Optimization Operation of the Park-Level Integrated Energy System Based on the Improved Coyote Optimization Algorithm

Conventional optimization methods cannot fully satisfy the interests of multiparticipants and protect the privacy of participants in the integrated energy system that observe changes in the energy market structure. To allocate the benefits among the stakeholders in the integrated energy system and improve renewable energy accommodation, the manuscript proposes an optimal dispatching strategy for a park-level integrated energy system employing the Stackelberg game. Firstly, the benefits and cost models of each stakeholder of the integrated energy system are constructed by considering the integrated demand response and the uncertainty of renewable energy output. A master-slave game model that contains the energy system operator, energy producer, and energy users is then established, and the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium is demonstrated. Furthermore, a distributed algorithm is proposed to resolve the game model by combining an improved coyote optimization algorithm with quadratic programming. Due to the shortcomings of the conventional coyote optimization algorithm, such as slow convergence rate and quickly falling into local optimum, a beetle antennae search is utilized to strengthen the optimal and the worst coyotes and to improve the convergence speed, global search ability, and optimization accuracy of the standard coyote algorithm. Finally, an industrial park in Northern China is adopted as an illustration to evaluate the effectiveness of the model and the improved algorithm.