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Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs

Authors :
Chunsheng Cui
Zhongwei Feng
Chunqiao Tan
Source :
Complexity, Vol 2018 (2018)
Publication Year :
2018
Publisher :
Hindawi-Wiley, 2018.

Abstract

Inspired by Shalev’s model of loss aversion, we investigate the effect of loss aversion on a bimatrix game where the payoffs in the bimatrix game are characterized by triangular fuzzy variables. First, we define three solution concepts of credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria, and their existence theorems are presented. Then, three sufficient and necessary conditions are given to find the credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria. Moreover, the relationship among the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria is discussed in detail. Finally, for 2×2 bimatix game with triangular fuzzy payoffs, we investigate the effect of loss aversion coefficients and confidence levels on the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria. It is found that an increase of loss aversion levels of a player leads to a decrease of his/her own payoff. We also find that the equilibrium utilities of players are decreasing (increasing) as their own confidence levels when players employ the optimistic (pessimistic) value criterion.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
10762787 and 10990526
Volume :
2018
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
Complexity
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.91f47e0596844018be56c68a2356ba7a
Document Type :
article
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/7143586