Synergistic Effects of Deterrence by Denial and Safeguards in the Biological Weapons Convention: Building on the History of International Nuclear Safeguards

The notion of deterrence by denial has been introduced in relation to biosecurity. The goal of deterrence by denial in biosecurity extends beyond dissuading attacks. It also encompasses the protection of citizens in the event of an attack. In this vein, it may be considered as including the elements of deterrence and safeguards in terms of the protection of complying states from the hazards of violations and evasions. In presenting a historical overview of nuclear safeguards and shedding light on the limitations of the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, this paper delineates the distinction between safeguards and verification for deterrence. Subsequently, it examines the case of the Biological Weapons Convention in which verification is considered a crucial factor for deterrence and investigates the potential for deterrence by denial to serve as an alternative to verification in effective safeguards. It argues that the adoption of deterrence by denial in biosecurity could exert synergistic effects by rectifying the shortcomings of the verification system within the Biological Weapons Convention and providing effective safeguards without the need for coercive measures.