable development in both the economy and the environment, promoting a low-carbon economy and implementing energy conservation and emission reduction measures are crucial. This study incorporates media participation as an effective source of government supervision into an evolutionary game model that addresses the choices of environmental regulations and emission reduction strategies for non-compliant port and shipping enterprises. Through the derivation and analysis of replicator dynamics equations and evolutionary stability, four different scenarios are identified, representing the strategic choices of government environmental regulations and non-compliant enterprise behaviors. Numerical simulations are used to demonstrate the evolutionary outcomes and pathways under different initial values and conditions. Additionally, the impact of media exposure probability on the strategic choices of the government and non-compliant enterprises is analyzed. The results indicate that a higher media exposure probability can promote non-compliant enterprises to opt for self-disclosure while reducing government regulatory costs. The government can enhance the positive involvement of the media to lower the regulatory costs imposed on non-compliant port and shipping enterprises, thereby improving the design of environmental regulations and achieving a win-win situation for economic and environmental performance.