Economic stability analysis of blue carbon cooperation in the South China sea region using evolutionary game model with Weber's law

The political environment of the South China Sea Region (SCSR) has gradually stabilized, such that regional cooperation in the preservation of marine resources seems realistic. Blue carbon international cooperation is an important solution to the problem of global warming, which has a large number of economic and political attributes. As a region that has incredibly abundant blue carbon resources, further cooperation among SCSR governments would present the opportunity to establish meaningful economic and environmental protections that would promote peaceful blue carbon development of this region. To examine the feasibility of such an undertaking, we leverage the imitator's dynamic game as a research method and introduce Weber's law to examine the subjective psychological factors (i.e., biases) of participants in qualifying the economic stability of blue carbon cooperation in the SCSR. The results suggest that the economic stability of blue carbon cooperation correlates to Weber's coefficient and the income produced by the different strategies. Based on these findings, we discussed policy recommendations to promote the sustainable economic development of SCSR.